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The world is confronted with multiple issues of security challenges, and 
how we understand these challenges is often based on parochial prisms 
that serve our own political, ideological and economic interests. This self-
centric framing of security is part of the challenge that we must confront. 
This book is an attempt to address some of these challenges by exploring 
how the use of multiple lenses could help enrich our understanding of 
the interconnected layers of security thinking and practices. Although the 
case studies used are from the Pacific, the broader conceptual narratives 
have universal resonance. In a world where security issues are linked to 
socioeconomic, political, ethnic, ideological and environmental issues, 
unpacking these connections in a way that makes analytical and policy 
sense is imperative.
The book is a result of data accumulated over three years of research 
(both field and archival), conferences, workshops and seminars. It is one 
of four books I have written that were funded by a New Zealand Marsden 
Fund research grant. Like any other book in social science, it is a kind of 
‘work in progress’, in the sense that, by the time the book is published, it 
will already be overtaken by continuously unfolding security issues. Hence 
there is a temptation to update either by producing another edition or 
even a separate follow-up volume. But this is not the intention, at least 
for the time being.
Security by its very nature is contested, and the debate about regional 
security in the Pacific is multidimensional and reflects the transforming 
and precarious nature of global security. What constitutes security is 
subject to multiple discourses, and to privilege one set of security variables 
over another, as is often done by researchers and policy-makers, can be 
unwise given the multifarious factors that shape our security environment. 
The book attempts to weave together both conceptual analysis and applied 
narratives in a symbiotic way, where one informs and shapes the other. 
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It has an interdisciplinary approach and is meant to be used by academics, 
researchers, policy-makers, security experts, regional and international 
agencies, civil society organisations and the public at large.
Ultimately, it is hoped that the book will contribute to understanding 
some of the deeper issues of conflict that continue to fracture communities 
with the hope of finding lasting solutions for a peaceful Pacific and 
a peaceful humanity.
The book is a result of invaluable contribution by a number of people and 
institutions. The funding for this research was generously provided by 
the Marsden Fund of the Royal Society of New Zealand. This is one of the 
four books that benefited from the Marsden funding. I also acknowledge 
the support of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Canterbury and 
other project collaborators on Pacific regional security, including the 
United Nations Development Program and United Nations regional 
office in Fiji, Department of Pacific Affairs (The Australian National 
University) and other individuals and organisations who were represented 
in a series of conferences and seminars that were part of the Marsden 
project on regional security. I also acknowledge the proficient role of the 
anonymous reviewers and Fulbright New Zealand for providing me the 
opportunity in 2018 to complete parts of the manuscript while based at 
UCLA, Duke University and Georgetown University as a Fulbright senior 
fellow. My special thanks to the numerous groups and individuals around 
the Pacific, especially Fiji, Tonga and Solomon Islands, who participated 
in various direct or indirect ways in the project.
A number of individuals need special mention. My sincere thanks 
to Professor Stewart Firth of The Australian National University for 
his professional advice and contribution to editing and arranging the 
publication logistics. I also extend my hearty thanks to John Moriarty, 
who worked hard on editing the first draft, and Cathryn Game for her 
meticulous work on copy-editing the manuscript. Last but not least, 





We must concentrate not merely on the negative expulsion of war, but 
on the positive affirmation of peace.
Martin Luther King
The few months I spent in the United States in 2018 as a senior 
Fulbright scholar at University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), 
Duke and Georgetown reinforced in my mind some of the contradictory 
manifestations of security in our contemporary era. Here was a country 
so militarily, politically and economically powerful, yet so insecure and 
paranoid about its own sense of identity, being and security. Here was 
a country that prided itself in being a hub of multiculturalism, yet there 
was so much division, tension and anxiety. Here was a country that 
marketed itself as the richest in the world, where the ‘American dream’ 
was a divine destiny, yet I witnessed so much poverty, homelessness and 
economic insecurity as I wandered the streets of Los Angeles and other 
major US cities.
This situation of contested narratives of security reflects the philosophical 
backdrop to this book. An experience of ‘security’ in one context may 
be the basis for ‘insecurity’ in another. Contending notions of security 
define the shifting prisms through which we socially construct our lived 
experiences and the dramatically changing world around us.
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The concept of security is often contested, given the different normative 
and empirical approaches as well as the different conceptual emphasis used 
by scholars (Baldwin, 1997). The normative differences can be a result of 
varying methodologies used and competing political, gender and cultural 
assumptions as well as different ideological outlooks, which may colour 
how security is conceptualised in everyday life or operationalised in 
policies (McLeod, 2015). The same can be said of Pacific security, where 
discussions have been wide-ranging with different authors emphasising 
different discourses and priority areas. One of the latest Pacific regional 
security agreements, the Boe Declaration on regional security endorsed by 
the Pacific leaders in September 2018, emphasised the primacy of climate 
change as ‘the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and well-
being of the peoples of the Pacific’ (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 
2018: 10). Others see political security and conflict as central issues 
that need greater focus, given some cases of instability in some Pacific 
countries in the past (for instance, see Henderson & Watson, 2005). The 
point is that while the selective emphasis may appear to help desegregate 
and simplify issues, it tends to prioritise and privilege some approaches 
while undermining the significance of some. At the same time, it has 
the potential to conceal the social synergies and historical connections 
between issues.
This book attempts to contribute to discussions on Pacific security using 
the analytical eclecticism approach, which selectively recombines different 
strands of discourses and focuses on connecting abstract theorisation 
with applied analysis and policies (Sils & Katzenstein, 2010). Within 
this broad parameter, the book weaves together different discourses in an 
interdisciplinary way to examine various dimensions of security and their 
connecting synergies, including their policy implications. The  use 
of multiple prisms could help in enriching our understanding of the 
complex interconnections between the different aspects of Pacific security, 
some of which are more visible and some of which are more subtle. 
Each aspect, whether, political, economic, sociocultural, environmental 
or psychological, is interconnected in both manifest and latent ways. 
In doing so, the book attempts to provide a critique of some paradigms 
often used in analysis of Pacific security and raises questions about their 
reliability in the context of a fast-changing and complex region. In this 
regard, the book deliberately sets out to combine both theoretical 
discourse and empirical analysis of case studies. The first three chapters 
are heavily conceptual and attempt to unpack some of the philosophical 
assumptions and sociological debates about the nature of security at the 
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global and regional spheres, which are often overlooked, and these are 
followed by three empirical chapters that draw their conceptual narratives 
from the theoretical discussions.
The book does not in any way claim to provide definitive answers to 
the myriad of security questions in the Pacific but rather to raise some 
critical questions about some of the existing security assumptions and 
discourses and how they are articulated and operationalised in the context 
of competing paradigms and contested methodologies. While the use of 
multiple conceptual prisms provides us with a broader picture of unfolding 
realities, the use of comparative case studies (Fiji, Tonga and Solomon 
Islands) is equally important to enable us to understand the unique 
historical experiences of Pacific Island Countries (PICs). The Pacific 
is not a homogeneous and generic entity, which is easily generalisable, 
but consists of diverse countries and communities that have undergone 
different forms of security experiences that have influenced their political, 
social and economic developments.
Context and approach
The notion of security is multifaceted and is constructed differently in 
varying contexts, depending on the theoretical, ideological, cultural 
and political prisms deployed to make sense of particular circumstances 
(Brooks, 2010). The questions of what constitutes a security problem, 
what is a risky situation, what and who poses threat to our lives, have 
been part of humanity’s self-exploratory journey since time immemorial 
as we construct and adapt our identities and define our social boundaries. 
As  globalisation incorporates disparate societies into a collective 
hegemonic embrace, security becomes fundamentally ethical in nature 
as we attempt to make sense of the diverse manifestations of threat at 
different levels—global, regional, national and local (Burke, Lee-Koo 
& McDonald,  2016). Many of these security issues will continue to 
haunt humanity in the future as long as the basic causes are insufficiently 
addressed or even ignored.
Threats posed by terrorism, climate change, socioeconomic inequality, 
political marginalisation, hunger, racism, environmental degradation, 
war, crime, violence, poverty and gender discrimination are not isolated 
phenomena with distant roots but are bred by the very conditions of 
which we are an integral part. Furthermore, they are manifestly or latently 
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interconnected in complex ways and manifest themselves in different 
degrees (Xuetong, 2009). They represent in multiple ways humanity’s 
social tendency to dominate, accumulate, appropriate and transform 
at the cost of others. Competition over resources, grabs for power 
and a desire for influence have left many threatened by powerlessness, 
marginalisation and oppression, in turn often creating a chain reaction of 
resistance and counter-resistance. Many security issues, such as poverty, 
terrorism and climate change, are ‘glocal’, meaning that they manifest 
themselves locally while having a global character and impact. This is 
indeed a challenge of significant proportions. How can these security 
issues be addressed simultaneously at the local and global levels to ensure 
a reasonable, sustainable and effective way of containing them without 
further contributing to their escalation? This book is a modest attempt 
to explore some of these issues. However, to avoid being swallowed up 
by the huge chorus of security narratives, the book focuses on selected 
security issues in the Pacific and how they articulate themselves uniquely 
in different island countries.
When American sociologist C. Wright Mills coined the term ‘sociological 
imagination’, he was referring to how humans, as agents of social 
consciousness and transformation, are able to expand their analytical 
faculty to connect and make sense of seemingly disparate issues, whether 
local or global, in a coherent and meaningful way (Mills, 1959). With 
this idea of interconnectedness and encompassment in mind, this book 
is an attempt to make sense of the complex relationships between various 
aspects of security at the global, regional and local levels, focusing on 
the PICs, in particular Fiji, Tonga and Solomon Islands, as case studies. 
In a broad way, the conceptual narrative used to capture this diversity 
is ‘analytical eclecticism’, which refers to consciously addressing and 
selectively recombining the theoretical and applied approaches of 
different theoretical schools to understand the multidimensional and 
complex issues related to security in different situations (Suh, Katzenstein 
& Carson, 2004). Due to the multifarious nature of security, the idea 
is to move away from the parochial obsession with deploying a single 
theoretical position to narrowly frame a multilayered and shifting 
phenomenon such as security to embracing a more multidimensional 
approach that allows for theoretical flexibility and adaptation. The singular 
approach tends to privilege particular ideological and analytical narratives 
over others and often leaves gaps in analysis. Different conceptual prisms 
such as the securitisation theory, postcolonial discourse, human security, 
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constructivism, realism and liberalism, to name some, have something 
to offer, although some more vigorously and inspiringly than others. 
Theories are not meant to impose a near-divine blueprint for constructing 
social reality, but rather they need to be treated as dispensable tools to help 
illuminate one’s path in the exploratory journey towards enhancement 
of knowledge. Thus the use of the analytical eclecticism approach in the 
book is really an acknowledgement of the multiple ways in which one can 
make critical discursive inroads into the issue of security without having 
to be limited by the confinements of singular theoretical dogma.
As a generic concept, security has universal relevance, but as a social 
construct it manifests itself differently when seen through different 
political, ideological or cultural lenses. We examine this in more detail in 
Chapter 2 when we analyse some of the contending discourses on security 
and their assumptions. There is a natural tendency to define security 
parochially in relation to threat to one’s immediate social environment 
and thereby ignore other levels of threat deemed remote and therefore 
irrelevant, such as the global aspects. This is understandable given the way 
security is intimately linked to people’s collective sentiments, identity as 
a group, shared notion of nationalism and sense of being and belonging. 
We can no longer ignore the fact that globalisation has connected the 
world in diverse ways; therefore societies that once saw themselves 
as ‘isolated’ are now drawn into the whirlpool of neoliberal values, 
overwhelmed by the hegemonic effects of Hollywood imagery, absorbed 
into unhealthy cravings for McDonalds and Coca Cola, or captured by the 
culturally transformative addiction of cyber-technology (Stiglitz, 2002). 
Pacific societies are no exceptions and, as part of these complex changes, 
their security challenges also go through a process of transformation and 
rearticulation (Lockwood, 2003).
Challenges in defining security
In everyday use, the term security seems to be quite straightforward and 
easily understood because it relates to people’s sense of safety and well-
being. However, it becomes more complex as we probe more deeply 
into the levels of epistemological genesis, ontological essence and social 
manifestations (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998). Different schools 
of thought define security not from the vantage point of a universalised 
principle but from specific ideological, political and cultural prisms. 
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This lack of consensus is not abnormal in academia and is often a result 
of competing narratives of history, geopolitics, human psychology and 
environment. For instance, as we shall see in Chapter 2, the securitisation 
theory, which emerged from the post–Cold War paradigm shift, moved the 
focus from the realist mainstream ‘hard’ security position towards a more 
constructivist prism, where conceptual constructions and words framed 
notions of security (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998). In contrast, the 
postcolonial theorists framed security in relation to power differentiation 
as responses to Western hegemony (Ayoob, 1995). Central to the 
postcolonial position were the notions of domination and subalternisation 
and the need to invert the hegemonic colonial perceptions using subaltern 
gazes (Green, 2011). Deconstructing and even decanting colonial 
hegemony and its security apparatus (institutional and ideological) is often 
a challenge because of the way in which it has been deeply intertwined 
with our contemporary lives (Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin, 2013). On the 
other hand, the human security project (with origins in the early 1990s), 
which saw security through multiple disciplinary lenses, was a response to 
the increasing diversity and interconnectedness of the world (Chandler, 
2012). In some ways, it muddied the water further with its boundless and 
nebulous representation of security by declaring almost every aspect of life 
as being security related. The feminist approach was closely linked to the 
postcolonial approach in terms of the centrality of power and inequality 
in the discourse, but goes further by critiquing the inherent masculine-
oriented framing of security. These differences in approach should not be 
seen as invalidating and neutralising the term ‘security’, but rather should 
alert us to the fact that it reflects the multidimensional, transformative 
and adaptive nature of the term, as we shall see in Chapter 2.
‘Security’ is no doubt one of the most high-profile issues in contemporary 
political, economic and social discourse, across nations and cultures, 
because of people’s obsession with self-preservation and perpetuity in 
the face of emerging threats and challenges to individuals, social groups, 
states, regions and the global community generally. Nevertheless, there 
is no consensus in terms of how it is experienced and perceived. Hence 
what may be experienced and perceived as a security ‘threat’ by one group 
may be different from the experience and perception of another. Different 
circumstances and conditions create different security situations, and 
people’s responses may also differ. Any attempt to frame a common 
conception is increasingly thwarted by the array of political, cultural, 
economic, psychological and social variables associated with security 
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in response to diverse issues such as war, poverty, human rights abuse, 
terrorism, genocide, internal conflicts, global geopolitical tension, global 
financial crisis and gender violence, just to name a few.
The horizontal and vertical configurations of security create an even more 
complex situation, especially when it comes to identifying and isolating 
individual security variables for study. Security can be assessed in relation 
to its ‘horizontal’ configuration (referring to the different types of security 
situation) as well as its ‘vertical’ configuration (referring to the different 
security contexts in a stratified way) at the levels of the individual, family, 
community, cultural group, nation, region and global community. It is 
very much a contextual construction as people frame their sense of fear, 
anxiety, safety and well-being individually or collectively in situations that 
they consider to be a ‘threat’. The source of a threat can be seen and felt 
directly or it can be ‘perceived’ (i.e. the source of fear may be imagined). 
Regardless of whether a threat is ‘real’, the psychological and social impact 
on an individual or group can be deep and long lasting. Identifying the 
sources of threat can be cumbersome and controversial because what 
might be a threat to an individual or a group might not be so to another. 
Threats, and responses to threats, can be constructed by some groups to 
suit their specific purpose at particular historical moments. For instance, 
stereotyping a group as a source of threat could be used as justification for 
the vilification or even annihilation of that target group, and this might 
serve the interest of some other groups. The opposing and incompatible 
construction of security images, paradoxically, can itself nurture security 
threats. For instance, competing groups casting each other as terrorists 
can escalate hatred and violence and entrench the spiral of violence.
The use of the term ‘security’ itself is often aligned to specific power 
interests. For instance, the term ‘national security’ has many faces, 
depending on the context and the underpinning political, ideological and 
cultural interest of those who define it. In the context of war between 
two countries, national interest is often defined in relation to protection 
and preservation of sovereign territory, people and state against foreign 
intrusion. However, this definition changes in times of internal strife, 
when national security could mean the safety of the citizens, and it could 
also strongly imply the protection of the elites in power. Often, as Pierre 
Bourdieu (1977) suggests, it is a means of mystification and legitimisation 
of the interests of powerful groups who falsely articulate it as universally 
representing the interest of the entire society.
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Because of the breadth and diversity of the subject, studies of security have 
largely been selective and based on specific research interests, political and 
social agenda, ideological orientation or policy demands. For instance, 
those studying global security may be interested in a range of issues such 
as big power rivalry, nuclear weaponry, terrorism, transnational crime or 
global peace; those studying national security may be interested in civil–
military relations, state repression, social control or social movements; 
while those studying human security may be interested in a whole bundle 
of issues revolving around people’s sense of well-being, ranging from 
poverty to environmental degradation.
Security as leverage: Justification and 
legitimisation
Because of its multiple levels of expression, meaning and appeal, the term 
‘security’ is readily deployed to frame foreign, economic, immigration, 
development, food and environmental policies and strategies. It is also 
used as a convenient justificatory device for xenophobia, genocide, 
ethnonationalism, anti-immigrant policies and religious intolerance. 
Ethnic, cultural and religious stereotypes are often constructed around 
security, especially in situations where cultural diversity intersects with 
other factors such as resource distribution and contestation over political 
power. This connection is made more explicit and sharper in times of 
crisis and, as the crisis deepens, this relationship becomes more intense 
and often assumes a cyclic and symbiotic pattern, where security becomes 
inseparable from everyday issues. It is common for certain actions, 
behaviour, ideas and groups to be cast as threatening to justify a response—
and often these responses provoke another cycle of insecurity.
The construction of ‘threat’ is a political act that enables a group or 
institution—whether state, religion, political organisation or ethnic 
community—to legitimise the exercise of moral or physical coercion on 
another group. In some cases, it can be a way of inducing and extracting 
political or economic advantage. For instance, the US military–industrial 
complex, which is critical for the US economy, needs the construction 
of a broad climate of regional or global threat, and even identification of 
specific threats, to sustain itself through arms sales. Subtler than this is 
how the military–industrial complex, under the guise of national security, 
engages in latent militarisation of society through Hollywood, cyber 
communication and other means (Turse, 2008).
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A direct consequence of threat identification is the creation of policies 
and practices aimed to contain a particular group. Trump’s attempt to 
create an immigration policy targeted at certain Muslim countries is 
linked to the broader climate of Islamophobia associated with the ‘war on 
terror’. Security is often inflamed through identification or construction 
of a threat or perceived threat, whether from within or outside a society. 
The  source of threat is usually constructed and defined using the 
prism and security variables selectively chosen by the ‘threatened’. The 
circumstances in which this threat takes place have a profound bearing 
on the intensity and urgency of the threat. How imminent the threat of 
war is, for instance, is dependent on the level of tension, the preparedness 
of the two sides and the existence of certain factors such as provocation, 
media intimidation and propaganda, which would heighten the possibility 
of a war. However, as in the Cuban crisis, when a full-blown military 
confrontation was thought to be imminent, interfering variables such as 
the decision of a Soviet submarine commander to disregard the order to 
fire, could quickly mitigate and even invalidate the threat. The collective 
sense of threat is a shared psychological state of anxiety, which can be 
readily provoked and heightened, and sometimes this can be quickly 
dispersed when favourable circumstances prevail.
Sometimes, identification and realisation of threat can be a long-term 
process, as in the case of climate change. The issue of climate change 
is socially and environmentally complex and involves a relatively long 
period. Climate change deniers, many of whom are supporters of the 
fossil fuel industry, use this long span of time to throw ambiguity and 
doubt into the scientific arguments on the global climate data and even 
reinterpret scientific evidence to support their arguments, against the 
opinion of the majority of scientists. The climate change debate shows 
that a diversity of factors, such as economics, ideology and political 
interests, have an influence on defining the nature of the threat. Debates 
on whether a phenomenon is a security threat may heighten or reduce the 
perceived threat level, depending on the persuasive discursive power of 
a particular position. Again, as in climate change, a generic threat may be 
directly or indirectly associated with other forms of threat. For instance, 
climate change is associated with displacement resulting from sea level 
rise and erosion and destruction of properties, plantations and livelihood 
by cyclones, floods and droughts. It is also associated with exacerbated 
poverty, child malnutrition, conflict over land and scarce resources as 
people migrate, and reinforcement of gender inequality as women tend 
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to be the ones more at risk than men, because of their culturally defined 
subordinate role in the domestic sphere looking after children and family 
subsistence.
In the same vein, responses to a perceived political threat have the potential 
to provoke more threatening situations, as we saw in the invasion of Iraq. 
Justified by the invented myth of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass 
destruction, that action led to a series of destructive events, including 
the sectarian civil war between Sunnis and Shiites that destabilised the 
country and created more threats than expected. The resulting chaos and 
destruction spawned the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS), whose expansionist 
intent spilled over into Syria, another country going through a civil war, 
thus plunging the already volatile region into an abyss of destruction and 
suffering, creating refugee problems and prolonged instability. The threat 
is further internationalised by the involvement of the United States and 
Russia, which have deeply embedded economic, political and strategic 
interests in the Middle East.
The Israeli/Palestinian conflict raises the important relationship between 
security and legitimacy. The issue of legitimacy is central to many 
conflicts around the world as competing groups construct philosophical, 
legal, cultural, political or historical narratives to give credibility to their 
claims and actions to defend those claims. The Israelis use the apartheid 
Zionist ideals for a separate Jewish state, based on the biblical myth of 
the ‘chosen people’ and ‘promised land’ to stamp their claims on what 
used to be the state of Palestine. On the other hand, Palestinians, whether 
Christian or Muslim, justify their claims on the basis of immemoriality; 
that is, they have always been there, and Palestine as a state was a legal 
and sovereign entity before being overwhelmed by Jewish immigrants. 
Israel sees Palestinians, whether youth, women and even children, fighting 
against Israeli occupation, domination and displacement, as ‘Islamic 
terrorists’ while Palestinians frame the Israeli military as agents of ‘Zionist 
terrorism’. The cycle of violence and counter-violence, justified by the 
negative framing of the other, fuels the burning fire of conflict. Both have 
competing historical memories to stake their claim on a common territory 




The book approaches security from a multilayered vantage point, through 
a comparative study of three PICs: Fiji, Tonga and Solomon Islands. 
The  first layer of analysis examines some of the global discourse on 
security and the way security has been defined and articulated over the 
years. The second layer of analysis provides a wide panoramic view of 
Pacific regional security, and the third layer focuses on the case studies on 
the ground, drawing on some of the strands of discourses in the first two 
layers. The idea is to construct an interconnected epistemological structure 
that links knowledge of the local, regional and global in a dynamic and 
coherent way. Our framing of security is enhanced by acknowledging 
that security is not a static construct but a dynamic phenomenon that 
oscillates between different layers of articulation.
The broad global security narrative
The general theoretical prisms that frame security discourses, as we shall 
see in Chapter 3, range across academic disciplines and are informed by 
varying ideological positions, from Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of culture’ 
position, which helped shape and justify the neoconservative political 
rubric of world politics, to Edward Said’s ‘orientalism’ discourse, which 
has inspired generations of postcolonial thinkers and activists; from the 
securitisation school’s emphasis on the post-structural action-based value 
of language, to the human security framework initiated by the United 
Nations. The list goes on. It is important to note that the general theories 
of conflict are based on multiple interpretations of history and human 
society, broad assumptions about power and institutions and, in some 
cases, responses to some existing modes of explanation that are deemed 
either theoretically unacceptable or empirically untenable.
Despite dramatic changes in the world in recent times, some modes of 
analysis remain unchanged, as adherents cling to vestiges of past thinking 
that are supposedly universal in terms of time and space. Some theories 
are more flexible and adaptable to the changing contours of events as they 
unfold, and some, like Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis, which 
was meant to celebrate the triumph of capitalism, are quickly overtaken 
by events and then die a quick death. Some theories, especially those that 
are supported by a deeper and broader panorama of history and human 
culture, are able to survive in different forms, despite dramatic social 
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transformations. For instance, Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, 
although unrefined in its original form, influenced the way security 
has been defined by generations of left-wing scholars and postcolonial 
writers in the fields of sociology, anthropology, development studies, 
media studies, indigenous studies, cultural studies and literature. Two of 
the most prominent discourses of the Gramscian tradition are Noam 
Chomsky’s idea of manufacturing consent and Edward Said’s orientalism.
As Chapter 2 shows, the book avoids being caught in the narrow confines 
of a mechanical and one-dimensional dictionary definition. The term 
‘security’ is not defined in any one universally relevant theoretical narrative 
or applied schema, but the concept is left open to theoretical contestation 
to allow for a critical examination of how the term is defined in different 
contexts from different vantage points.
Regional discourse
The book’s focus on regional analysis in Chapter 3 is significant in 
two major ways. First, it frames the most immediate geopolitical and 
sociocultural context for the case studies and, second, it provides some 
common political, economic, cultural and environmental characteristics 
on which the case studies draw and that help to define some of their 
shared commonalities. Although the Pacific, in which more than 
a  thousand languages are spoken, is the most culturally diverse region 
in the world, the PICs themselves have much in common in terms of 
the security threats they face. Many of these threats, such as vulnerability 
to the dictates of the global neoliberal agenda, are externally generated, 
whereas many others, such as political tension, are internally induced. 
There are many that are, in equal measure, shaped and affected by both 
internal and external forces.
The region is going through dramatic transformation, and many of the 
emerging security issues, such as inequality, poverty, environmental 
degradation, climate change, crime and land disputes, to mention 
only some, affect these PICs differently, depending on their capacity to 
respond to change, the availability of resources, the level of expertise 
available and political will. The scattered PICs are linked through regional 
institutions such as the South Pacific Commission (now called the Pacific 
Community), Pacific Islands Forum and a number of other educational, 
environmental, sporting, religious, civil society, developmental and 
professional organisations. In the midst of global power dynamics, PICs 
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find common solace in regional cooperation as a means to ensure that their 
collective voices are heard and their interests are recognised at the United 
Nations and other international forums. The regional security analysis 
this book presents tries to link, in a critical way, the different security 
narratives and historical strands to make sense of the complexities and 
challenges of security in the small island states, separated by thousands 
of miles of open sea. This provides the backdrop for the three case studies.
Local comparative case studies
The approach to the case studies of Fiji, Tonga and Solomon Islands in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 is based on the diverse variable method where, instead 
of using the same template for every case study, the approach for every case 
study differs in terms of method and emphasis. Using the same template 
and variables for comparative purposes tends to be mechanical and static, 
and effaces the uniqueness of the case studies. Each case study is different, 
and the idea is not to compare and contrast one against the other but to 
showcase each country’s own unique historical, political, social, cultural 
and economic realities. Fiji, Tonga and Solomon Islands are very different, 
and it would be both analytically flawed and theoretically unsound to 
make superficial comparisons, as certain variables would favour one case 
study over the others. Each case study is examined in the context of 
what, in my opinion, are the most pressing sociopolitical security issues. 
The three countries were chosen because they have all experienced major 
security upheavals in recent years in the form of internal political conflict, 
from which they have barely recovered. It is of interest to determine 
what lessons we can learn from them in terms of the broader regional 
security agenda.
Chapter 4 is focused on Fiji and emphasises the power contestation and 
ethnopolitical conflict and the ramification of these for Fiji’s multicultural 
society. The chapter broadens the panorama of security lenses and links 
major security issues of the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial era. 
A  historical reflection reveals that some aspects of precolonial political 
culture continue in various forms and in some cases contributed to 
ethnopolitical conflict in latent ways during the colonial and postcolonial 
eras. Fiji’s security issues are complicated by intracommunal loyalties, 
religion, culture and socioeconomic inequality, which in some instances 
tend to intersect with ethnicity. The role of the military has become 
increasingly pronounced since the first coup in 1987 and is now seen 
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as both a stabilising factor in times of potential turmoil and a usurper 
of democracy. The chapter looks at various attempts to address the 
multidimensional security situation in Fiji, including the formal 
constitutional process, civil society peace initiatives and community-
based conflict resolution mechanisms.
Chapter 5 provides an assessment of the political power contestation 
in Tonga, in particular between the ruling monarchical class and the 
pro-democracy commoner movement. Of all the Pacific countries, Tonga 
is probably the most hierarchical and certainly has the most rigid political 
and class structure, consisting of the monarch, nobles (nopele), who act as 
feudal lords, below whom are the commoners, the equivalent of the serfs. 
The internal contradictions have been well concealed through various 
means, including the appeal to culture and divinity. The tension built up 
over the years erupted into violence in the form of riots and burnings in 
Nukualofa, the capital, in 2006. This changed the complexion of Tongan 
politics in a significant way as the military, untested in local situations, 
began to build up its capacity to respond more effectively to internal 
security conditions.
The focus on the Solomon Islands in Chapter 6 is principally on the 
historical conditions and dynamics that helped to create conditions 
that built up to the 1999 violent conflict, the worst in the history of the 
country. Multiple factors contributed to the conflict, and many of them 
were rooted in the colonial history of Solomon Islands and how these 
shaped the economic, political and ethnic landscape. British colonialism 
was half-hearted, patronising and exploitative and pitted the locals, who 
wanted greater autonomy, against the colonial hierarchy, which was 
directly controlled from Fiji, the main British colonial base in the Pacific. 
Development was minimal, and the state infrastructure was embryonic. 
The inequality and incompatibility between the colonial state and the 
local population became a security issue. Anti-colonial resistance was 
viciously suppressed as the British sought to use local police against their 
own people. The British recruited local cheap labour, principally from 
Malaita Island, to work in plantations in various parts of Solomon Islands, 
especially Guadalcanal, and this contributed to land disputes and tension. 
A combination of land disputes, inequality, resource appropriation, 
corrupt leadership and lack of a unifying political culture helped to 
inflame the conflict. In a paternalistic way, Solomon Islands also became 
a laboratory for peace-building in the form of the Regional Assistance 
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Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), in which international agencies, 
academics and civil society organisations tried new methods of conflict 
resolution to serve their particular agenda.
The different approaches of the following chapters provide us with multiple 
prisms and angles of analysis that focus on aspects of conflict unique to 
those countries. Although the PICs may be geographically small and 
isolated, they must not be considered insignificant just because of this, 
but rather the rest of the world must learn from some of their successful 
ventures into peace-building. At a time when conflict pervades every 
corner of the globe and when world leaders, international organisations 
and countries (torn by wars and destruction) are looking for solutions to 
the plight of millions of people, the PICs can provide some lessons for 
humanity: lessons of peace. Conflict in the PICs seems to be short-lived 
because solutions are deeply entrenched in their culture and in their way 
of seeing conflict and the world. State intervention in the form of formal 
institutions of the law and politics might have a role, but expressions of 
resilience, hope and endurance among the communities, which have been 




Exploring the contours of threat: 
Competing security discourses
There are very few people who are going to look into the mirror and 
say, ‘That person I see is a savage monster;’ instead, they make up some 
construction that justifies what they do.
Noam Chomsky
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the analytical eclecticism approach deployed 
in this book requires one to be cognisant of the diversity of theoretical 
positions in the area of security, their strengths and their weaknesses, and 
how they might inform one’s formulation and application of relevant 
concepts in a constantly changing world. Disentangling the continually 
morphing and increasingly turbulent security sphere is a herculean task 
in its own right due to the multiplicity of factors involved and the range 
of discourses used to frame security across disciplines. This is made even 
more complex by the ever-changing nature of global and local security 
situations, the diverse responses to these and how these responses 
are understood and framed by states, international institutions, local 
communities, political organisations, scholars and other groups in society. 
The ensuing security debates revolve around a number of interrelated 
questions: What does security entail? Whose security is at stake? What 
or who is the source of insecurity or threat? Which factors contribute 
to, enhance and shape insecurity? The notions of security and insecurity 
belong to opposite sides of the same coin because, as the adage goes, the 
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security of one is the insecurity of another. Certainly, in the Pacific, these 
questions need to be asked much more overtly as the local, regional and 
global security environments change.
With this in mind, this chapter attempts to critically examine five 
discursive narratives of security, which have been chosen because of their 
prominence in recent years. This is far from being an exhaustive foray 
into this multifaceted area of debate but is, rather, an attempt to draw 
out selected strands of arguments to inform our understanding of global, 
regional and national dynamics of current thinking and practices related 
to security. This will provide a theoretical backdrop to the study of Pacific 
regional security in Chapter 3 as well as the case studies on Fiji, Tonga and 
Solomon Islands in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. It should be noted at the outset 
that some aspects of the security discourses might be applicable, directly or 
indirectly, to situations in the Pacific and some might not, as this depends 
very much on how the concepts are defined, interpreted and applied in 
varying circumstances. Security has a multidisciplinary flavour, and this 
is because of the growing interest in the subject by scholars in different 
academic discourses. This is increasingly so given the consciousness about 
the interconnectedness of contemporary issues such as terrorism, racism, 
political instability, crime, wars, refugees, inequality, militarisation, 
poverty and climate change, which have influenced people’s sense of 
anxiety. The framing and experience of security have become inescapable 
parts of our being as a global community. Thus, as the world becomes 
more globalised, security also becomes a globally shared concern at a time 
when local threats readily become globalised and global threats readily 
become localised in a complex symphony of symbiotic relationships.
Security is more than just a political concept. It can be construed to 
cover virtually every aspect of life, including the economic, cultural, 
psychological and spiritual domains, as long as there is realisation of an 
element of risk and threat that could affect people’s lives and well-being. 
However, it is often constructed in relation to specific contexts. Thus, as 
we will see later, particular definitions of security that claim to possess 
universal appeal and validity are in danger of being irrelevant in particular 
historical, cultural and political contexts. This is why it is important to 
have an open mind and to attempt to understand a particular security 
discourse using relativist, contextual, eclectic and even arbitrary lenses. 
In  other words, what might be a security situation in a particular 
conceptual sphere, time and space might not be so in another. Security 
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has to be located within the ambit of ‘habitus’, or contextual configuration 
of  human activities, norms and interests, as Pierre Bourdieu (1990) 
reminds us.
The chapter begins by looking at the multidisciplinary nature of security 
and critically examines some classical theories of security as well as some 
theoretical implications and some of the dilemmas posed in relation to 
policy-making. While security has been traditionally associated with some 
mainstream ‘political’ disciplines such as political science, international 
relations and political sociology, in recent years it has become 
a convergence zone for a whole range of disciplines, including economics, 
psychology, management, law and even mathematics. The chapter then 
examines the notion of securitisation, especially the way it has been 
framed by postconstructivists as a means of moving the argument away 
from the realist and formal statist position. Central to this is the work of 
the Copenhagen School, which has been instrumental in redefining the 
post–Cold War security debate.
The chapter next examines the idea of human security, a concept that was 
popularised by the United Nations from the early 1990s and has become 
dominant in development and policy discourse since then. Human security 
extended the traditional boundaries of security thinking and incorporated 
virtually every aspect of human life—whether political, economic, social, 
cultural, environmental or psychological—as security-related. Following 
this is a critical analysis of human security as a conceptual schema as well 
as an applied developmental tool. The chapter then explores gender, an 
area of security that is often ignored. Historically, security has been largely 
defined using masculine lenses and ideological constructions. Changing 
this trend by incorporating a more inclusive gender lens provides us with 
a more nuanced reality of how security plays out in society.
The last part of the chapter examines some of the salient features of the 
critical security paradigm, in particular the postcolonial discourse and 
how  it critiques and deconstructs the dominant theories of politics, 
society and security. In a way, a significant portion of the book’s analysis 
will be drawn from the critical security approach, especially its analysis 
of the political economy of security, the power dynamics involved and 
how PICs find themselves in a subaltern position amid the hegemonic 
machinations of the big powers.
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The challenge of security: An 
interdisciplinary and contested term
There is no consensus on the core existential features of ‘security’ because 
the term is often defined contextually and situationally, often in arbitrary 
ways. The diversity of the ‘security’ experiences of groups in different 
historical, cultural, political and psychological settings makes the concept 
a fertile ground for different disciplines to pick and choose aspects that 
are relevant to their particular areas of study. Security pervades all levels 
of human society from the private world of an individual experiencing 
psychological apprehension to global disputes over strategic interest 
and power, and including other issues pertaining to threat and risk in 
between. Throughout history, the perception and experience of security 
has influenced the conceptualisation, construction and operationalisation 
of human thinking and world views, cultural norms, political institutions, 
technological change and economic systems (Wallerstein, 1989). At the 
macro-global level, security is one of the largest industries in the world 
today. For instance, the US military–industrial complex connects a whole 
range of players such as large corporations, which manufacture weapons, 
universities, which carry out research, the state, which facilitates and 
legitimises the militarisation process, and the military in the United States 
and other parts of the world, which use the weapons (Giroux, 2007). This 
network is linked to wars, political instability and associated problems, 
such as displacement, poverty and human rights abuses in other parts of 
the world. Thus, not only are the different aspects and levels of security 
interconnected but also different conceptual approaches to the subject 
have brought together different disciplines to focus on security, conflict 
and peace studies (Webel & Johansen, 2012). Despite the different 
disciplinary foci, there are commonalities in terms of the need to carry 
out research using multiple methodologies with the ultimate purpose of 
creating a secure society for the future.
The division between different approaches is also ideological in nature, 
largely because of the influence of the Cold War when, by and large, 
global security was defined around two contending ideological camps: the 
Soviet Union, representing socialism, and the United States, representing 
capitalism. This established the fundamental ideological divide between 
the ‘Left’ and the ‘Right’, which influenced security studies. For instance, 
peace studies as an area of university research and teaching was often 
linked to academics on the Left, who saw global capitalism and US 
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hegemony as a threat to peace. Even within the Left, there were those 
who saw the Soviet Union as equally as hegemonic as US imperialism. 
In the ‘Third World’, peace activism was a response to the neocolonial 
excesses of the major powers as well as to internal dynamics, and many of 
its proponents were aligned to peace groups in Western countries. Many 
social scientists and natural scientists were part of the peace movement 
and used their transdisciplinary research skills in the collective fight 
for ‘peace’, however they defined it. In the Pacific, as will be shown in 
Chapter 3, the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) movement 
included a range of issues such as the environment, decolonisation, land 
rights, economic development, racism and militarism. These multiple 
issues were framed using multiple lenses, which resulted in debates even 
among peace activists and within academic disciplines.
At the end of the Cold War, there was renewed hope that the world had 
seen the worst in terms of conflict, and many security scholars shifted their 
focus from the ‘East’ versus ‘West’ contestation to localised intranational 
conflicts in the form of ethnic, religious and communal wars. This hope 
was exemplified in the rather over-optimistic declaration by Francis 
Fukuyama (1992) that the end of the Cold War heralded the triumph 
of liberal democracy and the ‘end of history’. However, this provocative 
position failed to grasp the reality that, despite the end of the Cold 
War, liberal democracy and capitalism were facing even more menacing 
challenges, which saw the rise of people protests, terrorism, cyber-wars, 
intrastate wars, transnational crime, ethnic conflict and increasing poverty 
and marginalisation (Dorling, 2015). The increase in ‘new wars’, as Kaldor 
(2013) calls them, was characterised by the shift from interstate conflict to 
multiple levels of conflict involving a range of non-state actors, terrorism, 
cyber-technology and non-conventional means.
Moreover, the withering away of the Cold War bipolarity saw 
a  reconfiguration of ideological positions and the emergence of ‘non-
aligned’ security discourses. Among these was the ‘greed and grievance’ 
approach popularised by Oxford economists Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler (2002). Based on particular interpretations of selected African 
experiences, Collier and Hoeffler argued that civil wars were caused by 
‘grievances’ over such issues as identity, social class, religion and culture 
and ‘greed’ over economic resources such as diamonds. Institutions such 
as the World Bank enthusiastically adopted these ideas and used them 
to frame their conflict and development policies. This was a significant 
foray by economists into the realm of conflict and security, and many 
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economists, even some in the Pacific, used the greed and grievance theory 
as a basis for understanding resource-based conflict in such places as 
Solomon Islands and Bougainville (Allen, 2007).
The greed and grievance theory has come under intense criticism because 
of its tendency to use single factors like greed to oversimplify complex 
situations shaped by a number of intervening and interrelated factors 
(Keen, 2000). The use of quantitative econometrics methods tends to 
undervalue the significance of subjective human feelings and perceptions, 
culture and politics in the conflict equation. The seemingly ‘scientific’ 
approach by the greed and grievance school is largely based on attempts 
at numerical quantification of incidents of conflict, and this overshadows 
the complex nature of society, social relations and the individual or 
collective propensity for conflict. The notion of greed itself tends to both 
moralise and psychologise the issue of competition of resources with the 
assumption that individual pursuit of wealth is a natural state of being, 
an argument that finds resonance in the biological determinist theory 
advocated by many psychologists (Thayer, 2004).
Another argument that makes a similar assumption is the rational choice 
theory, which economists have used to explain conflict over resources 
and power as individuals and groups attempt to maximise their gains at 
minimal cost and through displacement of others (Amadae, 2003). Like 
the greed model, the rational choice theory operates on the fallacious 
assumption that human behaviour is always predictable and quantifiable, 
as if it is predetermined by certain natural laws of human behaviour and 
social action.
The historical, socioeconomic and sociocultural conditions in Africa 
during the diamond wars of the 1990s that gave rise to the theory in 
the first place are hardly prominent in the PICs. The colonial histories 
of Africa (which were largely exploitative and turbulent) and that of 
the PICs (which were relatively benign) are very different indeed and 
cannot be connected simplistically using the same historical paintbrush 
(Fraenkel, 2004).
In the field of global politics and international relations, debates about the 
nature of security have revolved around a number of competing narratives 
of interstate relations. The notion of realism focuses on the Hobbesian 
idea of a human natural propensity for competition and violence, which is 
extended to self-serving interstate competition for power using aggressive 
means such as militarism (Snyder, 2004). The neoconservative and hawkish 
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elements within the US political system are often seen as belonging to this 
school, which was probably at its height during the Mutually Assured 
Destruction (MAD) policies of the Cold War (Mearsheimer, 2014). Those 
who were critical of the realist school saw this propensity for aggression 
as containable within international structures and norms, whose role was 
to rein in pariah states as a means of maintaining global peace and order 
(Lamy, 2008).
In almost direct contrast to the realist school was the liberal approach, which 
took a much more flexible stance by arguing for the goodness of humanity 
and the potential for collective peaceful engagement (Copeland, 1996). 
In a way this approach was also linked to the ‘liberal peace’ movement, 
which assumes the possibility of creating stability through the global 
‘norm diffusion’ of Western liberal democracy. A more radical departure 
was expounded by the constructivist school, which, based on the post-
structuralist schema, examined security in relation to the significance of 
persuasive ideas, collective values, culture and social identities (Barnett, 
2008). In a way, except for constructivism, these ‘classical’ international 
relations theories, while dominant in geopolitical debates, tended to be 
too state-centric and failed to address the dramatically changing situations 
where competing forces such as ‘terrorist’ organisations have taken 
‘dispersed’ forms.
The critical theories (so named because of their propensity to question 
and offer alternatives to mainstream ideas) provided different lenses to 
the classical approaches mentioned earlier. For instance, the dependency 
and neo-Gramscian theories focused on how global politics and conflict 
were shaped by power dynamics and economic exploitation by dominant 
powers over subaltern countries and groups of people (Cox, 1996). This 
position was further bolstered by the rise of feminism, which added the 
gender dimension as resistance to the largely masculine-dominated world 
of politics, militarism and power (Grant & Newland, 1991). The critical 
approaches were transdisciplinary and were linked to scholars arguing 
from the standpoint of exploitation, domination and power. They were, 
by and large, derivatives of the more generic conflict theory in sociology, 
which had its genesis in Marx’s philosophy of dialectical materialism. 
Some notable examples of the critical school were Noam Chomsky and 
Edward Said, whose ideas, as we shall see later, were diametrically opposed 
to those of Samuel Huntington, a modern-day intellectual beacon for 




Although the brief overview of security discourses above is far from 
exhaustive, the point I want to make here is that the illusive, contextual 
and situational nature of security invokes diverse approaches. The different 
disciplinary approaches in their own ways offer particular insights into 
the vast area of security. There are strengths and weaknesses that need 
careful analysis, and the book will draw on some of those that might be 
appropriate and applicable to the Pacific. The rest of the chapter examines 
in more detail some influential narratives on security and how they help 
to inform some discussions on Pacific security in the later chapters.
The securitisation discourse
The securitisation theory has hardly been used to frame security in the 
Pacific in a systematic way partly because of its reputation as being too 
European in terms of its conceptual genesis. This is not to say that it is 
irrelevant to the Pacific—in fact, as we shall see later, despite some of its 
weaknesses, it does provide useful conceptual tools to illuminate certain 
aspects of security in the Pacific.
What is securitisation? In the post–Cold War era, the prevailing realist view 
was subjected to critical examination by those who saw human behaviour 
as more complex than a simple dichotomy based on the bipolar division 
of socialism versus capitalism. There was an emerging school of thought 
that security had to be seen not just in terms of structural factors but also 
in the context of a speech act—this was the basis of the securitisation 
discourse popularised by Wæver (1995) and elaborated further by Buzan, 
Wæver and de Wilde (1998) of the Copenhagen School.1 The notion 
of securitisation provided an alternative constructivist approach to the 
age-old debate as to whether a threat can be understood as an objective 
reality or a reflection of subjective perception, by suggesting that threats 
are social constructions centred on speech acts. In various strands of social 
theory, ‘speech acts’ refers to the idea that verbalisation is the basis for 
‘doing’. An  example would relate to bringing a person into existence 
merely through the process of naming him or her; in the same way, 
the act of uttering the word ‘security’ makes it real and various aspects 
of life associated with it—including the military, political, economic 
1  The term ‘Copenhagen School’ is a reference to the University of Copenhagen, where the 
exponents of the securitisation approach were based.
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and environmental issues—become threats. This intrinsic relationship 
between verbalisation and action was what Austin (1962) referred to as 
‘performative utterance’ or ‘perlocutionary act’.
It must be noted, however, that to ensure that the speech acts are related 
to securitisation, they have to be part of the rhetorical structure and 
process related to war and associated concepts, such as survival, urgency, 
threat and defence. This forms the basis of the Copenhagen School’s 
assumptions about securitisation regarding: (a) the claim that the object 
in question is existentially threatened, (b) the right to take extraordinary 
measures to counter the threat and (c) convincing an audience that 
extralegal behaviour to counter the threat is justified. The idea of threat is 
embedded in politics itself and can be articulated in three major discursive 
trends: politics, action and intentionality; modern organisation of politics, 
spheres and sectors; politics, ethics and science (Gad & Petersen, 2011). 
For PICs, desecuritisation means inverting the securitisation discourse 
through ideas and policies that remove the threat and sense of anxiety 
through peace-building measures by civil society organisations or regional 
security initiatives such as the Biketawa Declaration (Pacific Islands 
Forum, 2000).
While the securitisation theory was an attempt to open possibilities of 
analysis beyond military affairs (Wæver, 2010), it has inspired debates, 
with its opponents arguing that it is too narrow and lacks universal 
contextual relevance. The criticisms range from constructivists, who argue 
for the theory’s reconfiguration and fine-tuning to correspond to changing 
circumstances, to critical postcolonial thinkers, who declare it moribund 
outright. One of the flaws of the theory is that the idea of securitising any 
activity by a group in power can be an arbitrary act, which can be used 
to stifle democratic debate and which could be used as justification for 
suppression of alternative views. What is probably needed is not so much 
a focus on securitisation, which could create more harm than good, but 
on the reduction of threats by focusing on ‘desecuritisation’, which Tjalve 
(2011) argued should take place at the level of polity rather than policy 
because of the close association between power politics and threat.
Another criticism is that the securitisation theory fails to take into 
consideration the fact that a combination of the security speech and 
practice of elites may contribute to erasing the distinction between 
‘exceptional’ and ‘normal’ political behaviour and security environments 
(Huysmans, 2006: 124–6; Williams, 2003). Furthermore, the theory 
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is unable to recognise the significance of normal and daily operation of 
security issues through bureaucracies (Aradau, 2006; Bigo, 2000; Kaliber, 
2005; Neal, 2006).
A major criticism of the Copenhagen School is its failure to consider the 
significance of the morality of securitisation. For instance, Floyd (2011: 
428) made the argument that the moral righteousness of securitisation was 
a core aspect of its own legitimacy, and he provided three criteria of moral 
framing, based on the just war theory. First, there must be an objective 
threat that endangers the survival of the actors; second, the referent object 
of security must be based on human needs; and third, the response must 
be appropriate to the threat. Apart from the absence of morality, there was 
also a strong argument about the lack of interface between science and 
securitisation. Berling (2011) used the Bourdieusian approach to argue 
that scientific arguments and ‘facts’ were critical aspects in understanding 
the way securitisation was defined, articulated and applied in real life, 
and he questioned the adequacy of the theory in explaining the issue of 
context and the importance of ‘practical reflexivity’ for security experts.
In addition, Salter (2007) is of the view that although there has been 
a growing number of case studies of successful securitisation and 
desecuritisation processes, there is still a strong dominant tendency by 
scholars to hold a statist view of securitisation, whereby the emergency 
powers of the executive are used in response to identification of threat 
and acceptance of the threat by an audience. There are, according to 
Salter, multiple sources of security moves and at least four different 
types of audience and speech contexts: popular, elite, technocratic and 
scientific. The relationship between threat and fear is an underlying strand 
of the securitisation theory, especially in terms of how fear can facilitate 
the process of securitisation. Williams (2011) inverted this suggestion 
and contended, using the notion of ‘liberalism of fear’, that instead of 
facilitating securitisation, the liberalism of fear opens a new window to 
enable us to visualise how fear can in fact undermine securitisation; that 
is, the fear of fear can be a desecuritising rather than a securitising factor.
Another major methodological flaw was that securitisation research 
tended to be based on casual approaches and did not have much empirical 
basis (Guzzini, 2011) because of the subjective interpretation of threat 
through speech act. Thus, the reliance on post-structuralist framing 
and lack of  empirical identification of threat weakens securitisation’s 
importance in applied policy. Because the notions of framing and 
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translation of securitisation are closely integrated, Stritzel (2011) made the 
argument that securitisation as conceived by Wæver was too traditional 
and essentialist and therefore there was a need to seriously review it. Along 
this line, Huysmans (2011) was of the view that the emphasis on the 
discursive and communicative aspects of securitising has overshadowed 
the significance of the concept of ‘act’, which in many ways defined the 
politicality of the speech act approach to security. Security practices were 
shaped more by political acts than by mere speeches.
Although many criticisms of the Copenhagen School by European 
theorists were based, as we have seen, on the need to refine securitisation 
theory to be more applicable, criticisms by some non-Western scholars and 
those from the critical security perspective were more directly dismissive, 
arguing that securitisation theory was not relevant to non-Western 
societies (Bilgin, 2011; Sheikh, 2005; Vuori, 2008). There was also a view 
that even desecuritisation was a conservative process that reproduced the 
existing liberal order (Aradau, 2004). Those using the peace studies lens 
made the point that securitisation had no morally defensible position on 
such issues as minorities and AIDS (Elbe, 2006; Roe, 2004). The theory’s 
Eurocentric and statist nature tended to be too analytically restrictive to be 
of much use in unpacking the complex security situation in postcolonial 
societies whose historical and cultural evolution had been shaped by 
complex colonial and postcolonial forces.
One of the most ardent critics of the Copenhagen School and mainstream 
security studies generally was the Aberystwyth School, which drew from 
the critical lenses of neo-Marxian dialectics and the neo-Gramscian 
notion of hegemony, and the Frankfurt School, to make the argument 
that security could be meaningfully understood only in the context 
of social transformation and human emancipation. Two leading figures of 
this school, Ken Booth and Richard Jones, asserted that security was not 
conceptually constructed and subjectively defined, as the Copenhagen 
School contended, but was related to real social conditions and human 
needs (Booth, 1991; Jones, 2001).
European security studies generally, including the work of the 
Copenhagen School, since World War II, was criticised as self-serving 
and possessing a ‘Eurocentric character’ (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006: 329) 
because of how it misrepresented societies, cultures and security relations 
of the global South. One of the consequences of this misrepresentation 
was the characterisation of the world in the form of self-constructed 
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Western cultural supremacy and ignorance of historical security relations 
through the acknowledgement of the joint contribution of European 
and non-European cultures in making history (Bessis, 2003). This is 
a  salient theoretical plank in postcolonial security discourse, which we 
will consider further towards the end of the chapter. While securitisation 
was largely Europe-focused, the rise of the human security discourse had 
a more global impact during the post–Cold War era, and this redefined 
the  security debate much more fundamentally in terms of the shift 
from the state to society as important units of security.
Despite some of the shortcomings of the securitisation discourse, an 
important aspect that is useful in understanding the security environment 
and security psychology in the Pacific is the notion of speech act and 
its association with the security rhetorical structure. Let us take the case 
of Fiji, for instance, where, since 1987, the term ‘coup’ has securitised 
the political narrative in a psychologically influential way. Since the series 
of coups between 1987 and 2006, the mere mention of the term ‘coup’ 
has had the potential to invoke anxiety, fear and feelings of insecurity 
(Ratuva, 2011a). Although triggered largely by perception, this climate of 
insecurity can influence a range of behavioural and normative issues such 
as people’s choices during elections, ethnic consciousness and relationship 
between cultural groups. A coup, whether real or illusory, becomes 
a security threat by its mere mention due to its prominence and sensitivity 
as part of the rhetorical structure of Fijian political discourse. The use 
of the terms ‘riots’ in Tonga (Senituli, 2006) and ‘tension’ in Solomon 
Islands (Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi & Okole, 2014) might also have a similar 
influence on the political rhetorical structure of the two countries.
The securitisation of the term ‘climate change’, through its strong 
association with human security, has provided a new dimension to the way 
we see and understand the integral connection between our environment, 
well-being and sense of threat (Mason, 2015). The securitisation of the 
term makes it political and therefore contested. For PICs, the securitisation 
of the climate change narrative works in their favour because it can be 
used strategically to access the Green Climate Fund and other facilities 
related to climate change. The same goes for the advent of the human 
security discourse in the early 1990s in the Asia-Pacific region, which saw 
the securitisation of almost every aspect of human life from poverty to 
diseases, education to religion, transportation to housing (Davies, 2017). 
The list goes on. As we shall see later, this universalised process of 
securitisation has a number of conceptual shortcomings.
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In both conscious and subtle ways, securitised concepts can influence 
the framing of issues and policy formulation by Pacific states, civil 
society, policy community, regional agencies and community groups to 
respond to a threat, whether real or perceived. Once framed as sources 
of possible threats, these issues can be used to mobilise public sentiments 
and justification for formulation of official state narratives, policies and 
legislations and in the process become institutionalised security discourses 
(Mason, 2015).
The shift from the statal to the societal: The 
human security discourse
The rise of the human security discourse in the 1990s shifted the security 
paradigm from the centrality of the state to the centrality of society 
(Shinoda, 2004). In the Pacific, this has filtered into government policies 
on security, poverty alleviation, education, development, welfare and 
almost every aspect of sociocultural and economic life (Cox et al., 2017). 
We will see this in more detail in Chapter 3.
The significance and relevance of the traditional notion of state-based 
‘hard’ security, often framed around the ideas of political security, 
national security and state security, have come under scrutiny as a result of 
attempts to re-evaluate the diverse conditions that threaten people’s lives 
and well-being. This includes a multiplicity of factors—political, social, 
cultural, economic, environmental, spiritual and psychological—that 
shape, in various ways, people’s sense of insecurity, fear, instability and 
anxiety. An array of disparate issues—including violence, exploitation, 
poverty, crime, climate change, education, governance, health and 
demographic change, to name a few—became part of the broad rubric 
of human security. The growing sense of insecurity and the loss of faith 
in the state as guardian of security contributed to this alternative analysis 
of security (Durodie, 2010).
The human security discourse was a response to the proliferation of new 
forms of security threats that could not be adequately captured within 
the confines of the traditional, state-centric national security paradigm. 
The transdisciplinary approach to human security spans a diverse range 
of academic and policy areas such as international relations, development 
studies, gender studies, environmental studies, public health, economics, 
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human rights, public policy, foreign policy and conflict or peace studies. 
This new wave of security thinking has helped to inform policy-making in 
many ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries, including the Pacific Islands, 
in global institutions such as the United Nations, Asian Development Bank 
and World Bank, and in civil society organisations and corporate sector 
organisations (Hampson & Penny, 2008). The extent to which human 
security ideas are integrated to policy, the specific contexts in which this 
happens and the ideological justifications used vary from situation to 
situation, but by and large there is some agreement that human security is 
an inseparable and inherent aspect of development, social life and change.
The human security narrative provides for flexibility in the way security is 
defined as new global and local conditions change. For instance, the threats 
of terrorism and the impacts of globalisation and mass migration have 
raised serious questions about identities, politics and world views. It has 
been suggested that these can be understood more critically by framing 
human security through legal, international relations and human rights 
lenses, especially when dealing with refugees, migrants and displaced and 
stateless persons and how, conceptually and practically, human security 
can sufficiently illuminate the myriad challenges they face (Edwards & 
Ferstman, 2010).
The appeal of the human security discourse has also been amplified by the 
failure of hard security policies in global affairs. For instance, the failure 
of the US-led coalition to achieve its political and strategic objectives in 
the period after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 was a clear 
manifestation of the inadequacy of the hard security paradigm and the 
need to broaden the analysis. Although the human security framework may 
be considered by some to be ‘conceptually fuzzy’, it still provides a more 
theoretically encompassing tool to examine the multiple dimensions and 
dynamics of the ‘war on terror’ (Shani, Sato & Pasha, 2007).
The war on terror was based largely on the deployment of force, 
consolidation of like-minded countries through the ‘coalition of the 
willing’, psychological warfare and arbitrary framing of the world in 
terms of the ideological binary ‘West’ versus ‘the rest’ (Scruton, 2002). 
The ideological fuel that inflamed and justified the wave of anti-Islamic 
sentiments ranged from crude propaganda through Fox News and 
other mainstream media to more sophisticated academic treatises such 
as Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis. These opinions blurred the 
lines between empirical reality and myths and spawned irrational hysteria, 
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religious intolerance and racial stereotyping. The complex interplay 
between socioeconomic factors, religion, political ideology, culture and 
militarism was beyond the realm of hard security.
In situations of modern conflict, human security often becomes more 
complex as different participants are driven by competing interests, such 
as corporate entities aiming to benefit financially from conflict, states 
who want to use conflict as a testing ground for their military power, 
combatants driven by claims to a historical motherland or humanitarian 
groups intervening to stop the conflict. Even humanitarian aid is 
confronted with apparently insurmountable political, legal, social and 
military challenges (Cahill, 2004). Creating a humanitarian space in 
a conflict situation is important to protect human dignity and human 
rights, especially the rights of the displaced, as well as contributing to 
peaceful reform and consolidation in the post-conflict transition period.
Another major issue of discussion is the link between human security 
and democracy, especially in terms of how countries can deliver social and 
economic rights through the broad inclusion of all citizens in decision-
making and poverty reduction. This is related to how democratic practices, 
separation of powers, freedom of the press and guarantees of human 
rights enhance human security (Large, Austin & IDEA, 2006). While the 
opening up of a more participatory and enlightened political space can be 
conducive to enhancement of human security, there are other significant 
factors, such as institutionalised inequality, vested economic and political 
interests and the hegemonic role of the dominant classes and institutions, 
that might undermine the democratisation of citizen participation.
Simply focusing on the formal and mechanical aspects of democracy such 
as elections, separation of powers, freedom of the press and guarantees of 
human rights has the potential to overshadow the deeper structural causes 
of inequality and disempowerment that cannot be addressed merely 
through formal institutional democratisation. Formal democracy does 
not necessarily equate to progressive development; in fact the opposite 
can also be true, as evidenced by the high level of development of some 
authoritarian states such as Singapore and the high level of acute inequality 
and poverty in India, which is a democratic state.
An emerging concern in recent years is the relationship between human 
security and cultural socialisation, especially in the form of formal 
education where certain values, norms and behavioural dispositions either 
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reproduce or undermine aspects of human security. The reproduction of 
various forms of behaviour and attitudes that encourage violence, including 
terrorism, through education is of particular concern (Nelles,  2003). 
The increasing international and local threats raise questions about the 
need for more political and pedagogic debates and policy formulation 
about how to use education as a means of reproducing peace values and 
eradicating violent behavioural tendencies. This debate needs to extend 
beyond formal pedagogy to involve parents who allow children to engage 
in ‘killing games’, such as in PlayStations and computer programs, 
and corporate institutions that create and make money from toys that 
simulate killing. This process requires a major, multipronged, approach 
geared to reforming the education system and the formulation of new 
foreign and domestic policy approaches based on conflict resolution at 
the local and global levels.
In the last 10 years or so, the issue of climate change has been dominant 
in the human security debate in many international forums, primarily 
because the phenomenon has a global impact on people’s human security, 
although how countries are affected varies considerably. For small island 
states such as many of those in the Pacific, the issue is urgent because 
of the progressive erosion and sinking of low-lying islands like those 
that make up Tuvalu and Kiribati. The process of climate change raises 
important issues of vulnerability and adaptation as critical components of 
human security. People’s vulnerability to naturally occurring or human-
induced climate change is often mitigated by new modes of cultural and 
technological innovation to enable people to adapt to the deteriorating 
conditions in the short term, but the real test is the challenge of creating 
sustainable long-term responses. The global climate change debate has 
been influenced by the national and neoliberal economic interests of the 
major industrialised powers at the cost of the smaller and more vulnerable 
island states. The effects of climate change pose risks not so much to state 
security but to human security in the form of basic needs, human rights 
and core values of individuals and communities (Barnett, 2011). Effective 
mitigation of climate change must involve shifting the emphasis away 
from the neoliberal economic discourse to framing it in human security 
terms, and this should be part of the global human security paradigm.
A globalised human security paradigm provides a shift in emphasis 
from the confinements of national-security thinking. Such a shift entails 
redefining the principles of state sovereignty in a global world where 
threats to humanity are beyond the capacity of any one nation to address 
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through unilateral action. This redefinition requires not only a new 
theoretical shift but also a change in the policy direction, capacity and 
roles of international agencies and civil society organisations in relation to 
human rights and the development of an effective intervention capacity 
to protect individuals from state action as well as other security threats 
arising from conflict, poverty, disease and environmental degradation 
(Battersby & Siracusa, 2009).
Moreover, achieving consensus and legitimacy for a global human security 
paradigm could prove problematic because of the contending political, 
economic, strategic and ideological interests and positions of the major 
global actors. For instance, President Trump’s climate change denial 
position as opposed to the rest of the world might prove to be a major 
stumbling block in the fight to save our planet from the impact of climate 
change. Corporate and ideological interests, challenges that compromise 
national sovereignty and international interests and differences in the 
power of states undermine the growth of any consensus on a global 
human security agenda (Bromley, Cooper & Holtom, 2012). The primacy 
of national interests over global human security considerations is likely 
to remain a major political bottleneck in the attempt to create a global 
human security environment.
It has also been argued that debates over the ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ 
human security frameworks have undermined the emphasis on power 
relationships, a theme that is central to the critical theorists we will 
look at later (Chandler, 2012). This is why it is important to integrate 
preventive human security practices to enhance resilience, to facilitate 
the empowerment of the vulnerable and to intervene to protect victims. 
These measures become more imperative in a situation where hegemonic 
groups use their control of state institutions to project their economic 
and political interests at the cost of subaltern groups. For instance, using 
the postcolonial discourse, d’Hauteserre (2011), in her study of colonial 
representation in New Caledonia, demonstrated that international 
tourism marketing is a political statement that constructs New Caledonia 
as a French enclave that relegates Kanaks to a subaltern position with 
minimal significance. This representation reinforced French colonial 
hegemony and neoliberal commodification of Kanak identity and ran 
counter to attempts to promote the human security of Kanaks.
COnTESTEd TERRAIn 
34
The globalisation of the neoliberal philosophy, practices and policies has 
raised and affirmed the relevance of global justice, which has acquired 
new meanings in the context of the economic, social and humanitarian 
crisis induced by the extreme phenomena associated with climate change 
(Munoz, 2010). Theorising democracy and justice in national contexts 
might be inadequate in transnational contexts, especially when dealing 
with the safety of individuals and communities such as those now being 
affected by climate change. This requires a new framework, revolving 
around the notion of human safety as a way of understanding the 
relationship between environmental crisis, unsustainable development 
and conflict. A critical process here is to link the concept of global 
justice and the democratic mechanisms of international governance 
(Munoz, 2010). Relatedly, many scholars and policy-makers are critical 
of the liberal institutionalist values that underpin international peace-
building and their emphasis on democracy, free market economics and 
the liberal state. The reason for that negative stance, it is suggested, is 
that such values undermine the importance of basic and everyday human 
needs while promoting externally imposed and inappropriate models 
of state institutions. It is argued that effective peace-building needs to 
be framed within the human security discourse with greater emphasis 
on welfare, livelihoods and local engagement to ensure legitimacy and 
sustainability (Newman, 2011).
To ensure effectiveness and legitimacy, human security should be part 
of a collective responsibility, especially in grave humanitarian crises 
involving genocide or ethnic cleansing. Collective responsibility relates 
to conceptualising the world as a community of peoples, rather than 
as a society of states in which other international and transnational 
actors operate (Peltonen, 2013). This collective realisation of common 
responsibility has led to the development of the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) framework. Related to this, it has been argued that the notion of 
shared responsibility should also extend to linking global development 
and human security to make sense of how countries are connected to the 
global economy and to defusing the social tensions and managing the 
security risks that can result from exposure to a turbulent international 
system (Picciotto, Olonisakin & Clarke, 2007). An instructive model for 
this is Sweden’s Shared Responsibility Bill, which merges peace, security, 
opportunity, environmental conservation, human rights and democracy 
into an integrated system.
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Along this line, we need to note that globalisation has strengthened the link 
between development and human security in the context of the changing 
contemporary sphere of international relations (Ştefanachi, 2011). 
This has especially been so since the Cold War, where the impact of the 
normative relationship between human development and human security 
policies on individuals has come under greater scrutiny. A more nuanced 
approach to this would require retheorising and employing alternative 
discourses of human security that encompass global transformation 
and local realities as well as multiple disciplines. The need for such 
a re-examination of theory and use of alternative discourses arises because 
the transnationalisation of threat and rolling back of state power can no 
longer be studied in a one-dimensional fashion but must be conceptualised 
from an interdisciplinary point of view, taking into account a range of 
interacting variables. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2005) emphasise this 
point by using case studies from Afghanistan, Central Asia and South Asia 
to frame and illuminate the international importance of human security 
as a basis for policy thinking in response to an intellectual need.
Nevertheless, there are still gaps to be addressed. For instance, Von 
Tigerstrom (2007) makes the assertion that, despite the fact that the 
concept of human security has influenced discourse and practice, 
and has become the subject of vigorous debate regarding its relevance 
to central questions of international law, it has, until recently, received 
little attention from international lawyers. Human security, it is argued, 
provides a  credible platform for the re-evaluation and rethinking of 
international law in terms of its ethical, normative and legal dimensions. 
This is especially so in relation to humanitarian intervention, internally 
displaced persons, small arms control and global health.
Critiques of human security
The initial enthusiasm relating to human security slowly withered away 
over the years as it became apparent that the concept was too broad and 
nebulous to be useful and, in certain cases, could not be neatly captured 
in policy framing. It has been described as too ‘fuzzy’, inconclusive and 
amorphous in the way it frames any potential threat in society, and while 
the term was initially used to escape the limitations of the hard security 
approach, its encompassing and holistic approach has turned out to 




Its fluid character allows it to be readily subjected to arbitrary manipulation 
as a propagandistic euphemism by states and various groups to project 
self-serving positive and popular images. Like populist but fuzzy terms 
such as ‘development’, ‘good governance’, ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’, ‘justice’ 
and ‘humanity’, which invoke affirmative images, the term ‘human 
security’ has been used by scholars, policy-makers, states and civil society 
organisations as a panacea for almost all social ills. Aid agencies often 
use values such as democratic behaviour and good governance, associated 
with human security, as preconditions to dictate the terms of aid. Hence 
the danger here is that aid can become a tool to leverage ideological 
conformity rather than a means of addressing poverty. A classic example 
of this is the Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and the 
African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, where conformity to 
certain political criteria by ACP countries was required as a condition 
of the aid. EU aid earmarked for the reform of Fiji’s sugar industry was 
withheld and redirected towards civil society organisations as a result of the 
delay in the post-2006 coup election, which was seen as a contravention 
of the democratic governance conditions of the Cotonou Agreement.
The association often made between human security and democracy, as 
if they were symbiotic, is problematic. This is partly because the concept 
of democracy can be used readily in a paradoxical way as justification for 
the violent imposition of external rule. The US involvement in Vietnam 
and invasion of Iraq, for instance, were justified on the grounds that the 
governing regimes in those countries were threats to democracy: Vietnam 
because of communism and Iraq because of the mythical weapons 
of mass destruction. Although the justifications were flawed, the fact that 
protection of freedom and other democratic values were used as tools of 
ideological mobilisation raises questions about the reliability of democracy 
as a viable human security concept.
In many nations of the global South, democratisation processes can be 
inherently conflictual because of a constant contestation over power, 
which sometimes leads to instability and unregulated competition for 
resources. Political elites, state bureaucrats and powerful corporations are 
usually in a position to control power and resources, and the resulting 
inequality has the potential to undermine human security. Often the 
local aspects of human security are ignored in development thinking in 
favour of state-based, corporate and international narratives and polices. 
This sometimes leads to further conflict.
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One of the paradoxical situations is the potential of the human security 
agenda to inadvertently undermine the international human rights 
regime. This is because the threat to human rights, which is driven by 
specific conditions, is subsumed and lost under the broad rubric of 
human security (Howard-Hassmann, 2012). While human security is 
meant to complement human rights principles, it also has the potential to 
undermine the primacy of civil and political rights as a strategic tool for 
citizens to fight for their rights. The use of the umbrella human security 
concept has created confusion between previously distinct policy streams 
of human rights and human development (Martin & Owen, 2010). The 
term ‘human rights’ itself has been relegated to a subservient position 
within the broader human security discourse, thus further exacerbating 
the ambiguity and confusion.
Despite its shortcomings, human security has become mainstreamed 
in the Pacific security discourse through policies and activities of 
international aid agencies, media campaigns, international conferences 
attended by Pacific people, academic research, civil society campaigns 
and state officials visiting communities (Bryar, Bello & Corendea, 2015). 
Human security has been associated with the work of UN agencies, 
development aid, the rise in environmental consciousness in the region as 
a result of climate change and the general recognition of the importance 
of social, political and economic rights that are closely associated with 
human security. Coincidently, the human security concept with its 
interconnected dimensions seems to fit in well with the Pacific cultural 
world views, which conceive of society as an interrelated whole. Human 
security has taken root in policies, laws and institutions and has more or 
less become part of societal normative systems (Corendea, 2012).
Critical security paradigm: The postcolonial 
discourse
Framing Pacific security through the postcolonial lens is uncommon, 
although postcoloniality itself has been a feature in some historical, 
literary, educational and sociological Pacific texts (Keown, 2005; Tawake, 
2000; Mishra, 2011). The postcolonial approach to security frames 
threat not in the form of interpretive abstraction and subjectivity, as the 
Copenhagen School does, nor as diffused and multiple facets of risks, 
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as the human security approach contends, but in the context of power 
relations, inequality and domination arising from historically defined 
relationships in politically and culturally defined spaces.
Edward Said, an icon of postcolonial discourse, popularised the term 
‘orientalism’, which was a critical deconstruction of the colonial gaze 
that represented the colonised in a patronisingly hegemonic manner, and 
helped to frame a new paradigm for postcolonial critique (Said, 1978). 
Said’s orientalism was a critique of the way the West (which he refers to 
as Occidental) deployed simplistic racial stereotypes to frame colonised 
peoples. The distorted images, articulated in novels, paintings, films and 
the media, became the basis on which the colonial world was understood 
in the European popular imagination. This provided the basis for imperial 
hegemony, which posed an imminent threat to the status and survival of 
subaltern cultures. The same orientalist logic, as Tariq Ali argued, was 
used to cast Muslims and Arabs as terrorists posing a major of threat to 
the West, especially since 9/11 (Ali, 2003).
Said expanded a considerable part of his intellectual energy critiquing 
Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis, which portrayed post–
Cold War conflict as the inevitable struggle between the West and ‘other’ 
cultures, especially Islam. In confirmatory response to Francis Fukuyama’s 
now moribund Hegelian narrative about the universal triumph of 
liberal democracy over communism (The End of History: The Last Man), 
Huntington asserted:
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this 
new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. 
The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source 
of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most 
powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of 
global politics will occur between nations and groups of different 
civilisations. The clash of civilisations will dominate global politics 
and the fault lines between civilisations will be the battle lines 
of the future. (Huntington, 1965: 22)
Said’s response to Huntington was in the form of his polemically bombastic 
article, ‘The clash of ignorance’, in which he rebutted Huntington’s 
attempt to construct static cultural boundaries in a world where cultural 
cross-fertilisation has been part of the dynamic human history and where 
politics and ideology, rather than culture, have created conditions for 
conflict (Said, 2001). The use of rather simplistic and generalised labels 
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like the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’ by Huntington tended to ‘mislead and confuse 
the mind, which is trying to make sense of a disorderly reality’ (Said, 
2001: 11). Said’s alternative discourse in these ‘tense times’ was to critically 
examine how the dialectics of relationships shaped the world, unhindered 
by cultural preconceptions and ignorance:
These are tense times, but it is better to think in terms of powerful 
and powerless communities, the secular politics of reason and 
ignorance, and universal principles of justice and injustice, 
than to wander off in search of vast abstractions that may give 
momentary satisfaction but little self-knowledge or informed 
analysis. ‘The Clash of Civilisations’ thesis is a gimmick like ‘the 
War of the Worlds’, better for reinforcing defensive self-pride than 
for critical understanding of the bewildering interdependence of 
our time. (Said, 2001: 14)
The ambiguity of the term ‘West’ is critically explored by Stuart Hall 
(1996), who saw it as an ideological construct based on a racialised 
discursive hierarchy where ‘the West’ = developed = good = desirable, while 
‘the non-West’ = under-developed = bad = undesirable (Hall, 1996: 186). 
This binary of ‘West and the rest’ has in some ways framed the dominant 
contemporary security discourse, where the values of the advanced and 
‘civilised’ West were constantly being threatened by the primordial non-
West and its unrefined values.
Said’s argument parallels Franz Fanon’s work on the coloniser–colonised 
relationship. The dialectics between the powerful and the weak resonated 
with Franz Fanon’s Black Skin White Masks, a study of the social psychology 
of racism and the dehumanisation created by colonial hegemony 
(Fanon, 1952). In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon (1963) examined 
the psychological struggle between the weak and strong, coloniser and 
colonised, master and slave, and how the coloniser used  violence to 
maintain dominance, thus legitimising the use of counter-violence as 
a means of emancipation.
The quest for answers to critical questions regarding security post 9/11, 
and the rise of racism and Islamophobia, provided new opportunities to 
revisit Said’s orientalism. A core strand in this situation was the notion 
of power, which was explored in a phenomenological way by Michel 
Foucault’s conception of surveillance, discipline, regulation, the biopolitics 
of population, and discourses of security and governmentality (Foucault, 
1991). While traditionally the state was seen as the focal point of power, 
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Foucault recognised the diffusion, relativism and dispersal of power in 
society. His notion that power was universally accessible and everywhere 
helped to examine the way in which the media, ideas and perceptions 
shaped the security climate in the post-9/11 period.
Security discourse has become a dominant feature of policy thinking, 
military strategies, governance structures and development framing, and 
this, according to Foucault, contributes to the way in which power is 
produced and reproduced:
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised 
up against it … We must make allowances for the complex and 
unstable process whereby a discourse can be both an instrument 
and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling point of 
resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse 
transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines 
and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart. 
(Foucault, 1998: 100–1)
The relationship between discourse and power is also explored in Stuart 
Hall’s work on the synergy between meaning and power, encoding and 
decoding, where, despite multiple meanings, the overriding meaning 
provides a hegemonic leverage for influence by dominant interests (Hall, 
1973). In the context of applied security, this means that the meaning 
of security, the source of insecurity and the nature of threats are framed 
and reproduced by hegemonic interests. One way of understanding the 
contours of security is through what Cynthia Enloe (1980) referred to as 
‘security mapping’, or the classification of relative degrees of threat and 
the reliability of various groups vis-à-vis the dominant group or state.
Today, the relationship between security, power and hegemony is 
manifested more markedly in the form of US global dominance. Although 
the United States portrays itself as a model for democracy and a global 
‘sheriff’ for freedom, its strategic and corporate interests are largely self-
serving in fulfilment of some universal truth at the cost of the ‘evil’ other. 
This prompted Noam Chomsky to refer to it as a ‘failed state’ operating 
on a ‘single standard’ based on the premise that ‘their terror against us 
and our clients is the ultimate evil, while our terror against them does 
not exist—or, if it does, is entirely appropriate’ (Chomsky, 2006: 3). 
The propensity of the United States to demonise and eventually punish 
countries and groups who do not behave in accordance with its grand 
scheme of things is seen as part of destiny, a righteous cause and a natural 
American right, as Chomsky argued:
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By now, the world’s hegemonic power accords itself the right to 
wage war at will, under a doctrine of ‘anticipatory self-defence’ 
with unstated bounds. International law, treaties, and rules 
of world order are sternly imposed on others with much self-
righteous posturing, but dismissed as irrelevant for the United 
States—a  longstanding practice, driven to new depths by the 
Reagan and Bush II administrations. (Chomsky, 2006: 3)
Influenced by Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and manufacturing 
consent (Gramsci, 2012), Herman and Chomsky make the assertion that 
induced adherence to the idea of US and Western moral righteousness to 
wage war is part of a system of ideological, intellectual and cultural control 
through education, media and other forms of public discourse (Herman 
& Chomsky, 1988). Consent is manufactured through a complex system 
of corporate, media and state manipulation of ideas and propaganda 
rather than being simply voluntary and rationalised. The 2003 invasion of 
Iraq was a classic case of hegemonic control of mainstream media, which 
acted as cheerleaders and consent-manufacturing machines for Bush’s 
warmongering adventure.
Tariq Ali further argues that the reaction to US hegemony has been equally 
mischievous on the part of Islamists, who have been as ‘fundamentalist’ 
as US warmongering adventurism. Hence what we have experienced 
has been the return of history in a horrific form, with religious symbols 
playing a part on both sides, represented in politico-religious rhetoric 
such as ‘Allah’s revenge’, ‘God is on Our Side’ and ‘God Bless America’. 
The violence of 11 September 2001 was an Islamic fundamentalist 
response to the Western fundamentalist violence inflicted on the people 
of Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen and other parts of the world. 
The United States had been involved either directly or indirectly in almost 
all of these violent situations. Ali’s Clash of Fundamentalisms, written in 
response to 9/11, like Said’s ‘Clash of ignorance’, was a repudiation of 
Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis, which portrayed non-Western 
cultures as deviant and threatening. Ali proposed that rival ideological 
fundamentalisms—Islamism on one side and Western imperialism on the 
other—were to be equally blamed for threatening global security and that 
both must be opposed (Ali, 2003). While many of the values proclaimed 
by the Enlightenment (from the late 17th to the early 19th centuries) 
have retained their relevance, portrayals of the American empire as a new 
emancipatory project are misguided.
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The framing of postcolonial societies as a threat to the West, represented by 
capitalism and liberal democracy, is not merely a theoretical proposition, 
it is also encapsulated in policy thinking. When former British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair labelled Africa as a ‘scar on the conscience of the 
world’, he was reflecting New Labour’s policy shift from ‘development–
humanitarianism’ to the ‘risk–fear–threat’ category in the broader context 
of the ‘war on terror’. While the securitisation of Africa helped to legitimise 
the ‘war on terror’, it, unfortunately, effectively undermined development 
initiatives (Abrahamsen, 2005).
There are some important conceptual lessons we can learn from the critical 
analysis of contemporary security. The view that dichotomises the world 
along the lines of the ‘West’ and the ‘rest’ creates a hierarchy whereby 
the non-West is seen not only as inferior but also as a source of threat. 
Although the militant Islamic fundamentalists responsible for 9/11 and 
other acts of terror constitute a small minority of Muslims, their actions 
have been used as ‘evidence’ of the primordial barbarism of non-Western 
peoples generally. This orientalist state of mind, as Said reminds us, is 
pervasive and takes various manifest and latent forms. Post–Cold War 
conflict is not so much a ‘clash of civilisations’, as Huntington suggests, but 
has more to do with contestation over entrenched political, economic and 
ideological interests, underpinned by either side’s inability to understand 
the situation of the other, or a ‘clash of ignorance’, as Said put it.
One of the prominent aspects of the critical and postcolonial discourse 
is the feminist security discourse. As Blanchard argues, ‘national security 
discourses are part of the elite world of masculine high politics’ (Blanchard, 
2003: 1289). The masculine-based realist conception of security, which 
puts the state and military at the centre of analysis, obscures the way the 
role of women has been reduced to subaltern status. Recently, feminist 
scholars have raised fundamental questions about the meaning of security: 
just who is being secured by security policies, and who is the threat? 
Security policies are often designed by men and security institutions such 
as the military, and are therefore imbued with patriarchal ideology and 
culture. Often the masculine personality is seen as the ‘protector’ just as 
much as it is seen as a threat, while women are the ‘protected’ weak and 
vulnerable. Yet women struggle every day against patriarchal hegemony, 
and this process, as Christine Sylvester states, ‘is always elusive and 
mundane’ (Sylvester, 1987: 183).
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The rise of the feminist security theory has redefined the terrain of security 
studies as well as opened new opportunities for creating a new engendered 
security discourse. Part of this intellectual and political project is to 
privilege women’s role in politics and unveil the shroud of invisibility 
that has rendered women hidden. The exclusion of women is linked 
to cultural framing and power relations and is therefore ideological in 
nature. Of significance here is our understanding of the power of the state 
in institutionalising and reproducing security discourse, and questions 
have been raised about whether the state actually protects women in times 
of war and peace. Women are often victims of violence, rape and abuse 
during wars and other conflicts, and sometimes these are perpetrated by 
soldiers themselves.
The fact that women are often victims of war has more to do with their 
social role as bearers of children and sources of the well-being of the 
family and has nothing to do with their natural inferiority. The notion 
of inferiority is sometimes used as the basis for constructing stereotypes 
that women are natural peacemakers, thereby fuelling the assumption that 
women are weak, docile and incapable of conspiracy, power play and war-
mongering. As we have seen in the cases of Joan of Arc, Margaret Thatcher, 
who ordered the British invasion of the Falkland Islands, and Golda Meir, 
who was Prime Minister of Israel during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, 
circumstances can dictate realities and disprove these myths. Women are 
imbued with diverse qualities such as peacefulness and aggression just 
like men, and denying them these fundamentally human characteristics is 
tantamount to denying them an equal place in society.
The role of women in peace activism, peace-building and conflict resolution 
in the Pacific has a long history, and in many cases—whether it be Fiji, 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga or any other community—
women have been at the forefront of political action and resistance to 
violence and conflict. The proliferation of gender-based organisations in 
the Pacific is part of the global wave of consciousness sweeping across civil 
society as well as states. Many of them draw inspiration from the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1325 on gender, peace and development as 
well as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), an international treaty adopted in 1979 by 
the United Nations General Assembly (United Nations, 1979).
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Recent research on the Fiji military using the gender intersectionality 
framework has shown the deeply embedded masculine culture 
within the military’s structure, ideology and institutional behaviour 
(Tagicakibau, 2018). This has been a psychological and cultural driving 
force behind the coups in Fiji since 1987. Militarist masculinity even 
pre-dates the coups and has roots in the traditional warrior culture that 
formed the basis of Fijian masculinity (Baledrokadroka, 2012). This will 
be examined in more detail in Chapter 4.
The feminist security discourse has been progressively taking hold 
in the Pacific, although its actual policy influence has been limited. 
There is now growing consciousness about gender and human security 
issues and their relationship, and this has provided impetus for the 
genderisation of security discourse and policies among regional and civil 
society organisations. The  resistance to the feminist approach has been 
largely from the patriarchal establishments, such as the churches and 
other traditional institutions. For instance, the opposition to CEDAW 
in Tonga was largely from churches as well as the traditional hierarchy, 
who saw gender equality as a threat to their control over land and power 
(Ratuva, 2017b).
The feminist security discourse is part of the broader critical social theory 
approach of the postcolonial discourse, which we look at next.
The relevance of the postcolonial security discourse in the Pacific cannot 
be understated. Rather than merely providing a simple snapshot of 
the immediate experience of threats, such as the case with the realist 
and liberal security discourses that have been dominant in the study of 
Pacific security, postcolonial theory provides a more historicised view by 
looking at the origins of unequal power relations from the colonial to the 
postcolonial era. PICs find themselves as subaltern entities in the global 
power dynamics, and often they are framed by neocolonial powers and 
their intellectual apostles through the ‘arc of instability’ and ‘failed states’ 
prisms. We shall examine this in more detail in Chapter 3.
The different theories discussed above have their own strengths as well 
as shortcomings, and they have their own analytical value when used to 
study the Pacific. Table 1 summarises the narratives around these security 
discourses and their significance in understanding security in the Pacific. 
These discourses will be used selectively in discussing various aspects of 
Pacific security in this book.
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Table 1: Security discourses and relevance to the Pacific
Security discourse Narrative Application to Pacific
Securitisation Threat is embedded in 
the language and the 
circumstances of usage .
Terms like ‘coup’, ‘arc of 
instability’ and ‘climate change’ 
invoke connotations of threat 
and thus become the basis for 
anxiety and feelings of insecurity .
Human security Situations, issues and factors 
that relate to and affect 
people’s livelihood rather 
than security of the state as 
traditionally assumed .
Relates to a whole range of 
social, economic, psychological 
and political issues such as 
poverty, employment, climate 
change, health and education . 
These issues are interrelated in 
the Pacific.
Postcolonial dominant security discourses 
are defined in terms of the 
interests of the ‘Western’ 
cultural prism . The views and 
interests of subaltern groups, 
many of whom were under 
colonial rule, need to be 
considered .
Most PICs are former colonies 
and are at the periphery of 
international capitalism and 
global power hierarchy . In many 
ways this also defines their 
security circumstances .
Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to demonstrate that security is not a given 
but a highly contested terrain and a dynamic and often arbitrary 
construct. Competing discourses try to define security using different 
ideological frames, conceptual tools, variables and contexts. For instance, 
securitisation theory focuses on the primacy of speech act, human 
security discourse is based on multiple situations of risks and threats to 
human well-being, the gender approach focuses on the dominance of the 
masculine culture, while the postcolonial approach provides an integrated 
narrative based on power through a dominant–subordinate relationship. 
The common strands in all these are two-fold: identifying the sources of 
threat or insecurity and ensuring peace. Again, the way these are defined 
is subject to conceptual and political contestation.
For the Pacific, one may be able to draw strands of thought from various 
security discourses to explain particular situations, not in a deductive 
way but in a critical and open-minded fashion in recognition of the 
strengths and limitations of the discourse in question. Indeed, some of 
the theories are fundamentally at odds with each other, and the way we 
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use them needs to be cautiously selective and evidence-based. The use of 
multiple discourses can be enriching because it enables one to visualise 
an issue and context from different conceptual and methodological 
vantage points without being hindered by the limitations of singular 
narratives. This is important for interdisciplinary-based studies such as 
this one, where seemingly disparate issues are framed as interconnected 
horizontally (across issues) and vertically (across different levels of issues). 
The approach is appropriate for the Pacific because of the interrelatedness 
and integration of social, economic, political and cultural issues associated 
with kinship-based semi-subsistence communities. Additionally, the wide 
diversity between and within PICs requires the use of multiple lenses to 
illuminate the manifest and latent dimensions of security. Often, the use 
of singular prisms can easily lead to generalisations, which oversimplify 
the complex social realities on the ground.
Let it also be emphasised here that the theories discussed in this chapter 
should not be treated as mere superficial abstractions; rather they are 
applied conceptual tools to help guide our understanding of the notion 
of security. Theories do not exist in isolation from social reality but rather 
reflect the way social reality is defined, framed and understood. For PICs, 
the challenge is the way theories are used to make sense of the constantly 




Swirling and divergent waves: 
Selected security dilemmas 
in Oceania
Just as the sea is an open and ever flowing reality, so should our oceanic 
identity transcend all forms of insularity, to become one that is openly 
searching, inventive, and welcoming.
Epeli Hau’ofa
One of the dilemmas in studying security in the Pacific is the wide diversity 
of cultures, political systems and states in the Pacific and the multiplicity of 
cultural, political, economic and cultural factors that are linked to security 
issues, thus making it difficult to provide a neat and generalised narrative. 
Attempts to create regional hard security and human security frameworks 
by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Pacific 
Islands Forum (PIF) have not met expectations due to difficulties 
in satisfying all the individual country conditions through unifying 
consensus. Like waves in a Pacific cyclone, they are often ‘swirling’ and 
‘divergent’. With this in mind, this chapter attempts to probe a number 
of interrelated aspects of regional security in a selected way, focusing on 
security perceptions and securitisation in relation to the terms ‘failed 
state’ and ‘arc of instability’, and the following internal political security 
dynamics among Pacific Island Countries (PICs): geopolitics and regional 
security, regional security mechanisms, human security, free trade and 
human security, hegemony and patronage, and climate change. Although 
these might appear to be disparate issues, in fact they are all connected 
to each other and to security at different levels and in different ways. 
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These  selected issues are examined using some of the conceptual lenses 
discussed in Chapter 2, in particular the postcolonial, securitisation and 
human security lenses.
Because of the specific historical characteristics of the PICs and the 
contemporary regional and global power dynamics that confine them 
to a relatively subaltern position, the postcolonial prism is employed to 
examine political, economic and cultural dynamics of interest. As former 
colonies, the history, sociocultural norms, sociopolitical structures and 
socioeconomic systems of most Pacific states are shaped to a significant 
degree by colonial hegemony and the effects of that are still felt today, 
despite years of formal independence. However, we need to keep in mind 
that there is a danger in applying concepts and theories simplistically. There 
are complex challenges in applying concepts, especially in relation to the 
interpretation of knowledge (epistemology), the subjectivity of meaning 
and the context in which the concepts are used. These complexities are 
compounded by the inherent cultural, political, historical and economic 
diversity of PICs (referring to sovereign national entities) and Pacific 
communities (referring to sociocultural groupings), which are often 
ignored in the clamour to create a generic ‘regional’ narrative such as the 
‘arc of instability’.
In the foreword to the book Securing a Peaceful Pacific, which provides 
a collection of articles by some of the Pacific’s leading experts on security, 
Don McKinnon, secretary general of the Commonwealth Secretariat and 
former foreign minister of New Zealand, proclaims:
The first decade of the 21st century in the island communities of 
the southern and central Pacific Ocean is proving to be a watershed 
period for the region’s security—change has already occurred and 
further change is imminent. (McKinnon, 2005: xi)
McKinnon goes on to identify three major security concerns: being 
‘exposed  and vulnerable to wider global forces’; ‘tension between 
traditional and … imported forms of leadership’; and ‘international, 
trans-border issues’. McKinnon’s solution lies in using collective regional 
approaches such as the Pacific Plan to consolidate ‘regional collaboration’ 
and even extending this to ‘regional integration’ (McKinnon, 2005: xi).
While some aspects of the hard security issues identified by McKinnon 
may still be valid, circumstances have changed in the last few years 
because of the increasing realisation of the importance of human security, 
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the emergence of climate change as a dominant security concern and the 
reconfiguration of intraregional geopolitics as a result of Fiji’s political 
manoeuvres since 2006. Also, the argument that regional collaboration is 
the panacea to national and local security problems needs closer scrutiny. 
While regionalism is a unifying discourse and practice, it is also potentially 
hegemonic and could become a political façade to hide entrenched 
interests and stratified power relationships. The two major Pacific 
hegemons, Australia and New Zealand, together with Fiji, a subhegemon, 
have carved out their own spheres of influence around which they define 
and impose their national interests over those of the other Pacific island 
states. Therefore when we talk of regional security we cannot sensibly 
talk of a unitary and shared security interest, but rather must consider 
a scattered, often contradictory set of ideological framings and political 
practices that are driven by inherent national interests, artificially framed 
and projected as universally applicable and consensually accepted under 
the euphemism of ‘regionalism’.
Therefore it is important to unpack the concept of regional security 
in terms of different layers of interests, thinking and activities that are 
intertwined in a complex web of often ragged and disjointed relationships. 
This chapter attempts to do so by, first, critically examining the terms 
‘failed state’ and ‘arc of instability’, which have been used as ideological 
prisms for framing Pacific security in recent years. The chapter examines 
the connotative and prescriptive imagery of the terms in the context of 
Said’s notion of orientalism and how such imagery carries resonance from 
the scientific racism movement of the Enlightenment.
The first part of the chapter uses the postcolonial prism to unpack 
the ‘arc  of instability’ assumptions regarding common primordial 
characteristics that run through the ‘unstable’ Pacific archipelagos, the 
so-called arc. The argument this chapter makes is that the PICs are so 
diverse in terms of their historical, political and cultural realities that to 
refer to them as an arc linked by common political and cultural experiences 
is an oversimplistic hypothesis. The chapter then provides a brief overview 
of regional geopolitics and implications on security. The following and 
related section looks at some regional security mechanisms and their 
role and implications in relation to the broader geopolitical and internal 
national dynamics of the region. Geopolitics is often the focus of regional 
security analysis in the Pacific and overrides other security considerations 
such as human security.
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The discussion on human security that follows is based largely on the 
attempt to put together a regional framework, which so far has proved 
challenging. The chapter then provides a critical examination of free 
trade in the form of the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations 
(PACER  Plus), together with its human security implications. This is 
followed by a discussion of the power dynamics of security, in particular the 
issue of patronage and hegemony and how they play out in the relationship 
between the small PICs countries and the bigger states, Australia and New 
Zealand. The last security factor to be discussed is climate change, which 
is a critical human security issue in the contemporary Pacific.
While admittedly these might not constitute all the security issues in the 
Pacific, they are significant in shaping the social, political, economic and 
cultural life of the Pacific and certainly do have potential to transform 
Pacific societies in dynamic ways in the future. The issues are not self-
contained but are interrelated and shape each other in complex ways.
The Pacific context
The diverse histories of the Pacific can be understood in the context of 
a chronological continuum from the earliest inhabited islands in the west 
to the most recently inhabited ones to the east. New Guinea (consisting of 
West Papua and Papua New Guinea), the largest of the Pacific Islands, was 
inhabited about 60,000 years ago while Aotearoa (New Zealand) to the 
east is estimated to have been inhabited around 700 years ago. The genesis 
of the Pacific people who live east of the Solomons can be traced back to 
Taiwan and South China. After more than 10,000 years of moving down 
the chain of islands in South-East Asia, they reached the Pacific Islands 
after admixtures with those who have already settled around Papua 
before continuing the journey eastwards. As shown by DNA of recently 
discovered skeletons in Vanuatu and Tonga, certain Asian groups might 
have continued to migrate eastwards without admixtures on the way and 
settled in Vanuatu, Fiji and the rest of the eastern Pacific. The darker-
skinned Papuan groups might have migrated eastwards later, resulting 
in more admixtures. Genetic tests indicate significant admixtures across 
the Pacific with varying degrees of traces of Papuan and Asian DNA, the 
former being prominent in the western part of the Pacific and the latter 
dominant in the eastern island groups (Kayser et al., 2008).
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This migratory process helped to create a transnational Austronesian 
cultural system, which starts in Taiwan, spans South-East Asia, crosses 
the Pacific and even includes Madagascar. People within the Austronesian 
cultural system largely share linguistic, cultural and genetic characteristics 
and are connected by the vast migratory routes that span tens of thousands 
of kilometres (Spriggs, 1997).
Despite the shared Austronesian cultural complex, different communities 
developed social structures, languages, norms and belief systems, which 
reflected their local conditions. The Pacific, where about 1,500 distinct 
languages are spoken by about 10 million people, is now the most 
culturally diverse region in the world. This is 25 per cent of the 6,000 
spoken languages of the world (Lynch, Ross & Crowley, 2002).
Attempts have been made in the past to categorise Pacific peoples 
into various anthropological groupings (Thomas, 1989). The most 
enduring was one by French explorer Jules Sébastien César Dumont 
d’Urville, who constructed and popularised three categories, namely 
Melanesia (black  people), Micronesia (small islands and people) and 
Polynesia (many islands and peoples) to cover the diversity of Pacific 
peoples and cultures across the entire Oceanic region (D’Arcy, 2003). 
Although variants of the ‘Polynesian’ category had been used earlier, the 
significance of these categorisations was that they framed Pacific peoples 
into racial boxes that became the basis for defining their identity. These 
categories were problematic because they assumed primordial and distinct 
differences between the different categories by drawing straight rigid 
lines to demarcate one racial region from the others (Hau’ofa, 1975). 
This fallacious narrative failed to consider the fluidity, continuity and 
interconnectedness of cultural systems across the Pacific from west to 
east. Genetic studies have also shown the complex admixtures among the 
Pacific peoples, thus making a mockery of these rigid racial classifications 
(Kayser et al., 2008; Spriggs, 1997).
European encounters
The early Europeans who visited the Pacific came in phases. The first were 
the explorers who arrived in the 1500s and for the next three centuries 
were  engaged in various activities, including claiming islands for their 
countries (Rigby, Van Der Merwe & Williams, 2018). Whalers, sealers, 
traders, planters, missionaries and a whole range of beachcombers arrived 
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in the early 1800s and their influence in transforming the cultures and 
social structures of the Oceanic communities were profound and long 
lasting (Edmond & Smith, 2003). The once autonomous subsistence 
societies were, because of such encounters, incorporated into the global 
capitalist system through the setting up of plantation economies, 
recruitment of cheap labour for other parts of the world such as Australia 
and South America, and trading of local products such as bêche-de-mer, 
sandalwood and other things (Campbell, 2011b).
Apart from missionaries, colonialism was probably the most 
transformative  foreign force. Almost every major colonial power was 
active in the Pacific, and every PIC became either a full colony or some 
sort of territory of a colonial power. Different European powers entered 
the Pacific and claimed colonies at different times with the Spanish being 
the first as early as the 1600s, followed by the Portuguese, Dutch, British, 
French, Germans and Americans in the 1700s and 1800s (Rigby, Van Der 
Merwe & Williams, 2018).
The Spanish annexed Guam and Mariana Islands in 1668 while the 
Portuguese took over East Timor in 1702 until independence in 1975 after 
which the Indonesians invaded and controlled the country. The British 
created their first colony in Australia in 1788 and Pitcairn Island, where 
descendants of the Bounty mutineers lived, in 1790. It later expanded its 
empire in the Pacific to incorporate New Zealand in 1840, Fiji in 1874, 
Kiribati (Gilbert Islands) in 1892, Niue in 1888, Tuvalu (Ellice Islands) 
in 1892, Solomon Islands in 1893 and Tokelau in 1899 (Fischer, 2013). 
The British were in competition with the French, who had established 
colonies in French Polynesia around the same time that Britain annexed 
New Zealand: Wallis and Futuna in 1837 and New Caledonia in 1853. 
Vanuatu was later added to the list but as a condominium with Britain 
in 1886, under a ‘joint naval commission’ and joint rule in 1906. Except 
for Vanuatu, none of the French colonies has become fully independent.
The Germans also acquired territories such as Nauru in 1888 and Samoa in 
1900; the latter occurred after the two Samoas (East and West) were split 
between the Germans and Americans in 1899 (Meleisea, 1987). It also 
established control of the north-east quarter of New Guinea, Federated 
States of Micronesia (FSM), Marshall Islands and Caroline Islands. 
Germany lost all its colonies to the Allies during World War I with Nauru 
being taken over by Australia and Samoa by New Zealand. Japan assumed 
control of FSM, Palau and the Marshall Islands after World War I but 
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lost them again during World War II. Although Dutch explorers were in 
the Pacific from the 1600s, most of their colonial activities were focused 
on the western part of the Pacific. Apart from Indonesia, their territories 
were limited to West Papua, which was initially under the Dutch East 
Indies from 1828 to 1949, when it became an overseas territory of the 
Netherlands (Matsuda, 2012).
New Zealand and Australia, which were themselves British colonies, 
became proxy mini colonial powers for Britain. New Zealand became the 
administering power for Western Samoa (1920–62), Cook Islands, Niue 
and Tokelau, while Australia took over administration of Papua from 
Britain in 1906 and German New Guinea in 1914. The United States was 
mostly involved in the northern Pacific. It annexed Hawaii in 1893, took 
control of Guam and Philippines from Spain in 1898, gained control of 
American Samoa in 1899, and, in 1945, took over Marshall Islands, Palau 
and Northern Marianas from Japan (Fischer, 2013).
The colonial encounter transformed the Pacific communities in deep 
and complex ways. Some of the typical reconfigurations included the 
centralisation of power under a single authority using both legal and coersive 
means to pacify the local population; imposition of a new political system 
that mirrored the colonial political values and structures; the establishment 
of a capitalist economy and development strategy to serve the interests of 
foreign traders, planters and investors; the imposition of taxation that 
forced locals to generate cash by whatever means for the colonial state; the 
creation of a local working class through the appropriation of local cheap 
labour; the alienation and commodification of land by Europeans; and 
the creation of a local comprador class to serve as a conduit between the 
colonial state and the local communities (Crocombe, 2001).
These developments had different manifestations in different PICs, 
given their unique circumstances. They also redefined the security 
configurations of the PICs in significant ways. In many cases, there was 
outright resistance to taxation, loss of land and political power, and in 
some cases there was a certain degree of collaboration and willingness by 
locals to accept colonial rule. By the time of independence, the colonial 
legacies were still instrumental in defining the shape and direction of 




The independence process in the Pacific took more than two decades, 
starting with Samoa in 1962 and followed by Nauru in 1968. The 1970s 
and 1980s saw a wave of decolonisation sweep across the Pacific with Fiji 
and Tonga (a British protectorate) becoming independent in 1970, Papua 
New Guinea in 1975, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu in 1978, Kiribati in 
1979 and Vanuatu in 1980 (Firth, 1989). The US territories of Marshall 
Islands and Federated States of Micronesia achieved self-governing 
status and entered into a Compact of Free Association arrangement with 
the United States in 1986 and 1994 for Palau (Hezel, 2013). None of the 
French colonies has become independent and, officially, the British still 
possess a territory in the form of Pitcairn Island.
Upon independence, the PICs had to respond to the new demands 
of statehood in a fast-changing regional and global environment. 
Colonialism had transformed then into subaltern entities at the margins 
of global power, and one of the first tasks was to claim a place at the 
table of nations where they could be recognised as sovereign states, 
a  right they were denied under colonialism (Connell, 1981). One way 
of doing this was to join the United Nations as full voting members and 
forming regional organisations such as the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in 
1971, University of the South Pacific in 1972 and Air Pacific, to name 
a few. These organisations were expressions of political self-actualisation 
and autonomy in a region contested by the two Cold War antagonists, 
the United States and the Soviet Union.
The PIF was established by some independent PICs as an alternative 
forum to the South Pacific Commission (SPC), a regional organisation 
set up in 1947 by the Pacific colonial powers to provide development 
support for the PICS as well as to keep the Pacific in Western hands and 
free of Soviet influence during the Cold War (Crocombe, 2001). The PIF 
allowed for discussions of political matters, unlike the SPC, and, after 
a major reorganisation of regional institutions, it became focused on issues 
of governance, security and trade whereas the SPC was responsible for the 
more technical, cultural and scientific aspects of regional development. 
To some degree, the end of the Cold War lifted the pressure on small 
Pacific island states to adhere to the Western bloc’s ideological agenda, 
enabling them to focus on other important aspects of regional security 
and sovereignty (Henningham, 1995).
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The political systems of the PICs differ considerably. The former US 
territories, Nauru and Kiribati, have presidential systems whereas the 
others have various localised versions of the Westminister system (Ratuva, 
2011b). Tonga is the only monarchy, modelled pretty much along the 
lines of its British counterpart. One of the features of the political systems 
is the syncretic relationship between, on one hand, the indigenous social 
structures and norms, and the Western model of liberal democracy on 
the other (Ratuva, 2004). The relationship between these two systems 
involves a dynamic process of accommodation, contradiction and 
synthesis over time. While there are moments of accommodation, there 
are also moments of tension and contradiction, and at times aspects of 
the two systems may synthecise into new structures and norms. Most 
PICs have experienced different types of conflict that are unique to their 
specific circumstances (Henderson & Watson, 2005).
While attempts have been made to paint conflict in the PICs using a broad 
brush under such generalised labels as ‘arc of instability’, the reality, as this 
book tries to demonstrate, is that those conflicts—whether they be coups 
in Fiji, violence in Solomon Islands, riots in Tonga, land conflict in Samoa, 
civil war in Bourgainville and so forth—have nothing to do with each 
other and result from the specific historical and sociopolitical dynamics 
in those respective countries. As in any other country, most of these 
conflicts have their genesis in colonial and postcolonial developments and 
need to be understood in those contexts rather than using superficially 
constructed stereotypic labels to avoid the difficult questions of historical 
causes (Henningham, 1995).
The economies of the PICs are quite diverse in terms of size, resources 
and productivity (Duncan, 2016). The bigger countries to the west of 
the Pacific are much more resourceful than those towards the east. For 
instance, the economies of Papua New Guinea and Fiji combined make 
up more than 80 per cent of the total PICs economies (AFTINET, 2018). 
Fiji, with its relatively advanced industrial base, constitutes more than 
80 per cent of intraregional trade outside Australia and New Zealand. 
The  western Pacific countries of Fiji, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and 
Papua New Guinea are part of the Melanesian Spearhead Group trade 
bloc. The  disparity in the trade relations among themselves, especially 




The largest money-earners for some PICs are tourism, remittances, 
fisheries, mining and forestry. Remittances in particular have become 
the economic backbone of local communities because money received 
is non-taxable, goes straight to families and provides an important 
social safety net against poverty (Choong, Jayaraman & Kumar, 2011). 
The large diaspora Pacific community and short-term seasonal labour 
schemes to New Zealand and Australia sustain the remittance economy. 
Aid, as we shall see later in the chapter, is still a significant source of 
development funds, the leading donors being Australia, the United States, 
China, New Zealand and Japan (Dornan, 2013). There are, however, 
fundamental differences in aid strategies. Australia is focused more on 
institutional reforms with money flowing back to Australia through the 
use of subcontractors and consultants, most of whom are Australian-
based; US aid is focused more in its former territories in the North Pacific 
under the compact arrangement; and Chinese aid is through ‘soft’ loans 
for largely public infrastructural purposes (Dornan & Pryke, 2017). 
Chinese development assistance is the fastest growing and provides more 
than 50 per cent of Fiji’s external infrastructural funding and 30 per cent 
of aid to Cook Islands, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu. Australia and New 
Zealand recently increased their aid allocation to the PICs in response to 
the expansion in Chinese economic influence (Lyons, 2018).
Despite the commitment to economic growth and trade, most PICs still 
rely on the semi-subsistence sector to support families on a daily basis. 
More than 70 per cent of the people in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu 
and Solomon Islands live in rural areas and rely primarily on subsistence 
living (Ratuva, 2010). Different countries have different degrees of 
urbanisation and subsistence dependency. At the same time, urbanisation 
has been increasing at a phenomenal rate with young people moving into 
urban areas for education, employment and other reasons. This has led 
to increases in crime, unemployment and associated problems. Inequality 
has also been exacerbated by the push towards neoliberal growth, which 
has led to social and economic problems as well as threatening security 
(Gamage, 2015).
Despite the fact that most PICs do not export any products, many 
have recently signed the PACER Plus, a regional free trade agreement 
spearheaded by Australia and New Zealand. Perhaps the most significant 
regional issue now, apart from regional trade, is climate change because of 
its potential impact on regional economies, environment, social stability 
and general well-being of the people.
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Outsider perceptions of Pacific peoples
Sociologically, perceptions are powerful mechanisms for framing others, 
and often the imagery constructed can shape subconscious attitudes 
to a group (Jussim, 2012). The encounter between Pacific peoples and 
Europeans involved both conflict and accommodation as the two strange 
cultures cautiously engaged and monitored each other for signs of 
hostility or friendliness. The two encountering groups held vastly different 
cultural world views. The views of the early Europeans were shaped by the 
philosophical, religious and cultural norms and ideals of their European 
societies whereas for many Pacific communities, social solidarity, 
reciprocity, collective ownership and subsistence production were the basis 
of their social organisation and cosmological world (Salmond, 1991).
Many Pacific Islands were named according to how they conformed to 
certain European cultural and moral imaginations (Gascoigne, 2014). 
For instance, when Magellan crossed the Pacific and came across Guam 
and the Mariana Islands by accident in 1521, he named the Marianas 
‘Island of Thieves’ after locals who helped themselves to pieces of iron 
from his ship (Bergreen, 2004). Captain Cook named Tonga ‘Friendly 
Islands’ (after being surprised by the welcoming and congenial attitudes 
shown by locals) and referred to Hawaii as ‘Sandwich Islands’ in honour 
of John Montagu, Fourth Earl of Sandwich, who as First Lord of the 
Admiralty was one of his sponsors (Hough, 2003). For a long time, Fiji 
was known as ‘Cannibal Isle’, a name that compelled sailors to avoid the 
place (Peck, 2010). Tahiti was named ‘New Cythera’ by Bougainville after 
the Greek islands where Aphrodite, goddess of love, rose from the sea 
(Martin, 2008).
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s notion of humanity as naturally good and noble 
was influential in the way Bougainville constructed the Tahitians he 
encountered in mid-1767 (Martin, 2008). He coined the term ‘noble 
savage’ to refer to those who still lived an idyllic and romantic life in the 
islands, which were abundant in food, and where people were naturally 
hospitable and sex was freely practised without much moral restriction 
(Marcelles, 2011). This played well with the European image of the 
innocence of savages, untouched by the vagaries of Westernisation. Two 
notions of the noble savage were identified, namely ‘soft primitivism’, 
such as Tahiti, because of the romantic, easy, pure and bountiful lifestyle, 
and ‘strong primitivism’, such as Australia and New Zealand, where the 
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indigenous inhabitants had to work hard because of harsher climates, 
which made them tough and Spartan. The ‘soft primitivism’ narrative was 
the more durable. It was the commodified version that became part of 
tourism imagery in later years. Paul Gauguin memorialised these myths 
in his paintings of Tahitian women (Staszak, 2004).
The other side of the coin was the term ‘ignoble savage’ to refer to those 
of darker skin colour on the western side of the Pacific, who were seen 
as barbarous, blood-thirsty savages and cannibals (Kabutaulaka, 2015). 
These stereotypes were reinforced by their classification as Melanesians, 
a term first used by Jules Dumont d’Urville, a French explorer, to refer 
not only to skin colour but also their ‘inferior’ and ‘dark’ moral and social 
character. Missionaries later reinforced these stereotypes through their 
emphasis on the ‘light’ and ‘dark’ spiritual dichotomy, which was taken 
literally to also include God’s human creations. This played into the intra-
Pacific racial prejudice with Polynesians regarding Melanesians as inferior 
(Kabutaulaka, 2015).
The romantic imagery of the ‘soft primitivism’ variant has been 
popularised in Hollywood movies such as South Pacific (1958), a romantic 
musical based on James Michener’s Tales of the South Pacific, and Paradise 
Hawaiian Style (1966), starring Elvis Presley. There have been other 
movies with the same thematic narratives over the years, including 
Moana (2016), a celebrated animation by Disney. Moana was a classical 
attempt to construct a mythological paradise using demeaning stereotypes 
about the child-like, innocent and supernatural-minded nature of ‘noble 
savages’ (Perry, 2016). Disney was making about US$300 million a month 
from the film while the Fijian indigenous owners of the knowledge argued 
that this was a clear case of intellectual theft and wanted compensation 
(Amid, 2014). This was a case of bio-piracy and intellectual property theft 
that enriched a large multinational at the cost of the indigenous people.
By the 1990s, new imagery began to emerge, including the ‘fatal impact’ 
theory proposed by Alan Moorehead in his book, The Fatal Impact, 1767–
1840, in which he argued that colonialism and European contact had 
caused unimaginable destruction that was beyond the control of Pacific 
peoples (Moorehead, 1990 [1966]). It had the social Darwinian notion 
that diseases and cultural influences were inevitable. The fatalistic narrative 
failed to consider the fact that the Pacific peoples were also conscious 
agents of change and active participants in historical change rather than 
just passive driftwood floating around at the whim of the waves in a sea 
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of transformation. By the 2000s, scholars and policy-makers began to see 
the Pacific through the deficit lenses of the ‘vulnerability’ thesis (Barnett 
& Waters, 2016). Predicated on the neoliberal economic narrative of 
scarce resources and commodification, the Pacific countries were framed 
as economically backward, lacking in resources, poor in skills and low in 
technological innovation, and therefore in need of the saving hands of 
Western aid donors (Rustomjee, 2016).
The Pacific has acted as a laboratory for racial categorisation and 
labelling and a testing ground for those trying to ensure the workability 
of their stereotypic ideals and Eurocentric views about humanity. In the 
next section, the notions of ‘arc of instability’ and ‘failed states’ will be 
explored in detail in the broader context of securitisation, including their 
implications on intergroup perception and security.
Pacific orientalism and securitisation: The 
‘failed state’ and ‘arc of instability’ imagery
As the securitisation theory suggests, using politically and ideologically 
loaded labels to frame a group of people or a country has the capacity to 
shape the security environment and people’s consciousness of a threat. 
In the context of this approach, threat is constructed via perception and 
articulated as ‘real’. This is where the securitisation and postcolonial 
approaches converge, at least to some extent. The use of words that 
influence action (as securitisation theorists emphasised) and the use 
of imagery to cast a culture in stereotypic imagery (along the lines of 
Said’s notion of orientalism) is an important convergence point to delve 
into the phenomenological implications of the ‘failed state’ and ‘arc of 
instability’ (FASAI) thesis. Such imagery has profound implications for 
security because of the way they cast Pacific communities as potential 
threats to peace and stability, not only to themselves but also to Australia 
and New Zealand (the two regional Western powers) and the greater 
region. The  FASAI discourse has been unashamedly repeated over and 
over again by scholars and the media to provide easy answers to complex 
problems, to the extent that it has gained near-universal traction as well 
as being institutionalised (through the introduction of the Fragile State 
Index) as part of the mainstream political discourse. It has even been used 




I argue that the subtexts behind FASAI go beyond the positivistic level of 
political science typology. In fact they conjure deeper phenomenological 
meanings, reminiscent of the social Darwinian idea of racialised 
stratification that has its theoretical genesis in the Enlightenment. Perhaps 
the starting point here is Said’s notion of orientalism, described as:
Dealing with the Orient [Third World] by making statements 
about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, 
settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for 
dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient 
… politically, sociologically, scientifically, and imaginatively. 
(Said, 1978: 3)
Said was making reference to a host of images predicated on negative 
stereotypes, paternalism and prejudiced assumptions that shaped European 
perception of the ‘orient’, which by and large referred to the postcolonial 
world. Today, in our changing postmodern world where cyberspace 
communication, social media and unrestricted information consumption 
envelop our daily lives, constructed imagery become powerful expressions 
of security and power that shape our attitude, behaviour and actions.
Over the years a proliferation of negative imagery has been used to 
‘securitise’ the Pacific. This ranges from the region as an ‘arc of instability’ 
(Ayson, 2007) consisting of ‘failed states’ (Wainwright, 2003) to some 
even making global comparisons by referring to the situation as an 
‘Africanisation of the Pacific’ (Reilly, 2000). An Australian political 
commentator argued that the notion of ‘failed state’ might not be reflective 
of the situation and suggested an equally grim label of ‘barbed wire’ reality 
(Dobell, 2007). Some have tried to express ‘sympathy’ by substituting the 
term ‘arc of opportunity’ for the term ‘arc of instability’ (Wallis, 2015) 
to reframe the situation, but the fundamental orientalist assumptions are 
still latent.
While these terms might be recent constructions, the images they conjure 
have similar deficit and demeaning connotations to the 19th-century 
notions of ‘noble savages’, of romantic but primitive Polynesia or the 
‘ignoble savages’ of Melanesia, consisting of morally despicable cannibals 
some of whom populated the ‘Cannibal Isle’ (Fiji). These images continue 
to resonate in such terms as the ‘arc of instability’ and ‘failed states’, 
referring to countries deemed to consist of people who are somewhat 
politically unstable, unreliable, unsophisticated and warlike; lack values 
of good governance; are unable to run their economies; and are corrupt 
and perpetually in a state of intertribal antagonism. Under the façade of 
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diplomacy, racial and cultural prejudices are often concealed but remain 
as latent cultural variables that seek to justify patronising and often 
imposing and intimidating approaches by bigger powers in the form of 
aid and interventionist foreign policy.
FASAI has been much more associated with so-called Melanesia, which 
itself is a racially loaded terminological designation, which refers to 
‘black’ people of the western Pacific. The term ‘Melanesia’ has become 
intellectually institutionalised as a racialised category. Not only does the 
term describe the colour of skin pigmentation of people but also over 
the years it conjured up connotations and images associated with savagery, 
cultural backwardness and intellectual inferiority (Kabutaulaka, 2015). 
Dumont d’Urville (2003: 164) classified ‘the many varieties of the human 
species that live on the various islands of Oceania’ who were different 
by virtue of ‘their many peculiar moral and physical features [which] 
no doubt require us to regard them as two separate races’. Melanesians, 
he suggested, are:
People with very dark, often sooty, skins, sometimes almost as 
black as that of the Kaffirs, and curly, fuzzy, fluffy but seldom 
woolly hair. Their features are disagreeable, their build is uneven 
and their limbs are often frail and deformed … Nevertheless, there 
is as much variety in skin colour, build and features among the 
black people of Oceania as among the numerous nations who live 
on the African continent and make up the race that most authors 
have referred to as Ethiopian. (Dumont d’Urville, 2003: 164)
The reference to Africa reflected the European obsession with the ‘dark 
continent’ mythologised in European travel accounts and literature 
over the years (as in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness) as the antithesis 
of European civilisation. Similar comparisons between Africa and 
Melanesia were made by a number of people, including Reilly (2000) 
and Downer (2003a).
Dumont d’Urville’s ideas reflected the growth of essentialism and scientific 
racism in European thought during the period of the Enlightenment, 
whereby societies were stratified according to their level of civilisation 
and progress, and black races were positioned at the lowest stratum of 
humanity (Fredrickson, 2000). It was not only a matter of skin colour: 
deeper than that was what Western observers saw as the primitive and 
decadent nature of their cultural life, their low level of intelligence, 
their moral depravity and their archaic social system. Scientific racism 
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had roots in the works of Chevalier de Lamarck about the inheritance of 
inborn biological traits over generations and was given prominence by 
various scholars, including Charles Darwin, who popularised the theory 
of evolution in his book, On the Origin of Species (Darwin, 1859). Some 
social scientists used Darwin’s theory as a basis for constructing hierarchies 
of societies according to levels of civilisation. The dominant assumption 
was that Western societies were the fittest and had the capacity to outlive 
the inferior black races. This came to be known as social Darwinism, 
a discourse that heavily influenced some 19th- and 20th-century writers 
from diverse disciplines (Hodgson, 2004). Early colonial officials such 
as Fiji’s first governor, Sir Arthur Gordon, were not only influenced 
intellectually and morally by this trend of scholarship but also used it as 
justification for their colonial policies to control and pacify the colonised 
who were deemed intellectually and socially inferior.
The Darwinian idea of lineal progression and stratification was prominent 
in major disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, political science, 
psychology, philosophy, economics, literature and other areas of study 
in the 19th and 20th centuries. In the mid-19th century, it shaped the 
ideas of such social scientists as Auguste Comte, regarded as the father 
of sociology, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber and even Karl Marx, all of 
whom attempted to use the ‘scientific method’ to discover laws of human 
behaviour to promote human freedom and progress (Seidman, 2008).
By the 20th century, the idea of human progression and hierarchical 
development was developed further into more complex narratives of 
social structures, norms and behaviour. Influential American sociologist 
Talcott Parsons identified variables such as ‘particularism’, ‘ascription’ and 
‘diffusion’ as characteristics of primitive societies as opposed to ‘efficacy’, 
‘achievement’ and ‘specificity’ for advanced societies (Parsons, 1991). 
These differentiated societal characteristics became the ‘scientific’ basis for 
the modernisation theory, which by the 1960s had become the mainstream 
development discourse to justify global capitalism. Lerner, a leading 
American proponent of the modernisation discourse, saw Caucasian races 
as more advanced intellectually and technologically and boasted:
Modernity is primarily a state of mind-expectation of progress, 
propensity to growth, readiness to adapt oneself to change. The 
nations of the North Atlantic area first developed the social 
process—secularisation, urbanisation, industrialisation, popular 
participation—by which this state of mind came to prevail. 
(Lerner, 1965: viii)
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For non-Caucasians, their ‘traditional’ status, reinforced by inherited 
characteristics that inhibited their drive towards modernity, would soon 
give way to superior cosmopolitan cultures. To this end, Cyril Black, 
in his book, The Dynamics of Modernisation, said:
Cosmopolitan criteria of personal association replace the restraints 
imposed by race, creed, family and caste. The former divisions 
between peasants, townspeople and aristocrats have given way 
to a more homogeneous society in which one’s position depends 
more on individual achievement than on inherited status. 
(Black, 1966: 19)
The idea of progression and stratification was also prevalent in 
development  economics. One of its proponents, Walt Rostow 
(1960), outlined five stages of growth, from ‘traditional’ to ‘high mass 
consumption’, which many used as the defining discourse for modernity 
and legitimation of global capitalism as the only natural system. Rostow’s 
theoretical schema has been criticised for being ahistorical, culturally 
prejudiced and a justification for US global imperialism. Nevertheless, this 
narrowly Western-centric view was also prevalent in mainstream political 
science, where people like Samuel Huntington proclaimed Anglo-Saxon 
models of liberal democracy to be the most developed and mature form 
of political system, which ought to be emulated by underdeveloped 
non-Western societies (Huntington, 1965).
Moreover, by the end of the Cold War, the idea of the triumph of Western 
culture, capitalism and liberal democracy became an ideological obsession 
of right-wing scholars such as Huntington and Francis Fukuyama. 
Fukuyama’s End of History (1995) used the Hegelian historical dialectics 
discourse of the contesting interaction between ‘thesis’ and ‘anti-thesis’ 
(representing the competition between capitalism and socialism) to argue 
that capitalism had finally triumphed. With the  collapse of the Soviet 
empire, Western liberal democracy was seen as the yardstick for political 
stability, democracy, participation, efficiency and progress while other 
systems were seen as inappropriate or ‘failed’. Despite its fundamentally 
flawed assumptions and the fact that the ‘end of history’ thesis quickly 
became redundant as a result of fast-changing global events, for a short 
time it had traction and some supporters:
The rise and fall of nation-states is not new, but in a modern era 
when national states constitute the building blocks of legitimate 
world order the violent disintegration and palpable weakness 
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of selected African, Asian, Oceanic, and Latin American states 
threaten the very foundation of that system. International 
organisations and big powers consequently find themselves sucked 
disconcertingly into a maelstrom of anomic internal conflict and 
messy humanitarian relief. Desirable international norms such as 
stability and predictability thus become difficult to achieve when 
so many of the globe’s newer nation-states waver precariously 
between weakness and failure, with some truly failing, or even 
collapsing. In a time of terror, moreover, appreciating the nature 
of and responding to the dynamics of nation-state failure have 
become central to critical policy debates. How best to strengthen 
weak states and prevent state failure are among the urgent 
questions of the twenty-first century. (Rotberg, 2003: 1)
Rotberg’s quote above is representative of widespread and entrenched 
views among the scholarly and diplomatic communities in the West and 
captures the underlying sentiments of the dominant powers in relation to 
the so-called ‘failed states’. The same sentiments are also reflected in the 
words of Alexander Downer, Australia’s minister for foreign affairs from 
1996 to 2007:
When you have a failed state, it’s a state that can be exploited 
by people such as money launderers, drug traffickers, people 
traffickers, possibly even terrorists. It’s an environment which can 
be exploited by those types of people … It has happened where 
states have tottered on the edge of failure or in the case of Somalia 
been failed states. I don’t want the analogy of Somalia to be taken 
too far. But I think these are very real risks and it’s important 
Australians understand that this is expensive; there are some 
dangers involved in this. It’s not highly dangerous like the war in 
Iraq, but there will be islands to become a failed state and a failed 
state to fester off the coast of Australia, then we don’t know what 
that failed state could be exploited for, and by whom it could be 
exploited. But it does constitute risks to Australia in the medium 
term. (Downer, 2003a)
Downer was securitising Australia’s relationship with the Pacific states by 
directly constructing a security divide, which saw Australia as the victim 
to be protected from the Pacific threat. The subaltern, postcolonial states 
of the Pacific, as possible spaces for nurturing terrorists, posed security 
threats to Australia, an advanced democracy. Rhetoric was different from 
reality because Australia, not the Pacific Islands, became a fertile breeding 
ground for terrorists, as evidenced by the capture of a number of terrorists 
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in the country over the following years (Donnelly, 2011). The association 
made with Somalia intensified the Africanisation imagery that Ben Reilly, 
an Australian scholar, advocated:
As these facts suggest, it is hard to escape the conclusion that 
we are today witnessing the progressive ‘Africanisation’ of the 
South Pacific region. ‘Africanisation’ refers to four interrelated 
phenomena that have long been associated with violent conflict 
and the failure of democratic government in Africa: the growing 
tensions in the relationship between civil regimes and military 
forces; the intermixture between ethnic identity and the 
competition for control of natural resources as factors driving 
conflicts; the weakness of basic institutions of governance such as 
prime ministers, parliaments and, especially, political parties; and 
the increasing centrality of the state as a means of gaining wealth 
and of accessing and exploiting resources. (Reilly, 2000: 262–3)
It has been argued that Reilly’s theory is full of inaccurate empirical 
observations and fallacious assumptions (Fraenkel, 2004).
It was, however, not the first time that the Pacific had been compared 
to Africa, as we saw earlier in the case of Dumont d’Urville. Since the 
Enlightenment, Africa has often been seen in the popular Western 
imagination as a marker of primitivism. The tendency to link the Pacific 
to African countries is part of the racialisation of discourse that Said 
was talking about in his orientalism theory. Hall (1996), as we saw in 
Chapter 2, also elaborated on this in his ‘West and the rest’ thesis. Critics 
have argued that the notion of the failed state is a pre-emptive ideological 
strike weapon that gives big powers an excuse for intervention in the 
affairs of smaller powers (Nay, 2012). It had been suggested that this 
is a salient factor in Australia’s ‘cooperative intervention’ policy (Fry & 
Kabutaulaka, 2008).
The notions of ‘failed’ and ‘fragile’ states are not just academic typologies 
used by both liberal and conservative scholars; they are also widely used 
as policy and analytical tools in the areas of peace-keeping, development 
strategies, aid programs, diplomatic negotiations on global security, 
humanitarian assistance, poverty reduction strategies, international trade 
agreements and foreign intervention by states, international agencies and 
even civil society organisations (Wallis, 2015; Fry, 1997; Wainwright, 
2003). However, there has been growing criticism that the terms are 
ideologically and politically defined to distinguish countries that do not 
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conform to Western values and thus provide justification for intervention 
in these countries under the pretext that they are security threats 
(Nay, 2012). The invasion of Iraq and the Regional Assistance Mission to 
the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) were justified by means of this narrative. 
The terms ‘failed’ and ‘fragile’ state are Western-centric and frame the 
world into a  ‘them’ (failed) versus ‘us’ (non-failed) binary, which Hall 
(1996) talked about, and in doing so demarcates the world into a security 
dichotomy. This is problematic because it attempts to fit all countries into 
a one size fits all generic security template and ignores their cultural and 
historical diversity (Call, 2008).
Often the term is defined in a realist way where the state is perceived as 
a strong and coercive entity and its ability to exert itself on the population 
determines its legitimacy, stability and robustness. This narrow definition 
denies the existence of non-state structures, social networks, indigenous 
world views, cultural capital and informal social systems that keep 
society together. In addition to this, the term ‘failed’ state is defined and 
used liberally in different ways by different people to suit their political 
interests. As such it often takes on very negative connotations, which are 
readily used to condemn, intimidate or dismiss the state as unworthy of 
being included in the civilised global order.
Thus, in the broader context of Pacific regional security, the terms used 
matter as they can shape perception, behaviour and policies. Concepts 
are not isolated symbols but are part of a bigger language–cultural system 
that frames the world in particular ways. The terms ‘failed’ and ‘fragile’ 
state and ‘arc of instability’ are securitising terms that define images of 
the Pacific to suit the political and ideological fashion of the beholders. 
They are not ‘neutral’ political science typologies as some scholars 
want to pretend but loaded concepts that reinforce the ‘them’ versus 
‘us’ security dichotomy as well as transforming the nature of interstate 
relationships. They are among the latest classificatory concepts within the 
broader discourse of lineal progression and stratification of humanity and 
have their theoretical genesis in the Enlightenment. Inherent in this is 
the dichotomous idea of ‘advanced’ versus ‘primitive’ and, in this case, 
‘successful’ versus ‘failed’. Within this dominant world view, European 
societies belong to  the positive and non-European societies belong to 
the negative sides of the  equation. This same intellectual tradition had 
branded Pacific societies as ‘savages’ and now deems them to have ‘failed’. 
The point to make here is that the demarcation and ranking of people 
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and repetition of words to reinforce these judgements becomes part of the 
political language and reality and an integral part of the Pacific security 
discourse over time.
Often Pacific regional security is defined and understood only in relation 
to events and geopolitical relationships. While this is significant, it is 
also important to understand the more subjective meanings of labels and 
imagery used to categorise countries and people. They represent certain 
views, assumptions and attitudes, often hidden behind the veneer of 
diplomacy, yet which have the potential to shape security thinking and 
policies in profound ways.
Securitising the Pacific as generic region: 
Deconstructing the myth
The ‘Pacific’ is often seen in generic terms as a region consisting of people 
of similar cultures, thinking and social systems. In New Zealand, for 
instance, the term Pasifika, a ‘localised’ version of Pacific, implies people 
of similar identities who are stereotyped as dumb, fat, lazy and welfare 
parasite ‘coconuts’ (Salesa, 2017). A similar deficit insinuation is implicit 
in the term ‘arc of instability’, which paints the Pacific as a  bunch of 
countries that share the same ‘unstable’ characteristics that make them 
‘vulnerable’. There is a subconscious assumption about a virus of instability 
spreading like wildfire across the Pacific and enveloping the region in an 
infectious way. In the broader security prism, the Pacific is seen as a high-
risk and volatile area that needs constant supervision and oversight by 
big powers.
These generalisations do not take into consideration the different 
historical,  socioeconomic and sociocultural specificities of individual 
countries and the fact that their security issues are unique to their 
particular conditions and are not a shared characteristic. A broad scan 
across the Pacific from west to east will show not a pattern of similarities 
but a range of diversity in terms of historical experiences, sociopolitical 
structures, cultural norms and the factors that led to conflicts. I want to 
emphasise this point by briefly examining the situations in a number of 
countries and identifying their salient differences.
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Let us start with Timor Leste, the westernmost state in the arc. Perched on 
the Asia-Pacific ‘border’, Timor Leste has been going through a process of 
post-independence transformation after years of colonial subjugation under 
the Portuguese, later the Japanese and, most recently, the Indonesians. 
Tens of thousands of Timorese lost their lives over the years as a result 
of brutality by the Japanese and Indonesian invaders. Their eventual 
independence in 2002 provided a chance to construct a new nation from 
the ashes of colonial dismemberment and civil war (Jardine, 2002). When 
the Indonesians invaded East Timor in 1975, Australia, Britain and the 
United States were complicit parties by endorsing Indonesia’s takeover. 
Australia continues to be a beneficiary of its proximity to East Timor by 
claiming oil reserves within East Timor’s territorial waters. This has put 
a choke hold on Timor Leste’s economic capacity and is a major cause of 
the rift between the two countries. While the ‘arc’ theory places the blame 
for political misfortune on the incapacity of the country’s people to sort 
out their own domestic affairs, the contribution of external colonial actors 
are often ignored. Colonisation, wars and genocide have ravaged the 
country so badly that it has taken considerable effort by the international 
and local communities to rebuild it. The simplistic label of ‘unstable’ does 
not help in understanding the country’s complex colonial history.
Next door to Timor Leste is West Papua, whose only link with Timor 
Leste is having a common colonial power in the form of Indonesia. West 
Papua had been a playground for resource competition by the European 
powers, but the Dutch eventually made their claim in the 1800s. 
Indonesia claimed West Papua as well as other Dutch colonies when it 
became independent in the 1940s (Leadbeater, 2018). West Papua was 
caught up in broader Cold War politics with the United States. This 
thwarted the West Papuan move towards independence. Negotiations led 
to the New York Agreement in 1962, whereby the United States and the 
Netherlands, with the support of other powers and the United Nations, 
conspired to transfer the territory to Indonesia. To legitimise the deal, 
the United States supervised the Act of Free Choice as a referendum to 
determine whether West Papuans wanted independence or integration 
with Indonesia. The Indonesians picked 1,025 men out of 800,000 people 
and coerced them into making their pro-Indonesian choice. The vote 
was considered ‘unanimous’, and West Papua became the twenty-sixth 
province of Indonesia under its new name of West Irian. West Papua’s 
relentless struggle for independence, in which hundreds of thousands of 
people have died, continues to this day (Leadbeater, 2018).
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The point to note here is that most of the problems of West Papua thus 
far have been due to foreign colonial interests, including big mining 
conglomerates like Freeport, which benefits handsomely from Indonesia’s 
colonialism. West Papuans do not have a state of their own to run, and 
this distinguishes them from other Pacific states in the ‘arc’.
The situation in Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) had unique features 
that were different from the previous two cases because it involved 
indigenous landowner resistance to the exploitative and environmentally 
destructive extraction of their resources by Rio Tinto, the Australian 
mining conglomerate, facilitated by the Papua national government. 
The violence that followed shifted from a military-style confrontation 
between the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army to intracommunity violence. The consequences for 
the small Bougainville community were devastating. A peace agreement 
and the eventual setting up of an elected autonomous government paved 
the way for political stability, but the task of creating a viable economy 
with or without mining and total independence from Papua New Guinea 
remains a major challenge for the future. A planned referendum will 
eventually determine the future of the country (Adams, 2002).
On the PNG mainland itself, issues of law and order are not necessarily 
linked to Bougainville but are consequences of the country’s dramatic 
transformation from a tribal subsistence economy with community-based 
sociocultural structures and norms to full-blown capitalism and liberal 
democracy. Enthused by an abundance of cash from natural resources, the 
grey area between tradition and modernity has been the site for violence, 
crime and corruption. This is a major challenge for many resourceful 
postcolonial societies where the state becomes the conduit between 
competing modes of production and competing elites vying for power 
and resources (Lucker & Dinnen, 2010).
Solomon Islands, as a former British protectorate, also has a very different 
colonial history from Timor Leste and West Papua. It was largely governed 
through the British governor in Fiji, who was also high commissioner for 
the western Pacific. The paternalistic governance arrangements created 
tension between the British and the locals, and often the punitive reaction 
of the British was swift. This served only to worsen the relationship. 
The establishment of the colonial plantation economy created a system 
of internal labour migration, and the consequent pressures on land and 
resources contributed to tension between the people of Guadalcanal, who 
were the local landowners, and the people of Malaita, who were mostly 
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migrant labourers (Moore, 2004). The growing inequality and power 
imbalance further aggravated the tension, which erupted into full-fledged 
intertribal violence in 1999. Regional intervention through RAMSI 
was an Australian-funded regional initiative to respond to the escalating 
security situation in Solomon Islands. RAMSI will be examined in more 
detail in Chapter 6.
The Vanuatu situation is quite different from the Timorese, West Papua, 
Bougainville and Solomon Islands situations in several respects. Vanuatu 
was a condominium (joint colony) of France and Britain and, while 
there was an attempt at secession by a group backed by French and other 
business interests, the country has been relatively stable, except for riots in 
1989, a prison breakout, the occasional stand-off between the police and 
the military, and changes in government as a result of changing loyalty 
of politicians. The National Council of Chiefs, or Malvatu Mauri, has 
been a strong cultural pillar in reconciliation in times of disturbances. 
Competition over wealth by the elites, as seen in PNG, is not much of 
an issue in Vanuatu because of a lack of mineral resources. Instead, there 
is a major push by the government and community for preservation 
of the subsistence indigenous economy and a disdain for individualistic 
capitalism (Wirrick, 2008). However, there have also been cases of 
corruption involving politicians and, in a recent case, a former prime 
minister was imprisoned for bribing other parliamentarians, who also met 
the same fate.
Fiji’s political and security situations are quite distinctive from those of 
other countries mentioned for a number of reasons. For a start, a large 
diaspora population consisting mainly of Indo-Fijians, together with other 
ethnic groups, shaped both the demographic and ethno-power politics, 
which largely revolved around contestation for power by the indigenous 
Taukei and the Indo-Fijians. Although ethnicity has often been seen as 
‘the’ major driver of conflict in Fiji, the situation is much more complex 
and needs to be understood in terms of the dynamic interplay between 
ethnicity, elite competition for political power, socioeconomic inequality, 
intracommunal loyalty, racialised perception, religious affiliation, role 
of the military, cultural identity and the politics of land and resources. 
On top of these is the role of ethnic entrepreneurs in whipping up ethnic 
sentiments to serve political ends. The coups in Fiji between 1987 and 
2006 were associated with various combinations of some of these, and 
in any particular case some factors would be more dominant than others 
(Ratuva, 2011a).
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While some of the variables associated with Fiji politics might be similar 
to those present in other PICs, the nexus between them, including the 
historical and the sociopolitical circumstances under which they occur, 
are quite different from interactions elsewhere, and the results and 
consequences are also different.
Although, in terms of history, genealogy and culture, Tonga and Fiji share 
a lot in common, the factors that shape their internal security situations are 
very different indeed. Tonga’s political conflict emanates primarily from 
its rigid class system, whereby the monarchy and its loyal band of nobles 
rule over an increasingly disgruntled commoner class (Campbell, 2011a).
The differences between the hereditary ruling class’s desire to maintain 
its power and privileges and the commoner’s desire for emancipation 
from the  clutches of the constitutional monarch through greater 
democratisation of the political system led to tension, culminating in the 
2006 riots. The constitutional reforms in 2010 saw the relinquishing of 
some power by the monarch and the establishment of provisions to enable 
the first commoner prime minister to be elected.
In Samoa, conflict tends to be confined to villages, where social fractures 
caused by disputes over land and titles are pervasive and are among 
the major causes of tension and instability (Tiffany, 1980). Although 
Samoa does not have a military, unlike Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu (which has 
a paramilitary force) and PNG, it does have a well-equipped riot police 
unit armed with semi-automatic high-powered rifles, which is deployed 
when there is a serious security situation. The widespread use of firearms 
in village conflicts in Samoa is a threat to future stability in a country 
where strict adherence to tradition and admiration for modernity are 
simultaneously celebrated in a paradoxical way.
Conflict in the French territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia 
has been influenced largely by socio-economic inequality and resistance 
to colonial rule, although there are also existing intercommunal tensions 
between non-French groups (Fisher, 2013). In New Caledonia, violence 
in the form of killings, hostage crises, riots and assassinations have been 
common. The referendum on independence on 4 November 2018 was 
won by anti-independence voters (56.4 per cent to 43.6 per cent), a victory 
that was followed by unrest triggered by dissatisfied indigenous Kanaks. 
Under the Noumea Accord agreed between the political leaders, there 
is a possibility of further referendums in 2020 and 2022 (Fisher, 2018). 
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However, as yet, there is no timetable for independence for French 
Polynesia, although it has been reinscribed on the UN decolonisation list 
despite protests by France. The push for independence is still strong, and 
how it plays out in the future remains to be seen.
These brief examples show that conflicts among the Pacific countries have 
little relationship with each other in terms of one directly influencing 
the other. While it is undeniable that national conflicts have some 
degree of influence on regional politics and security in terms of regional 
responses, they are generally self-contained and, apart from RAMSI in 
Solomon Islands, solutions to conflicts are often found within the affected 
countries themselves. The growing consciousness about peace-building 
at the regional level has led to the growth of civil society organisations, 
regional organisations such as the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) 
and international organisations such as UNDP, participating actively in 
conflict resolution and security projects. Regional solutions to national 
conflict problems might work up to a point, but, for sustainability, 
local citizens must be at the helm in providing direction and the 
appropriate mechanisms.
The point here is that securitising an entire region using generalised 
narratives such as ‘arc of instability’, ‘Pacific identity’, ‘Pacific way’, ‘Pacific 
security’ and so forth does little to eliminate complex local realities. While 
there are of course shared security issues relating to inequality, gender, 
climate change, poverty and other human security factors, these are 
universal conditions, happening elsewhere in the world, which emanate 
from similar circumstances taking place simultaneously but are not 
transmitted from one country to another. Addressing specific historical 
conditions and their local consequences is important in understanding 
the security situation more clearly, rather than framing generalised 
securitising narratives and labels that neither illuminate the historical and 
security reality nor help in formulating viable strategies for addressing 
them. This is the reason for using the detailed comparative case studies 
approach in this book.
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Geopolitical security narratives 
and responses
Because it is sandwiched between the major powers in the form of the 
United States to the east and Russia and China to the west, the Pacific 
Ocean has inevitably become a common space for strategic, political and 
economic interaction (Ratuva, 2014). While the economic and strategic 
focus has been on Asia, the PICs, despite their small size, also play a vital 
role in the bigger strategic picture. The geopolitical significance of the 
Pacific to global politics was first realised during World War II when it 
became the battleground against Japanese invasion. Almost all countries 
in the northern and western Pacific were invaded by Japanese forces, and 
other PICs contributed to the war effort by sending soldiers to fight the 
invading Japanese military (Van der Vat, 1992).
The end of World War II and the start of the Cold War heralded a new 
era of Pacific regional security. The two contending nuclear powers, the 
US and the USSR, and their respective allies, used the Pacific for naval 
and other military bases, and as a testing ground and deployment arena 
for their forces (Firth, 1987). Meanwhile, PICs—many of which were 
colonies of Western powers like Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France 
and the Netherlands—were shepherded into a Western sphere of influence 
to prevent their being influenced by communism.
One of the first attempts to do so was the setting up of the South Pacific 
Commission (SPC) under the Canberra Agreement of 1947. The work 
and policy prescriptions of the SPC, consisting of the colonial powers 
and their colonies, were based on technical and developmental issues and 
deliberately ignored political and security matters that were of concern to 
most PICs. The need to openly address political and security issues such 
as independence and nuclear testing, which the colonial powers were not 
willing to discuss, was a decisive factor that led to the formation of the 
Pacific Islands Forum in 1971 by the independent PICs (Crocombe, 2001).
Regional security in the Pacific from the 1940s to the 1980s was very much 
shaped by Cold War geopolitics. Under the policy of ‘strategic denial’, 
the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and United States) treaty provided 
a broad security umbrella to keep Soviet influence at bay and to maintain 
the Pacific as an ‘American lake’ (Hayes, Zarsky & Bellow, 1987). Aid was 
an important source of leverage to ensure that PICs remained within the 
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ANZUS political and ideological orbit at a time when PICs were eager 
to express their independent identities in a dramatically changing world. 
To cement their nuclear and strategic capabilities, the major colonial 
powers—the United States, France and Britain—tested nuclear bombs 
in their respective territories (Firth, 1987). The United States tested their 
bombs in the Marshall Islands from 1946 to 1958, France on Moruroa 
Atoll in French Polynesia from 1966 to 1996 and Britain on Christmas 
Island in Kiribati from 1956 to 1958. Within the half-century from 1946 
to 1996, the three nuclear powers conducted more than 315 nuclear tests 
in the Pacific (Maclellan, 2015).
These tests had environmental, health, economic and political 
consequences for the islands. Many islanders, like servicemen who were 
involved, were exposed to large doses of deadly radioactive materials, 
which continued to linger over the years. In the broader geopolitical 
context, the tests incorporated the Pacific peoples as reluctant participants 
in the realities of Cold War contestation and the arms race and made 
them pawns in the swirling politics of global power. While it is easy to 
dismiss nuclear tests as merely matters of military and strategic interest, we 
must not forget that they had a profound influence in providing coercive 
legitimacy to colonialism at a time when anti-colonial ‘winds of change’ 
were blowing around the world. The nuclear bombs were a  symbolic 
representation of the big powers’ hegemonic territorial claims, although, 
unlike the local population, citizens of the big powers did not have to live 
with the environmental and health consequences. Having said this, it is 
important to also emphasise that many servicemen involved in the tests 
suffered both short-term and long-term health consequences as a result of 
the tests (Maclellan, 2018).
The tests were just part of the broader trend of militarisation in the Pacific 
in the form of military bases and alliances. Although the United States was, 
at least in terms of Roosevelt’s rhetoric, not predisposed towards classical 
British-type colonialism, it nonetheless had formal control of a number 
of PCIs in the north, which it used to serve its strategic interests. As part 
of its strategic containment thrust against the Soviet Union, the United 
States had numerous military bases and other military facilities around 
the Asia-Pacific region. There were 343 of these in 1947, 235 in 1949, 
291 in 1953, 256 in 1957, 271 in 1967, 183 in 1975 and 121 in 1988 
(Blaker, 1990). The number of bases decreased further over the years, 
especially after the Cold War.
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Sandwiched between the two major contesting adversarial powers, 
the Pacific people found themselves reluctant players in a game of 
domination by foreign powers, and this inspired the establishment in 1975 
of people-led resistance movements against nuclear imperialism in  the 
form of the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) movement 
(Robie, 1992). This testified to the growing discontent of Pacific peoples 
about the activities of the major powers in their part of the world, as 
well as concern about the future security and livelihood of the region 
(Maclellan, 2015). The multiple campaign issues of the NFIP movement 
recognised the interconnected nature of different aspects of colonial 
hegemony, including nuclear tests, land rights, militarisation, unequal 
and exploitative development, human rights, colonialism, environmental 
degradation and other related concerns. For a long time it was the major 
critical voice against colonialism and the major advocacy network for 
both hard and human security in the Pacific.
It must be remembered that the NFIP movement was part of the wave of 
anti-nuclear sentiment that swept the world. In the Pacific this led to the 
declaration in 1984 of a Nuclear Free New Zealand by the ruling New 
Zealand Labour Party under Prime Minister David Lange, who, in an 
Oxford Union debate against Jerry Falwell, leader of the American Moral 
Majority, declared nuclear weapons to be ‘morally indefensible’ (Lange, 
2004). This was followed by the signing of the South Pacific Nuclear 
Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ) by 13 member countries of the Pacific Islands 
Forum on 6 August 1985 in Rarotonga, Cook Islands. As we will see later, 
the SPNFZ was the first regional security agreement, and it set the tone 
for more regional security agreements in the future.
By the end of the Cold War there was a dramatic shift in the regional 
security configuration as a result of both internal and external dynamics. 
The United States started to reduce its economic assistance to PICs, 
except for its northern Pacific territories. It closed the USAID office in 
Suva and reduced its military presence around the Asia-Pacific region, 
including closing the Subic Bay naval base and Clark air force base in 
the Philippines and reducing the numbers of military personnel in Japan. 




The resulting strategic vacuum in the Pacific was quickly filled by China, 
a growing world power whose economic and political influence in the 
Pacific increased greatly as a result of its soft power approach in the form of 
aid and other non-military means (Wilkins, 2010). This has been a major 
challenge to Australia and New Zealand, two close allies of the United 
States, whose sense of territorial hegemony as major regional players was 
often based on the rather paternalistic ideological assumption that the 
Pacific was their ‘backyard’ (Fry & Kabutaulaka, 2008).
The involvement of external powers in the Pacific had a competitive 
dimension, with countries trying to win support and loyalty. Obama’s 
pivot to Asia and the Pacific saw the intensification of US economic, 
political and strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific region at a time 
when China had established itself as a major Pacific power. Over the years, 
China had outdone the United States in providing aid to the Pacific and 
in gaining diplomatic leverage (Ratuva, 2014). Concerns about losing 
control of the Pacific (Hayes, Zarsky & Bello, 1987) inspired a reversal of 
the immediate post–Cold War strategy of rolling back from engagement 
with the region towards re-engagement, culminating in the visits to the 
Pacific by presidents  Bush and Obama, as well as senior US officials 
such as Hillary Clinton, who attended the Pacific Island Forum leaders 
meeting in Rarotonga in 2012. The PICs have always voted with the 
United States and the Western allies in the UN general assembly, and this 
was an asset the Western bloc did not want to lose to China or any other 
potential adversary.
On the other hand, the Chinese, who have become the largest aid donor 
for many Pacific states, had to deal not only with the United States 
but also with Taiwan in a long-running battle for global recognition 
(Atkinson, 2010). Since the 1980s, both have been involved in cheque 
book diplomacy as a  way of gaining recognition as the legitimate 
representative of the Chinese people among the PICs. Taiwan actually 
needs recognition by other states as a way of fulfilling the UN definition 
of a ‘state’. Six countries in the Pacific (Marshall Islands, Solomon 
Islands, Tuvalu, Nauru, Palau and Kiribati) recognise Taiwan as a result of 
economic inducements. The competition between China and Taiwan has 
influenced the behaviour of political elites and internal political instability 
in various ways in Solomon Islands, Vanuatu (which changed allegiance) 
and Kiribati over the years (Ratuva, 2014).
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Apart from the Chinese, other powers like Russia and Georgia began 
to show interest in the Pacific Islands because of their voting potential 
in the United Nations. Russia has been campaigning for recognition 
by the United Nations of the Georgian breakaway provinces of South 
Ossetia and Abkhasia, whereas Georgia has been adamant that this is 
not going to happen. Both countries therefore splashed money to win 
hearts, minds and, of course, votes (Ratuva, 2014). The Arab League also 
actively campaigned in the Pacific before the UN vote to accord Palestine 
a ‘non-member observer state’ status in 2012. Four Pacific states (Nauru, 
Palau, Marshall Islands and Federated States of Micronesia) voted 
against Palestine, and the rest abstained. Indonesia has also been actively 
campaigning diplomatically to counter the region-wide support for West 
Papuan independence (Firth, 2013).
Among the Pacific island states themselves, the existence of subregional 
groupings in the form of the Melanesian Spearhead Group and the separate 
leaders’ meetings of the Polynesian and Micronesian groups has created 
a certain degree of political division in the region, although they have 
not really led to any deep fragmentation in the region. Perhaps the most 
divisive issue revolved around Fiji. After Fiji’s suspension from the PIF, 
it proceeded to set up its own alternative regional body called the Pacific 
Islands Development Forum (PIDF) (Dornan, 2013).
The tension between Fiji and the two big Pacific powers, Australia 
and New Zealand (whom Fiji consistently accused of spearheading its 
suspension from the PIF), had repercussions for regional stability and 
security. Fiji used the opportunity to engage proactively with its ‘look 
north policy’, which saw China being embraced as a saviour in Fiji’s 
hour of need. The close political, economic and military links between 
Fiji and China raised concerns among the Western powers, which felt 
threatened by what they saw as China’s expansionist agenda in the central 
Pacific, close to Australia and New Zealand. Relationships between Fiji, 
Australia and New Zealand began to thaw, and full diplomatic relations 
were restored after the Fiji general elections in 2014. Despite that, tension 
still lurks beneath the surface.
The brief regional security narrative above is really meant to provide 
a  broad overview of some of the salient geopolitical issues that have 
shaped the geopolitical security environment in the Pacific. There are a 
number of important points to remember here. First, while the individual 
countries have unique historical experiences and internal sociopolitical 
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dynamics, as discussed earlier, at another level, they are linked by strands 
of security policies, thinking and practices, emanating from external 
powers or from among the PICs. Regional security therefore becomes 
the site for negotiation between national sovereign security interests 
and collective regional and global security interests. Second, when we 
talk about regional security, we are referring to a changing and dynamic 
phenomenon. Changes in the geopolitical balance of power, as witnessed 
at the end of the Cold War and with the rise of China, often result in 
changing security dynamics and responses of individual PICs or groups 
of PICs (as a regional bloc). Third, the PICs often find themselves 
subsumed into a vortex of security contestation of the big powers, as we 
saw during the Cold War and the period after. In some cases, PICs saw 
themselves as pawns in the power game between the contending external 
powers (Ratuva, 2017a). Fourth, PICs can no longer ignore the fact that 
they are now part of the bigger global security agenda, and the challenge 
they face is how they redefine their identity in a way that comfortably 
facilitates both the local and global narratives. Fifth, as we saw in the 
case of Fiji, emerging fault lines caused by political differences may see 
more intraregional tension, more so at a time when subregional groups 
are beginning to exert their identity and significance. The last point here 
is that, in the long term, regional security problems will need to be sorted 
out internally using local mechanisms for conflict resolution. This should 
be built into the regional architecture as part of the political process rather 
than something to be activated only when problems arise.
Regional security mechanisms
Members of the PIF countries share a growing consciousness about 
their role in determining the future trajectory of regional security as 
a result of emerging issues relating to transnational crime, development, 
environmental concerns and political stability (Anderson & Watson, 
2005). The response by the PIF was to put in place a number of declarations 
that were meant to be guidelines for dealing with emerging security 
situations. The first of these was the Declaration on Law Enforcement 
(Honiara Declaration) signed in Honiara, the capital of Solomon Islands, 
in 1992 (PIF, 1992). Although this declaration focused largely on regional 
cooperation regarding law enforcement relating to crime, it had the 
latent function of regionalising the security concerns of individual PIF 
countries. The rationale was that an adverse law enforcement environment 
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posed a major threat to the sovereignty, security and stability of the 
region. The Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC), consisting of 
security-related government personnel and departments, was tasked with 
coordinating security-related activities and met just before the leaders’ 
meeting in order to provide advice for the leaders on matters pertaining 
to security.
Five years later, in 1997, the PIF leaders crafted the Aitutaki Declaration 
during their retreat on the island of Aitutaki in the Cook Islands. This 
agreement was more comprehensive than the Honiara Declaration 
and was far more specific about issues of regional security. It outlined 
a number of principles relating to: promoting a comprehensive, integrated 
and collaborative approach to security; good governance, sustainable 
development and international cooperation, including preventive 
diplomacy; overcoming vulnerability, building mutual confidence and 
strengthening the overall security of states in the region; and recognition 
of the need to resolve conflict by peaceful means, including by customary 
practices. An interesting aspect of the Aitutaki Declaration was the 
recognition of the need for preventive diplomacy using the FRSC, 
the offices of the Forum Secretary General, eminent persons, fact-finding 
missions and third-party mediation (PIF, 1997).
These principles reflected the shifting realities on the ground, anxiety 
about unpredictable political conflict and the need for collective 
responses with an emphasis on preventive measures. However, it just 
fell short of prescribing intervention—this was to be provided for by 
the Biketawa  Declaration. Signed in Kiribati in November 2000, the 
Biketawa Declaration was a direct response to the Fiji coup in May 2000 
and the Solomon Islands political crisis of the same year. It reiterated and 
also tightened up key aspects of the Aitutaki Declaration, but perhaps the 
most significant provision dealt with the possibility of intervention. While 
it respected ‘the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of 
another member state’, the Biketawa Declaration proclaimed:
Forum Leaders recognised the need in time of crisis or in response 
to members’ request for assistance, for action to be taken on the 
basis of all members of the Forum being part of the Pacific Islands’ 
extended family. The Forum must constructively address difficult 
and sensitive issues including underlying causes of tensions 
and conflict (ethnic tensions, socioeconomic disparities, lack of 




One of the significant aspects of this provision was that possible 
intervention was to be requested by a member country. A formal request 
by the Solomon Islands Government led eventually to the signing of the 
agreement for RAMSI deployment in 2003. However, the situation was 
much more complex than it appeared to be. Two Solomon Islands prime 
ministers had earlier made requests to Australia in 2000 and 2001, at the 
height of the conflict, but these were turned down. In fact the Australian 
Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, was adamant that:
Sending in Australian troops to occupy the Solomon Islands 
would be folly in the extreme. It would be widely resented in 
the Pacific region. It would be difficult to justify to Australian 
taxpayers. And for how many years would such an occupation 
have to continue? And what would be the exit strategy? The real 
show-stopper, however, is that it would not work … foreigners do 
not have answers for the deep-seated problems afflicting Solomon 
Islands. (Downer, 2003a)
As a result of 9/11 and the changing global security climate, Australia 
made a U-turn and agreed to the Solomon Islands’ request. Underpinning 
this change in view was the assumption that Solomon Islands was a ‘failed 
state’ and a potential breeding ground for terrorists, from where they 
could attack Australia. Thus, on 24 July 2003, Solomon Islands signed an 
agreement with six member states of the Pacific Islands Forum, namely 
Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Tonga and Samoa, to 
allow the security forces from those countries to enter Solomon Islands 
under the umbrella of RAMSI. We will look at the details of the conflict 
in Solomon Islands, as well as some of the shortcomings of RAMSI, 
in Chapter 6.
On the other hand, the PIF response to the Fiji crisis in 2006 was 
an exercise in futility because Fiji’s coup leader, Commodore Frank 
Bainimarama, did not take the eminent persons delegation of the forum 
seriously and ignored the PIF’s appeal for an early election. This was one 
of the reasons for Fiji’s suspension from the PIF, a decision that still has 
repercussions today. Fiji’s suspension provided it with an opportunity 
to create an alternative geopolitical configuration to suit its regional 
ambitions. We look at the Fiji situation in more detail in Chapter 4.
While the Biketawa Declaration has attracted considerable attention, little 
is known of the Nasonini Declaration, another regional agreement signed 
in the wake of 9/11 following the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 
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on counter-terrorism. Signed in Suva in 2002, this was an anti-terrorism 
declaration framed within the broader rubric of global and regional 
security. Governments and regions around the world were required to put 
in place anti-terrorism mechanisms in support of Resolution 1373 and, 
for the PIF states, the Nasonini Declaration, named after the Suva suburb 
where the PIFS office is located and where the signing took place, was part 
of their contribution to the war on terror.
While the various security declarations above unified the Pacific under 
formal security rubrics, the reality on the ground in terms of internal 
political dynamics is more complex than any universal regional agreement 
can fully grasp. Even the Pacific Plan, which was created in 2005 as 
a  blueprint for regional governance, growth, sustainable development 
and security, failed to address the multiplicity and complexity of security 
issues. The new Regional Framework established in 2015, and meant to 
be the substitute for the Pacific Plan, has been facing difficulties in terms 
of implementation because of the challenges in addressing the diversity 
and complexity of security issues.
Regional human security: Integrating diversity
We saw in Chapter 2 how the notion of human security has taken global 
policy thinking by storm since the 1990s. Although human security 
is a relatively new concept in the Pacific, its influence on regional and 
national policies has grown exponentially over the years. This growth is 
due to the combined efforts of international agencies and aid donors in 
instilling the virtues of human security in Pacific island states and civil 
society organisations through multilateral and bilateral relations, aid, 
policy engagement and civic education. Although hard security has been 
the dominant regional narrative (see for instance Henderson & Watson, 
2005), the affirmative reception to the concept of human security is due 
to its all-encompassing nature, which blended well into Pacific indigenous 
cultural world views where political, social, economic, psychological and 
cultural components of life are inseparably linked.
The regional human security framework is a result of a series of 
consultations between the UNDP, PIFS, civil society organisations and 
governments over a period of a few months in 2007. The consultations 
arrived at some degree of broad understanding about some of the shared 
human security issues in the Pacific relating to development, land, ethnic 
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relations, climate change, environment, resources distribution, inequality, 
gender, education, human rights and other issues (UNDP,  2007). 
Nevertheless, there is still a divergence of opinions over what human 
security should specifically entail, especially given the diversity of Pacific 
cultures and national interests. For instance, there is debate as to whether 
human security should be framed in terms of threat to individuals, as 
the UNDP argued, or threat to the community, as many Pacific civil 
society organisations suggested during the consultation. The compromise 
reached was that both are important. One of the lessons learnt by 
UNDP during a regional consultation in Nadi, Fiji, was that the cultural 
context is important and, for many Pacific communities whose ethos 
revolves around communal-based and semi-subsistence life, well-being is 
fundamentally defined by the shared culture of the group.
The 2007 consultations, which were attended by the author, also reached 
a consensus that gender equality was a critical issue in understanding 
the security of the group, especially in times of transition and conflict in 
predominantly patriarchal Pacific communities. Gender issues, it must be 
noted, permeate social categories and communities, although how they 
are conceptualised differs considerably across the social spectrum; at one 
end of the continuum are the more conservative cultural traditionalists 
and fundamentalist Christians, who believe in the natural inferiority 
of women, while on the other side of the scale are the more educated 
and progressive thinkers who believe in gender equality (UNDP, 2007). 
And there are, of course, those who oscillate in between. Participants in 
the consultation saw the progressive position as providing the necessary 
ideological fulcrum for the future trajectory of gender relations and social 
transformation in the Pacific. The tension between the two ends of the 
social continuum will continue, and arriving at a consensus, especially at 
the national and community levels, is a major challenge.
One of the major challenges with the operationalisation of the concept 
of human security in the Pacific is the difficulty in incorporating it into 
public policies in a genuinely serious way. The political pressure by 
donors and international partners might open up possibilities of countries 
manufacturing data that could get them a higher ranking in the UNDP 
Human Development Index (HDI), where human security variables 
are used extensively. Annual reports of human security projects are also 
written in an exaggerated way to please donors. The lack of expertise in 
appropriate interdisciplinary field methodologies is a major drawback, 
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more so because most professionals in the Pacific are trained in a mono-
disciplinary fashion. Another major drawback is the lack of consciousness 
of what human security is and its importance in national development.
In response to these concerns, PIFS devised a common template for 
a human security framework for the small island states. The framework 
resulted from a region-wide consultation in collaboration with UNDP, 
other regional organisations, civil society organisations and government 
agencies. The framework aims to ‘provide a clear common foundation 
and strategic guidance to Forum Island Countries, the Secretariat and 
other stakeholders for improving the understanding, planning and 
implementation of human security approaches in stand-alone and broader 
peace, security and development initiatives in the unique Pacific context’ 
(PIF, 2009). Apart from the consultations held between 2006 and 2008, 
the framework also draws from the major regional security declarations 
including the Aitutaki Declaration (PIF, 1997), Biketawa Declaration 
(2000), Leaders’ Vision (2004), Pacific Plan (revised 2007) and directives 
from the FRSC in Outcome Statements (2006–11).
One of the problems with the framework is that it is too rigid in its 
definition and, at the same time, too abstract; it lacks clarity about the way 
it is to be actualised in unique real-life Pacific situations. One of the 
PIF’s dilemmas is to ensure that policy-makers in member governments 
understand the policy utility and beneficial outcomes of human security 
in relation to development, governance, well-being and security generally. 
Even the FRSC, whose task is to provide regional security policy direction 
for the Forum leaders, has been unable to fathom the significance of 
the term. At its Auckland meeting in 2008, attended by the author, it 
was clear that ‘hard’ security was still paramount and should remain 
a primary factor in the regional human security framework. This position 
was not surprising because of the way in which traditional hard security 
psychology was firmly implanted in the perception and ideology of state 
institutions. It will take time to ensure that human security becomes an 
integral component of contemporary strategic and policy thinking.
Although the regional human security framework is based on the five 
principles of being preventive, localised, inclusive, collaborative and 
people-centred, there is no clear direction as to how these are to be 
applied in practice. Not only does the framework lack internal conceptual 
coherence, it also lacks analytical depth and strategic direction for effective 
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implementation. It is largely an isolated document created by regional 
bureaucrats who have minimal links to communities outside the PIFS 
headquarters in Suva, Fiji.
Free trade and human security
In recent years, the impact of free trade on Pacific communities, especially 
its impact on human security, has been vigorously debated. Central to 
the debate is whether free trade is necessary to enhance the development 
of Pacific societies or is destructive to their lives and undermines their 
well-being. The discussions have revolved around the possible impact of 
PACER Plus, the region’s most recent free trade agreement, which was 
signed on 14 June 2017 by Australia, New Zealand, Tonga, Niue, Nauru, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Cook Islands.1 Fiji, Papua 
New Guinea and Vanuatu refused to sign, although Vanuatu has since 
changed its mind and will probably sign soon. Other countries that did 
not sign were Marshall Islands, Palau and Federated States of Micronesia, 
and the excuse given was transportation difficulties.
Proponents of PACER Plus are of the view that regional free trade is 
a  panacea for the future growth challenges of PICs’ economies. Trade 
liberalisation and alignment with World Trade Organization (WTO) 
trade rules, it is argued, will allow for greater competition and a wider 
variety of choices in terms of goods and services for Pacific customers, 
thus driving down prices. Although import tariffs, an important source of 
revenue for governments, will be lifted, based on a formula implemented 
progressively over time, advocates of neoliberal policies firmly contend 
that other forms of taxation such as Value Added Tax (VAT) will make 
up for the deficit. For instance, Ronald Duncan, a well-known Australian 
scholar and advocate of neoliberal economics argued:
Trade liberalisation with the rest of the world is likely to be the 
most beneficial policy for Pacific countries to follow, whether done 
unilaterally or by joining the WTO … Once trade liberalisation is 
identified as an important policy reform, the most important issue 
1  Apart from PACER Plus, other regional trade agreements include the South Pacific Regional 
Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA), a non-reciprocal preferential agreement 
between the PICs and including Australia and New Zealand, which started in the 1980s; Pacific Island 
Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) between the PICs and excluding Australia and New Zealand; 
and the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), a trade agreement with the European Union.
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would be the identification and removal of the binding constraints 
to its adoption. These may be institutional, economic, policy-
related, or cultural, among others—including the opposition of 
vested interests. Within the Pacific, opposition to open markets is 
very strong and supported by vested interests, ideology, and cultural 
beliefs. Economic issues also constrain the response to changes in 
the terms of trade through trade liberalisation, such as insecurity 
of land tenure and poor access to credit. (Duncan, 2008: x)
The reference to social and cultural issues as ‘binding constraints’ that need 
‘removal’ represents a typical neoliberal narrative, which sees unrestrained 
hard economics as undisputedly paramount over other aspects of human 
security. The reference by Duncan to ‘vested interests’ is contentious 
because it assumes that critics of free trade in the Pacific, who largely 
consist of academics, activists and civil society organisations, somehow 
stand to gain financially from the absence of free trade.
In 2009, Australia’s Minister for Trade, Simon Crean, vaunted the virtues 
of PACER Plus as both a free trade and development-based agreement 
that goes a long way to integrating the Pacific economies as well as opening 
up their borders to a greater flow of goods, labour and services:
PACER Plus is not just a trade agreement: it is fundamentally 
concerned with developing the capacity of the Pacific region. 
It is clear that PACER Plus could address a number of issues 
common to the whole region. For example, how to comply with 
the quarantine requirements into Australia and New Zealand; 
developing consistent rules of origin within the region; the 
importance of improving aviation links to encourage greater 
tourism; and liberalisation of the telecommunications industry are 
just a few areas that have been raised with me. It is also clear that 
there is great potential to develop a region-wide labour mobility 
and skills development program for the Pacific. Of course, each 
country will have individual concerns specific to their nation and 
people—and we envisage that this too will be part of the structure 
of future discussions as we move forward. (Crean, 2009)
Although in the same speech Crean denied that Australia pressured 
the PIF to start negotiation on PACER Plus, the chief trade adviser for 
the PICs, Dr Chris Noonan (a University of Auckland academic), thought 
otherwise: ‘The pressure to negotiate a WTO-compatible agreement is 
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coming from Australia and New Zealand rather than the Forum Island 
Countries. That’s been the whole history of the PACER-Plus process’ 
(Maclellan, 2011).
Australia and New Zealand committed themselves to providing funds of 
up to A$1 million initially for three years for the Office of Chief Trade 
Adviser (OCTA) to provide advice for the PICs in response to their 
plea for more advice and capacity-building towards future negotiations. 
This financial offer complicated matters because it was perceived as 
compromising the independence of the OCTA. Australia even suggested 
that, as chief bankroller, it should have a say in the governance of the 
OCTA. Shifting the OCTA to Port Vila was seen as a much better idea 
than having it housed in the PIFS in Suva because of direct influence 
by Australia through the economic governance director, an Australian 
(Pacnews, 2010).
Strong sentiments were expressed about the need to make OCTA 
independent from the PIF because of possible interference by Australia 
and New Zealand. Noonan resigned as director of OCTA due to what 
he saw as the bullying tactics by Australia and New Zealand in leveraging 
their powerful position to force negotiations on small island states. He was 
replaced by Dr Edwini Kessie, a WTO employee and passionate believer 
in trade liberalisation, who oversaw the negotiations until the end.
The major pro–free trade narratives revolve around a number of 
selling points, including creating a more open and predictable trading 
environment; consistency and transparency of rules throughout the region 
on sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade and 
customs procedures; greater liberal and product-specific rules of origin; 
growth of investment in the region, particularly by New Zealand and 
Australian investors; greater certainty around tariffs for exporters; more 
opportunities for trade-related development assistance for PICs; and 
a more mobile labour force in the region (NZMFAT, 2017).
When PACER Plus was finally endorsed on 20 April 2017, the event was 
hailed as a great success by the New Zealand Minister for Trade, Todd 
McClay, who said:
This is a significant achievement. After 8 years of negotiations, 
we can now focus on implementing an agreement which future-
proofs our access whilst helping develop their export economies 
… PACER Plus is a unique trade and development agreement. 
It  includes a development package of more than $55 million 
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that will help raise standards of living, create employment 
opportunities and increase export capacity in Pacific Island 
countries … The  agreement will also create a common set of 
trading rules covering goods, services and investment in support of 
economic growth. These rules will help reduce tariffs and red tape 
for exporters and investors, which will increase the attractiveness 
of the region for trade and investment. (NZMFAT, 2017)
Is agreement on free trade to be considered a ‘success’ or, as opponents 
would argue, a threat to the well-being of the Pacific people? The argument 
that PACER Plus is a threat to vulnerable PICs is based on broader 
human security concerns. The removal of tariffs means a  significant 
reduction in revenue for import-reliant PICs. PICs will need to make up 
this financial loss through other means such as VAT and other forms of 
taxation, which will burden local consumers further. In addition, local 
industries, especially in manufacturing, processing and agriculture, can be 
overwhelmed by the unrestricted flood of foreign goods entering the local 
market. Local industries do not have the resilience and ability to compete 
with global producers on a level playing field. The reality is that there is 
no level playing field because foreign companies have the advantage of 
greater capital outlay, technology and resources and are backed by more 
powerful economies. Although goods might be cheaper, the resulting 
unemployment can lead to poverty, social marginalisation and crime. 
Economic grievances built up over time have the potential to fuel political 
agitation and violence. We have seen this in Fiji, Solomon Islands and 
Tonga, the three case studies in this book, where feelings of socioeconomic 
marginalisation have readily translated into explosive political grievances 
and violent action.
The unrestricted availability of cheap unhealthy food such as New Zealand 
mutton flaps is a major concern for Pacific peoples at a time when the rate 
of diabetes and obesity among them is one of the highest in the world. 
Already the propensity to consume cheaper manufactured food such as 
noodles and fizzy drinks is high in many Pacific communities, and this 
can be exacerbated by the availability of more varieties of cheap high-sugar 
and high-carbohydrate foreign food products. In addition, the waste from 
the manufactured food products adds more pressure on already fragile 
atoll environments, where waste disposal and the impacts of climate 
change have been major challenges. Climate change has damaged and 
transformed the coastal configuration of many islands and limits their 
capacity for waste storage.
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Another major concern is the hegemonic power leveraging and imposition 
of dominant interests associated with the agreement. Behind the veneer 
of diplomacy, it has been observed that discussions on PACER Plus were 
fraught with subtle bullying tactics. The trade justice campaigner for the 
Pacific Network on Globalisation (PANG), Adam Wolfenden, said:
Australia and New Zealand are again using PACER Plus to get 
what they want out of the Pacific, this despite the constant rhetoric 
from the region’s biggest neighbours that this is a development 
agreement for the Pacific. The Pacific Island Countries have long 
argued that Labour Mobility and Development Assistance are the 
two areas of possible benefit to them under PACER Plus and yet 
those are the areas that Australia and New Zealand are showing 
practically no flexibility on. That some of the smallest nations 
in the world are the ones who are shouldering the flexibility in 
these negotiations is typical of what we have come to expect in 
relationships with our biggest neighbours in the region. The power 
dynamics in the PACER Plus negotiations mean that Pacific 
Island Countries development gets sacrificed to demonstrate our 
good faith. It is the Island Countries who continue to negotiate in 
good faith. (Fonua, 2014: 1)
Other PIC officials expressed their displeasure with the PACER Plus 
negotiations. The chair of the Negotiating Group on Labour Mobility for 
Solomon Islands expressed regret that:
We are nowhere near achieving an agreement on the core demands 
of the PICs … While we acknowledge the efforts of New Zealand 
to bridge the gaps in the negotiating positions of the Parties, 
we believe that the proposed Arrangement falls far short of our 
expectations in many respects. (Fonua, 2014: 1)
As expected, a number of compromises had to be made as the Tongan 
chair of the Negotiating Group on Development Assistance asserted:
We have managed to demonstrate considerable flexibility to 
overcome some of the initial divergences we held at the inception 
of these negotiations … In the spirit of compromise, we have been 
able to overcome that fundamental difference, without which 
we would not be seeking to elaborate on the structure of the 
‘Development Assistance’ component. (Fonua, 2014: 1)
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Despite these reservations, the chief trade advisor for the PICs, Edwini 
Kessie, remained optimistic and suggested that:
We are making good progress in the negotiations, especially on the 
sticky issues of labour and development assistance and other issues 
such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to 
trade and customs procedures as well as negotiations on trade in 
services and investment. (Fonua, 2014: 1)
Kessie criticised the PANG opposition to PACER Plus by saying:
A PACER Plus Agreement will help the PICs to put in place a 
coherent trade and investment policy framework that should 
create the necessary conditions for trade and investment to 
flourish and for the long-term economic development of their 
countries. The Agreement should enable them to push through 
reforms that would provide a pathway for the sustainable growth 
and development of their economies. (Pareti, 2014)
Dr Roman Grynberg, a former senior economist with the PIF, disagreed 
with this optimistic assessment:
It is very likely that the two principle bargaining objectives of the 
Pacific Islands, to get a trade agreement that gives them security 
of labour market access for Pacific islanders to Australia and New 
Zealand (ANZ) and security of development assistance, will not 
be met. ANZ have made it perfectly clear that they will never 
make bound commitments in either area because of the precedent 
this will establish for FTA negotiations with India and other large 
countries. What ANZ are expecting is a profoundly unequal 
treaty, i.e. the islands agree to bind their tariffs at zero or at low 
levels and in return ANZ promise to be nice and, if they are in the 
mood, will grant labour market access and development assistance 
but certainly no legal commitments on either issue. This outcome 
is all the more absurd and unjust given that the island states 
already have duty free access for their exports under the unilateral 
SPARTECA treaty and so will stand to gain almost nothing from 
Pacer Plus. (Grynberg, 2014: 2)
Despite the fact that PACER Plus is now signed, debates about its impact 
will continue. The disagreement over PACER Plus’s conditions is reflective 
of the bigger power dynamics of inequality and hegemonic relations. The 
fact that Australia and New Zealand provide most of the funds for regional 
organisations such as PIF and SPC is seen as justification for  influence 
and control of these regional organisations.
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The long-term economic security of the small PICs depends very 
much on a number of critical factors, including the conditions of 
trade and aid they have to engage with. Often, trade imbalance and 
poorly implemented development aid can undermine their capacity for 
growth and sustainability. The only PIC with a sizeable manufacturing, 
processing and export base is Fiji, which also controls about 80 per cent 
of intraregional trade, and its absence from PACER Plus means that the 
power balance is extremely skewed, with Australia and New Zealand 
providing approximately 90 per cent of the goods for trade. The trade-
off in the form of labour mobility will depend very much on changes 
in the immigration and labour policies of New Zealand and Australia 
in the future. The current seasonal workers schemes have been working 
satisfactorily in terms of providing employment for unskilled workers, 
while the recent attempt to hire skilled workers will affect the progressively 
depleted skilled labour force in the PICs. How the increasingly strict rules 
that restrict skilled immigration to New Zealand and Australia will affect 
labour mobility in the future is a cause for concern.
For countries that have largely subsistence economies, the prospect 
of benefiting from a free trade deal might not be the best way forward 
because of their inability to participate equally and meaningfully. Free 
trade is sensible and workable as a two-way process only where there is 
reciprocal trade and power is shared relatively equally. This is far from 
being the case with PACER Plus, where trade flow is one-directional and 
the distribution of benefits skewed. This raises a range of concerns in 
relation to equity, food security and other forms of human security.
Patronage, economic disparity and security
One of the significant factors in security is the imposition of power, as 
Foucault (1991) reminds us. In a situation of patronage, the imposition 
of power and power imbalance can create conditions for oppression and 
marginalisation of smaller or weaker groups, which could exacerbate 
differences. Economic power differentials in the Pacific revolve around 
the  patronage-type dominance of Australia and New Zealand in the 
economic as well as political affairs of the region (Ratuva, 2008). A classic 
example of this is in regard to PACER Plus, which is, as we saw earlier, 
an agreement between countries with extremely unequal power. For 
instance, the combined population of Australia and New Zealand is 
about 30 million with a combined GDP of about US$1,560.231 trillion 
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and an average GDP per capita of US$54,506. This compares rather 
unfavourably with the combined economic capacity and performance of 
10 PICs that are members of the World Bank (Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall 
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu) with a total population of 2.28 million, 
a total GDP of US$8.009 billion and average GDP per capita of $US3,460 
(World Bank, 2013).
This large disparity is also reflected in the trade figures, which favour 
Australia and New Zealand disproportionately. For instance, in the 
calendar year ending 31 December 2011, New Zealand’s exports to 
the Pacific were worth more than NZ$1.5 billion, reflecting a 12 per cent 
growth from 2010. This was in contrast to a mere NZ$98 million worth 
of exports from the PICs to New Zealand, representing a deficit of 
NZ$1.4 billion (NZMFAT, 2012). The lack of domestic production and 
export, as well as New Zealand’s strict biosecurity rules, have contributed 
to the disparity.
Australia and New Zealand’s patronage is further strengthened through 
aid. Aid for building up trade capacity, together with the prospect of more 
labour mobility, were used as leverage to buy the consent of PICs to sign 
PACER Plus. Both countries have been prolific dispensers of aid in the 
region, with New Zealand disbursing more than half of its total aid in 
the  islands, justified on the basis that the Pacific includes ‘some of the 
world’s smallest and most isolated states’ and ‘the region faces a range of 
economic and social development challenges, and much of the region is 
vulnerable to natural disasters’ (NZMFAT, 2014). New Zealand’s total 
estimated aid to the Pacific in the 2014–15 period was NZ$121.5 million 
for bilateral aid and $NZ19.5 million for Pacific regional agencies. At the 
same time, Australia’s aid to the Pacific (excluding PNG) was A$174 million 
in 2013–14 and A$196.9 million in 2014–15. Apart from bilateral aid, its 
multilateral aid program for the period 2014–17 included A$21.6 million 
for the PIF, A$51.5 million for the Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
and A$14.9 million for the Pacific Leadership Program (PLP). Australia’s 
view is that bilateral and regional aid complement each other:
Australia’s regional program complements our bilateral program 
investments to support economic growth and poverty reduction 
in the Pacific. Many of the Pacific’s challenges cannot be addressed 
solely on a country-by-country basis. The regional program adds 
value where it is more efficient and effective to work through 
regional approaches. (DFAT, 2014)
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Australia’s justifications for its aid to the Pacific are based on:
Isolation, both in terms of geography and communications; small, 
often dispersed, populations and markets that limit economies 
of scale and domestic revenue opportunities; limited natural 
resources; rapid population growth that outstrips job creation, 
income earning opportunities and social services; a shortage of 
critical infrastructure with poor maintenance; high vulnerability 
to the impacts of climate change and natural disasters, and 
economic shocks such as fluctuating international fuel and food 
prices. (DFAT, 2014)
These challenges, it is argued, are ‘exacerbated by the limited capacity in 
Pacific island public sectors’, difficulty in ‘managing the requirements of 
modern business and government’ and their inability to ‘deliver essential 
functions including providing services such as health, education and 
policing’ (DFAT, 2014). In 2012, Australia’s bilateral aid to the PICs 
consisted of the following: Fiji (A$46 million), Kiribati (A$35 million), 
Papua New Guinea (A$494 million), Samoa (A$41 million), 
Solomon Islands (A$235 million), Tonga (A$33 million) and Vanuatu 
(A$66 million). In per capita terms, aid to some of the PICs is among 
the highest in the world. While aid flows were justified using manifest 
deficit narratives, the more politically latent role of aid to maintain 
a sense of patronage and manufacture consent among the PICs cannot be 
discounted easily. Australia, together with New Zealand, largely funds 
the PIF, and this makes the regional agency susceptible to ANZ control 
and influence (Grynberg, 2014).
Interference in the Economic Partnership 
Agreement
This power imbalance and patron–client psychology was also reflected 
in the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations between 
the Pacific-based African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and 
the European Union, in which Australia and New Zealand insisted on 
provisions for their involvement, although the agreement had nothing 
whatsoever to do with them. In doing this, the two countries hoped 
to keep their regional patronage undisturbed by the influence of other 
outside powers.
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Roman Grynberg described this thus:
This [EPA negotiation] was deeply resented by Australia simply 
because the Forum works on consensus and the fact that the 
islands would provide a consensus on trade issues and prior to 
the ACP group, Australia could effectively veto anything they did 
not like. But what the ACP negotiations provided to the islands 
for the first time in their history was a relatively well-funded 
mechanism by which they could come to decisions in their own 
interests without having to appease Canberra and Wellington. 
This sort of independence by Canberra’s vassal states in the Pacific 
islands, i.e.  what it sees as ‘its lake’, was unacceptable to their 
policy-makers. (Grynberg, 2010: 1)
The use of the term ‘Canberra’s vassal states’ is interesting here and connotes 
a feudatory relationship, in which the economic and political survival of 
Pacific communities is predicated on their loyalty to the two countries 
and, in turn, on the two countries’ patronage of Pacific countries.
Australia and New Zealand are always wary of the influence of the 
European Union in the region through the EU-funded Pacific ACP 
group, which included only the 14 Pacific Islands and excluded the two 
larger powers. Australia, in particular, felt uneasy about the fact that its 
power to veto any PIF decision and its capacity to induce a consensus 
were going to be undermined by another competing hegemon. The ACP 
negotiations provided the opportunity for the small island states to make 
‘decisions in their own interests without having to appease Canberra and 
Wellington’ for the first time in their history (Grynberg, 2010: 1).
Attempts to initiate trade agreements through PICTA, which did not 
involve Australia and New Zealand, with China, Taiwan and also Australia 
and New Zealand did not succeed. In 2009, Roman Grynberg, the PIF 
director of trade who had been sympathetic to the small island states’ 
cause and was a thorn in the side of the Australians, was removed and 
was replaced by an Australian. That Australia exercises direct influence on 
some PICs, such as Papua New Guinea, through Australian businessmen 
in PNG who influence trade policy ‘has long been the talk of the Forum’, 
as they have ‘sabotaged the EPA negotiations by negotiating behind 
the backs of other Pacific islanders and completely undermined Pacific 
solidarity’ (Grynberg, 2010: 1). The concern raised here is that, by signing 
a separate EPA deal with the EU for fish market access, PNG would be 
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in a position to solicit fish supplies from other PICs, a move that would 
benefit these Australian commercial interests. Agreeing to an EPA that was 
devoid of important provisions such as labour mobility and aid, crucial 
for PICs, would have provided a very bad precedent for the PACER Plus 
negotiations.
The EPA negotiations have been temporarily suspended due to the 
inability of the EU and the PICs to achieve consensus on some issues, 
such as EU access to fishing resources in the Pacific as payoff for some 
concessions. PACER Plus has been endorsed and signed, although some 
countries, including Fiji and Papua New Guinea, have refrained from 
committing themselves. The refusal of those two countries to sign is based 
on the recognition that the agreement has the potential to undermine their 
productive capacity by killing off local industries that cannot compete 
against bigger Australian and New Zealand importers and investors. 
For the small PICs, who have been led to believe that the agreement is the 
panacea for their economic woes, the full impact of free trade is still to set 
in and, because they are bound by the agreement, it will not be easy to 
extricate themselves in the short term.
The point to emphasise here is that, while Pacific regionalism is often 
hailed as a consensual and harmonious configuration of consenting 
sovereign states, the reality is very different. The two dominant powers, 
Australia and New Zealand, wield much greater power than any other 
state, which enables them to keep the small states under their hegemonic 
control. Their ability to influence and buy loyalty through aid creates 
a regional patronage relationship that is hidden beneath the façade of 
regionalism. The security implications of these arrangements are latent 
rather than manifest. The  loss of sovereignty and autonomy of small 
island states to determine their own foreign policy direction and economic 
development choices is a great concern in an era of globalisation, where 
states are expected to be more assertive and independent minded. 
External manipulation and patronage can be disempowering and create 
a sense of insecurity. Expressing one’s political sovereignty, independence 
and determining one’s policy trajectory for the future provides a sense 
of self-empowerment and security. This is an important psychological 
prerequisite for both national and regional stability.
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Climate change and human security
There is a growing consensus that climate change is probably the single 
most important future threat to human security in the Pacific. Many low-
lying, small island countries such as Tuvalu, Kiribati and Marshall Islands 
are not in a position to mitigate the persistent increase in sea level and 
erosion in the foreseeable future. In addition, the increase in the number 
of climate-induced disasters such cyclones, coral bleaching due to high 
sea temperatures, floods and droughts are socially and economically 
disruptive and, in many cases, very costly. While these trends have been 
part of the Pacific people’s daily challenges for years, it is only in the last 
20 years or so that, as a result of greater consciousness-raising through 
international and regional campaigns, the issue of climate change has 
become prominent.
The discourse on climate change is highly political, as much as it is 
environmental and scientific. Although about 97 per cent of the world’s 
scientists now acknowledge the climate change phenomenon to be ‘real’, 
there are climate change ‘agnostics’ (who are not sure about aspects of 
the matter) and even outright deniers, some of whom are linked to the 
energy industry and conservative political camp and who see climate 
change as a left-wing fear-mongering scam. The deniers’ position has 
been given an ideological boost by US President Donald Trump’s 
stance that climate change is a ‘Chinese hoax’ and by his anti-climate 
change policies, which include potential US withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement (COP21) on climate change, expected withdrawal from the 
Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the undoing of Obama’s climate change 
strategies. Any US withdrawal from the estimated US$100 billion GCF 
will affect the small Pacific island states. The United States had committed 
itself to giving US$3 billion to the fund, with US$1 billion being paid 
so far. The discontinuation of the US contribution means that funds for 
climate adaptation and rehabilitation will be reduced considerably, thus 
affecting the small Pacific states’ mitigation and resilience capability. So 
far, six Pacific island states have acquired funding from the GCF: Fiji 
(US$31 million for an urban water supply and wastewater management 
project), Tuvalu (US$36 million for a coastal adaptation project), 
Vanuatu (US$23 million for climate information services for resilient 
development), Samoa (US$57.7 million for integrated flood management 
to enhance the climate resilience of the Vaisigano River catchment), Cook 
Islands (US$17 million for the Pacific Islands renewable energy investment 
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program) and Solomon Islands (US$2.5 million for the Tina River hydro 
power development project) (GCF, 2017). Other island countries are still 
processing their applications through various accredited institutions.
Increasingly, various other forms of bilateral and multilateral aid to the 
Pacific are related, either directly or indirectly, to steps to mitigate the short-
term or long-term effects of climate change. However, a main concern is 
whether aid related to climate change actually reaches those who really 
need it. Although conventional assumptions perceive climate change aid 
as humanitarian, the reality is that it is latently political. Climate change 
has now become a commodified political issue, and many donors use the 
opportunity to be seen as generous, hoping that this will help promote 
their status as good global citizens. This competition for glory and tight 
control over the GCF have overshadowed its humanitarian aspects. The 
challenge is how to connect the global political discourse to realities on 
the ground. The influx of aid and climate change experts into the Pacific, 
funded by the GCF and other donors, can be disempowering for local 
communities whose innovation and indigenous knowledge of adaptation 
and resilience have been undermined and considered irrelevant amid the 
newly introduced and externally funded technologies and skills.
A major challenge is how to create space for conversation between the 
externally driven global discourse on climate change and local indigenous 
innovations and knowledge in the Pacific. The state, as a conduit for global 
and regional policies, can play a critical role in engaging and integrating 
the two levels. This requires changes in thinking and in approaches to 
engender more inclusive and diversified policies in response to climate 
change. One way forward is to frame climate change as a human security 
issue that affects the livelihood of the local communities and to seek ways 
in which local communities can be empowered to directly participate 
in climate change mitigation. This could promote the importance 
of community-based innovations and knowledge for adaptation and 
resilience.
While climate change is a creeping disaster that has the potential to affect 
all aspects of security in profound ways—economic, social, cultural, 
environmental or political—the way Pacific communities respond to it 
depends very much on, first, their understanding of the problems; second, 
the will to address the problems; and third, the availability of the means 
to address these problems. The first issue is critical because it affects the 
second and third issues. In some countries such as Tuvalu and Kiribati, 
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many still believe that climate change is the ‘will of God’ and that there 
is nothing we can do about it, while some even argue that climate change 
mitigation is against God’s will. At the same time, the more progressive 
members of the churches have been actively trying to confront this view 
through greater consciousness-raising with the help of governments 
and civil society organisations. The challenges associated with changing 
people’s thinking are immense and one of the greatest barriers to climate 
change campaigns.
For some island countries such as Tuvalu and Kiribati, the option of 
relocation is now a real possibility. Kiribati has purchased 6,000 acres 
of land in Fiji as a possible site for relocation if the situation demands 
it. Climate change migration poses even bigger challenges in relation to 
logistics, integration and political status. For instance, for argument’s 
sake, if the 116,000 people of Kiribati decide to migrate to Fiji, there are 
a number of challenges that need careful consideration. Will they migrate 
as individuals, to be absorbed and integrated into Fijian society? Will they 
relocate as a ‘state’, in which case Kiribati would become a mini ‘state’ 
within the Fijian state? Or will Fiji give them a semi-autonomous status 
to run their own affairs as part of the Fijian state, similar to the Banaban 
people, who were relocated from Ocean Island in Kiribati to Rabi Island 
in Fiji by the British in 1954, after their island was mined for phosphate? 
Another critical question is what will happen to the submerged atolls, 
reefs and so on after the relocation of the state? Do they still remain part 
of the sovereignty of the relocated Kiribati state or would Kiribati make 
a deal with Fiji to make Kiribati’s exclusive economic zone a part of Fiji’s 
territory in exchange for setting up an autonomous Kiribati political 
entity in Fiji?
The issue is more complex than it seems, especially if one considers the 
issue of land politics, resource distribution, ethnic relations and population 
expansion in Fiji, a country already beset by a multitude of security issues. 
What we might see in this situation are layers of security issues feeding 
on one another. This is why it is important to have very clear guidelines 
in the beginning, based on dialogue for a win-win end result between 
Fiji and Kiribati. Nevertheless, Fiji has declared its willingness to take in 
people from Tuvalu and other Pacific Islands as climate change migrants, 
although, in the broader scheme of things, the region should be involved 
proactively through the PIF. Unfortunately, Australia and New Zealand’s 
ungenerous refugee and immigration policies might not be conducive to 
a comprehensive and humane regional approach.
COnTESTEd TERRAIn 
98
Moreover, climate change is an issue that has deepened the wedge between 
Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and Pacific island states on 
the other, especially in relation to what is perceived as Australia and New 
Zealand’s lack of commitment to reduction of carbon emissions under 
the Kyoto Protocol. A former Australian prime minister, Tony Abbott, 
suggested that like-minded centre-right governments around the world 
should form an alliance to resist global moves towards carbon pricing 
and in favour of more ‘direct action’ measures. Representing the voice of 
desperation of small island states, Kiribati’s president lamented:
We’re not talking about the growth GDP, we’re not talking about 
what it means in terms of profit and losses of the large corporations, 
we’re talking about our survival. What will happen in terms of 
greenhouse gas emissions levels agreed to internationally will not 
affect us, because our future is already here … we will be under 
water. (ABC, 2014)
The same sentiment was expressed by Christopher Loeak, president of the 
Marshall Islands, a country that still suffers from the effects of US nuclear 
tests in the 1950s:
I’m very concerned that the Prime Minister [of Australia] is setting 
the wrong tone in what needs to be a very determined effort to 
tackle climate change. Prime Minister Abbott’s comments on 
Monday with Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper are a 
further indication that Australia is isolating itself on this issue. 
We see all the time the problem is getting worse, but we don’t 
want to lose hope. We believe that there are still opportunities to 
curb this problem and we look forward to working with the world 
community to talk about it, and to do anything we can to help 
them to do something about climate change. (ABC, 2014)
The PICs have also been critical of the fact that many developed countries 
have not fully committed themselves to the Green Climate Fund (GCF). 
Even the UN Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund established in 2001 has 
been largely shunned by prospective donors. Furthermore, access to the 
GCF has been bureaucratically cumbersome. This involves applying for 
assistance through accredited organisations, which will help put together 
a proposal for the government concerned.
In July 2014 representatives of four of the world’s most vulnerable atoll 
countries—Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands and Tuvalu—met in 
Kiribati to discuss some of their shared challenges in relation to global 
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warming. To make their voice stronger they formed the Coalition of Atoll 
Nations on Climate Change (CANCC). Such international solidarity 
by small states plays a crucial role in providing psychological security 
and hope in a world where parochial national interests supersede global 
moral responsibility.
The issue of climate change has raised the global profile of PICs 
in international forums, and Pacific leaders have assumed prominence in 
the global campaign. By chairing the Conference of the Parties (COP25) 
on climate change by global leaders, Fiji has demonstrated the deeper 
sense of global responsibility that Pacific island states have in saving their 
islands and planet Earth. Despite the turnabout by the United States, the 
momentum of the global campaign will continue and, in the Pacific, the 
people will have to respond to climate change challenges by consolidating 
their efforts, both locally and globally.
The empire strikes back: The new 
Pacific diplomacy
The response of the PICs to the need to engage with the big power more 
effectively was to pull their political and moral resources together using 
more creative diplomatic approaches. This required some independent 
and strategic thinking because of the need to overcome some of what they 
see as patronising and exploitative tendencies by the bigger powers such 
as Australia and New Zealand (Fry & Tarte, 2015).
This ‘new Pacific diplomacy’, as Fry and Tarte (2015) call it, seems to 
have been galvanised in part by Fiji’s suspension from the Pacific Islands 
Forum and the rise of climate change as a major security threat. Following 
its suspension in 2009 and sanctions by Australia and New Zealand, Fiji 
proceeded to unravel the regional governance and security architecture 
as part of its ‘revenge’. One such move was the setting up of the Pacific 
Islands Development Forum (PIDF) as a counter to the PIF, which has 
been dominated by Australia and New Zealand through funding and 
direct political influence. Although PIDF has faced funding challenges 
over the years, its diplomatic and geopolitical symbolism and statement 
of resistance was unmistakable. This geopolitical manoeuvre was aimed 
at weakening the hegemonic foothold of Australia and New Zealand 
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in the region as well as softening the dominance of traditional regional 
organisations such as the PIF (Dornan, 2013). Some countries showed 
support for the PIDF while still members of the PIF but some did not.
In addition to the PIDF was the invigoration of the Pacific Small Island 
Developing States (PSIDS) as the main lobbying group for small Pacific 
states at the United Nations. This was in recognition of their much 
sought-after UN votes as well as the desire to be independent of the PIF, 
which had been the major negotiating mechanism for the PICs (Manoa, 
2015). The PSIDS started in the early 1990s as a collective negotiation 
group for the PICs, but it took on a new political energy and trajectory 
after 2009 through Fiji’s influence. Also associated with this is Fiji’s 
attempt to breath energy into the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), 
again as a way of weakening the ‘core’ of regionalism in the form of the 
PIF. However, internal tensions within the MSG probably overshadowed 
any hope of a strong subregional bloc. Fiji’s opposition to the PIF might 
have also been influenced by its opposition to Australia and New Zealand, 
which it wanted expelled from the PIF because of their sanctions on Fiji 
after the 2006 coup, among other reasons. Fiji’s headship of the UN G77 
countries (which included China), as well as presidency of the UN General 
Assembly, gave it the international status to leverage its influence within 
as well as beyond the Pacific.
Protecting Pacific resources from foreign resource predators in the form 
of fishing fleets has always been a major challenge for Pacific states, and 
this was one of the reasons behind the formation of the Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement (PNA) by the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and 
Tuvalu, which control about 60 per cent of the western and central Pacific’s 
tuna supply. The role of the PNA was to empower the PICs to protect 
their quickly depleting tuna stock as well as protect the environment from 
overexploitation and destructive fishing methods (Tamate, 2013). Only 
certain PICs are members of PNA. There have been other cases of the 
way the new Pacific diplomacy scenario has unfolded, including the new 
policy directions by Meg Taylor, secretary general of the PIF, and the push 
to separate the PACER advisory office from the PIF (Fry & Tarte, 2015).
The issue of climate change has heightened the status and significance 
of PICs considerably. With Kiribati’s and Tuvalu’s voices being echoed 
internationally and Fiji’s leadership of the COP25, PICs have now found 
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themselves at the forefront of the global fight against climate change 
(Williams & McDuie-Ra, 2018). The question of how this translates into 
states committing themselves to the Paris Agreement is still to be seen.
My criticism of the new Pacific diplomacy concept is that some of the 
manoeuvrings involved, such as Fiji’s attempt to outflank New Zealand 
and Australia, are actually beyond the realm of diplomacy and involve 
geopolitical contestation of power and influence. This regional power 
contestation (rather than ‘diplomacy’) caused fractures within the regional 
diplomatic regime, and it took not so much diplomacy but unfolding 
of political developments, such as the Fiji election, for relations to 
normalise. Also, the term ‘new’ can be misleading because, while the 
actual events described were somewhat new developments, some of the 
underlying principles and dynamics, including intra-Pacific consensus 
and solidarity vis-à-vis contestation, are not new at all (Ratuva, 2005). 
Even the formation of the PIF itself was based on resistance to political 
domination by the colonial powers that controlled the South Pacific 
Commission. The cycle of consensus and contestation has been part of 
the normal process of diplomacy and geopolitics in the Pacific, and new 
variations of  these have emerged when circumstances demanded. Some 
of the hype of a decade or so ago has fizzled out, and what was seen as 
‘new’ then has now become ‘old’; consequently, resurrection of ‘old’ ideas 
and practices can now become ‘new’.
Conclusion
The notion of a speech act, as the securitisation theorists remind us, 
is a powerful mental and political tool to influence and transform our 
thoughts. The power of words and texts associated with security shape 
our beliefs and attitudes and contribute to securitising the social climate. 
Indeed terms like ‘failed’ and ‘fragile’ states as well as ‘arc of instability’ 
play a decisive speech act role in the securitisation and orientalisation of 
the Pacific. As this chapter has tried to demonstrate, the implications in 
terms of policies and regional power relations places PICs in a neocolonial 
subaltern position. The need to deconstruct these ideologically, culturally 
and politically prejudiced terms is required from critical scholars as a way 
of demystifying regional politics.
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Furthermore, cultural, socioeconomic, political and historical diversity in 
the Pacific makes it rather naive to attempt to make generalisations about 
security in the Pacific. Even using a particular conceptual framework 
might not capture the multifaceted and diverse manifestations of security 
dynamics in a region so wide and scattered yet so globalised and constantly 
in a state of transformation. The Pacific peoples are scattered around the 
globe; for some countries, there are more citizens living outside than 
inside the country, and therefore the changes they exert in their respective 
communities are wide-ranging and profound. Security in the Pacific 
must be understood in the context of multiple forces, circumstances and 
lenses. This includes a combination of external factors such as the impact 
of global neoliberal capitalism, international cultural imperialism and 
climate change, and of internal factors such as geopolitical contestation, 
disputes over resources, competition over political power and issues 
relating to well-being.
The concept of human security can be useful in linking aspects of political, 
economic, social and cultural life that threaten the Pacific people’s well-
being. However, at another level it becomes too nebulous in the way 
it securitises almost every aspect of life, to the extent that it becomes 
quite challenging for policy-makers to frame relevant policies to address 
security issues. Because the human security framework is top down in its 
conceptualisation and implementation, there is a large disconnect between 
international and regional discourses and policies at the national level. 
Even within a country, there is a gap between the state policy bureaucracy 
and the local community, because, for many Pacific island communities, 
daily security priorities are often determined by daily needs, which are 
often different from those of pre-designed official templates.
Security issues such as resource disputes and contestation of power at the 
local level have the potential to expand and create much bigger conflict 
issues and dynamics at the national level, and also have the potential to 
oscillate downwards, as we will see in the case studies of Fiji, Tonga and 
Solomon Islands in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. While there are unique issues that 
are locally induced, there are some, such as climate change, that are more 
global than local, although there are locally devised innovations designed 
to mitigate their effects. Climate change is probably the most high-profile 
and most devastating and costly security threat to Pacific communities, 
largely because it is associated with climate forces beyond human control. 
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Pacific leaders have been at the forefront of campaigns to mitigate climate 
change in an effort to persuade industrialised countries to reduce their 
carbon emissions.
There are other security issues that are created by human activity and 
ordinarily are too overwhelming or even impossible for small Pacific 
island states to change. These include issues relating to global economic 
crises and free trade, which have the potential to harm local communities. 
Debates about the desirability of free trade, such as PACER Plus, continue, 
and the fact that most PICs have signed up to PACER Plus means that 
voluntary risk-taking is part of the way we deal with security. Thus, rather 
than being passive players in a world of global economic competition, 
small states still have access to windows of opportunity, albeit in a limited 
way, to affect policies that could affect their long-term economic security.
The gap between regional and local security discourses poses a challenge 
in terms of legitimacy and the practicality of security policies, especially 
when regional security thinking is defined by global security templates. 
Rather than a top-down approach, there should be more emphasis on 
grounded and localised discourses as the basis for building up a national 
and regional security framework. In addition, the specific circumstances 
of the individual countries should be taken into consideration and, 
rather than just providing a regional solution, there should be innovative 
responses based on local dynamics and realities. The three case studies in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 show that, rather than manifesting similarities, there 
are wide differences between PICs—differences that are often overlooked 
in favour of quick fixes and easy explanations based on negative stereotypes 





End of coups?: Fiji’s changing 
security environment
Power does not corrupt men; fools, however, if they get into a position 
of power, corrupt power.
George Bernard Shaw
Fiji was chosen as a case study because of some unique features that make 
it different from other PICs. These include the nature of contestation for 
political power between a diaspora group and the indigenous community 
(referred to as Taukei, a term used throughout the chapter) and how 
this interplays with socioeconomic factors and land and identity issues. 
In addition, Fiji is the only PIC that has undergone regime change through 
military coups; hence the role of the military and the associated culture 
of politico-masculinity has been a major factor in shaping the country’s 
security context. In a broad and exploratory way, this chapter examines 
the interplay between some of the factors that have shaped Fiji’s security 
environment over the years and their impact on the country’s evolution.
When the chief of staff of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) 
declared on 16 July 2017 that the military had ‘moved out of the coup 
culture and was no longer a threat to the country’ and was going to 
accept the 2018 election results (Swami, 2017), the national mood was 
one of both jubilation and anxiety. Jubilation because of the feeling of 
comforting reassurance this announcement provided and anxiety because 
similar guarantees had been heard before. The future will tell whether Fiji 
is now entering the ‘no coup’ phase of its history or whether history is, 
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given the right circumstances, likely to repeat itself (Fraenkel, Firth and 
Lal, 2009). This very much depends on a number of interrelated security 
dynamics, which this chapter will examine.
For a country that has had six coups,1 the security situation has to be 
understood in the context of a number of cross-cutting issues relating 
to, first, what Stewart (2008) refers to as ‘horizontal inequality’ or 
ethnocultural disparities or perception of them; second, ethnopolitical 
contestation for power between the two major ethnic groups (Taukei and 
Indo-Fijian); third, politicisation of identity, religion and culture; and 
finally, socioeconomic inequality and competition over resources. While 
some of these issues might be more prominent than others in different 
historical or contextual spaces, they all contribute in their own ways to 
shaping the security configuration in the country.
However, contrary to conventional stereotyping of Fiji in predominantly 
ethnic terms, the situation is much more complex and syncretic. 
For  instance, while there is ethnic tension, there is also trans-ethnic 
mutual engagement and convergence of ethnic interests, and while there 
are distinct cultures, there is also space for transcultural interaction and 
integration.
By using selected aspects of the postcolonial, securitisation and human 
security approaches, this chapter explores in an overarching way the 
dynamic interplay between various political, economic and social forces 
that have shaped Fiji’s security climate in phases of historical change from 
the precolonial and colonial to the postcolonial era. It starts by looking 
at the notion of warrior chiefs and their role in providing security for the 
community. The chapter then looks at the imposition of colonial security 
designs and the way these transformed Taukei society. This invoked 
resistance to colonial hegemony, as we will see next. The resistance 
movement led to a more intensive and brutal pacification drive by the 
British to keep the Taukei within the ambit of their security boundary.
1  The generally accepted view is that Fiji has had four coups (two in 1987, one in 2000 and one 
in 2006). I have argued that, technically, Fiji has had six coups (two in 1987, two in 2000, one in 
2006 and one in 2009). The first coup in 2000 occurred when George Speight and his group stormed 
Parliament on 19 May 2000 and took members of the government hostage, and the second coup 
(or countercoup) occurred when the military dismissed the president, abrogated the constitution and 
declared martial law on 29 May. The first coup by Speight was against the government and the second 
coup by the military was against the state, although it was carried out under the pretext of saving Fiji 
from the rampaging ethnonationalist group that had overthrown the government and caused havoc 
in other parts of Fiji. See Ratuva (2011a).
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The chapter then focuses on the institutional, coercive and hegemonic 
strategies of the colonial state to maintain its security agenda. Divide 
and rule system of governance (i.e. native policies that locked the Taukei 
into a regressive semi-subsistence way of life) and legal mechanisms were 
deployed as means of control. Following this, we will examine the process 
of securitisation after independence and how political, constitutional and 
legal means were used to maintain security. We will also discuss the issue of 
economic security and how this fed into the changing political dynamics.
The chapter then examines the role of state security institutions such as 
the military and police in the bigger security framework before looking 
at the issues of perceptions and ethnic framing as security factors. Finally, 
the chapter explores the importance of community peace-building and 
conflict resolution in addressing long-term security issues in Fiji.
Warrior chiefs, power and security 
in precolonial Fiji
To fully grasp the genesis of some of the factors that have shaped Fiji’s 
current security environment, we need to retrace the evolution of some 
salient cultural strands back to the precolonial era when politics, culture, 
resource distribution and identity formed an integrated system in 
a communal subsistence habitat and where contestation for power between 
chiefdoms defined the security terrain of the land. How these were framed 
by early missionaries were far from positive and some descriptions were 
reminiscent of the social Darwinian European mindset of the time, as we 
examined in Chapter 2. This mindset is reflected in the words of the Revd 
Thomas Williams:
But the savagism of the Fijian has a more terrible badge, and one 
whereby he is principally distinguished by all the world; his cruelty 
is relentless and bloody. That innate depravity which he shares in 
common with other men, has in this case been fostered into peculiar 
brutality by the character of his religion, and all his early training 
and associations. Shedding of blood to him is no crime, but a glory. 
Whoever maybe the victim—whether noble or vulgar, old or 
young, man, woman or child—whether slain in war or butchered 
by treachery, to be somehow an acknowledged murderer is the 
object of the Fijian’s restless ambition. (Williams, 1858: 112)
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The imagery of the ‘savage’ and ‘cannibal’ Fijian survived over the ages 
and found its way into folklore and orientalised racial stereotypes. Today, 
these racial perceptions still pervade in latent forms. These orientalised 
narratives obscure the dynamic sociopolitical realities in Fiji, which need 
to be discussed as a starting point to frame our analysis of security. A more 
sober analysis of this power struggle is provided by Joseph Waterhouse, 
an Australian-English missionary who was in Fiji in the mid-1800s:
The occasions of war are very numerous. The possessions of land 
and women, and the commission of murder, are the principal 
causes. To these may be added personal affronts to chiefs; the 
refusal to give up a particular club, bird or shell; the unlawful 
eating of the turtle, the lust of conquest; the wish to murder, 
amidst the din of battle, a chief of their own, who is suspected of 
ambition, a violation of the tabu, love-affairs, and last, not least, 
a determination, on the part of the country at large, to check 
despotism. (Waterhouse, 1866: 315–16)
Causes of war varied according to the situation. Over the years, as Mary 
Wallis, wife of an American bêche-de-mer trader noted, competition over 
access to European trading goods became a major cause of war between 
the dominant powers such as Bau, Macuata, Bua, Lakeba and Cakaudrove 
as the desire for wealth took root (Routledge, 1985). As  missionary 
Joseph Waterhouse noted, Cakobau, a powerful chief from the island 
of Bau whose power and influence covered a significant portion of Fiji, 
accumulated both traditional goods through serfdom of his vassals in 
conquered territories and European goods through the use of forced 
labour to provide bêche-de-mer for European traders (Waterhouse, 1997).
In times of disputes, clans and communities were often at risk of being 
attacked by hostile neighbours, so they had to be at the ready with men, 
women and children engaged in a well-rehearsed division of labour in 
a  siege  situation. While men would be directly responsible for front-
line fighting, women and children would play roles such as lookouts, 
messengers and providers of food through planting, harvesting and 
fishing (Clunie, 1977). Villages were located strategically, on the basis 
of a number of factors including the availability of water and food, and 
defensibility. Many villages were on fortified hills or circular mounds, 
surrounded by ditches as a form of defence (Field, 1998; Best, 1993).
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Chiefs formed alliances through intermarriage and reciprocal friendship 
agreements as a way of maintaining good relations and stability. This was 
the case with the major polities of Lakeba, Bau, Somosomo and Rewa 
where the chiefs were closely related by blood. Sometimes, intermarriage 
also led to conflict because of the divergent loyalties of children of the 
chief ’s competing spouses (Waterhouse, 1997). In times of war, intertribal 
alliances were activated as chiefs requested the help of neighbouring chiefs 
to fight a common enemy. Often tabua (whale’s tooth), a highly valued 
cultural artefact, was used by A to request B to fight C, and C would try 
to reverse the process by presenting a tabua to B to help defeat A. Strategic 
alliances were fluid and volatile, and liumuri (back-stabbing) was a clever 
tactical manoeuvre to outwit the enemy. The complex cycle of treachery 
helped to maintain a sense of political equilibrium because it ensured 
that chiefs kept a close check on each other’s power. Being alert to both 
internal and external threat was a major social asset to ensure security. 
Some chiefs, such as Tui Lakeba, Tui Cakau and Vunivalu of Bau, even 
sought assistance from the Tongans, who had a long association with Fiji 
(Reid, 1990). For some time, Fiji had been a ‘refugee’ centre for exiled or 
runaway Tongan chiefs, as we shall see in Chapter 5.
Power struggles between sons of chiefs, who were often children of 
different mothers, were common, and in some cases brothers would kill 
each other as they competed for the right of succession. A central plank of 
this power struggle was competition over who would be the undisputed 
qaqa (warrior). The most successful contender had to prove his prowess in 
war and leadership skills at an early age. Clunie (1977) makes the point 
that socialisation into warriorhood started quite early in life through 
exposure to cannibalism, war role-play and warlike sports.
The construction of the warrior personality permeated almost every 
aspect of social life, including community security, sports, division of 
labour, religion, cannibalism and even sexuality. The warrior personified 
protection, power, authority and wisdom. Chiefs had to be the strongest 
warriors in the community, and a warrior’s status was legitimised by the 
use of coercion, treachery and tactical wisdom (Calvert, 2003). Successful 
warriors were defined in terms of the number of people they killed in war, 
accorded high status in society, hero-worshipped and given special names; 
their clubs were provided with sacred names, reified and mythologised 
(Clunie, 1977). Warriors could take any woman of their choice and, after 
death, they became part of the eternal cosmology as protective ancestral 
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spirits. As protectors, warriors provided the major security system, which 
kept social disruption in check, ensured social cohesion and provided 
continuity and survival of the group. This reified imagery of the warrior 
continues to be part of a Fijian boy’s socialisation process through the 
inculcation of notions of yalo qaqa (bravery), tagane (manliness) and dau 
vala (fighter) among others. These personality traits helped to nurture 
a natural fit into the yalo ni mataivalu (military spirit), which was glorified 
through meke (traditional dances), vucu (chants), sere (songs) and tukuni 
(mythology). A corollary of this is the entrenched self-perception that 
indigenous Fijians are individually natural soldiers and collectively 
a  martial race (Ravuvu, 1991b; Nawadra, 1995). We  shall return to 
this point when we discuss the role of the military in contemporary 
Fijian politics.
Large areas of Fiji came under the authority and protection of powerful 
chiefs who extracted tribute from their subjects (Routledge, 1985). 
In fact, protection by conquering chiefs was predicated upon payment of 
tribute, provision of slave labour and subservient loyalty. The relationship 
between chiefs and commoners played out in the context of the internal 
hegemonic rule and influence of chiefs at different levels of social 
relationships. The security of chiefs was seen as the security of the rest of 
society. It was common for chiefs to collect tribute from people within 
their own communities as well as from conquered tribes under their 
control as a way of consolidating their power (Roth, 1953).
Threats to the warrior chief ’s position were both internal—from 
competing brothers or cousins—and external, often in the form of chiefs 
from other tribes, some of whom were their own relatives. War captives 
were classified as bokola (human flesh to be eaten) and were ceremonially 
consumed in feasts that symbolised internalisation of the enemy’s power 
as well as psychological and spiritual dominance over enemies (Williams, 
1982). At a time when polygamy was a marital norm, chiefs were at 
liberty to appropriate commoner wives from their own communities or 
neighbouring tribes. The chief ’s main wife was usually another chief ’s 
daughter, and intermarriage between tribes was a way of maintaining 
peace and forging long-term alliances, although this did not work all the 
time, as evidenced in the wars between the two powerful polities of Rewa 
and Bau, where the chiefs were close cousins (Routledge, 1985). One of 
the fundamental roles of the social structure and its division of labour 
was to provide social, economic and political security for chiefs, rather 
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than for ordinary members of the community. Glorification of chiefly 
status and mana was central to the language of diplomacy and ceremonial 
discourse (Hocart, 1913).
Social transformation as a result of external influence started with the 
early beachcombers. Shipwrecked sailors, runaway convicts from 
Australia, whalers and adventurous sailors settled among the locals, 
became Fijianised and introduced guns and diseases (Maude, 1964). 
The missionaries were probably most influential in terms of transforming 
belief systems, cultures and the way security was redefined and articulated 
in everyday life. Instead of relying on the fearsome warrior and traditional 
gods for protection, the new security paradigm was based on protection 
by the Christian God, European technology and muskets (Waterhouse, 
1866). To some extent this new paradigm undermined the legitimacy of 
the warrior personality, and altered the relationship between chiefs and 
the ordinary people.
The new sense of security introduced by missionaries was predicated 
on belief in European superiority and the denigration of everything 
‘heathen’ (Ryle, 2010). Even before turning Christian, Cakobau was an 
avid collector of European goods, including a schooner and countless 
treasure boxes of European goods, which he saw as enhancing his wealth, 
prestige and power (Waterhouse, 1997). By the mid-1850s, competing 
chiefs possessed European firearms and cannons, which were used in wars. 
European artefacts and clothes were seen as symbolic of a new and higher 
culture, a belief planted and nurtured by early Europeans, including 
missionaries (Campbell, 1980). Missionaries saw themselves not only as 
saviours of souls but also as agents of Western civilisation and progress. 
To them, the future spiritual, social and political security of Fijians lay 
in Christianity, and the easiest way to achieve this was to convert chiefs 
and transform the warrior personalities (Williams, 1982; Calvert, 2003). 
It was expected that the rest of the community would automatically 
follow their chief ’s conversion. The conversion process became part of 
the political competition between chiefdoms and even led to wars in Bua, 
Tailevu, Lau and other parts of Fiji between chiefs and vanua that had 
accepted lotu (Christianity) and those opposed to it (Routledge, 1985). 
Opposition to lotu was based on the fear that the new religion would take 
away their identity, mana, power and authority and terminate the highly 
cherished continuity with the ancestral world, which had been cast as 
‘evil’ and ‘demonic’ by the new religion (Thornley, 2002; Ryle, 2010).
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Much of the early to mid-1800s saw the clash between two security 
systems: the Fijian and the European. By the 1850s, most chiefs in 
the eastern part of Fiji, through Tongan and missionary influence, had 
succumbed to the new religion (Scarr, 1984). Ma’afu, a Tongan chief 
who was leader of the Tongans in Fiji, extended his influence and became 
a threat to Cakobau, who set up his own government with the support 
of some Europeans (Spurway, 2015). These new governments provided 
a new form of security framework, which integrated both the Taukei and 
European systems. European-type laws were enacted that overruled local 
norms, and taxes were imposed in a similar manner as the old tributary 
system. On the island of Vanuabalavu, given to Ma’afu by Tui Cakau 
(paramount chief of Somosomo), Ma’afu set up a land tenure system 
whereby young men were given lots on which they farmed in order to 
pay their tribute to the Ma’afu government (Spurway, 2015). The same 
system found resonance in Tonga and is still in use now. Cakobau basically 
converted his conquered territories into a new ‘modern’ state using new 
European symbolism such as a flag (with a peace dove on it), an army 
reinvented from his bati (warrior clan), European advisers, taxes and new 
laws. Security was now imposed not through the whims of warrior chiefs 
and threats of war clubs but through European-styled laws endorsed by 
a council of chiefs and European advisers (Scarr, 1984).
Anti-colonial resistance and the security 
contours
By 10 October 1874, when Fiji was ceded to Britain by the local chiefs, 
security in Fiji was influenced by a number of perceived threats, including 
growing fear of the all-powerful Ma’afu, the prevalent lawlessness of 
European settlers and the continuing alienation of land by Europeans, 
some of whom were assisted by some chiefs (Maude, 1964; France, 1969). 
This deed of cession marked a significant turning point in Fiji’s history 
as a new centralised state system was brought to bear in a country that 
hitherto consisted of competing chiefdoms (France, 1969). The deed 
of cession, which was signed by 12 Taukei chiefs together with British 
representatives, saw the establishment of a politically powerful and legally 
coercive system, which subjected the indigenous Fijians to British law, 
political institutions and norms (Newbury, 2011). Supported by various 
acts, it redefined the security discourse by shifting the emphasis away 
from the chiefs and community to the state and Crown.
113
4 . End OF COuPS?
The real intent among the indigenous Fijians of the deed of cession has 
been the subject of debate over the years. As Newbury observes:
Time changes the perspectives. Later interpretations of the 
sovereign basis for concessions in the dialogue resulting in 
the  transfer of political power between two cultures express the 
tension implicit in the use of historical documents lifted out 
of their historical context by a later generation of protagonists to 
serve very different political agendas. (Newbury, 2011: 28)
Some believe that the deed of cession was based on a contract between 
Queen Victoria and the Taukei chiefs, and therefore the instrument 
of independence should have been returned to the Taukei community 
and not to Fiji as a state (Baledrokadroka, 2003). This has thrown into 
question the legitimacy of Fiji as a state, which might be a laughable 
proposition but at the same time a serious one by some ethnonationalist 
lawyers and political activists in recent years.
Meanwhile, the establishment of the British colonial state was far from 
being a peaceful affair. In fact it was to be the beginning of a long, bitter 
and complex struggle, which saw interconnected moments of resistance 
by many indigenous Fijians, particularly those from the western side of 
Fiji, who saw British colonial rule together with their comprador Fijian 
chiefs, who were largely from the eastern side of Fiji, as posing a direct 
threat to their sovereignty and well-being (Durutalo, 1986). A series of 
resistance movements emerged that took different forms, from the direct 
use of force to more subtle modes of mobilisation and rebellion using 
religion and the withdrawal of labour and support for the colonial regime 
(Ravuvu, 1991a).
One of the very first and also possibly one of the most violent acts of 
dissent was a major rebellion in western and central Viti Levu in 1876, 
which came to be known as the Colo Wars, a mere two years after Fiji 
became a British colony (Nicole, 2006); Routledge, 1985). The term 
colo (pronounced tholo), which literally means inland or interior, was 
a derogatory label (which connotes being uncivilised, savage and wild) 
used by those along the coast and by colonial officials to refer to those 
in the interior of Viti Levu who had not embraced Christianity and 
were opposed to British colonial rule. The Kai Colo (people of Colo) 
were independent-minded and sought to protect their culture, land and 
social autonomy from encroaching external domination in the form of 
Christianity, colonialism and the hegemonic power of Bau, a chiefdom 
that was in alliance with the colonial state (Nicole, 2006).
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Bau had been a powerful kingdom in precolonial times and had extended 
its empire through conquest to various parts of Fiji, except on the western 
side and in the interior of Viti Levu, which were not readily accessible and 
were well defended by local chiefs and their warriors. The anti-Bau, anti-
Christian, anti-European planter and anti-colonial resistance spanned 
miles of territory linking villages across the borders of Nadroga, Serua, 
Namosi, Naitasiri and Ba provinces in a broad resistance alliance (Nicole, 
2010; Thornley, 2002). The local grievances included tension with 
missionaries who had embarked on an aggressive program of conversion 
using local missionaries; European planters alienating arable land, often 
using dubious means; and the role of eastern chiefs in expanding their 
influence and power using the colonial state. The rebellion by the Kai 
Colo was brutally suppressed by the colonial state using the Armed 
Native Constabulary (ANC), which consisted largely of Taukei young 
men, recruited from ‘friendly’ villages, under the command of European 
officers (Brown, 1998).
The same grievances that provoked the Colo Wars also motivated the 
Tuka Movement of 1879–91, a broad-based rebellion opposed to 
the exploitative and oppressive attitudes and practices of Bauans, settlers, 
labour recruiters, missionaries and the colonial state and its institutions. 
Led by a charismatic leader, Navosavakadua (‘he who speaks only once’), 
from the province of Ra, the Tuka Movement assumed a religious–cultural 
approach, a strategy that had a deep influence in mobilising the powerless 
and subaltern communities around Fiji (Kaplan, 1995). Ra had been 
subjugated by Bau for years. Many of its young men had been recruited 
for work as labourers, and some of its best land had been alienated through 
deceitful means. In the interior of the province lie the sacred Nakauvadra 
Ranges, believed to be the home of Fiji’s supreme deity, Degei, the snake 
god (France, 1966). This sense of spirituality gave the Tuka movement 
a cosmological character that connected well with the religious-minded 
locals. The response by the colonial state was harsh, leading to the 
obliteration of some villages and the exiling of Navosavakadua to Rotuma, 
an isolated island in the north of Fiji.
In Vanua Levu, the second largest island in Fiji, there was also rebellion by 
the Seaqaqa people against the decision to bring the district of Sasa, which 
had close ties with the southern district of Wailevu, under the direct rule of 
Naduri, the seat of power of the high chief of Macuata, Tui Macuata. This 
resistance attracted the wrath of the ANC, which crushed the rebellion 
and whose leaders were either hanged or banished (Ali, 2008).
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Opposition to the heavy-handed and oppressive style of colonial leadership 
through selected chiefs, who were designated high positions within the 
colonial regime, was rife, and many saw that the solution lay with forming 
a federation with New Zealand, a movement that was at its height from 
1901 to 1903. In the first three decades of the 20th century, a charismatic 
leader, Apolosi Ranawai, was a major centre of attention because of his 
alternative socioeconomic scheme for indigenous Fijians. He set up the 
Viti Kabani (Fijian Company) for the purpose of empowering Taukei 
growers and businesses by undercutting European intermediaries who 
controlled the banana and copra market (Sutherland, 1992). This was 
tantamount to a revolt against the colonial capitalist economy, colonial 
state and chiefly order and therefore called for drastic response. Again, 
the reaction of the colonial state was to supress the movement by exiling 
Ranawai to Rotuma and later to New Zealand (Nicole, 2006).
Continued resistance to colonial rule also employed more subtle means 
in the form of semi-religious and political groups such as the Luveniwai 
Movement. This resistance was in response to taxation (vakacavacava), 
continued alienation of land by some chiefs, paternalistic colonial rule and 
exploitation of labour. Although there were strict rules under the native 
policy for movement of people, Fijians devised means of absenteeism 
from villages to avoid burdensome state-sponsored responsibilities such 
as taxation and the practice of lala or provision of goods and services to 
chiefs upon demand (Chappelle, 1970).
These forms of resistance were in direct response to the excesses of 
colonial rule, which threatened to undermine and usurp the autonomy 
and power of tribes as well as transform them into subservient entities 
of the Crown through the imposition of the Christian ethos, taxation, 
the reorganisation of land tenure systems and governance structures to 
reflect the interests of colonial capital in alliance with comprador chiefs 
(Nicole, 2010; Sutherland, 1992).
Crafting colonial security: Coercion, 
hegemony and divide and rule
The British response to colonial resistance took various forms, including 
the direct use of military force using the ANC, imprisonment, execution, 
village relocation, banishment from villages and exile of leaders (Ravuvu, 
1991a; Nicole, 2006). More subtle means, such as surveillance, use of 
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chiefly authority through the native administration and ‘traditional’ 
appeal, use of church influence and even the use of sports such as cricket, 
were deployed, sometimes cautiously and sometimes more enthusiastically, 
to keep indigenous Fijians under the tutelage of colonial hegemony.
Perhaps the most potent force for colonial pacification was the ANC, 
a paramilitary force that acted as police and army at the same time, set up 
through the Royal Gazette of 10 October 1874. The founding commander 
was Lieutenant Henry Olive of the Royal Marine Light Infantry, and 
senior officers were mostly Europeans. As in other colonial armies, the 
ordinary rank and file were local indigenous people, who were often 
pitted against other indigenous Fijians in the name of law and order. The 
ANC evolved from Cakobau’s Royal Army, which was set up in 1871 and 
was used extensively to subdue tribes in central Viti Levu and Lovoni on 
Ovalua Island. At first, Europeans saw Cakobau’s army as a threat to their 
security, but they changed their mind as the threats from the Kai Colo 
increased and Cakobau’s army was the only available means of providing 
security (Brown, 1998).
The ANC brutally put down anti-government and anti-Christian 
insurrection against the Kai Colo around the Nadroga–Navosa area in 
what came to be known as the Little Wars (Brewster, 1922). The British 
used chiefs who were coopted into the colonial bureaucracy at the district 
level (buli) and provincial level (roko) to recruit villagers by leveraging 
traditional and kin-based loyalty. This was to be the pattern of recruitment 
into the Fijian armed forces for much of the 20th century (during World 
War I, World War II and the Malayan Emergency of the 1950s). In the 
service of the Crown, chiefs used their mana to invoke the masculine 
values of yalo qaqa (warrior spirit and bravery) and dau vakarorogo (loyalty 
and obedience) as a way of extricating young men from their daily 
communal responsibilities to become coercive agents of the colonisers. 
This created a situation of colonial paradox whereby the colonised were 
used as instruments of oppression against other colonised.  The native 
soldiers were institutionalised, imbued with a new identity and ideological 
outlook and let loose among their own relatives, described thus:
The ANC had performed well. Reports on the affair [Little 
Wars] stress that the indigenous troops of the government did 
not hesitate to kill men of the same race when ordered to do so 
by their officers. Nor did they hesitate to punish their own men. 
(Brown, 1998: ii)
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Gordon’s idea was that wrongdoers were not to go through the mainstream 
British justice system all the time and were also to be judged by district 
commissioners with advice from Fijian assessors. The idea was to make 
use of the Fijian Administration mechanism as a way of maintaining and 
sustaining colonial hegemony without having to resort to force (all the 
time) to ensure submission. Despite this, the use of direct force continued 
unabated. The ANC was deployed to quell the rebellion in Seaqaqa in 
1894, mentioned earlier. The governor declared a state of emergency, and 
39 sotia (soldiers), commanded by Epeli Nailatikau, son of Seru Cakobau, 
were deployed on this operation. The rebellion was broken, and some 
survivors were arrested and sentenced to death, but this sentence was later 
commuted to imprisonment (Nicole, 2010; Brown, 1998).
The very first laws to set up Fiji’s security forces were Ordinance No. XXX 
of 19 December 1876, which provided regulation of the police force, 
and Ordinance No. XXXI of 29 December, which provided regulation 
of the ANC (Colony of Fiji, 1876). There were four different classes 
in the disciplined forces: the ANC, whose members were called sotia 
(soldiers); the regular police (ovisa) in Suva and Levuka, at that time the 
only two urban centres; the rural police (ovisa ni yasana), who reported 
to the district commissioners; and the village police (ovida ni koro), who 
reported to the village headman (turagani koro).
Despite the existence of the ANC, local Europeans, consisting of 
merchants and plantation owners who modelled themselves along the lines 
of European landed gentry, were still uncertain of the capacity of Taukei 
soldiers to protect them. They persuaded Governor George O’Brien to 
enact an ordinance to establish a volunteer force in 1897. One  of the 
primary reasons for this measure was to quell local disturbances against 
plantation owners. Another reason was to respond to rumours about 
a possible New Zealand invasion. This ordinance was repealed in March 
1906 and was replaced by the Fiji Rifle Association Ordinance, which 
allowed the mobilisation of rifle clubs in case of a New Zealand ‘invasion’ 
(Colony of Fiji, 1906). These clubs formed a private army of sorts, which 
operated outside the ambit of state control. The real intention of the 
1906 Ordinance was not so much defence against possible invasion as 
protection of European economic and political interests in Fiji at a time 
when the colonial policies on land, under Gordon’s orthodoxy, were seen 
by many Europeans as being too pro-native (Brown, 1998).
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The security dynamics in the colony gained an extra ethnic dimension 
after 1879 with the arrival of Indian labourers in that year to work on 
the sugar plantations (Lal, 2004). European–Taukei relations, based on 
vertical political patronage and paternalism, gave way to a more horizontal 
intercultural relationship predicated on suspicion and hostility. The influx 
of Indians meant the indigenous Fijians were no longer seen as the only 
subaltern group that posed a major threat to Europeans but were viewed 
instead as a convenient strategic leverage against the Indians, who were 
seen as troublesome and in need of coercive control.
Fiji’s new ethnically demarcated society was characterised by ethnicised 
division of economic, social and political spaces, which provided the 
security environment conducive to the protection of European capital 
and political interests at the cost of the other two subaltern groups: the 
Taukei, who lived a subsistence village life under the tutelage of chiefs, and 
Indo-Fijians, who lived a regimented and oppressive plantation life within 
the cane belt (Sutherland, 1992). The security apparatus of the colonial 
state ensured that the social lines which demarcated ethnic spaces were 
clear. A manifest consequence of this was the way in which the subaltern 
groups (in this case the indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians) were pitted 
against one another through separate representation in the legislature, 
ethnic economic division of labour and separate political governance system 
for indigenous Fijians (Fijian Administration). This institutionalised 
system of demarcated governance provided the security pillar for what 
was known as the ‘divide and rule’ policy (Macnaught, 2016).
The use of hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, as a security strategy was 
evident and worked very well for British colonial control, in fact more 
effectively than the deployment of coercion through the ANC. Hegemony 
was articulated through a complex system of administration, political 
representation and cultural control and reproduction. These included 
a syncretic mixture of British state bureaucracy to legally frame the process 
of decision-making (Macnaught, 2016) as well as the use of Taukei chiefs 
to preside over the various levels of Taukei administration at the national, 
provincial, district and village levels, and rigid rules under the Native 
Act to keep indigenous Fijians within the social rubric of communalism, 
a form of social organisation that the British deliberately imposed to keep 
ordinary Taukei subservient to chiefs who acted as compradors for the 
colonial state (Ratuva, 2013; Sutherland, 1992).
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A separate Fijian Administration (Tabacakacaka ni Taukei) structure was 
created in 1876, with the Great Council of Chiefs (Bose Levu Vakaturaga) as 
the apex deliberative body. This system defined the boundaries of cultural 
identity and political rights of the indigenous Fijians in a paternalistic 
way, often by arbitrarily imposing decisions and declaring them sacrosanct 
and beyond questioning. Submission to the officially sanctioned Taukei 
code of cultural dispositions and behaviour was legitimised through appeal 
to the belief in an immemorial and divinely ordained chiefly culture 
(i  tovo vaka-turaga) and the indispensability of kinship ties (veiwekani). 
The native policy defined the ethno-administrative boundaries of 
Taukei  identity as well as the ‘security’ parameters that demarcated the 
Taukei from other ethnic groups, principally the Indo-Fijians, who 
were made out to be a threat to Taukei land, culture, rights and political 
interests (Nayacakalou, 1975). This system of social insulation acted as 
a political security buffer as well as a system of control by the colonial 
state, whose policies not only reinforced the separation of the different 
ethnic groups but also pitted one against the other.
The changing global security climate in the British Empire and the world 
generally had some influence on security at home. Soldiers from Fiji (most 
of European origin) participated in the Boer War in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s as well as World War I (1914–18), as both were expressions 
of loyalty to the empire. Indigenous Fijians, like other coloured colonised 
people under the British Crown, were not allowed to bear arms and fight 
at the front during World War I and instead were confined to membership 
of the labour corps. This changed during World War II when a Fijian 
battalion was sent to fight in Solomon Islands against Japanese forces 
under New Zealand and US officers. The wars were opportunities by 
the British to tighten their security grip on the colonies using emergency 
powers and enlistment of able-bodied men to fight their wars (Nawadra, 
1995; Ravuvu, 1991b).
Meanwhile, rebellion in the plantations by Indo-Fijian labourers was 
common in the late 1800s and early 1900s and in the 1920s. In some 
cases policemen were sent to quell the disturbances (Gillion, 1962). 
Intervention in sugar plantation tension served three major purposes. 
First, it was a way of keeping industrial peace, which served the interest 
of colonial capital; second, it helped to keep Indian workers and their 
grievances isolated from Taukei Fijian workers, who also expressed 
opposition to exploitation; and third, it presented an opportunity 
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for the colonial state to affirm its authority and legitimacy in the new 
colony (Sutherland, 1992). This had resonance with the broader security 
framework of the ‘divide and rule’ policy to maintain ethnic separation 
as a way to ensure that aggrieved Indo-Fijian and Taukei workers did not 
join forces and pose a direct threat to colonial capital.
Chiefs were readily deployed to isolate Taukei workers and persuade 
them to refrain from participation in industrial strikes and other forms 
of dispute because they undermined the Taukei sense of community and 
cultural respect. An example of this occurred during the oil workers’ 
strike of 1959, when workers of different ethnic groups took part in an oil 
workers’ strike, which spread to other industries and culminated in a major 
anti-colonial riot in central Suva. Chiefs used their traditional authority 
to call indigenous Fijian workers together and ask them to refrain from 
any activity that would bring disrepute to the chiefly system and Taukei 
culture (Sutherland, 1992). The appeal to tradition and loyalty to chiefs 
was a powerful psychological tool to deter anti-state resistance among 
indigenous Fijians. This was a technique used throughout the colonial 
period to break up trans-ethnic proletariat solidarity and reinforce the 
power of the chieftocracy, a close ally of the colonial state (Durutalo, 1986).
Responses to the use of security strategies such as direct coercion, 
institutional control, ideological and cultural domination and political 
manipulation were diverse. While such strategies ensured submission to 
the whims of colonial hegemony, they also generated multiple responses in 
the form of cynicism, evasive tactics and direct opposition. The multiple 
nodes and expressions of power (in the Foucauldian sense) attempted 
to institutionalise control at one level, but at another level it was not easy 
to contain, control and transform the multiple and diffused manifestations 
of power in the community. Security in the colonial contest therefore 
became highly contested in a way that saw the hegemonic and subaltern 
discourses engaging in both mutual and contradictory ways. Upon 
independence in 1970, the security environment changed, although 
some of the underlying ethnic, economic, cultural and political factors 
remained and continued to influence postcolonial relations.
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Postcolonial transformation: The politics 
of securitisation
Some of the more salient features of security in the postcolonial era were, 
in the main, defined in ethnopolitical terms, articulated in three ways. 
The first was the sense of self-preservation and parochialism about a group’s 
own security and how this was contained within a well-defined cultural 
boundary (Norton, 1977). The second was how this boundary would 
impinge on and even intersect with other cultural boundaries. The third 
was how the area of convergence of these boundaries could be negotiated 
to create a balance and an overriding national identity. In other words, 
how was communal identity to be reconciled with national identity in 
a way that ensured political equilibrium and stability (Ratuva, 2005)?
This was a classic case of communal nationalism versus civic nationalism, 
as articulated by Stavenhagen (1996), where the desire to protect and 
promote group interest often collides with the collective interest, 
represented by the state. However, Stavenhagen tends to dichotomise 
the relationship between the two forms of nationalism and fails to 
take into consideration the syncretic relationship between them, which 
often involves the simultaneous coexistence and interaction between 
contestation, accommodation and synthesis (Ratuva, 2004). Rather 
than assuming a stereotyped binary configuration, ethnic relations in 
Fiji articulated themselves in multiple forms: while there was tension, 
there was also accommodation; while there was racialisation, there was 
also multicultural engagement; while there was communalism, there were 
also individual rights; while there was authoritarian rule through coups, 
there was also popular democracy (Ratuva, 2004). This complex syncretic 
configuration shaped the trajectory and character of Fijian political and 
social discourse and security in the postcolonial period.
The perception of security in Fiji needs to be understood in the broad 
context of this complex syncretic interplay of diverse forces, rather than the 
narrow emphasis on ethnicity. The racialised discourse should not be seen 
in isolation but must be linked to issues such as group rights and identity, 
resources including land, power, inequality and socioeconomic status. 
The  simplistic ethnic lens has the potential to construct premeditated 
threats in the form of the other, and this manifested itself in a Taukei 
sense of anxiety whipped up during the colonial days regarding a possible 
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takeover of their land by Indo-Fijians, and the Indo-Fijian fear of loss of 
citizenship and rights. Communal anxieties fed into each other, creating 
a vortex of distrust, which was exacerbated in times of crisis.
Racialised constitutional engineering 
and insecuritisation
Since independence in 1970, Fiji has had four constitutions (1970, 1990, 
1997 and 2013), and all have either been victims of or results of 
coups, political conflict and anxiety about group security, and rights. 
Constitutional engineering was often seen as a mechanism for conflict 
resolution through provision of ethnic representation, but in the 2013 
constitution, the emphasis on ethnic representation was curtailed in 
favour of common trans-ethnic representation through a single national 
constituency under a proportional representation system.
The 1970 constitution, the first after independence, provided for 
a whole series of mechanisms to respond to perceptions of group 
insecurity by both Taukei and Indo-Fijians. The first of these was 
political representation. Of the 52 parliamentary seats allocated, 22 were 
reserved for indigenous Fijians, 22 for Indo-Fijians and 8 for other 
minorities (European, part-Europeans, Chinese, Pacific Islanders and 
so on) usually categorised as ‘general electors’. The 22 seats for each of 
the two major ethnic groups were further divided into 12 communal 
(elected by members of the same community) and 10 national roll seats 
to be elected cross-ethnically. For general electors, the division was three 
communal and five national roll  seats (Fiji Government, 1970). This 
communal system of seat reservation was meant to provide a sense of 
balance and national confidence to respond to fears by indigenous Fijians 
of possible domination by the numerically superior Indo-Fijians, who 
over the years have been persistent not only about independence but 
also about exerting their political rights through a one-person one-vote 
system of election. In 1966, four years before independence, Indo-Fijians 
comprised 51 per cent of the population, as opposed to 42 per cent for the 
indigenous Fijians, a demographic balance that indigenous Fijians feared 
would give Indo-Fijians electoral advantage. Fear of loss of political rights 
through elections and loss of land rights through foreign and Indo-Fijian 
speculation and entrepreneurship were powerful factors in the minds of 
many indigenous Fijians (Ali, 1972).
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During the 1969 constitutional talks in London, the agreement between 
the leaders of the Alliance Party, representing Taukei and minority interests, 
and the National Federation Party, representing Indo-Fijian interests, 
revolved around a discursive process of ethnic bargaining. The result was 
a constitution that represented two competing interests synthesised into 
a common national trajectory. This consensus of sorts was re-elected in 
the post-independence ‘multiracialism’ philosophy of the ruling Alliance 
Party, which won the pre-independence election in 1966 and the first post-
independence election in 1972 (Ali, 1972). The multiracial experiment 
consisted of two competing discursive philosophies: coexistence and 
distinctiveness. The former referred to different ethnocultural and 
religious groups living side by side, observing each other’s holidays (such as 
Christmas and Easter for Christians, Diwali for Hindus and Mohammed’s 
birthday for Muslims), sharing common national symbols such as flag 
and anthem, sharing daily cultural artefacts, food, music and values and 
promoting ideological consciousness about a unified national identity. The 
second aspect, paradoxically, appeared to be a counteracting ideological 
force and referred to the idea of ethnocultural distinctiveness, whereby 
individual communities maintained and expressed their distinctive 
identities and interests. This formula was predicated on the assumption 
that multiculturalism was workable only in a situation where diversity 
and distinctiveness existed side by side and was articulated simultaneously 
as part of a unifying national identity (Ratuva, 2004).
In the broader security schema, this was probably a workable arrangement 
then, given the prevailing circumstances, because the opposing forces 
converged in a middle space where they negotiated and appeased each 
other, at least at the level of parliamentary politics and everyday ethnic 
relations, although this did not fully address the deeper schisms that were 
to manifest themselves later in times of crisis (Robertson & Sutherland, 
2002). The interaction between coexistence and distinctiveness was part of 
a syncretic dynamics—meaning that there was a simultaneous occurrence 
of cultural accommodation as well as contradiction, which maintained 
a certain degree of harmony in the first 13 years after independence. It was 
not an overwhelmingly tense and racialised situation, but a situation where 
relationships oscillated between tension and consensus in a dynamic way 
within the broader rubric of the Alliance Party’s multiracial philosophy. 
However, the paradox was that this synergy also helped to deepen and 
consolidate the Alliance Party’s hegemonic strategy to maintain political 
and ideological dominance of a trans-ethnic alliance between chiefly and 
business elites. Multiculturalism was a Trojan Horse of sorts to maintain 
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this alliance. The chiefly elites had strong political leverage over the Taukei 
Fijian population, and multiracialism was seen as workable only if the 
interests of these elites were left unchallenged (Robertson & Sutherland, 
2002). The communal distribution of seats and ethnopolitical culture, or 
what has been termed ‘communal democracy’ (Ratuva, 2005), reinforced 
this sociopolitical arrangement and at the same time rendered it fragile.
Sociologically, this situation created a syncretic condition that pitted 
communal and civic nationalism against each other, as Stavenhagen 
(1996) talked about, where tension and accommodation between the 
exertion of ethnocommunal difference and reconciliation of diversity 
for national unity take place simultaneously, with one overcoming the 
other in particular instances. The contestation between the two modes 
of nationalism becomes acute in times of crisis, particularly when 
ethnonationalism becomes an unrestrained force that seeks to transform 
and overtake civic nationalism as the dominant political and ideological 
force (Horowitz, 1985). The situation often becomes critical when 
contestation over state power, threat to cultural group rights, protection 
of identity, competition over resources and perception of exploitation and 
marginalisation become part of the political equation and are exploited by 
ethnic entrepreneurs for political advantage (Jenkins, 2008). The use of 
aggressive institutional leveraging and ultimately force by the dominant 
ethnocultural group can result from this contested synergy and thus create 
a situation of insecurity for the state and other ethnic groups, and can 
undermine civic nationalism as the unifying force for the state.
That is exactly what happened in 1987 when the cloak of civic nationalism, 
buttressed by the multiracialist ideology, was overcome by the power of 
Taukei ethnonationalism. The crisis was provoked by the defeat of the 
Alliance Party, which had total control of the state apparatus, including 
the military and other powerful neocolonial indigenous institutions, 
such as the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC), the Fijian Affairs Board, the 
Native Land Trust Board and Provincial Councils, with the backing of the 
European and Indo-Fijian business community and most of members of 
the indigenous population. As mentioned earlier, despite its multiracial 
philosophy, the Alliance Party’s real power was anchored on the power 
and privilege of the Taukei chieftocracy, which provided the primordial 
mana and cultural legitimacy for ethnonationalist agitation after the 
Alliance’s electoral loss during the April 1987 general elections (Robertson 
& Tamanisau, 1988).
125
4 . End OF COuPS?
The victorious coalition, consisting of the newly formed Fiji Labour Party 
(FLP) and the Indo-Fijian–dominated National Federation Party (NFP), 
posed a direct threat to the Alliance’s political hegemony as well as to 
the Taukei institutions that were part of its broader alliance. The national 
destabilisation activities of the Taukei Movement, an extremist 
ethnonationalist vigilante group consisting of Alliance supporters, were 
targeted at the Indo-Fijian political ‘take-over’, which was perceived as 
posing a threat to Taukei political rights, land security, economic interests 
and religious beliefs. The harmonious balance between communal and 
civic nationalism was broken as a result of the shift in political gravity away 
from Taukei political control. The underlying contradictions between 
the notions of coexistence and distinctiveness, which encapsulated the 
philosophy of multiracialism, were thrust to the surface, with the latter 
overshadowing the former as it asserted itself in an aggressive and violent 
way (Prasad, 1989).
The military, which was closely aligned with the chieftocratic system—
culturally, politically and historically—intervened on behalf of the 
Alliance  historical bloc, despite its constitutional role as the ‘neutral’ 
vanguard of national security. The role of the military, as we will later 
consider in detail, was largely shaped by a rather uncomfortable 
mixture of institutional praetorian norms learnt in military colleges and 
Taukei sociocultural values of warrior masculinity, inculcated through 
close association with the chieftocracy and indigenous cultural ethos 
(Sanday, 1991).
To the Taukei ethnonationalists, the capture of state power by the military 
provided considerable relief. Many felt that, with the help of the military, 
Taukei communal rights and political ascendancy were now secure, and 
this was constitutionalised in 1990 (Reeves, Vakatora & Lal , 1996). 
A pertinent aspect of the 1990 constitution was the way it conceptually 
connected national security and Taukei security as being symbiotic; that is, 
national security was possible only through protection of Taukei security:
The events of 1987 were occasioned by a widespread belief that 
the 1970 constitution was inadequate to give protection to the 
interests of the indigenous Fijian people, their values, traditions, 
customs, way of life and economic well-being … the indigenous 
people of Fiji are endowed with their lands and other resources 
and the right to govern themselves for their advancement and 
welfare. (Fiji Government, 1990: 12)
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Taukei political ascendancy was further bolstered by the communal 
representation system, which provided 37 seats for Taukei, 27 for 
Indo-Fijians, one for Rotumans and five for other ethnic minorities in 
a 70-member parliament (Fiji Government, 1990: 49). To secure Taukei 
political control further, the 1990 constitution ensured Taukei dominance 
in the 34-member senate, in which 24 seats were allocated through 
nomination by the Taukei-dominated Great Council of Chiefs (GCC), 
one seat was for the Rotuman community and nine for Indo-Fijians and 
others. The GCC was constitutionally required to appoint the president, 
and this effectively meant that the position of head of state was to remain 
perpetually in Taukei hands (Lal, 1998).
The process of state capture and the attempt at political ascendancy by 
the Taukei to entrench their group security merely institutionalised and 
increased the political insecurity of Indo-Fijians. This security zero-sum 
game was to be the dominant pattern of ethnopolitics for a number of 
years even after the 1997 constitution, which provided for 25 open seats 
and 46 communal seats, was promulgated (Fiji Government, 1997). 
Despite the attempt in the 1997 constitution to provide a sense of shared 
security for all citizens through the new Alternative Vote (AV) electoral 
system, a Bill of Rights and social justice provision, the perception of 
insecurity among the more marginal members of the Taukei community 
persisted, and ethnic entrepreneurs took advantage of this to whip up 
ethnonationalist fervour. Thus, when Mahendra Chaudhry was elected 
as the first Indo-Fijian prime minister in 1999, ethnonationalism reared 
its ugly head again and agitation increased in tempo, culminating in yet 
another coup in May 2000 (Robertson & Sutherland, 2002).
This time the role of the military was more ambivalent than in the two 
coups in 1987. The reason for this was that there was confusion due to the 
number of players with different motives involved. For instance, the elite 
Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit (CRW) of the military was involved, 
together with ethnonationalist politicians and activists, and senior 
military officers were divided as to whether the military should support 
the coup. The military eventually decided to ‘officially’ oppose the coup; it 
imposed emergency powers, removed the president and the constitution 
(in another coup), arrested the coup-makers and set the country on a 
path towards re-democratisation. This series of events raised fundamental 
questions about the dramatically oscillating security dynamics in Fiji, 
especially the changing position of the military in relation to framing 
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security, the unreliability of constitutional engineering in protecting 
group security and, as we saw in 1987, the power of ethnonationalism to 
spawn dramatic political change in the name of Taukei security.
The 2000 coup was paradigm shifting in the sense that it marked the 
reconfiguration of the military’s relationship with Taukei chieftocracy 
and ethnonationalism. Instead of being seen as allies, as in the 1987 
coups, these powerful political forces were now seen as sources of 
insecurity. Although the military had appointed Laisenia Qarase, a fervent 
ethnonationalist, interim prime minister in 2000, he was later vilified by 
the military, even after he won the 2001 and 2006 elections, as posing 
a threat to national security because of his political beliefs. The continuing 
differences between Qarase’s party, the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewe ni 
Vanua (SDL) and the military, led by Commodore Frank Bainimarama, 
created a national security crisis that was soon to plunge Fiji into another 
period of turmoil (Ratuva, 2011a).
Central to this security crisis was the way the military, the most 
powerful security institution of the state, was at loggerheads with the 
elected government on a number of issues, including the dispute over 
the extension of the commander’s contract and differences over two 
controversial Bills that the SDL had planned to put through Parliament. 
The first was the Reconciliation, Truth and Unity Bill, which called for the 
release of George Speight, leader of the 2000 coup, and his fellow coup-
makers as a condition for national reconciliation, among other things. 
The second was the Qoliqoli Bill (Fishing Rights Bill), which was aimed 
at transferring ownership of the foreshore area from the state to Taukei 
landowners. Opposition to these Bills by the military was framed around 
their potential to inflame inter-ethnic tension and heighten insecurity. 
Threats by Bainimarama against the overthrow of the Qarase government 
attracted charges of treason, which the police had started investigating 
(Fraenkel & Firth, 2007).
The tension escalated, resulting in the overthrow of the Qarase 
government by the military in December 2006. Later, in March 2009, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the coup was illegal. Less than 24 hours 
later, the president abrogated the constitution and reappointed 
Bainimarama as  prime minister in what was technically another coup. 
The abrogation of the constitution was significant, because it meant that 
all constitutionally prescribed state institutions, positions and power were 
completely annulled and state control shifted entirely to the military. 
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The military regime accelerated the pace of social, economic and political 
transformation in line with the People’s Charter, a document put together 
earlier in 2007–08 as a blueprint for post-coup reform (Fiji Government, 
2008). Among the changes were the abolition of the GCC, which 
the military regarded as a  threat to national security, reform of the 
Taukei neocolonial institutions, deployment of military officers in key 
government positions, prosecution of perpetrators of corruption by the 
newly formed Fiji Commission Against Corruption, aggressive national 
development strategies and the use of the term ‘Fijian’ for all Fiji citizens 
of different ethnic groups (Ratuva, 2013).
The abolition of the GCC in particular was controversial, and people 
reacted to it differently. For more conservative Taukei, the abolition of 
the GCC and reform of the neocolonial institutions posed a threat to 
their sense of cultural security. The more progressive Taukei saw the GCC 
as an archaic institution whose role in sustaining chiefly privilege had to 
end. From the viewpoint of some Indo-Fijians, the abolition of the GCC 
provided a sense of relief that a major legitimising tool of ethnonationalism, 
which had in the past posed a threat to their political security, was now 
history. However, some Indo-Fijians had close links with some chiefs 
who were members of the GCC and who acted as a restraining force on 
extreme ethnonationalism. There were those who feared that the abolition 
of the GCC would resurrect and regalvanise ethnonationalism in an ugly 
manner. The prediction by some that FijiFirst, the coup supporters’ party, 
would lose the 2014 election under the new 2013 constitution because 
of the abolition of the GCC did not eventuate. In fact, FijiFirst won a 
landslide victory and also secured more than 50 per cent of Taukei votes 
(Ratuva & Lawson, 2016).
The coups, as we have seen briefly above, have shown that even constitutional 
safeguards were not sufficient to avoid ethnopolitical conflict and state 
capture. While constitutional engineering helped to reconfigure state 
structure, provided norms for representation and legitimised the operation 
of the state, it failed to contain ethnonationalism and ethnic contestation. 
The successive constitutions dealt only with structural and normative 
issues and did not address the deeper ideological and cultural issues. 
The constitutionally prescribed communal representation system in the 
1970, 1990 and 1997 constitutions helped to institutionally entrench and 
socially legitimise ethnopolitical contestation and antagonism, although 
in different degrees. Despite its attempts at providing ethnic balance and 
multiracial security, the 1970 constitution merely created conditions for 
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the potential unravelling of multiracialism in crisis situations. The 1990 
constitution mainstreamed ethnonationalism, provided security for 
the Taukei and reigned in insecurity for Indo-Fijians and other ethnic 
minorities. The thawing of ethnic relations and the establishment of 
the 1997 constitution, considered to be one of the most progressive 
in the world, failed to curb the excesses of ethnonationalism leading up 
to the 2000 coup and the tension that precipitated the 2006 coup.
The promulgation of the 2013 constitution is based on the assumption 
that the 2006 coups and the subsequent transformation of Fijian 
society has removed once and for all the scourge of ethnonationalism, 
and has replaced it with a multiracial society predicated on trans-
ethnic equality and supported by the open proportional representation 
system. Its promulgation and legitimacy have been widely criticised and 
questioned because of the politics associated with the constitutional 
process. The  draft constitution put together by the Constitution 
Commission led by Professor Yash Ghai was rejected, and the government 
created its own version by cannibalising aspects of the Ghai draft. The 
2013 constitution attempts to guarantee security in different ways such 
as the removal of ethnic representation, strengthening the role of the 
military as a security ‘watchdog’ and, ironically, giving more power to 
the executive in appointments as well as giving amnesty to perpetrators 
of past coups, among others.
The cumulative effect, as we see today, is the greater centralisation of 
power in the hands of the attorney general and prime pinister, unwanted 
intervention in parliamentary political debate by the military and use of 
fear as a means of manufacturing consent among the civil service and 
population. It is fair to say that the 2013 constitution was founded on 
the premise of security to facilitate the interests of a range of players, 
including coup perpetrators, executive, ruling party and a state system 
that has a much deeper and authoritarian control over the civil service 
and population. Any action that militates against the dominant order, 
such as strike action by unions or attempts at political extremism and 
dissention, is often met with efficient response through the use of 
a range of legalistic mechanisms meant to inhibit rather than encourage 
democracy. The election in 2014, won through a 60 per cent majority by 
the military-backed FijiFirst, was the first under the 2013 constitution, 
and in a way it institutionalised the security narratives mentioned above.
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However, the result of the November 2018 election saw the ruling 
FijiFirst winning by only 50.02 per cent of the total vote. While this 
majority is sufficient to sustain a stable government in the next four years, 
the real question is, if this trend continues, what might happen if the 
Taukei-based Social Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA) wins the next 
election in 2022? Will the military maintain its constitutional role as 
an independent security institution, or will it maintain its loyalty to the 
FijiFirst and intervene extralegally on its behalf as it has done in the past?
Politics of economic security
Perhaps one of the most salient security factors closely associated with 
ethnic politics over the years has been perceived and experienced inequality. 
Associated with this was mutual self-victimhood whereby both Taukei 
and Indo-Fijians saw the other as privileged while considering themselves 
to be marginalised and exploited. The Taukei saw Indo-Fijian dominance 
in the retail, commercial and professional sector as ‘evidence’ of economic 
domination, self-enhancement and even exploitative tendencies. On the 
reverse side of the coin, Indo-Fijians saw ownership of about 90 per cent 
of the land by Taukei landowning groups as symptomatic of unequal 
rights and wastage of resources.
The Taukei sense of economic disadvantage had deeper roots in the 
colonial epoch when a series of laws and policies under the native 
administration locked Taukei into a rigid communal life revolving around 
the village subsistence sector under the tutelage of chieftocrats, who also 
acted as comprador functionaries for the colonial state (Fisk, 1978). This 
system drew inspiration from the protectionist ideology of the first British 
Governor, Sir Arthur Gordon, whose social Darwinian belief was that the 
best way for the Taukei to survive the vagaries of Western influence was 
through preservation of their culture and the inalienability of their land:
To have preserved the actual institutions of native society might 
have stemmed the rapid decrease in the Fijian population; to have 
encouraged the adoption of European institutions might have 
enabled the survivors to adjust themselves to the changing world 
introduced by the white man. (France, 1969: 31)
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The policy cocooned the Taukei in a communal system characterised by 
feudalistic subservience and greater institutional control over their lives, 
and this had a profound and long-lasting effect on the socioeconomic 
situation and political psyche of the Taukei.
While the Taukei were locked into the communal subsistence village life, 
other ethnic groups had a head start in education and commerce, thus 
creating and solidifying inequality, which saw the Taukei at the bottom 
of the commercial, educational and professional ladder. This intersection 
between ethnicity and class shaped perception and attitudes between 
communities and, for the Taukei, it was a latent source of their grievances. 
When the native policies were relaxed towards the mid-1960s as Fiji moved 
towards independence, these grievances were articulated more readily and 
became a source of ethnonationalist sentiment (Nayacakalou, 1975).
Socioeconomic grievances and envy were readily translated into political 
grievances against Indo-Fijians because of their preponderance in retail 
and commerce. The relationship between economic insecurity and 
political grievance is noteworthy here because in the colonial and even 
postcolonial economy the two were closely related. Part of the Taukei 
sense of resentment emanated from their awe of the capitalist economy 
and all its technological aspects and commercial institutions that they 
had been made to believe were superior to, and more progressive than, 
the subsistence economy under which they lived. The Taukei came to see 
themselves as ‘inferior’ to the Europeans and Indo-Fijians who controlled 
the capitalist economy. This sense of marginalisation and disempowerment 
became a psychological breeding ground that nurtured ethnonationalism 
in later years.
Attempts to address the economic security of the Taukei through piecemeal 
introduction of the cash economy in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s failed 
to make any substantive transformation (Spate, 1959; Belshaw, 1964; 
Ratuva, 2013; Bain, 1986). Among numerous reasons was the control of 
these development projects by chieftocrats selected by the colonial state, 
whose interests were largely focused on accumulation of wealth and power 
for themselves. This was a case of ‘inherent obstacles to economic advance 
imposed by the traditional system’ (Spate, 1959: 55). By the time of 
independence, the Alliance government, aware of the growing disparity, 
integrated the notion of Taukei special development into a series of five-
year development plans. This, too, failed to have any significant impact on 
the socioeconomic situation of the Taukei because it was treated almost 
like a mere footnote to the development plans (Ratuva, 2013).
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Underneath the euphoria of independence and hope of a new national 
identity and destiny was the problem of socioeconomic inequality 
(Fisk, 1970). The private sector was controlled largely by European and 
Indo-Fijian capital, while the professional and educated Taukei were 
mostly concentrated in the civil service, which also had a preponderance 
of Indo-Fijians. These economic grievances were used as agenda for 
political mobilisation in 1975 when the Fijian Nationalist Party was 
formed by a  group of urban Taukei entrepreneurs who found their 
business endeavours constantly thwarted as they competed against the 
monopoly of the Indo-Fijian commercial class, which controlled retail, 
real estate and other commercial enterprises. When the Taukei-supported 
Alliance Party lost the election to the Indo Fijian dominated National 
Federation Party – Labour coalition in April 1987, there was a major 
shift in the balance of power away from the Taukei. As a consequence, the 
grievances came to the surface and precipitated ethnic tension and created 
a major schism. In the ensuing riots, Indo-Fijian shops and  properties 
were indiscriminately targeted.
The affirmative action policies put in place by the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa 
ni Taukei party, led by coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka after the 1987 coup 
were predicated on the belief that the best way to avoid future coups was 
to bridge the economic gap between the Taukei and Indo- Fijians. One 
of the aims of this affirmative action program was to create a  Taukei 
business class to balance the Indo-Fijian commercial dominance. 
Concerted energy to create equality through the shortest possible time 
was seen as an imperative to achieve economic parity, social justice and 
intercommunal harmony. The state, now under Taukei control, provided 
preferential policies in the form of special Taukei loans, scholarships, 
business licences, taxi licences, fishing licences and other forms of grants. 
Unfortunately, the patronage system within the Taukei political and 
commercial hierarchy got in the way of what was theoretically a socially 
progressive program. This led to widespread corruption, whereby some 
leading Taukei bureaucrats were able to manipulate their links and power 
within the state system to divert state funds to their investments. Perhaps 
the worst consequence of the patronage system and corruption was the 
collapse of the National Bank of Fiji, which dished out a flood of cash to 
elite Taukei under the justification of economic empowerment. As a result 
the bank became insolvent and had to close after losing more than FJ$300 
million (Ratuva, 2013).
133
4 . End OF COuPS?
After the 2000 coup, a more systematic affirmative action framework, 
called the 20-Year Development Plan (2001–20) for the Enhancement of 
Participation of Indigenous Fijians and Rotumans in the Socioeconomic 
Development of Fiji, was put in place by the SDL, under Prime Minister 
Laisenia Qarase. The document made the optimistic assertion that:
In conflict resolution, affirmative action helps address the grievances 
of particular groups who have been historically disadvantaged, and 
have used extremist political means to articulate these grievances. 
In this way, affirmative action directly targets the grievances by 
removing the existing inequalities, and thus assists in minimising 
political tension and conflict. (Fiji Government, 2002: 24)
Unfortunately, these noble goals were not achieved because of the 
corruption and scandals associated with the program, which led to 
the prosecution and imprisonment of a number of civil servants and 
a prominent businessman.
After the 2006 coup, the strategy for addressing Taukei economic security 
changed from affirmative action, which was abolished, to an integrated 
development strategy for national development. The military regime, 
which in September 2014 returned to power through a landslide victory 
under the banner of the FijiFirst party, also introduced social protection 
polices in the form of free education, free buses for students and elderly 
citizens, and an increase in social welfare allocations, among other things.
Although economic affirmative action as a measure to address security did 
not work as well as hoped, the consolation was that educational affirmative 
action was perhaps the most successful initiative because it helped many 
Taukei achieve higher levels of education and at the same time contributed 
to the expansion of a sizeable Taukei middle class. Although affirmative 
action was a state-driven program to uplift the economic security of the 
Taukei, it was seen by other ethnic groups, especially the Indo-Fijians, as 
a form of discrimination against them.
The military and security
The Fiji military has come under serious scrutiny in recent years because 
its behaviour since 1987 in relation to staging coups, and its responsibility 
for human rights abuses, has raised questions about its reliability as the 
last bastion of security. Despite changes in the justifications for coups 
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(in 1987 it was in support of Taukei ethnonationalism, and in 2006 it was 
purportedly to thwart ethnonationalism) and institutional transformation 
from 1987 to the present, its interventionist tendencies continue and have 
been further strengthened by the 2013 constitution, which prescribed 
a more proactive security watchdog role for the military. Studies of the 
Fiji military have largely revolved around its praetorian character and 
contemporary interventionist role in politics, staging coups and imposing 
authoritarian rule (Sanday, 1991). Sometimes we overlook some of the 
deeper cultural dynamics associated with the notion of warrior psychology, 
as we discussed earlier, and its role in providing cultural framing of both 
Taukei masculinity and Fiji military. A better understanding of the 
military could be gleaned from analysing it at two levels: the sociocultural 
and the institutional.
Sociocultural norms and psychology 
of the military
It is interesting to note that one of the legacies of the precolonial era 
is the notion of warrior culture psychology. The warriors in precolonial 
days were not part of a specialised institution but were individuals 
bound by sociocultural norms and expectations to taqomaka (protect) 
the community from other tribes (Waterhouse, 1866). During times of 
conflict, warriors were drawn from the ranks of ordinary young men in 
the community or friendly tribes; otherwise the role of protecting the 
chief was the responsibility of the warrior class or bati.
The warrior psychology was premised on two interrelated discourses. 
The first was the notion of tagane (masculinity) and how this was stratified 
in relation to one’s level of qaqa (physical prowess) and yalo kaukauwa 
(bravery). The second was the bestowing of honour through community 
praise and the construction of a mythology to differentiate the hero-
warrior from ordinary men. The elevation of the warrior to the level of 
cosmological stardom brought honour, respect and glory to the entire 
community. In the early days, successful warriors were given special names 
to signify their social status. While Taukei society has changed dramatically 
over the years, the cultural reification of masculinity and warrior 
psychology continued to be passed down through the ages via gender 
socialisation. As young boys grow up, they are initiated into martial ways 
to become a tagane (tough man), which in many ways prepares them for 
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a future soldering life. Many Taukei young men see themselves as ‘natural’ 
soldiers. The community-wide impact of this belief is pervasive. Almost 
every Taukei has a close relative in the military (Baledrokadroka, 2016).
The idealised construction of the past remains a potent social force 
that influences male identity and sense of being. Failing to live up to 
honourable warrior virtues is considered demeaning and unworthy of 
a Fijian warrior. This collective martial consciousness found expression 
on active duty during international military operations. In peacetime, it 
is embodied in situations requiring the articulation of masculinity, such 
as rugby and street-fighting; other manifestations include patriarchal 
hegemony and the domestic abuse of wives.
The notion of warrior psychology becomes a security threat when framed 
and articulated in an ethnicised way. Often Indo-Fijians are considered 
lamulamu (cowards) and malumalumu (physically weak) and therefore 
have no place in the military, considered the natural enclave for Taukei 
(Durutalo, 1986). The overt military expression of masculinity became 
prominent during the series of coups since 1987, in which the military’s 
coercive might was used to usurp constitutional and state authority. The 
interplay between the traditional notion of the warrior and the modern 
notion of the professional soldier defines the identity of a Taukei soldier, 
and in some ways the military frames the Fiji security environment. 
However, despite this, the military can still play a syncretic role: first, 
as leverage for ethnonationalism, authoritarianism or for human rights 
abuse; second, to promote stability, security and peace. The Fiji military 
and the deeply embedded warrior ideology have played a major role in 
shaping the security discourse and climate in Fiji, and they will continue 
to do so in the future.
Institutional role of the military
Views about the Fiji military, a 3,000-strong institution, have been 
framed in two opposing ways. First, it is seen as a coup-making institution 
whose very existence poses a threat to the security of democracy 
(Baledrokadroka, 2016). The second view is that the role of the military 
(as defined by Chapter 81 of the Army Act) is for ‘defence and state 
security of Fiji in the maintenance of Law and Order in land and sea’ 
(Fiji Government, 1955). The reality is much more complex and involves 
a syncretic mixture of both of these positions. The image of the military 
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is constructed  from various political and ideological viewpoints that 
attempt to frame security in different ways. Whether the military is seen 
as a security threat or as a provider of security depends very much on 
the historical and sociopolitical context and the ideological lenses used to 
frame the manifest and more latent behaviour and activities of the military.
Even the official role of the military has been redefined over the years 
to reflect changing security circumstances. For instance, Section 3 of the 
RFMF Act 1961 (revised 1985) states that:
The Forces shall be charged with the defence of Fiji, with the 
maintenance of order and with such other duties as may from time 
to time be defined by the Minister. (Fiji Government, 1961: 1)
This provision recognised the salience of both ‘defence’ of Fiji from 
undefined external forces and internal threats, as suggested by reference 
to the ‘maintenance of order’. Although there was no identifiable external 
threat, the military’s role in internal control, especially in supressing 
anti-colonial rebellion and quelling activities deemed subversive, were 
common features of the colonial legacy.
Upon independence, the RFMF Act provided the functional and 
operational framework for the military, and its role was not even mentioned 
in the 1970 constitution, which was the main blueprint for Fiji’s post-
independence political development. Only the position and appointment 
of the commissioner of police were mentioned (in Sections 84 and 107, 
respectively), and it was probably assumed that the military, whose role 
was seen either to be ceremonial or to fight external wars, was considered 
relatively autonomous of the mainstream state governance system and 
therefore did not require constitutional mention. After 96 years of British 
rule, it was assumed that the military would continue to express the same 
commitment to patriotism and respect for state authority. This assumption 
evaporated in May 1987 after the first coup.
After state capture in 1987 by the military in support of ethnonationalist 
concerns, the country awoke to the idea of the military as an institution 
capable of sudden political intervention and transformation. This reshaped 
the perception of the military in mainstream national consciousness from 
being a subservient tool of state security to an institution capable of 
usurping state authority and power. This shift in the military’s political 
role shaped its own self-perception as well as the broader dynamics of 
civil–military relations in Fiji, as it now sees itself as the ultimate arbiter 
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and protector of security. This was reflected in Section 94 of the 1990 
constitution, which redefined the role of the Fiji military thus: ‘It shall be 
the overall responsibility of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces to ensure 
at all times the security, defence and well-being of Fiji and its people’ 
(Fiji  Government, 1990: 106). In addition, the constitution officially 
changed the name from Royal Fiji Military Forces to Republic of Fiji 
Military Forces, in line with the declaration of the country as a republic.
The term ‘overall responsibility’ represents a sense of overarching control 
as undisputed overlord of national security, which overshadows any other 
form of collective participation by non-military sectors of the community. 
The emphasis on ‘well-being’ shows the expansion of the boundaries 
of responsibility away from simply defence to people’s everyday life. 
On experiencing the sumptuousness of civilian political power and its 
associated trappings after taking over the government through coups, the 
military-backed regime decided to constitutionalise the role of the military 
not only in the context of its defence role but also as a political and social 
watchdog of people’s well-being. This raises fundamental questions about 
the line of demarcation between the military sphere of operations and the 
civil sphere of engagement. In a latent way, this watchdog role provides 
justificatory leverage for the military to intervene in civilian politics and 
affairs under the guise of protecting the nation’s well-being. Ironically, it 
could provide a licence for future coups.
The 1997 constitution (Section 112 [1]) simply endorsed the 1990 
provision by reiterating that ‘the military force called the Republic of 
Fiji Military Forces established by the Constitution of 1990 continues 
in existence’. In addition, the appointment process of the commander 
as stipulated in the two constitutions were similar; that is, the president, 
acting on the advice of the minister, must appoint a commander of the 
Republic of Fiji Military Forces to exercise military executive command of 
the forces, subject to the control of the minister (Fiji Government, 1997).
Perhaps the most far-reaching proposals in redefining the role of 
the military were provided in the 2012 constitutional draft by the 
Constitution Commission led by Professor Yash Ghai. The draft, which 
was eventually rejected by the government, expanded and elaborated the 
role of the military and proposed that it: first, be ‘responsible for the 
defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
Republic’; second, ‘assist and cooperate with other authorities in situations 
of emergency or disaster when so directed in writing by the National 
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Security Council’; third, ‘be deployed to restore peace in any part of Fiji 
affected by unrest or instability, only if requested in writing by, and under 
the control of, the Commissioner of Police, and with the prior approval 
of the Minister responsible for defence’; and, fourth, ‘may be deployed 
outside Fiji’ only with the prior approval of Parliament or Cabinet 
(Fiji Constitution Commission, 2012: 142). The draft constitution also 
recommended a National Security Council to which the military would 
be accountable.
In some ways, these provisions made the military more accountable to 
civilian authorities. Clearly, with the lessons of the six coups in mind, the 
commission saw the need to bring the military under civilian oversight 
for the long-term civilianisation and democratic reform of security 
institutions. This did not go down well with the military hierarchy, which 
had enjoyed its stint in power and who were determined to steer the 
country towards a particular path of political and economic development. 
Hence the rejection of the 2012 constitutional draft by the military-
backed government did not come as a surprise, especially when, in its 
submission to the Constitution Commission, the military stated in no 
uncertain terms that it was the ‘last bastion’ of law and order in Fiji and 
would continue to provide guidance for the governance of the country, 
ensuring that peace, prosperity and good governance was practised and 
adhered to (RFMF, 2012). This statement was seen to ‘indicate that the 
RFMF sees itself as supervising the civilian government, rather than 
responsible to it’ (CCF, 2013: 36–7).
The role of the military under the 2013 constitution, which was put 
together by the government itself, ironically reverted to the 1990 provision 
for the role of the military, stating that: ‘It shall be the overall responsibility 
of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces to ensure at all times the security, 
defence and well-being of Fiji and all Fijians’ (Fiji Government, 2013: 
83). The image that the military had been trying to propagate after the 
2006 coup had been that of an ideologically inclusive and multiculturalist 
stance, in opposition to divisive ethnonationalism. Replicating the 
role prescription from the 1990 ethnonationalist constitution seems 
paradoxical indeed.
Although the military sees this constitutional provision as a safeguard 
against forces of instability such as unregulated ethnonationalism, others 
see it as a constitutional licence to intervene in national politics at any 
time under the excuse of ensuring security, defence or well-being.
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The legal security institutions
The roles of the police, the courts and prisons are important in 
maintaining a certain degree of social order in a society scarred by 
ethnopolitical conflict. The capacity of these institutions to carry out their 
constitutional role ultimately depends on a number of factors, including 
their responsive capacity, operational philosophy and available resources 
as well as the nature of the conflict. The series of coups had the direct 
effect of relegating these institutions to roles that saw them as subservient 
to the military, which saw itself as the last bastion of security (RFMF, 
2013). In a political environment where coups have blurred the line and 
redefined the relationship between constitutional state authority and 
extralegal military coercion, the powers and roles of the police, courts and 
prisons are often subsumed into the extraconstitutional demands of the 
coup-makers.
During the first coup in 1987, the police force was directly under the 
control of the military. The police commissioner and his deputy were 
removed by force, military-appointed ‘loyal’ police officers were given 
top positions, including a military colonel as commissioner, and police 
stations were literally taken over by soldiers (Robertson & Tamanisau, 
1988). Many policemen became collaborators with the military by helping 
in the arrest and imprisonment of anti-coup activists. The professionalism 
and political independence of the police was compromised, and the 
institution lost its credibility as it came under the political and ideological 
control and manipulation of the post-coup regime.
The police force also went through the post-coup ‘Fijianisation’ program 
in the civil service, as part of the broader pro-Taukei affirmative action 
program (Ratuva, 2013). The 2000 coup put further pressure on the 
police, this time not as coup collaborators (as in 1987) but as a largely 
ineffective security buffer between the coup perpetrators and the public. 
The real test for the police was during the riots, burning and looting in 
Suva’s central business district following the overthrow of the government 
by some ethnonationalist politicians with the support of the CRW. 
The commissioner, Isikia Savua, an army colonel who was alleged to have 
been a coup conspirator himself, did not issue any definite order; nor was 
any security plan in place against possible violence by ethnonationalist 
marchers on the fateful Friday, 17 May. The marchers, protesting against 
what they saw as Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry’s meddling in 
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Taukei issues such as land, ended up running amok in Suva City after they 
heard of the takeover in Parliament (Robertson & Sutherland, 2002). 
A TV shot of the commissioner inspecting the result of the mayhem a day 
later with a golf club in hand was not only a pitiful sight but also symbolic 
of the utter failure of the police to prevent or respond to the civilian riot.
Many in the police rank and file questioned the suitability and credibility 
of the commissioner of police. These grievances were vindicated in the few 
days after the coup when armed civilian supporters of the coup roamed 
at will around Suva and other places around Fiji, intimidating citizens, 
looting cattle and crops to feed the coup supporters camping at the 
parliamentary complex, and forcefully taking over control of some towns. 
In the process, police stations were taken over and policemen were forced 
to ‘surrender’.
The balance of force was rather unequal because the police were not armed 
while the coup supporters were, and, around the city of Suva, policemen 
on duty were sworn at and humiliated by coup enthusiasts. This led to 
considerable loss of morale, and many police personnel experienced 
depression and had to seek counselling (Fiji Police counsellor, personal 
communication, 2009). For days, fear and anxiety gripped the population 
of Suva as waves of rumours of civil unrest, instigated by the rebels, spread 
like wildfire around the capital, causing unprecedented panic, which 
forced people to go home early or leave the capital altogether. The thought 
that the police were utterly powerless in the face of armed thugs roaming 
the city with impunity worsened mass hysteria and caused near-chaos.
The fluid security situation after the 2000 coup caught people by surprise. 
After the arrest of members of the government, the president used his 
constitutional prerogative to declare a state of emergency and, in the 
process, ‘sacked’ the government, now in captivity, on the grounds that 
it was ‘unable to act’. This left a serious power vacuum and, without the 
support of the military, President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara could not 
exercise authority as effectively as he would have wanted. The military 
stepped in, asked the president to vakatikitiki (move aside) and took over 
executive authority on 29 May, technically staging another coup.
The takeover by the military shifted the balance of power away from 
the coup-makers (although they still possessed guns acquired from the 
military). To the relief of the people of Suva, the military took control and 
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peace of mind returned for many. The new security environment enabled 
the police to operate more confidently, and they were able to rearticulate 
their security role, although under the protective shield of armed soldiers.
The 2000 coup provided a critical lesson for the police in terms of its 
role in the broader national security paradigm. The instability wrought 
by the 1987 and 2000 coups rendered the police ineffective as a security 
institution with a national mandate for maintenance of law and order. 
There had to be serious thinking about its fundamental strategies. 
The task of reforming police structure, rebuilding police morale and 
reprofessionalising its operations was given to Andrew Hughes, a senior 
Australian police officer.
The relationship between Hughes and the military commander, 
Bainimarama, was cordial at first, but deteriorated as a result of the police’s 
investigation into a possible charge of treason against Bainimarama. This 
followed Bainimarama’s threat to remove Qarase’s government by force 
over the renewal of the commander’s contract. Qarase’s attempt to pass 
the Reconciliation, Truth and Unity Bill, mentioned earlier in the chapter, 
inflamed the situation. To complicate matters, the police set up its own 
special unit and tried to import new automatic rifles for its armoury 
as a way of responding to any future coup attempts. The military felt 
threatened by this and intercepted the weapons at the Suva wharf and also 
raided the headquarters of the special police unit in Nasinu, outside Suva.
The final straw was when Hughes and two other senior police officers 
went to New Zealand to arrest Bainimarama, who was having talks with 
Qarase through an invitation by the New Zealand Government. When 
this failed, Hughes, fearing for his life, did not return to Fiji (Hunter 
& Lal, 2018). The two senior police officers who accompanied him lost 
their jobs. The significant point here is that Fiji was facing a situation in 
which the two main institutions of national security were pitted against 
each other as they contested for legitimacy and control while the country 
was going through a crisis spawned by the 2000 coup and that, in turn, 
spawned the 2006 coup. The contestation was not based on any noble 
agenda such as how best they could strategise about national security, but 
rather on a complex hodgepodge of divergent personal interests between 
the heads of the two institutions, competing versions of their functions 
and legitimacy, and irreconcilable framings of security. To legitimise its 
stance, the police relied on the 1997 constitution (Part 4, Section 111), 
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which established the position of commissioner of police. The police force 
was also guided by the Police Act of 1966, which formalised the role of 
the police as such:
The Force shall be employed in and throughout Fiji for the 
maintenance of law and order, the preservation of the peace, the 
protection of life and property, the prevention and detection of 
crime and the enforcement of all laws and regulations with which 
it is directly charged; and shall be entitled for the performance of 
any such duties to carry arms. (Fiji Government, 1966, Part 2, 
No. 5)
On the other hand, the military’s claim to legitimacy was based on 
two instruments—one legal, the other coercive. The legal mandate was 
based on the 1997 and 1990 constitutional provisions about the ‘overall 
responsibility’ of the military ‘to ensure at all times the security, defence 
and well-being of Fiji and its people’, as we have already discussed. 
This legal discourse was the fulcrum on which the more aggressive and 
threatening behaviour of the military was launched. The military also 
gained self-bestowed political and moral authority as a result of taking over 
state power after the 2000 coup and after determining the future political 
trajectory of the country by appointing an interim prime minister.
The collision between the two security institutions paradoxically became 
a security threat in itself because each one was trying to nullify the 
other’s legitimacy. In the end, the power of coercion won the day, as the 
military, with its greater firepower and training for combat, overshadowed 
the largely unarmed and less pugnacious police. There were a couple of 
incidents when a shootout between the two forces almost happened; if it 
had, it would have been disastrous, as it would have threatened the safety 
and security of citizens.
After the military took over political control following the 2006 coup, 
the police force literally became a part of the military command system. 
Esala Teleni, a senior naval officer, was appointed commissioner, although 
officially and operationally the police remained ‘autonomous’. Teleni’s term 
as police commissioner was full of controversy as a result of a combination 
of factors, including the abruptness of his military-style leadership, 
which contradicted routine policing norms; his constant suspicion that 
police officers were secretly pursuing an anti-coup investigation against 
him and were attempting to sabotage his leadership; and the role of the 
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commissioner’s brother, a Pentecostal preacher who tried to use the police 
force to gain leverage for spreading his religious message and gaining 
converts to his New Methodist group, which had broken away from the 
mainstream Methodist Church.
The increasingly acute crisis within the police led to the appointment 
of Major General Ioane Naivalurua, another senior military officer and 
former commissioner of prisons, as commissioner of police. His task was to 
reform the governance structure and strategic direction of the institution 
and to arrest and resuscitate the plummeting morale of the police officers. 
Naivalu’s reform of the prison system as commissioner of prisons won 
him accolades as a dynamic and imaginative visionary. Those reforms 
introduced innovative initiatives such as the Singaporean-styled Yellow 
Ribbon project aimed at rehabilitation and community involvement, as 
well as commercial projects and skills development for prisoners. Naivalu 
was later posted to a diplomatic position and was replaced by a South 
African, Major General Ben Groenewald, who was tasked by Nelson 
Mandela to reform the South African police in the post-apartheid era. 
Groenewald resigned and left Fiji in November 2015 and was replaced by 
yet another military officer in the form of Brigadier Sitiveni Qiliho.
The militarisation of the police was not total but nevertheless provoked 
various levels and pockets of resistance among senior police officers who 
felt threatened professionally by the intrusion of military officers into 
their domain, and by the coercive and often illegal tactics of the military 
officers when dealing with public ‘threat’. This created a cycle of resistance 
and counter-resistance within the police force, which threatened its sense 
of institutional cohesion and operational effectiveness.
The challenge for the police in the future will be how it redefines its role 
in the bigger security picture, especially how it draws the boundaries of 
its operation and modes of engagement in ways that are distinguishable 
from those of the military. The demilitarisation and reprofessionalisation 
of the police must work hand in hand to transform the institution for 
a sustainable and stable police force. More importantly, the reform must 
create citizens’ trust in an organisation that has in the past engaged in 
arbitrary acts of violence on captured prisoners and other members of 
the public. A number of initiatives, like Neighbourhood Watch and 
community policing, have been deployed in the past to integrate the 
police into the community and nurture cooperation with civilians in 
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the  battle against crime. Although these might have been successful 
in  solving some incidents of crime, they have not really addressed the 
deeper causes of insecurity.
Perceptions, ethnic framing and threats
Human behaviour, especially its predisposition towards violence, is 
shaped  by an array of cultural, psychological, ideological, economic, 
religious and political forces acting in either direct or subtle ways (Jenkins, 
2008). Our behaviour is intrinsically linked to our perceptions and 
attitudes, and often threats are constructed in response to what might be 
perceived to be hostile behaviour by the other.
In multi-ethnic societies such as Fiji, the construction of others, definition 
of social group boundaries and creation of common spaces for interaction 
take place in symbolic and dynamic ways. Contrary to mainstream 
perception about a dichotomous tense relationship between ethnic 
groups, principally Taukei and Indo-Fijians, the relationships are much 
more complex and involve both tension and accommodation taking 
place at the same time. Intergroup perception expressed in the form 
of prejudiced imagery and stereotypes or affirmative perception could 
range from being superficial and temporal to being extreme and deep-
seated, and there is often a dynamic oscillation of perception between 
the two poles, depending on the circumstances. While there have been 
cases of expressions of extreme ethnonationalism by Taukei in the past, 
these largely took place in the context of political crisis fuelled by the 
active role of ethnic entrepreneurs who take advantage of the situation to 
instil fear and agitate for ethnic and religious hatred, thereby making it 
easier to mobilise and control people to serve their political interests and 
ideological agenda.
Mobilisation and politicisation of ethnically based framing has the potential 
to inflame group passion and communal tension. Fiji’s postcolonial 
history shows how this phenomenon can shape political culture and the 
political landscape significantly in dynamic ways. In Fiji, ethnically based 
framing of others has been nurtured by a number of manifest and latent 
factors with roots in the colonial epoch, as we have seen.
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The demarcated social worlds in which Taukei and Indo-Fijians lived during 
the colonial days were reinforced by the British policy of divide and rule 
(Narayan, 1984). Separate political representation and the socioeconomic 
division of labour, which saw Indo-Fijians concentrated in the cane belts 
as workers and farmers while the Taukei were largely locked into village 
subsistence life controlled by rigid communal laws under the tutelage of 
chiefs, ensured that the separate and rarely linked spaces inhabited by the 
two communities shaped antagonistic consciousness of each other. The 
construction of otherness was a response to the demarcated and contested 
political space. This was institutionalised in the constitutions, which 
prescribed ethnic representation, separate schools, separate trade unions 
and separation in general social life such as sports and residential areas.
The stereotypes and negative perceptions emanating from these conditions 
can pose security threats on their own. This is because feeling and attitudes 
of the people have the capacity to inspire political action, despite the 
security roles of the state, military and police. Indeed people do change 
and influence society generally. One way of changing people’s ethnic 
consciousness at the informal level is community-based peace-building, 
which we look at next.
Community-based peace-building 
as response to security
When we talk of community-based peace-building systems, we refer to 
a whole range of approaches, some ‘traditional’, some more contemporary 
and some spontaneously and contextually constructed, which are often 
used to respond to local conflicts in the rural, urban and peri-urban 
areas. Often those involved are familiar with each other, either culturally, 
professionally or socially, and have a common understanding of the 
significance of resolving conflict, although their versions of the conflict 
may differ. Different cultural groups have different approaches to peace-
building. The Taukei, for instance, tend to rely on a mixture of culturally 
based practices of reconciliation, Christian notions of love, forgiveness 
and conflict resolution, and more contemporary forms of mediation. 
These are used either individually to respond to specific contexts or 
together in a hybrid way, depending on the complexity of the conflict. 
Hindus and Muslims also use aspects of their religious philosophies as 




Perhaps one of the most pertinent questions is how local and culture-
based means of conflict resolution can be used transculturally. This was 
attempted by Qarase’s government in a national reconciliation ceremony in 
Fiji in 2005 through the use of the veisorosorovi (intergroup reconciliation) 
model earlier proposed by Ratuva (2003). While the initiative brought 
some of the perpetrators and the victims of the 2000 coup together in 
a symbolic and widely publicised solemn ceremony, the impact on the 
broader ethnopolitical situation in the country was minimal. In fact the 
whole process failed because the military and the Fiji Labour Party, two 
key players during the 2000 coup, refused to participate. The veisorosorovi 
model was workable only if all parties consensually agreed on a common 
aim and vision using the Taukei protocol.
Use and abuse of the veisorosorovi model 
in national reconciliation
The failure of the veisorosorovi model in the national reconciliation 
initiative in 2005 was not due to the weakness of the approach but to 
the blatantly political intent of the organisers and to the tense political 
conditions that prevailed in Fiji at the time.
The term veisorosorovi comes from the word soro, which refers to a number 
of social and behavioural values, including to submit oneself, to surrender, 
to humble oneself or to give in. In the Fijian cosmology, this could be 
framed in relation to submission to supernatural or divine authority and, 
in sociopolitical and cultural terms, it means humbling oneself as a means 
of appeasement. The term veisorosorovi refers to different modes of peace-
building such as bulubulu (literally meaning to ‘bury’) or matasanigasau 
(literally meaning ‘arrow’), both of which simultaneously refer to soliciting 
forgiveness and admitting guilt (Ratuva, 2003).
Sociologically, veisorosorovi has a number of salient aspects worth noting. 
First, it is reciprocal, as the repetition of the term soro suggests. Reciprocity 
is a critical element in the Taukei sense of social balance and cohesion. 
In  peace-building terms, this provides space for reforging broken ties 
and allowing social synergy to flow between the two conflicting groups 
and to lock them together in a united mould. This unity of purpose can 
be temporary and can also be long-lasting, depending very much on the 
situation. Second, veisorosorovi can be restorative through reaffirmation 
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of kinship ties that had been temporarily fractured by an individual 
committing a wrong. Third, it can be transformative not only through the 
renewal of relationship but also by making sure that the conditions where 
these relationships exist change into something better and more peaceful.
In these processes kinship provides a powerful peace-building force 
because of its capacity to provide a sense of both socially constructed and 
‘primordial’ connection. This is more so within the Taukei community 
where veiwekani (kinship) is valued as both an unquestioned immemorial 
inheritance and a constantly constructed and reconstructed phenomenon. 
Although it is a unifying and therefore peace-building force, it also has 
the capacity to generate tension as a result of competition over land, titles, 
resources and power.
The pertinent question here is to what extent can the veisorosorovi 
approach, which has been the cornerstone of Taukei peace-building, be used 
in trans-ethnic conflict? When the Qarase government decided to carry 
out a national reconciliation program in 2005 based on the veisorosorovi 
approach, there was clearly some uncertainty as to its efficacy in a tense 
and potentially volatile political situation. In October 2005 a whole week 
was devoted to workshops and discussions on reconciliation, culminating 
in a public veisorosorovi ceremony at Albert Park in Suva. The ceremony 
consisted of a multidimensional process that involved presentation of 
matanigasau by the government and Taukei chiefs to various ethnic and 
religious groups pleading for forgiveness for their suffering during the 
2000 coup.
However, behind the veneer of public peace-making lay deeper political 
and religious interests. The ceremonies, while officially coordinated by 
the Ministry of National Reconciliation, were largely influenced by 
a Christian group called the Assembly of Christian Churches in Fiji 
(ACCF), a fundamentalist interdenominational group whose members 
included Prime Minister Qarase and other senior officers of the state 
(Newland, 2007). Also, the reconciliation was meant to be part of a deal 
to appease the victims of the coup, especially Indo-Fijians, as well as the 
military, so that agreement could be readily reached to release from prison 




The initiative ultimately failed because two important players, the military 
and Fiji Labour Party (which was the main victim of the 2000 coup), 
refused to participate in the veisorosorovi, arguing that legal and retributive 
justice must take precedence over reconciliation and restorative justice. 
In other words, the perpetrators of the coup deserved to remain in prison 
as a deterrent to future potential coup-makers. Nevertheless, the failure 
to harness consensual support for the reconciliation project was part 
of its downfall. It was not really a fault of the veisorosorovi approach as 
such, but rather of the way it was used, or rather abused—as leverage to 
serve ulterior political motives in a highly charged political atmosphere—
that undermined its credibility and effectiveness. One of the inherent 
principles of the veisorosorovi approach is that it must be supported by all 
the parties concerned and that there should be transparency and honesty 
in people’s intention. Using it as leverage for conspiratorial political ends 
has the potential to undermine its moral value and authority.
This is one of the dilemmas associated with using traditional forms 
of peace-building mechanisms at the national level outside the local 
community. Outside the scope of the kinship network, the power dynamics 
change as relationships become more formal and less personal and are 
influenced by national political ideas and processes. In such a  strange 
atmosphere, local peace-building mechanisms such as veisorosorovi, which 
were meant for community-based conflict resolution, are bound to be 
confronted by challenges. Adaptation of local peace-building systems to 
a trans-ethnic national context is still possible, but preconditions such as 
consensus among those involved on both perpetrator and victim sides 
as to what needs to be done, and the rationale behind it, must first be met. 
The process can also be tailored to suit the circumstances.
Civil society peace-building and security
Apart from the culture-based systems, the role of civil society organisations 
in peace-building in Fiji is well established. Religious organisations, 
women’s organisations, human rights and peace organisations have been 
active in urban areas for decades. In some cases these groups operate on 
their own within their particular constituencies, and in other cases they 
collaborate under a common umbrella.
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The period of peace activism in the 1970s set the tone for the proliferation 
of peace groups in Fiji. The anti-French nuclear testing at Moruroa Atoll 
in French Polynesia sparked an international outcry. In Fiji a number of 
citizen groups, including church groups, student organisations and other 
civil society groups such as the Young Women’s Christian Association 
(YWCA), joined hands to form an umbrella organisation called ATOM 
(Against Atomic Testing on Moruroa). A major regional peace conference 
in Suva in 1975 saw the establishment of a region-wide peace movement 
whose agenda extended from opposition to nuclear testing to other 
issues including decolonisation, land rights, indigenous emancipation, 
demilitarisation and development. This, as we noted in Chapter 3, saw 
the birth of the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific movement (NFIP), 
whose geographical coverage included the Pacific Islands states, Australia 
and New Zealand, and Pacific Rim countries such as Japan, Philippines, 
Indonesia and the United States.
The NFIP had a significant influence on Fiji’s peace movement. It influenced 
the setting up in 1983 of the Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group (FANG), which 
became the focal point for peace activism in Fiji for decades. When the 
Pacific Concerns Resources Centre (PCRC), the secretariat of the NFIP, 
was relocated to Suva from Auckland in 1993, peace activism in Fiji was 
given a further boost as peace groups and other civil society organisations 
in Fiji benefited from the organisation’s resources and expertise.
In addition to the YWCA and FANG, a number of peace organisations 
emerged in the 1990s and 2000s. Among these were women’s-based 
organisations such as Women’s Action for Change, which used plays and 
other forms of dramatisation to publicise peace messages; the Fiji Women’s 
Rights Movement, which mobilised women for political action; the Fiji 
Women’s Crisis Centre, which provided support for female victims of 
domestic violence; Femlink, which engaged in media outreach programs 
for urban and rural women; and the Foundation for Rural Integrated 
Enterprises and Development, whose fundamental responsibility is to 
empower poor rural women through development of local and family-
based industries. Femlink was also the local focal point for Pacific 
People Building Peace (PPBP), the Pacific arm of the Global Project 
for the Prevention of Armed Conflict. Collectively, these organisations 




Other peace-based organisations include the Citizens Constitutional 
Forum (CCF), set up after the 1987 coups to facilitate dialogue between 
competing political groups in Fiji. Later the CCF became a human rights 
advocacy group. The Fiji Dialogue emerged in response to the 2006 coup. 
Its role was to provide space for dialogue between the perpetrators and 
victims of the coup. Perhaps the very first professional peace-building 
organisation was the Pacific Centre for Peace-Building, which has been 
carrying out training, workshops and consultancies for various government 
departments and community groups.
The role of religious organisations has been critical in providing a spiritual 
dimension to peace in a country where religion takes centre stage in most 
cultures. The Interfaith, an initiative for multireligious engagement, 
brought together various religious groups such as Christians, Hindus, 
Muslims, Buddhists and Sikhs to worship and pray for the nation. The 
fundamentalist leaders of the Methodist Church were often reluctant 
to join the Interfaith movement because of its close connections to 
ethnonationalists and saw worshipping beside ‘heathens’ as sacrilegious. 
However, the more progressive leaders enthusiastically joined the 
Interfaith. The Methodists and a number of Pentecostal churches were 
active members of the ACCF, which was instrumental in the failed 2004 
veisorosorovi initiative. The Ecumenical Centre for Research Education 
and Advocacy, a research and advocacy group set up within the Catholic 
Church, was actively involved in peace-building programs together with 
other groups like the CCF.
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was proactive in 
peace-building through its Peace, Stability and Development Analysis 
project, which attempted to link various institutions and organisations 
for a unified framework for national peace-building. Another UNDP 
project was the National Initiative on Civic Education, which was based 
on a national public education process on the issues of human rights, 
democracy, elections and governance. The idea was that through civic 
education, national consciousness about unity and peace could be 
attained. The Pacific Conference of Churches has also been a stalwart for 
peace-building in Fiji, where it is based.
Given Fiji’s small size, civil society space is quite crowded and highly 
contested. While attempts have been made to bring some organisations 
under a common umbrella, such as the Fiji Human Rights Coalition, 
Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group, PPBP, Dialogue Fiji and Interfaith, the power 
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dynamics between them and the desire to maintain their distinctive 
identities in a highly charged political climate continue to be major defining 
factors in their relationships. This is further complicated by the political 
alignment of different organisations. At the time of the 1987 coups, the 
division was blatantly ethnic and ideological. Taukei-led organisations such 
as the Methodist Church and those with right-wing leanings such as the 
indigenous Fijian-based Soqosoqo Vakamarama (Women’s Organisation) 
supported the ethnonationalist coup. Opposition to the coup came from 
non-Taukei and left-leaning organisations. Although the CCF was largely 
Taukei-dominated, it had a multi-ethnic and centre-left position and was 
opposed to the use of political violence for ethnic ends. FANG, which had 
a centre-left political position, came into direct collision with its parent 
organisation, the PCRC, which was supportive of indigenous rights. 
While FANG supported indigenous rights, it believed that they were not 
to be supported at the cost of other communities’ rights, a position that 
the 1987 coups undermined.
This division was exacerbated by the political alignment of civil society 
leaders with political parties, government or aid donors. This in some 
ways shaped the power dynamics within the political party space and 
often created tension, suspicion and sometimes outright opposition. 
Some civil society organisations evolved their ideological position in 
relation to the political climate. The CCF leadership, which initially had 
sympathy for the 2006 coup because of its attack on ethnonationalism, 
later evolved into a strong critic of the military-supported government 
because of its human rights stance at a time when government security 
forces were involved in serious human rights abuses. The chief executive 
officer of CCF was later charged and convicted under the Media Industry 
Development Decree of 2010 for contempt of court for republishing an 
article that was critical of the justice system in Fiji.
Some civil society organisations drew self-gratifying inspiration from 
being  self-styled warriors in a politically divided political space while 
others tried to bridge the gap by engaging with the ‘enemies’ such as the 
security forces. While some of these organisations were seen as opportunist 
fraternisers by others in the field, they saw it as an opportunity to soften 
the hyper-militaristic psychology of the security forces from within. Some 
of these organisations included the Women’s Crisis Centre, which was 
involved in gender violence training, and the Pacific Centre for Peace-




Despite the 2014 democratic elections, the feeling of insecurity has not 
totally abated, and therefore the role of the civil society organisations as 
champions of peace and human rights will continue. As agents of conflict 
resolution and peace-building, the role of civil society in contributing to 
lessening insecurity in the community cannot be overemphasised.
Conclusion: Addressing the security 
dilemmas
It would be naïve to think of Fiji’s security primarily in terms of coups and 
the role of the military as projected in popular imagery. Fiji is a complex 
country where ethnic, religious, cultural, gender, regional and class issues 
intersect in multiple ways, shaping social, economic and political security 
at different levels. Hence security in Fiji needs to be framed using multiple 
lenses; in this case the simultaneous use of postcolonial, securitisation and 
human security approaches.
It is true that the coups exacerbated poverty, ethnic tension, political 
instability, social alienation, human rights abuse and feelings of 
vulnerability; however, it is also true that the same forces were involved in 
each of the coups. A focus on the coups tends to divert our attention from 
mundane security issues, some of which are manifest and some latent. 
Hard and human security issues are closely intertwined and in many 
ways cannot be separated. Sometimes the line between hard and human 
security cannot be neatly demarcated. A classic case is the relationship 
between coups and socioeconomic dislocation, where one contributes in 
indirect ways to causing or influencing the other.
The nature of security and the response mechanisms in Fiji have evolved 
significantly from the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial epochs. 
These were shaped largely by constantly changing political dynamics, 
socioeconomic structures, cultural systems and shifting perceptions 
and behaviour patterns. The largely tribal and subsistence precolonial 
communities revolved around the charismatic and authoritarian power 
of the warrior chiefs, whose political power pervaded the entire society. 
Intra- and inter-tribal contestation over power was common, and often 
the smartest and most tactical survived, although physical strength was 
also important.
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Colonialism transformed Fijian society in fundamental ways, including 
reconfiguration of the sociopolitical structure, the land tenure system and 
socioeconomic way of life. Resistance to colonial hegemony took the form 
of passive resistance and latent counterhegemonic forms, with occasional 
violent episodes. The British responded through the use of force, and the 
reciprocal response was the use of similar force. Many people died, many 
were executed by the British, and leading opponents of British colonialism 
were banished and exiled. The British contained resistance through tactical 
use of the Fijian administration structure and the vital role of chiefs as 
colonial compradors to keep the Taukei subservient and docile. This 
paternalistic system contributed to the retarded economic situation of the 
Taukei and, upon independence, the resultant inequality contributed to 
the ethnopolitical tension that culminated in later political instability.
Fiji’s security situation after independence flowed from colonial 
experiences. The ethnopolitical contestation for power, economic 
inequality and the role of ethnic entrepreneurs in communal mobilisation 
were amplified by higher demands for progress, newfound freedom of 
expression and mobility, and globalisation and all its influences in people’s 
views, expectations and behaviour. The coups became ruptures through 
which these complex vortexes of issues were vented. These transformed 
Fijian society in critical ways as responses and counter-responses to 
security became centripetal forces in the country’s evolution.
The future security of the country lies in how Fiji’s new democracy can 
be reconfigured to facilitate consensus rather than adversarial politics. 
While Fiji has a democratic system in place, it is still sitting on fragile 
political foundations. Fiji’s recent political history, characterised by 
layers of dialectical synergies—hegemony and counterhegemony, 
repression and counter-repression, vengeance and countervengeance, and 
coups and countercoups—has not been automatically counteracted by 
electoral democracy. Rather, electoral democracy has simply relegated 
those synergies to a less visible level where they will hibernate until 
circumstances induce them to rear their ugly heads again. Sometimes 
formal democratic contestation can contribute to this possibility, as 
aggrieved minority political groups who feel alienated and disempowered 
by formal democracy might resort to extraparliamentary means to achieve 
their aims, or at least to satisfy their personal vendettas and vengeful 
urges. Creating a moderate middle-ground space where extreme positions 
on both sides can converge and conduct dialogue is critical to achieving 
sustainable stability in the long run.
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As Fiji’s drive towards modernisation and economic growth along the 
path of the Asian developmental state model intensifies, emerging issues 
of inequality, poverty, environmental degradation through mining and 
other forms of pollution, land disputes and crime will likely also intensify. 
These will affect Fiji’s future security in unprecedented ways, and any 
collective reaction to the neoliberal developmental policies of the state will 
be met with authoritarian means, as in Singapore, whose developmental 
strategy Fiji is trying to religiously emulate. If this happens, the security–
countersecurity cycle could continue unabated for some time yet.
Nevertheless, the people of Fiji have a great sense of resilience, as 
demonstrated by their capacity to adapt to dramatically changing 
circumstances as well as to withstand the excesses of coups and political 
repression. The capacity for resilience as well as the people’s potential 
for peaceful transformation are at the heart of Fiji’s future stability and 
security. The Fijian people have proven this time and time again.
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Thy kingdom burn: 
Hegemony, resistance and 
securitisation in Tonga
There will be no end to the troubles of states, or of humanity itself, till 
philosophers become kings in this world, or till those we now call kings 
and rulers really and truly become philosophers, and political power 
and philosophy thus come into the same hands.
Plato
Although Tonga and Fiji have very close historical and cultural links 
(Geraghty, 1994), their political architecture and security dynamics are 
very different. As we saw in Chapter 4, Fiji’s security configuration is 
complicated by its multicultural make-up, in which ethnicity, religion and 
culture interplay with sociopolitical and socioeconomic factors in complex 
ways. This is in contrast to Tonga, a culturally homogenous society, where 
security has been largely shaped by intracommunal sociopolitical and 
socioeconomic class cleavages consisting of contending vertically stratified 
groups; on the one hand, the majority—commoners with subaltern status 
and privileges; on the other hand, the minority—an hereditary monarch 
and nobles, who by virtue of their control over land also wield significant 
political and economic power (Campbell, 2015).
The dissolution of Parliament by King Tupou VI on 24 August 2017 sent 
shockwaves around the region because it signalled a rather gloomy prospect 
about the promise of sustainable democracy in the young bourgeoning 
Pacific island state. Although the government of Prime Minister Akilisi 
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Pohiva, the target of the disolution, returned to power after new elections 
were called, the King’s unilateral intervention in democratic politics 
has fundamental implications for Tonga’s security environment. This 
is manifested in a contested relationship between the monarch and the 
interests of commoners, as this chapter attempts to explore. This chapter 
focuses largely on the deteriorating security situation building up to riots 
in Nuku’alofa (the capital) on 16 November 2006 and its implications 
for security dynamics in Tonga, in particular the way they redefined the 
political culture and democratic process and the implications they have 
for the future security of the kingdom. The riot was a watershed event 
in Tonga’s modern history, and it is important to see it in the context of 
the big picture, including the growth of the democracy movement. This 
involves examining the multilayered relationships between authoritarian 
monarchical rule, feudalistic restrictions of political rights, depressed 
socioeconomic conditions, inequality, corruption, cultural patronage, 
the pro-democracy movement and the demand for reform. The interplay 
between these forces provided the energy that had built up over the years 
before the final spark that led to rioting, looting and burning.
Before Tonga became unified under the current Tupou dynasty, in the 
1870s, Tonga consisted of warring chiefdoms until Tupou I conquered 
the country and imposed his rule on it for a long time; however, its internal 
dynamics and contradictions intensified and the system was bound to 
give way. The so-called ‘stability’ that existed was not entirely due to the 
benevolence of the monarch, who sits at the apex of the cultural and 
political hierarchy, as suggested by Campbell (2011a), but must be seen in 
the context of complex factors, including the use of cultural, ideological 
and political leveraging and hegemony as means of manufacturing 
consent. For instance, the monarchy derived its legitimacy from the 
Church, which bestowed on it a ‘divine right’. This justificatory ideology 
is reinforced by collective cultural loyalty; and central to this is the belief 
that the monarch is the embodiment of sacredness, whose demigod status 
is part of the cosmological order of things, which dictates profane social 
life and the secular state. These complex layers of cultural hegemony 
provided the ideological mysticism that sustained an authoritarian system 
of rule for some time. The first organised counterhegemonic resistance to 
the monarchy was by educated individuals who began questioning the 
privileges of the traditional elites. The critical exposé of these ‘organic 
intellectuals’, to use a term coined by Gramsci (1971), inspired generations 
of Tongans to demand their political as well as their economic rights in an 
authoritarian and impoverished country.
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Rather than being imported from outside, the security situation in 
Tonga was largely brewed, sustained and controlled from home. The 
accompanying reactions and counter-reactions were manifestations of 
the local political dynamics that helped to shape the historical trajectory 
of the country. Contrary to popular belief, the period between 1875 (when 
Tonga was unified) and 2006 (when the riot took place) was not one 
of ‘stability’ but rather one of effective control and hegemony that kept 
the population in a state of willing submission under the ideologically 
pacifying spell of religious and cultural conformity. Over time, this 
nurtured the conditions for resistance, which needed the right trigger and 
right circumstances to reach the threshold of action.
This chapter makes the argument that instead of looking at the riot of 
16 November 2006 in terms of spontaneous lawlessness (Campbell, 
2012), it must be understood in the broader context of transformational 
social consciousness manifested in resistance against the monarch and the 
establishment. In ‘rethinking’ Tonga’s security dynamics, it is important 
to look at the broader ‘habitus’, to use Bourdieu’s term, referring to the 
interplay between structures and agencies to shape people’s thinking, 
behaviour and responses. This relationship, according to Bourdieu 
(1984), reproduces power in symbolic but asymmetric fashion, whereby 
dominant classes impose their values as natural and legitimate. In the 
case of Tonga, the institution of the monarchy has been able to harness 
and impose its power through the use of overbearing ideological and 
institutional mechanisms to shape people’s consciousness and responses. 
However, consent to hegemony, as Gramsci (1971) advises, cannot be 
total. The pro-democracy movement and the riot in November 2006 
showed the limitations of hegemony as attempts by the ruling elites to 
domesticate consciousness may invoke counterconsciousness.
To understand this counterconsciousness, this chapter, using the 
postcolonial, securitisation and human security lenses, unpacks the 
surface impression of stability, which often sheltered deeper structures of 
inequality, political and ideological hegemony and feudalistic patronage. 
These are often framed and justified by both religion and dominant 
cultural discourse as ‘divine’ and ‘natural’. The chapter then examines the 
counterforces at play, focusing on the people’s resistance movement, 
the riot and, finally, on the implications of the riot for the political culture 
and future security of the kingdom.
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The evolution and contestation  
of political power
Archaeological evidence suggests that around 3,000 years ago Tonga might 
have been first settled by Austronesian Lapita people who originated from 
South-East Asia and who had migrated through the western Pacific over 
several centuries. Carbon dating suggests that Tongatapu was settled 
before any of the other islands in the Tongan group (Daly, 2009).
Oral records further suggest that the first Tu’i Tonga (High Chief or King 
of Tonga), ‘Aho’eitu, emerged around 950 AD. He was believed to have 
originated from the sun god Tangaloa, and he was considered to be sacred. 
He possessed mana (divine right to rule) and was the head of a society 
based on tapu (prohibition, restriction, sacredness). In ancient Tongan 
cosmology, mana was not in the blood but in the head and genitals of chiefs 
(Van der Grijp, 2014: 23). The mana, which possessed both political and 
religious power, provided the cosmological prism that defined one’s place 
in society and the ideological glue that bound the community together. 
The residues of this belief have been passed down over the years and still 
exist today, although the source of mana is now the Christian god and the 
religious conduit is the Free Wesleyan Church, the official Church of the 
monarch. We will address this point further later, when we consider the 
ideological means for sustaining the monarchical hegemony in the face of 
the anti-monarchical struggle by the pro-democracy movement.
According to oral history, there was a continuous dynastic line until 
European contact, when the written record started. The thirty-ninth and 
last Tu’i Tonga, Laufilitonga, died in 1865. The second dynasty, the Tui 
Ha’atakalaua, assumed the temporal authority of the Tu’i Tonga, which 
meant that the Tu’i Tonga was left only with the sacred role. The third 
dynasty, Tu’i Kanokupolu, was a temporal line and, by the mid-19th 
century, had become the most powerful of the three. Through marriages, 
the three lines converged under the current Tupou dynasty (Spurway, 
2015). An important aspect of Tongan culture and lineage that is often 
overlooked is the interface between gender and rank and the way the 
convergence of lineages helps to reinforce rather than water down women’s 
rank (Herda, 2008).
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The successive reigns of the Tu’i Tonga were often turbulent, and violent 
deaths occurred. There were also cases of trans-Pacific contact and 
exchanges with Niue, Samoa, Rotuma, Wallis and Futuna, Rotuma, 
Fiji, and New Caledonia; and Tikopia, in Solomon Islands, was quite 
prominent in the 12th century under the Tui Tonga. Under successive Tu’i 
Tonga, the trilithon at Ha’amonga, used for astronomical purposes, was 
built, in addition to the langi, the terraced tombs at Mu’a, the old capital.
The arrival of the Dutch trading vessel Eendracht in 1616 signalled 
the first European contact and also marked the beginning of external, 
European-initiated changes to Tongan society. In 1643 Abel Tasman, 
another Dutch explorer, landed in Tongatapu. But it was really Captain 
Cook who put Tonga prominently on the then world map by giving it the 
name ‘Friendly Islands’ after his visits in 1773, 1774 and 1777. Alessandro 
Malaspina, a Spanish sailor, visited in 1793 and in 1797. The first London 
missionaries arrived in 1797, followed in 1822 by the Revd Walter Lawry, 
a Wesleyan missionary. The missionaries were to have a lasting influence 
on the social and political landscape of Tonga (Wood, 1938).
In 1831, Taufa’ahau, who also assumed the title of Tu’i Kanokupolu, 
was baptised with the name Siaosi (George) after King George IV of 
Britain. The reign of Taufa’ahau, who also took the name of Tupou, was 
characterised by a trail of conquest, which included taking over power in 
Ha’apai and Va’avau and the defeat of Tu’i Tonga. The unification of Tonga 
was a result of a power struggle resulting in wars and the usurpation of titles 
and territories. Siaosi brought about significant changes, including the 
abolition of serfdom in Vava’u in 1835, and the publication of the Vava’u 
Code in 1838, the first written laws in Tonga and the Pacific generally. 
With the help of the missionary Shirley Baker (incidentally a male), he 
declared Tonga a constitutional monarchy in 1875; incorporated the 
European royal style; provided emancipation for the ‘serfs’; instituted land 
tenure, a code of law and freedom of the press; and weakened the power of 
chiefs who posed a threat to his position. The so-called ‘emancipation’ was 
really a way of transferring the loyalty of people away from their chiefs, 
thus weakening their legitimate powerbase while strengthening his own 
hegemony in the process.
Tupou I’s tactical manoeuvres saved Tonga from foreign colonial rule. 
At the end of the 19th century he called a meeting of chiefs of Va’avau, 
Niufo’ou, Niuatoputapu, Tongatapu, ‘Eua and Ha’apai and urged them 
not to give up Tongan sovereignty to any foreign power but only to God. 
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Problems began when the British High Commission deported Shirley 
Baker, a British subject who had become Tonga’s premier, and appointed 
Tuku’alo, a competitor for the royal throne, to the post. Infuriated, Tupou I 
moved to Ha’apai and ignored the new government under Tuku’aho. 
In protest at what was seen as British arrogance, a large part of  the 
Tonga population refused to pay tax. Although Tuku’aho was dismissed 
as premier by the Privy Council in 1893, the unilateral imposition of 
power by the British, including Tukua’ho’s appointment, contributed to 
diminishing the authority of the King. At the time of his death in 1893, 
Tupou I’s mana had declined considerably. Tukua’ho’s misfortune was 
exacerbated after he was accused of introducing a flu pandemic from New 
Zealand. The population was reduced by 10 per cent as a result of the 
disease (Rutherford, 1977).
A major irony is that while Tupou I fought to keep European imperial 
powers out of Tonga, he himself remodelled the Tongan Tu’i institution 
after the British monarchy. He was named after King George of England, 
transformed the chiefly position of Tu’i Kanakupolu to a fully fledged 
European-style monarch, including the formal ceremonies, state 
institutions, official dress and other symbols. This was fine-tuned over the 
years by generations of the Tupou dynasty to include their general lifestyle 
and even accents, to the extent that the institution became more European 
than Tongan, ironically at a time when some European countries had 
done away with the archaic institution of a monarchy. It was and still 
is probably the most ridiculous case of superficial political imitation of 
Europeans anywhere in the world.
European influence, especially the direct involvement of missionaries 
in local social and political transformation, also strengthened Tupou I’s 
power through the use of British-style laws and the 1875 constitution 
to legitimise his rule. The irony was that, while this transformed Tonga 
into a modern monarchy at a time when Pacific states were still under 
colonial rule, it also locked Tonga into a historical time warp, a situation 
that was to haunt the kingdom later. As other Pacific states gained 
independence and embraced democracy towards the end of the 1900s, 
the Tongan political system had hardly evolved and remained relatively 
static until constitutional reforms almost 120 years later. The rigid system 
served the monarch and nobles well by institutionalising their power as 
well as providing for their dynastic continuity (Herda, Terrell & Gunson, 
1990). To further bolster the power and perpetuity of the elite, children 
of royalty and nobles were sent overseas, especially to Australia, to study.
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Despite there being a number of contenders for the throne, Tupou I, 
who died aged 96, was succeeded by his great-grandson, Tupou II. The 
new King immediately faced continuing controversy, including criticism 
of his womanising ways, choice of wife, abuse of state fund, and poor 
governance. This led to financial crises in 1895 and 1897, and the 
government was forced to borrow externally from Deutsche Handels 
und Plantagen Gesellschaft, a German trading company based in Samoa. 
The King was very unpopular among Tongans, and there was widespread 
resentment—perhaps the first recorded mass grievances in the history of 
modern Tonga. People complained that, although they paid taxes, there 
was no visible improvement in their lives. However, Tongans, including 
nobles (who feared losing status and land) were afraid to publicise their 
views about the King who has been described as a ‘vain and egotistical 
man’ (Van der Grijp, 2014: 235).
The crisis provided Britain with the option of annexation. Many 
commoners wanted British rule as a way of removing the scourge of chiefly 
oppression. On the other hand, the nobles detested any idea of British 
rule because of the certainty of losing power and land, a situation similar 
to Fiji under British rule. Amid the internal power struggle, on 18 May 
1900, Tonga became a protected state by the Treaty of Friendship with 
Britain. Despite its protectorate status, Tonga maintained its sovereignty, 
and a British consul became the representative of Britain from 1901 to 
1970 (Bott, 1981).
Europeans lobbied for the removal of the monarch’s power and a reduction 
in significance to a symbolic institution with a flag but no governing or 
judicial power. Europeans were frustrated with government policies such 
as blockages on free trade, curbing of copra exports, difficulty in extension 
of land leases, ineffectiveness of the police and lack of protection against 
theft of trade goods. There was also fear among the British that what they 
saw as the lack of discipline and the rebelliousness of the Tongans might 
influence Fijians, who also had their share of resistance against British 
rule, as we saw in Chapter 4.
The British decided that the best way to deal with the unpopular King 
was to give him an ultimatum: cooperate with the British in reforming the 
operation of the state or be deported to Fiji. Tupou II opted for the former 
and carried out a number of important reforms, such as the appointment 
of locals and Europeans to the civil service. The reforms benefited Tonga 
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through the building of hospitals, water towers and other public amenities. 
The King was saved from the humiliation of deportation and instead the 
Premier, Sateki, and the Minister of Finance, Fatu, were deported to Fiji.
The British bullying tactic manifested a rather odd political arrangement 
where, despite the fact that Tonga was not a full British colony, British 
interest still prevailed in various circumstances. To ensure Tongan 
compliance with British imperial interests, the Treaty of Friendship 
was renewed in 1905, 1958, 1965 and 1968 in preparation for 
eventual ‘independence’ (from its protectorate status) on 4 June 1970 
(Rutherford,  1977). This was part of the familiar evolutionary process 
towards independence in British colonies. Because Fiji was the centre of 
British imperial rule in the Pacific, political developments in Fiji would 
also have repercussions in other colonies or protectorates. It was hardly 
coincidental that Tonga as a protectorate was also granted self-rule in 
1970, the same year that Fiji gained independence, although in different 
months. It needs to be stated here that Tonga was a protectorate of Britain 
and not a colony like Fiji.
As was to be the case in Fiji, resistance to British rule in Tonga took 
the form of economic self-empowerment. A copra growers’ cooperative 
called the Ma’a Tonga Kautaha was formed. The idea was that Tongans as 
producers could produce and market their produce directly rather than 
going through European intermediaries and traders. Started by a  failed 
British businessman, Alister Cameron, and supported by Vaema, 
a noble from Houma, the cooperative was an instant success, with 1,300 
members on Tongatapu in May 1909 and 2,000 in Ha’apai and Vava’u in 
July 1909. This was an amazing feat for a population of only 22,000 and 
with 5,000 adult taxpayers (Hempenstall & Rutherford, 1984). The Ma’a 
Tonga Kautaha inspired the Viti Kabani, the Fijian version, led by Apolosi 
Nawai, who was later arrested and exiled by the British to Rotuma, as we 
saw in Chapter 4. The movement died out around 1914 after a dispute 
over Cameron’s bookkeeping practices, amid hostility towards cooperative 
endeavours by the Europeans and the British. The British saw the Ma’a 
Tonga Kautaha as an attempt to undermine European capital, which 
the imperial system was supposed to protect, as well as a direct threat to 
British authority itself.
After the collapse of the Ma’a Tonga Kautaha, European-owned 
companies such as Burns Philp (BP) suddenly made large profits. The 
BP inspector of companies for Tonga had earlier complained that Tongan 
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workers were not to be trusted because they refused to make copra when 
the price was low. Instead they withheld and accumulated their copra, 
forcing the price up. The company complained that Tongans were only 
prepared to work for the meagre amount of 10 shillings a day (Hove, Kiste 
& Lal, 1994:  77). Tongan economic resistance was quite sophisticated 
and effective, and demonstrated the potential for collective people’s action 
against overwhelming odds, a political virtue that was to be useful in 
future pro-democracy protests.
Tupou II was succeeded by his 18-year-old daughter Salote Tupou III, 
who ruled for 48 years from 5 April 1918 to 16 December 1965. Although 
Salote’s early years were quite challenging, her reign inspired great interest 
in the institution of the monarch as she embarked on ambitious projects to 
modernise Tonga through improved economic development, health and 
education, and, at the same time, sought to record and resurrect cultural 
aspects of Tongan identity, literature and philosophy. She was very closely 
connected with the people through her village visits, scholarly endeavours 
such as poetry, helping to mediate differences between churches and her 
involvement with American soldiers during World War II. Her visit to 
London for Queen Elizabeth II’s coronation exposed Tonga on the global 
stage. Queen Salote’s reign was a ‘romantic’ yet nostalgic period in Tonga’s 
collective consciousness. The queen was an accomplished composer of 
songs and poetry (Wood-Ellem, 1999). Her paternalistic political style 
reinforced Tongan loyalty and strengthened the ideological legitimacy of 
the monarchy, which had been threatened by opposition to Tupou II’s rule.
Queen Salote was succeeded by her son Taufa’au Tupou IV, whom she 
appointed prime minister during her reign. Under Tupou IV, the Treaty 
of Friendship and Tonga’s protectorate status ended in 1970 in accordance 
with the arrangements put in place by Queen Salote Tupou III before 
her death in 1965 (Wood-Ellem, 1999). Following this, Tonga became 
part of the Commonwealth of Nations in 1970 and a member of the 
United Nations in 1999. As part of its cost-cutting measures, the British 
Government closed the British High Commission in Nuku’alofa in March 
2006, and all responsibility was shifted to the British High Commission 
in Fiji.
After Tupou IV’s death in September 2006, he was succeeded by Tupou 
V, who had been minister for foreign affairs and defence for 25 years 
until 1998. Tupou V, who had lived the life of an unmarried international 
playboy, was more independent minded and was in a much better position 
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to open the floodgates of political reform. Barely two months into his new 
role, even before the official coronation, the riot of November 2006 took 
place, providing a catalyst for reform. In the middle of the reform, Tupou 
V passed away on 18 March 2012. The process of reform culminated in 
a major amendment to the constitution in 2010. Tupou V was succeeded 
by his younger brother, Crown Prince Tupouto‘a ‘Ulukalala or Tupou VI, 
a more conservative and less popular figure than his elder brother.
Competing security discourses: Dynastic 
hegemony versus people’s resistance
Perhaps the two most ideologically incongruent forces in contemporary 
Tongan political history, whose competing interests defined Tongan 
political security from the 1970s onwards, were the institution of the 
monarchy (together with the nopele) and the pro-democracy movement. 
These groups held divergent ideological discourses about Tongan politics 
and society. One relied on the appeal to cosmological mana and divine will 
for societal consent and legitimacy whereas the other relied on principles 
of equality and human rights as the basis for political action and social 
transformation (Herda, Terrell & Gunson, , 1990). The only thing in 
between was the shared collective identity of being Tongan, but even then 
there are still very clear distinctions between the cultural worlds of royal 
and commoner Tongans.
The power differential is reinforced by landownership; constitutionally 
the monarch literally ‘owns’ all the land, and he or she has the power 
to distribute it to the nobles or matapule (talking chiefs) as part of their 
hereditary estates. The ordinary people have no land of their own but have 
to rely on the landed gentry to provide them with lots when required.
Mana, divinity and royalty
The end of the Tu’i Tonga dynasty in the 19th century did not necessarily 
end the sacred and divine disposition associated with the Tu’i Tonga’s 
position. In fact, notions of sacredness and divine origin were reinvented 
and institutionalised by Tupou I, who merged the three dynasties—
Tu’i Tonga, Tu’i Ha’atakalaua and Tu’i Kanokupolu—under his own Tu’i 
Kanokupolu title (Bott, 1981). The mythical ideology of spirituality was 
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a powerful lever to gain consent, which Tupou I and his descendants used 
strategically to maintain their unrivalled rule when the use of force—last 
used by Tupou I as a tool of unification—to ensure submission, was no 
longer necessary.
The unification process allowed Tupou I to reconstruct Tongan history 
and cosmology to his and his descendants’ advantage. It ensured that the 
Tupou dynasty could claim not only direct descent along the Tu’i Tonga 
line but also the heritage of its associated sacredness. Moreover, the role 
of the sun god, Tangaloa, as the direct guardian of the monarch was 
supplemented and not totally replaced by the Christian God. Christianity 
became the new opium that reified the divine origin of the monarch as well 
as instilled mass consent in Tongans, who saw their culture as part of that 
divine obligation of submission. This reification process was integrated 
into the Tongan socialisation process to strengthen people’s sense of 
belonging within the divinely ordained three-tier sociopolitical structure.
Thus the syncretic coexistence of traditional cosmology embodied in 
mana and Christian cosmology manifested in divinity became a powerful 
ideological force and at the same time a legitimising tool for the monarch. 
This means that any other social or political grouping or institution, 
including the state, must remain subservient to this cosmological 
discourse. For instance, modern state governance was ultimately subject to 
monarchical endorsement, as Section 41 of the 1875 constitution stated:
The King is the Sovereign of all the Chiefs and all the people. 
The person of the King is sacred. He governs the country but his 
ministers are responsible. All Acts that have passed the Legislative 
Assembly must bear the King’s signature before they become law. 
(Kingdom of Tonga, 1875: 13)
The constitutionalisation of the ‘sacred’ status of the King transcends the 
human and makes the political status of the monarch irreproachable. 
In the domain of secular politics, the nobles, who acted as the comprador 
class for the monarch, elected nine members out of the 33 members 
of the nobility compared to only nine members elected by the rest of 
the population. The supremacy of the monarch was endorsed by the 
constitutionally prescribed oath of councillors and representatives, which 
states: ‘I solemnly swear before God that I will be truly loyal to His 
Majesty King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV the rightful King of Tonga’ (Kingdom 
of Tonga, 1875: 20). The name had been amended to reflect the current 
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monarch in power. Nevertheless the oath of allegiance and the emphasis 
on the claim to ‘the rightful King of Tonga’ made the Tupou dynasty 
impermeable to counterclaims and attempts to question its legitimacy.
Land is also a powerful hegemonic and social control mechanism. Section 
104 of the 1875 constitution stated that: ‘All the land is the property of 
the King and he may at pleasure grant to the nobles and titular chiefs or 
matabules one or more estates to become their hereditary estates’ (Kingdom 
of Tonga, 1875: 24). The line of control over land from the King to the 
nobles and eventually the people creates a power hierarchy that gives the 
nobles and monarch significant control over people’s livelihood, identity 
and sense of loyalty. This system of feudalistic patronage was given 
divine approval by the Church and remains one of the most powerful 
sociocultural forces in Tongan society.
Apart from this religious, cultural and cosmological appeal, the powers of 
the monarch were fully entrenched in the 1875 constitution. It guaranteed 
perpetual dynastic succession and provided for absolute authority to 
govern the kingdom. The monarch appointed the prime minister and 
ministers and had authority over them, and had the power to dismiss 
as he or she wished. Laws were legislated by Parliament under his or her 
authority. Also, the monarch had unrestricted power to make treaties with 
foreign states and to grant hereditary noble titles and estates, and could 
not be impeached. The constitution itself could not be changed without 
the monarch’s consent (Kingdom of Tonga, 1875). Although the day-
to-day running of the kingdom was in the hands of the government, the 
monarch could intervene at will (Powles, 2007).
One must situate the pro-democracy movement in the context of such 
a monolithic sociopolitical structure. According to Gramsci, hegemony 
can never be total because of what he refers to as ‘dual consciousness’, or 
the capacity of people to think and act independently of the dominant 
ideological forces. The inability of the feudal patronage system to evolve 
and adapt to changing aspirations and expectations of the newly educated 
and globalised young generation became its own nemesis. Paradoxically, 
education since Tupou I and his predecessors was meant to breed 
conformity to Tongan identity as constructed by the Tupou dynasty. 
By the 1980s, a new breed of critical thinkers was able to look beyond 
the ideological blinkers and started what came to be known as the pro-
democracy movement. Power asymmetry created its own contradictions 
and conditions for resistance.
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Counterhegemony: People’s movement
Resistance to feudal patronage and the excesses of the monarch caused 
rumblings within the Tongan community, but these were largely absorbed 
by a collective sense of cultural loyalty and, for the more religious, the 
subconscious fear of committing sin by being anti-monarch. Queen 
Salote’s efforts in creating a Tongan cultural renaissance through 
education, poetry, and mythologisation and romanticisation of Tongan 
royal genealogy gave the royal institution a regenerated populist image 
and provided Tongans with a resurgence of cultural euphoria and belief 
in the benevolence of the monarchy. However, the era of romanticism 
quickly faded under Tupou IV, who, unlike his poetic mother, Queen 
Salote, was an enthusiastic economic dreamer who wanted to drive 
Tonga towards a technocratic path of modernity and development. In the 
process, he committed one economic blunder after another and thus 
allowed cocooned grievances to emerge.
Possessed of an overly ambitious entrepreneurial streak, Tupou IV 
embarked on a modernisation process and vowed to integrate Tonga 
more deeply into the global economy through education, resource 
development, an improved health system, transport, tourism and 
communication, although he was reluctant to carry out political reforms. 
As part of this plan, Tongans were also encouraged to migrate overseas 
and send back remittances to relatives to improve their standard of living. 
These modernisation initiatives had minimal impact because of the 
misuse of state funds, the unilateral control of investments by royalty in 
ill-conceived investments and the unequal distribution of resources such 
as land, wealth and power, which were concentrated largely in the hands 
of the nobles and monarch. One by one, Tupou IV’s entrepreneurial 
ambitions were thwarted by incompetence and unethical deals and the 
list of failures became a source of embarrassment for the government: the 
collapse of Royal Tonga Airlines, sale of Tongan passports, loss of funds 
in an American insurance scam, and establishment of a ship registry that 
was misused and generated no income. Under his watch, members of the 
royal family expanded their business empire to control state assets such 
as electricity and Tongasat, a company that ‘owns’ Tonga’s satellite slots 
and is run by Princess Pilolevu, Tupou IV’s daughter. In recent years, 
the Tonga Herald, an online paper, was created to defend and promote 
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the Tongan establishment and the royal family against critics. These were 
the circumstances that galvanised people’s grievances and inspired the 
clamour for greater democratic reforms.
Although the desire for democratisation of Tonga had been nurtured 
over the years, debates became public in the 1980s and it was not until 
the pro-democratic national convention in 1992 that the Tonga Pro-
Democracy Movement (TPDM) was officially launched as an organised 
political movement based on the demand for a more egalitarian political 
system and a greater share of political power by the people. Some pioneers 
of the pro-democracy movement are Dr Langi Kavaliku, a  prominent 
scholar; the Revd Dr Siupeli Taliai, a respected educator; the late Revd 
Dr Sione ‘Amanaki Havea, former president of the Free Wesleyan Church 
of Tonga; the late Bishop Patelisio Finau,1 the first Tongan leader of the 
Catholic Church in Tonga; and the late Professor Futa Helu,2 prominent 
scholar and founder of the Atenisi University. Over the years the younger 
generation took control of the leadership and future direction of the 
movement. Samuela ‘Akilisi Pohiva, a graduate of the University of the 
South Pacific and former educator with a very charismatic and outspoken 
personality, became the public face and symbol of the movement.3 Others, 
like Dr Feleti Sevele, the former prime minister, and Lopeti Senituli, 
former director of the  Suva-based Pacific Concerns Resources Center, 
were also among the leading lights.
The name of the TPDM was changed to Tonga Human Rights and 
Democracy Movement  in 1998, in recognition of the need to emphasise 
the significance of human rights in the movement. The name was changed 
to the Friendly Islands Human Rights and Democracy Movement 
1  A number of Bishop Finau’s contemporaries in the Pacific, like the Revd Akuila Yabaki in Fiji, 
also adhered to the liberation theology movement, which began in Latin America and spread to other 
developing countries because of its appeal to those seeking social change, especially its focus on the 
liberation of the oppressed from the powerful classes of society. In my interview with Bishop Finau in 
1994, he talked at length about his love for liberation theology and the need for a ‘social revolution’ 
in Tonga; that is, significant transformation of the cultural and political structures.
2  Professor Helu described his trip to Italy with his performance group as being ‘in the footsteps of 
Gramsci tour’. Gramsci (1891–1937) is well known to sociologists and political scientists as a major 
exponent of the theory of ‘hegemony’, which refers to the way the state and those in power use social, 
cultural and economic mechanisms to generate consent and domination of the population. Hence 
the best response is to use ‘counterhegemonic’ strategies. Gramsci’s ideas have influenced generations 
of revolutionaries and social reformists over the years, including some Pacific activists and scholars. 
See Gramsci (1971).
3  Mr Pohiva was controversially dismissed from his teaching position by the government, which 
set his colourful political career in motion.
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(FIHRDM) in 2005, when the movement was registered under the 
Incorporated Societies Act. One of the demands of the government was 
that the word ‘Tonga’ should be dropped, because the  pro-democracy 
movement had no right to use it unilaterally but needed the permission 
of the government.4
Like any other new political organisation, there were external as well as 
internal pressures as the FIHRDM attempted to consolidate its political 
position amid differences. Jockeying by members for endorsement 
as candidates for the 2005 election led to internal rifts within the 
FIHRDM, and some members, such as Professor Helu, deputy chairperson 
of the organisation, were expelled. The Tonga Democratic Party (TDP), 
which was formed by the dissident group, became incorporated under 
the Incorporated Societies Act and emerged as an alternative pro-
democracy political grouping. The members of the TDP consisted of 
strong supporters of the FIHRDM like Father Seluini ‘Akau’ola, Teisina 
Fuko, Semisi Tapueluelu and former minister of police and acting 
Deputy Prime Minister, William Clive Edwards, whose pro-democracy 
credentials have often been questioned because of his previous links with 
the establishment.5
Nevertheless, the FIHRDM was the leading political voice in a much 
larger loose alliance of pro-democracy groups, which included the 
Friendly  Islands Teachers Association, with Finua Tutone as president, 
the Tonga National Council of Churches, with the Revd Simote Vea as 
its general secretary until the end of 2005, and the Legal Literacy Project 
Team, with Betty Blake as its coordinator.6 The  line of demarcation 
between these organisations and the FIHRDM was blurred, since their 
4  Tonga, unlike its neighbours Fiji and Samoa, does not have a history of political movements 
and political parties. The FIHRDM was probably the first organised political group. The refusal of 
the government to allow use of the word ‘Tonga’ in the FIHRDM’s name was seen as a way of taking 
away the legitimacy and national status of the pro-democracy movement.
5  As Minister of Police in the 1990s, Edwards was a strong opponent of the pro-democracy 
movement. He banned the Times of Tonga newspaper, ordered surveillance of pro-democracy meetings 
and brought civil actions against ‘Akilisi Pohiva and other democracy activists for defamation. Pohiva and 
two Times of Tonga journalists, Kalafi Moala and Filokalafi ‘Akauola, were found guilty by the Tongan 
Parliament of contempt of Parliament in 1996 and were jailed for 30 days. However, the three were 
later awarded US$26,000 for wrongful imprisonment. As Minister of Police and Prisons, Edwards was 
responsible for their imprisonment. The turning point for Edwards was when he was sacked as minister 
by the Prime Minister, Ulukālala Lavaka, in 2004. Edwards then joined the pro-democracy camp.
6  Over the years, the number of Tongan civil society organisations taking up the pro-democracy 
cause increased. They provided greater diversity in terms issues relating to of trade union rights, women’s 
rights and community health and community development to the broader pro-democracy agenda.
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leaders held key positions in both organisations. For instance, the Revd 
Simote Vea was chairperson and Finau Tutone the deputy secretary of 
the FIHRDM for a number of years. Also, Professor Helu, while head 
of Atenisi University, was also deputy chairperson when he was expelled. 
In an interesting development, during the September 2005 annual general 
meeting, HRH Prince Tu’ipelehake was appointed patron of FIHRDM.7
Although pro-democracy sentiments had a long period of development 
and consolidation, between the September 2005 civil service strike and 
the 16 November 2006 riot, the pro-democracy movement developed 
into a stronger, more proactive and more assertive nationwide network of 
politicians, civil servants, business people, journalists, churches, lawyers, 
villagers, schoolchildren, the unemployed and even royalty in the form of 
Prince Tu’ipalehake. Senituli describes the situation thus:
These new emergent organisations, together with the more 
established member organisations of the ‘pro-democracy 
movement’, and individuals, including the People’s Representatives 
to the Legislative Assembly and individual members of the clergy 
and of the legal profession, had formed a loose coalition of political 
actors looking for a cause. It included a number of people who 
felt personally aggrieved by some government policy or decisions 
and were intent on seeking revenge. It also included a large group 
of aspiring politicians who had failed in numerous attempts to 
win a seat in the Legislative Assembly or had lost seats they once 
held and saw the opportunity to stake early claims for seats in 
a reformed Parliament. (Senituli, 2006: 3–4)
The need for a more unified front was apparent, and this led to the 
formation of the People’s Committee for Political Reform (PCPR).
The broad pro-democracy alliance swelled after the 22 July 2005 public 
servants’ strike with the inclusion of the Public Servants Association 
Interim Committee, Tonga National Business Association (TNBA) and 
the Oceania Broadcasting Network Television (OBN-TV), whose general 
manager was Sangster Saulala, a government minister, who was later 
7  Dubbed the ‘prince of the people’, Prince Tu’ipelehake’s pro-democracy stance gave a moral 
boost to the pro-democracy movement. He was the first member of the royal family who publicly 
pronounced his support for political reform in support of the commoners’ demands.
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suspected as being one of the organisers of the riot. However, it should be 
noted that because of their professional and personal interests, some key 
members of these associations were ambivalent about, or even opposed to, 
alignment with the FIHRDM in case it should undermine their demands 
for better pay and work conditions.8
The involvement of the TNBA was of interest because it comprised 
entrepreneurs who owned small- to medium-sized businesses and who 
supported the public service strike. The strikers were members of  the 
Tongan middle class who made up a significant portion of the customer 
base of these businessmen. Any increase in pay would also have a positive 
flow-on effect to their businesses. In addition, the TNBA saw the 
proliferation of foreign businesses, especially those belonging to Chinese, 
Indians and Europeans, as a threat to their survival in the constricted 
Tongan market. They were also against Tonga’s attempt to join the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) because of its potential impact in allowing 
an unrestricted flow of cheap foreign goods into Tonga, which they would 
find difficult to compete against.9 In addition, they were also opposed 
to the government’s anti-corruption policy, because of its clampdown on 
businesses.10 Key players in the TNBA included Dr Tu’i Uata, ‘Ofa Simiki 
and Peseti Ma’afu who, with others in the association, were members of 
either the FIHRDM or TDP.
OBN-TV played a key role in raising public consciousness through 
direct live coverage of the activities and speeches at Pangai Si’i. Set up 
in the early 1990s as a Christian station by Christopher Racine, an 
American businessman, OBN-TV was a strong advocate of the pro-
monarchy and anti-democracy Tonga Kotoa Movement but later changed 
political allegiance as the wave of pro-democracy sentiment became 
8  The 2005 strike was the largest in the history of the kingdom. While it was seen by some as 
part of the pro-democracy mobilisation, the strike had its own rationale and dynamics, which were 
industrial in nature and independent of the pro-democracy agenda. However, the strikers’ demands, 
which included higher pay, were fully supported by pro-democracy supporters. Many strikers were 
also members of the movement.
9  Tonga’s membership of the WTO affected local business as well as the Tongan economy generally 
in a profoundly negative way. The TNBA saw the pro-democracy movement as a useful political 
mechanism through which they could articulate their commercial interests.
10  The government’s anti-corruption policies, which targeted the business community, were viewed 
with cynicism, especially given the number of highly publicised scandals and cases of corruption 
involving the government and the royal family.
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insurmountable.11 In assuming the role of the ‘CNN of Pangai Si’i’, 
OBN-TV became the media link between Pangai Si’i, which was the 
centre of political action, and the rest of the country.12
The electoral successes of the pro-democracy campaigners were stunning. 
For instance, the HRDM won seven of the nine people’s seats during the 
2002 election. They won the same number of seats in 2005 and proceeded 
to introduce reform proposals in the Legislative Assembly. These electoral 
gains posed a direct threat to the establishment. They brought into question 
the long-held assumption that, in the symbiotic relationship between 
cultural and political loyalty, the two elements are immutably related. The 
voting pattern showed that ordinary Tongans were able to express their 
independent political choice against the political establishment under 
the patronage of the monarch. While people still revere the monarchy as 
a cultural institution, they were eager to see changes in the political realm.
The anti-establishment votes could also be seen as a way of directly 
demystifying the perceived ‘sacredness’ of the Tupou dynasty. One may 
also say that it was a referendum against the feudal patronage system 
that gave the nobles uncontested privileges. It affirmed in the minds of 
the people that they had the power to exercise freedom of choice and to 
transform society. It was a liberating process that opened up opportunities 
for rethinking alternatives outside the hegemonic order created through 
Tupou I’s appropriation of Tu’i Tonga’s mana, Queen Salote’s cultural 
renaissance and Tupou IV’s globalisation strategies.
Maintaining state security: Repression  
of pro-democracy movement
The autocratic leverage of the monarchy through the mysticism of mana 
and divinity and the political and ideological appeal of the constitutional 
supremacy of the monarch were not sufficient to contain the chorus 
11  The Tonga Kotoa movement was set up as a pro-monarchical organisation in the face of the call 
for political change by the pro-democracy movement. Nevertheless it supported the ousting of Prince 
Ulukalala as prime minister in 2005.
12  One of the strengths of the pro-democracy movement is its very effective use of the media. Apart 
from the Kele’a, it also uses other papers like Matangi Tonga, an independent and critical medium under 
the guidance of one of the Pacific’s most experienced journalists, Pesi Fonua, and Taimi Tonga Media, 
under the direction of Kalafi Moala, a well-respected journalist. Radio and TV were also well utilised. 
OBN-TV became the most important mobilising medium at Pangai Si’i on 16 November 2006.
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of pro-democracy voices and their revolutionary fervour. Hence the 
monarch and the state had to resort to more secular and psychologically 
coercive means.
As far back as the 1980s, at the time of the Cold War, Pacific states like Fiji 
and Tonga that felt threatened by potential internal resistance to the status 
quo (in the form of the Fiji Labour Party and the demand for democracy 
in Tonga) were attracted to the Asia-Pacific Anti-Communist League 
(APACL), formed in Taiwan to keep Chinese communism at bay in the 
Pacific. A leading supporter of the APACL, Tongan nobleman Fusitua, 
a former speaker of the Tongan Parliament, made the link between the 
demand for democracy and communism thus: ‘Anybody who tries to move 
the people against the established order, causing chaos, anarchy, that’s 
the first degree of communism’ (Crocombe, 2005: 266). In an APACL 
meeting in Tonga in 1985, the pro-democracy advocates were branded 
‘communist’ conspirators as a way of discrediting them. Bishop Finau was 
once labelled a ‘Marxist’ by the King for his support of the pro-democracy 
movement (Bain, 1993). A favourite strategy, as in Singapore, was the use 
of defamation against the pro-democracy supporters as a retaliatory and 
punitive response. A number of selected cases are given below as examples.
In September 1996, Pohiva, Kalafi Moala and Filokalafi ‘Akau’ola, Times 
of Tonga editor, publisher and deputy editor, respectively, were imprisoned 
after being convicted of alleged contempt of the Legislative Assembly 
following the publication in Taimi Tonga, a weekly newspaper, of an 
impeachment motion against the minister of justice that had not been 
tabled in the legislature (Robie, 1996). They were released after serving 
24 days of a 30-day sentence after the Supreme Court ruled that the 
assembly, which overwhelmingly consisted of pro-monarchy supporters, 
breached a number of constitutional provisions in the conviction of the 
three. This decision was later upheld by the Tonga Court of Appeal.
In early March 1998, the Supreme Court acquitted Pohiva in a libel 
case brought against him by the government regarding his claims in an 
interview with the Wall Street Journal and reprinted in Kele’a, in which he 
called Tupou IV a ‘dictator’. In the interview, Pohiva alleged that the King 
was involved in ‘financial legerdemain’ in relation to the proceeds from 
the sales of Tongan passports to foreigners as well as revenues generated by 
Tongasat, a company run by the King’s daughter, Pilolevu, which leased 
global satellite positions Tonga claimed (Matangi Tonga, 1998).
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Later in the month, on 30 March 1998, the Magistrate’s Court convicted 
and fined ‘Akilisi Pohiva US$336 or in default ordered six months 
imprisonment for defamatory remarks about the minister of police 
published in Taimi Tonga. Pohiva was also convicted and fined US$336 
or in default imprisoned for six months for an article published in Kele’a 
(PINA, 1998).
In another case the editor of Kele’a, Mateni Tapueluelu, and his wife, 
Laucala Pohiva, were fined almost T$70,000 in damages and costs for 
defamation after publishing a letter to the editor that alleged corruption 
by a particular minister (Stuff NZ, 2013). The case had ramifications 
for the 2014 election, as Tapueluelu later lost the seat he won after the 
supervisor of elections ruled that he did not declare his pending court 
fine when he submitted his application for candidacy.
It began to dawn on the establishment that the constitution to which 
they declared allegiance in their oath was paradoxically a liability as far as 
provisions related to free speech were concerned. To remedy the situation 
and to erect a firewall against the media onslaught, the government 
initiated restrictive measures such as the Media Operator’s Bill as well 
as, in 2003, a constitutional amendment to restrict media freedom. The 
legislation gave the government the power to control coverage of ‘cultural’ 
and ‘moral’ issues, ban publications it deemed offensive and ban foreign 
ownership of the media. This was a big blow to the pro-democracy 
movement because of its heavy reliance on the media, including ownership 
of Kele’a, as part of its mobilisation campaign.
The intended legislation provoked thousands of people to take part 
in a protest march through the streets of Nuku’alofa in October 2003 in 
the first demonstration of its kind in the kingdom. Oblivious to the 
people’s demands and the international outcry, and despite a hot debate in 
Parliament, the Media Operator’s Bill and the constitutional amendment 
were passed in 2004, and the new licensing process started in earnest. 
All the papers that were critical of the excesses and corruption of the 
monarch and government, including Taimi ‘o Tonga (Tongan Times), 
Kele’a and Matangi Tonga, were denied licences, while those granted 
licences were church-based or pro-government. The constitutionality of 
the amendment was contested in the Supreme Court, and the chief justice 
struck out most of the clauses in the amendment. This was just one in 
a series of judgements in which the Supreme Court declared attempts to 
control the media unconstitutional.
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The paradox was that the monarch’s attempt to use the constitution that 
had served its hegemonic interests for generations to undermine free 
speech was declared unconstitutional. This was a serious blow to the 
monarch’s claim to sacredness. It also raised fundamental issues about 
the empowering role of the judiciary as an independent organ of the state 
on which people could rely to confront the overriding political powers of 
the monarchical juggernaut.
In the broader context of security, the Supreme Court’s decision had 
two implications. First, it provided people with a sense of sociopolitical 
security in the face of authoritarianism, and second, the court’s legal 
declaration as a secular institution of the state demystified some of the 
divine and sacred images associated with the monarch. As the ideological 
veil lifted, people could then see the nakedness of the monarch’s control 
over state power, which was often hidden under the veil of cultural mana 
and Christian divinity. By resorting to legal and other secular means of 
control and coercion, the monarchy might have felt that its unquestioned 
acceptance by the people could no longer be guaranteed and might no 
longer have felt secure simply by using ideological leverage such as mana 
to cultivate and perpetuate what Marx refers to as ‘false consciousness’.
Maintaining security through concessions
The failed attempt to weaken the pro-democracy movement through 
constitutional reform and passage of the anti-media legislation gave 
way to the only other available option, cooption and ‘taming’ of the 
opposition through reform. In 2004, responding to public demand for 
reform, Prince Tu’ipelehake suggested that a parliamentary committee be 
set up to facilitate consultations and discussions on possible constitutional 
reform. This was approved by Parliament. Although its implementation 
was resisted by some entrenched interests, it was given renewed vigour by 
the 2005 civil service strike.
With the support of the monarch, the National Committee for Political 
Reform (NCPR) was set up with Tu’ipelehake as chair, assisted by 
Dr Sitiveni Halapua, a prominent Tongan scholar based at the East-
West Center in Hawaii. After the untimely death of Tu’ipelehake in 
the United States, the chair of the NCPR was taken over by Halapua, 
who, on 31 August 2006, presented the report, written in the Tongan 
language, to the ailing King Tupou IV. Meanwhile, among the signals that 
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changes were afoot, two HRDM supporters, Dr Feleti Sevele and Sione 
Haukinima, were appointed Cabinet ministers. In 2006 Sevele became the 
first commoner to be appointed prime minister. He succeeded ‘Ulukalala 
Lavaka-Ata, the King’s younger son, whose term was rocked by scandal.
The death of Tupou IV in 2006 signalled a new era in political change 
for Tonga, as his son and successor, King George Tupou V, seemed 
more attuned to reform. However, before Parliament could enact any 
reform agenda, the riot took place and fear of more violence became the 
major catalyst for speedy change. The King promised wide reforms in 
political representation, the power of the monarch and other areas of state 
governance. This led to the establishment in 2008 of the Constitutional 
and Electoral Commission, whose task was to engage in wide consultation 
with the Tongan people and propose changes to the constitution. 
The amendments to the constitution were passed by the assembly in April 
2010 and enacted five months later.
Some of the significant reforms included changes in parliamentary 
representation, the appointment of the prime minister and the 
appointment of Cabinet. Previously, the unicameral Legislative Assembly 
consisted of the King’s nominees in the form of privy councillors and 
Cabinet ministers, nine representatives of the nobles and six representatives 
of the people. Under the new changes, the number of seats for the people’s 
representatives increased from nine out of 30 (30 per cent) to 17 out of 
26 (65.4 per cent) and the number of seats for the 33 nobles remained 
at nine. While previously the monarch appointed the prime minister 
and Cabinet, the new changes gave power to Parliament to elect a prime 
minister, who then appointed Cabinet. The prime minister may choose 
up to 12 ministers for Cabinet, including up to four non-elected persons 
from outside Parliament. While the coopted Cabinet members became 
part of and responsible to Parliament, they could not, however, take part 
in parliamentary votes. In a limited way, the executive authority of the 
monarch shifted to Cabinet, which was accountable to Parliament.
However, there were differences between the government and 
pro-democracy group in their approaches to reform. The pro-democracy 
group claimed that ‘60 per cent of our proposal was in line with 
Tu’ipelehake’s Committee’ (Pohiva, 2007: 3). In their original proposal 
to the assembly on 9 November 2006, the people’s representatives 
argued for six nobles’ representatives and 17 people’s representatives. 
On 13 November this was changed to nine seats for nobles and 21 for the 
177
5 . THy kIngdOM buRn
people’s representatives. The government’s proposal was for 14 people’s 
representatives and 9 nobles’ representatives. However, the government 
wanted to retain the monarch’s prerogative of appointing a third of 
a Cabinet of 14 ministers from the 14 people’s representatives and nine 
nobles’ representatives in the assembly or from outside. There were other 
differences, including views on the electoral system (Senituli, 2006). 
Some of these differences also helped to fuel the tension that had already 
built up.
In 2010 the first election under the new electoral system took place. 
Optimism reigned that at last, and for the first time, Tonga would see 
an elected commoner-led government. Although Pohiva’s party, the 
Democratic Party of the Friendly Islands (DPFI), won 12 out of 17 seats, 
they could not form a government because the other five independent 
parliamentarians opted to join the nobles, who had nine seats, to form 
a 14-seat government. This power dynamic changed after the 2014 
election. Although the DPFI won only nine seats (a decrease of three 
seats) and independents won eight seats (an increase of three), six of the 
independent parliamentarians joined the DPFI to form the government. 
The dramatic U-turn by the independents was probably out of fear of 
further violence if the DPFI did not come to power (Akilisi Pohiva, 
personal communication). This enabled Pohiva to become prime minister 
(Ratuva, 2015b). This became the pinnacle of Tonga’s political reform—
the leader of the pro-democracy movement becoming prime minister 
of the kingdom.
But how substantive and sustainable was the reform? Despite the reforms, 
the monarch still reigns supreme politically as head of state with veto 
powers, and culturally as the highest symbol of Tongan social cosmology. 
Although King George V provided the much-needed blessing for the 
reform, the power of the monarch was not actually reduced. Rather, 
the exercise of those powers was to be limited. This means that, rather 
than directly making executive decisions, the monarch would seek the 
advice of the prime minister as well as the law lords. King George V 
emphasised this when he said in a press release:
Officially, the sovereign’s powers remain unchanged. Because we 
are a monarchy, we have a unity of power as opposed to a separation 
of power. The difference in future is that I shall not be able to 
exercise any of my powers at will, but all the sovereign’s powers 
must be exercised solely on the advice of the Prime Minister in 
most things, and in traditional matters the law lords who advise 
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exercise of power. In that case, I suppose we are different from other 
nominal monarchies which retain the trappings of monarchy, but 
actually govern themselves as republics. (King George V, 2012)
The King still retains veto power as well as the power to dismiss the 
government. One of the conceptual changes in the constitution in relation 
to ‘King’s powers’ was the deletion of the word ‘governs’ and substitution 
of the word ‘reigns’ (Government of Tonga, 2010a). This is to shift 
the emphasis from an authoritarian to a ceremonial image. However, 
questions are still being asked as to whether the reform of the monarch’s 
role is substantively genuine or merely symbolic.
The reformist King George Tupou V died in March 2012. He was 
succeeded by his brother Crown Prince Tupouto’a Lavaka, who was sworn 
in as King Tupou VI. The new King is considered less amenable to reform, 
and questions are already being asked as to whether his reactionary 
political demeanour might provoke future upheavals.
The riot and ensuing debates
The build-up towards the riots followed a series of developments in 
a  tense  and high-pressure atmosphere. The long-awaited report of the 
National Committee on Political Reform (NCPR) was presented to 
the Legislative Assembly in October 2006, together with two other reports, 
one from Cabinet and the other from the People’s Committee for Political 
Reform (PCPR), which was submitted by the people’s representatives. 
After some deliberation, the Legislative Assembly adopted the report 
and recommendations of the NCPR ‘in principle’ and, following this, 
the government proposed that a tripartite committee, consisting of equal 
numbers of representatives from Cabinet, the people’s representatives 
and the noble’s representatives, be formed to try to arrive at a consensus 
regarding a model that would combine all three reports (Senituli, 2017).
This suggestion for a tripartite committee was opposed by the people’s 
representatives, who insisted that the Legislative Assembly conduct a vote 
on the PCPR report and recommendations. Further action on the issue 
was to proceed during the scheduled 6 November 2006 session but, due 
to concerns about the security of members of the assembly, the speaker 
decided to adjourn the house for the year. This deference was the last 
trigger that sparked the riots.
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The pro-democracy supporters who had camped at Pangai Si’i Park in 
central Nuku’alofa for days marched to the Legislative Assembly and 
threw coconuts at the building. The crowd later scattered and became 
uncontrollable as people ran amok around the capital, burning, looting, 
tipping over cars and throwing rocks and other objects.
The riot started around 3.30pm. The destruction of properties was not 
indiscriminate but well targeted. The businesses destroyed belonged to 
the government, prime minister, royalty and foreign entrepreneurs, 
mostly Europeans, Chinese and Indian. As we have seen earlier, the 
pro-democracy grievances were linked to political rights and economic 
exploitation. By and large, these were reflected in the choice of targets 
for smashing, burning and looting. There was ‘collateral’ damage to other 
properties as the rioters went out of control.
In subsequent Court of Appeal cases, a number of individuals were 
singled  out as potential ring leaders. One of them was Isileli Pulu, 
a  pro-democracy leader, who was heard by witnesses yelling out: 
‘Proceed to plan number four’ when the government-owned Leiola 
Duty Free store was being vandalised. He reportedly thanked the rioters 
saying, ‘Thank you, thank you, we have accomplished what we wanted’ 
(Court  of  Appeal,  2009b: 9). A video tape of the riot shows Pulu in 
the midst of the destruction directing people in the manner of a ‘field 
commander’ (Matavesi, 2006).13
The same film showed that the rioters seemed to be aware of which shops 
to attack and which ones to miss. Those that were targeted were stoned 
and plundered. The ‘onlookers’ seemed to be aware also of the ‘appropriate 
targets’. Another film on YouTube showed a woman yelling to the camera, 
‘We are free’, perhaps referring to her newfound political status, real or 
imagined, symbolised by the free-for-all destruction, as she, together with 
other bystanders, cheered on the rioters.
Unemployed youths, some of whom were sent home for ‘cultural 
education’ from overseas, notably the United States, took advantage 
of the opportunity to vent their frustrations by joining the fracas. 
The destruction of businesses by ordinary protesters was a classic example 
of how political protests could create conditions for the development 
of multiple expressions of grievances. In the broader context of their 
13  A Fijian sports administrator filmed the build-up to the riots and the riots themselves, and this 
video was used as a significant source of evidence during the trial.
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demand for equality and reform, people singled out businesses belonging 
to the monarch as evidence of greed and corruption that contributed to 
inequality. In the same way, Chinese were seen as contributing to the 
ordinary Tongan’s lack of socioeconomic progress through control of 
retail and merchandise trading. As we have seen elsewhere, socioeconomic 
grievances readily transform into ethnopolitical grievances and ethnic 
scapegoating when the circumstances are favourable (Ratuva, 2013).
About 80 per cent of the central business district (CBD) was destroyed, 
and about 10 people, mostly looters, died in the fire. Footage of the riot 
taken by a Tonga-based Fijian sports administrator showed a number 
of interesting scenarios. It appeared that the riot was pre-planned. Not 
only were particular shops targeted but also certain individuals were seen 
organising rioters. Many bystanders also joined in and helped themselves 
in the looting spree. There were a lot of opportunistic activities by 
small groups of looters targeting alcohol, which contributed to more 
drunkenness and fuelled the free-for-all destruction.
The looting and the burning were symbolic political acts. In my field 
interviews in Tonga, several views were suggested. Some said that the riots 
provided protesters with an opportunity to express their repugnance at 
a system they saw as being unfair and exploitative. Some saw the riots as a 
cleansing act for Tonga, to clear out the dirt-filled past and restart with 
a new future and identity. Some also saw the incident as a moment of 
empowerment when, in a hitherto unthinkable way, the people finally 
‘took control’ of the country’s capital, albeit in an extralegal way.
State security responses
In the beginning, the police and His Majesty’s Armed Forces (HMAF) 
were caught off guard by the spontaneous eruption of violence. Later, 
as things began to calm down, they regained control and cordoned off 
the CBD, ensuring that no one entered the ‘crime scene’. The day after, 
a state of emergency was declared, and only fire-fighters, police, utility 
workers and those involved in essential services were allowed inside 
a defined perimeter. Residents within the perimeter had to undergo 
searches. The emergency laws were wide-ranging, including prohibiting 
the gathering of more than five people within the area. Security forces 
were given the right to stop and search people without a warrant (Radio 
New Zealand, 2006b).
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Fearing further escalation, the government’s major response on 
17 November was to promise prompt democratic reforms, including the 
guarantee that elections that would ensure the dominance of people’s 
representation would be held in 2008. Meanwhile, the Chinese embassy 
started evacuating Chinese nationals who were victims of the riot on 
a chartered plane. There were also chartered flights for people of other 
nationalities who wanted to leave Tonga.
The post-riot security situation in Tonga was still unpredictable and 
potentially volatile, and the government sought help from Australia 
and  New Zealand, under the provisions of the Biketawa Declaration. 
The two countries obliged by providing 110 soldiers and 44 police 
officers to act as peace-keepers. There was a clear division of labour for 
the Australian and New Zealand security personnel. The Australians were 
directly involved in patrolling the streets to assist the Tongan police while 
the New Zealand soldiers were deployed to look after airport security 
and the New Zealand police were in charge of the New Zealand High 
Commission’s security. The involvement of security forces from Australia 
and New Zealand raised a number of questions. Pohiva himself criticised 
the involvement of foreign troops, stating that it was further proof of the 
ineffectiveness of the government and its security apparatus under Sevele, 
which failed to heed the warning signs of the people’s anger and did not 
intervene in time to stop the riots (ABC, 2006).
On 19 November, the restrictions surrounding the CBD were relaxed 
and access was granted for the Sunday church service, but only on foot. 
Meanwhile, police investigations were under way, and some looted goods 
were returned. Part of the investigation was to examine the call logs at 
the telecommunication centre, hoping to find some clues as to who was 
involved in organising the riot. By 22 November, police had arrested 
about 26 people. At last it appeared that the security forces were in control 
and the security of the country was being normalised. Some shops and 
commercial centres were open in town as well as in the suburbs.
In early December the Australian and New Zealand forces began 
withdrawing, and the local security forces took firm control of the situation. 
The police had by then made about 571 arrests, some in controversial 
circumstances. There were allegations of police brutality associated with 
the investigation, codenamed ‘Operation Kaliloa’. Pro-democracy MP 
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and former police minister Clive Edwards alleged that police brutality 
was widespread, with an estimated 300 people, including himself, being 
brutalised. He was quoted as saying:
We are trying to get the medical certificates and photographs of 
these and we are hoping to be processing and publishing them, 
because instead of having a state of trying to restore peace  and 
order, the soldiers are causing problems [for] the people, 
and  attacking people. It’s very bad over here at the moment. 
(Radio New Zealand, 2006a)
Under the state of emergency law, a number of high-profile individuals 
were arrested and charged with inciting violence. These included Edwards 
and Pohiva. The state of emergency was renewed several times. In January 
2008, one year and four months after the state of emergency was first 
declared, a Proclamation of Public Order was once again declared on the 
grounds that ‘there exists a state of danger’ in Nuku’alofa. The proclamation 
further stated that central Nuku’alofa would be ‘controlled and maintained 
by the Tonga Police Force and Tonga Defence Force for the sole purpose of 
maintaining public order for all people of the country’ (Fonua, 2008: 1). 
This drew heavy criticism from the pro-democracy leaders, who saw no 
need for it because of a lack of threat to security. The state of emergency 
was finally lifted in January 2011 after the 2010 election, which saw Siale 
Tu’ivakano, a nopele, become prime minister.
Most of the post-riot cases were tried in the Court of Appeal. The court 
quashed a number of cases, such as the charges of uttering seditious 
comments and inciting violence, against five leading pro-democracy 
campaigners, ‘Akilisi Pohiva, Isileli Pulu, William Clive Edwards, ‘Uliti 
Uata and Lepolo Taunisila. It stated that ‘it would be impossible for 
a  reasonable jury to conclude that the appellants were uttering threats 
rather than legitimate warnings’; however, it also suggested that the 
warnings pertained to ‘what would inevitably happen if no heed were taken 
of the people’s will’ (Court of Appeal, 2009a: 21). The term ‘inevitably’ 
is significant because it is an endorsement of the fact that violence was 
unavoidable in the circumstances if the political demands were not met. 
The ‘people’s will’ in this case refers to what the people at Pangai Si’i 
wanted, which was the proposal for 30 parliamentary seats, consisting of 
21 representatives for the people and nine for the nobles. The inability of 
the government to promptly agree to this spawned what Pohiva referred 
to as the ‘people’s upheaval’. The judgement quoted Pohiva saying that: 
‘The people are waiting if it’s a yes or no … the rule of law is a fraud … 
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The law is in the hands of the people’ (Court of Appeal, 2009a: 15). 
Although this might not have been an ‘order’ to carry out the riot, it was 
a direct endorsement and pre-empting of the riot.
Thus the judgement acknowledged that while there was no prima facie 
evidence of the pro-democracy leaders uttering seditious comments or 
inciting people to riot, they did acknowledge that the leaders were aware of 
the potentially explosive situation if their political demands were not met. 
It was probably a case of not directly ordering an ‘attack’ but indirectly 
prodding and encouraging until the threshold of patience was reached.
The court cases reduced the tension and anxiety considerably as people 
realised that the rule of law had once again taken charge of the once chaotic 
situation, although the security threat had not totally disappeared. The 
riot was no doubt the climax of decades of seismic relationships between 
the contesting classes and the accumulating grievances. The build-up of 
tension, anger, anxiety and impatience for change was going to erupt 
at any moment when the circumstances were favourable and the right 
triggers were in place. The delay by the Legislative Assembly in passing the 
PCPR’s recommendation for reform was the last straw.
All the King’s men: The role of His Majesty’s 
Armed Forces
Where does HMAF fit into all these? Perhaps a brief discussion of the 
emergency powers of the military would throw more light on the state’s 
responses.
Despite the growing political tension and demands for greater democracy, 
HMAF (known as the Tongan Defence Force until 2013) was not 
deployed locally in the 1980s and 1990s during the formative years of 
the pro-democracy movement, although it might have been involved in 
secret surveillance operations and might have also developed strategies to 
protect the monarch in times of emergency. It was only during the riot in 
November 2006 that it was actively used and, even then, because of the 
time taken for the decision-making process for deployment to be reached 
(as we shall later discuss), there were delays and it was powerless to do 




Although Tongan soldiers served in World War I as members of the New 
Zealand Expeditionary Force, it was not until 1939, at the beginning of 
World War II, that the then Tongan Defence Force (TDF) came into 
existence. Tongan soldiers, trained by the New Zealand military, saw 
active service in Solomon Islands in 1943 at a time when American and 
New Zealand troops were also stationed on Tongatapu. The TDF was 
disbanded after the war and was reactivated in 1946, remaining for a long 
time a ceremonial military for the monarch.
Constitutionally, the King is the commander-in-chief of HMAF. That 
position gives him total authority over the security mechanism of the 
state. HMAF has been virtually an extension of the monarchy by acting 
as its ceremonial and coercive arm. Both Tupou V and Tupou VI, the 
current King, had military training, the former at Royal Military Academy 
Sandhurst in the UK and the latter at the US Naval War College. Their 
military training was symbolic of the close integration of the monarch, 
the state and the military. Tupou VI started as a naval officer in 1982, 
and rose to the rank of lieutenant commander in 1987. He commanded 
the naval vessel Pangai from 1990 to 1995 and later became military 
commander. During his term as commander, Tongan forces participated 
in the regional peace-keeping mission in Bougainville. He completed 
his military career in 1998 and was appointed minister for defence and 
minister for foreign affairs. He was later appointed prime minister on 3 
January 2000 until his sudden resignation on 11 February 2006 amid 
increasing pro-democracy protests.
Tongan soldiers were deployed as part of the regional peace-keeping force 
under the Regional Mission Assistance Mission (RAMSI) in Solomon 
Islands from 2004 to 2005. Tongan troops also joined the ‘coalition 
of the willing’ in Iraq from 2004 to 2008. They were also deployed 
in Afghanistan under a Royal Air Force regiment from February 2011 to 
April 2014.
The name His Majesty’s Armed Forces was conferred in September 2013, 
a politically symbolic move that subtly, yet clearly signalled where the 
control and loyalty of the armed forces must lie. This was ironic in a time 
of reform and the loosening of certain powers of the monarch in the 
affairs of the state. On the other hand, it might have been a deliberate act 
to consolidate the military’s accountability to the monarch at a time when 
the latter’s power was being threatened by greater democracy represented 
by an elected government. It appears that, more and more, as Tonga’s 
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political dynamics unfold in an uncertain direction, the monarchy is eager 
to protect its institutional interests and ultimately its perpetuity through 
reliance on HMAF. The new name signalled in an unambiguous way the 
close security alliance between the monarch and the military.
With a total of about 450 personnel, HMAF, whose official mission is 
to ‘defend the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Tonga’, consists of three 
operational command components and two support elements (logistics 
and training groups). It is partially supported by Australia, the United 
States, China, the United Kingdom, India and New Zealand through 
defence cooperation agreements. This security cooperation was activated 
after the Nuku’alofa riot and resulted in the deployment of New Zealand 
and Australian troops. The three major components, organised in a unified 
command system, are the regular force, the territorial force and the active 
reserve, and the three major units of the regular force are the land force, 
Her majesty’s Defence Force (HMDF) and the navy.
The governance and command structure of the force consists of a number 
of components, including HMAF Headquarters, Joint Force Headquarters, 
Territorial Forces, Land Force, Tonga Royal Guards, Tongan Navy, Royal 
Tongan Marines, Air Wing, Training Wing and Support Unit. In recent 
years, the HMAF has forged links with relevant international defence 
organisations for training and operations purposes. These include the 
Pacific Armies Management Seminar, Pacific Area Senior Officers Logistics 
Seminar, Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), International 
Hydrographic Organisation, South Pacific Hydrographic Commission, 
NATO Codification and the United Nations. These engagements and 
alliances have helped to expand and deepen Tonga’s security capability, 
both regionally and internally.
The Tonga Defence Service Act 1992 (Section 5 [1]) defines the roles 
of the HMAF as:
The defence of the Kingdom; the aid of the civil authorities in the 
maintenance of order in the Kingdom; the support of the civil 
authorities; and, those other functions and duties that His Majesty 
may from time to time determine.
Clearly there is provision for the military to act as an internal security 
mechanism in the ‘maintenance of order’. In fact Subsections 2  and  3 
endorse the use of force, which might even lead to death, if it is 
necessary in the circumstances, under ‘lawful orders’, as long as such an 
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order complies with international law (Government of Tonga, 1992). 
Furthermore, the Public Order Preservation Act 1988 (POP; Government 
of Tonga, 1988b), enacted four years earlier, provides the legal scenario 
for intervention of the  military in times of emergencies. There is an 
administrative and political process to be followed in the declaration of 
a ‘state of danger to public order’, starting with the determination by the 
prime minister through the advice of the minister of police or minister 
responsible for internal security whether, given the state of security, an 
emergency needs to be declared. This declaration is then submitted to the 
Privy Council, which will then make the final decision before it is gazetted 
and takes effect.
Sections 5–18 of the POP give wide-ranging powers to the police and 
HMAF, ranging from setting up roadblocks to arrest and use of lethal 
force. This is supplemented by the Emergency Powers Act 1959, which 
provides the King with emergency powers to make regulations:
Subject to the provisions of this Act, His Majesty in Council 
may in an emergency make such Regulations as appear to him 
to be necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the 
defence of the Kingdom, the maintenance of public order and 
for the maintaining of supplies and services essential to the life of 
the community. (Government of Tonga, 1988a: 5)
The emergency powers of the military and police were used to arrest 
suspected rioters and, by 17 January 2007, two months after the riots, 678 
people, ranging from nine to 70 years old and including 54 women, had 
been arrested and charged with offences relating to the violence (Senituli, 
2017). There were altogether 320 related prosecutions, accompanied 
by allegations of widespread brutality by the security forces. The state 
of emergency was renewed every 30 days, until it was eventually lifted 
in 2011.
One of the dilemmas of the HMAF is that, although, as an institution, 
it is controlled by the monarch, the individual soldiers of the rank and 
file are still closely linked to the community as members of the kainga. 
They are often torn between, on one hand, their professional loyalty 
to the Crown and, on the other, their obligation to their families and 
communities. Sometimes their own families and local communities might 
be supporters of the pro-democracy movement. To be caught in a situation 
where a soldier’s sense of commitment is being pulled by opposing forces 
can be a psychologically intimidating and unsettling experience. Hence 
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the strongest weapon that the HMAF has is not so much its praetorian 
militaristic strategy but its community engagement role as community 
peace-keepers. This is despite allegations of brutality by soldiers, which 
were denied by the military (Radio New Zealand, 2006c).
Competing narratives of security
The smoke had hardly cleared when the debate as to who was responsible 
for the violence started in earnest. There was a clear division of competing 
narratives between those who were part of the government and those who 
were not, with each group accusing the other of being responsible.
Writing in 2005, Lopeti Senituli, the then prime minister’s political 
adviser, said: ‘Political transitions are frequently occasions for violence; 
Tonga, however, has so far managed change and conflict with a notable 
lack  of violence’ (Senituli, 2005: 1). However, after the riot of 
16 November 2006, he forthrightly declared that an ‘attempted coup’ had 
taken place (Senituli, 2006: 1). On the other hand, Pohiva, the leading 
people’s representative in Parliament, referred to the same incident as 
a  ‘people’s  upheaval’ (Pohiva, 2007: 1). The language used by the two 
sides diverged considerably and represented their different positions in 
the political divide.
From his vantage point, Senituli, a former secretary of the pro-democracy 
movement who later joined the government as adviser to the prime 
minister, accused the pro-democracy supporters of attempting to 
overthrow the government, Fiji-style. He stated that the members of the 
pro-democracy PCPR must bear the full responsibility for the violence 
and deaths of 16 November and added that:
The People’s Representatives (and the PCPR’s) plan was to call for 
a ballot anyway, which they knew they would lose, which would 
then provide the people in Pangai Si’i with the excuse to storm 
the Legislative Assembly and inflict injury, if not death, on the 
Prime Minister and the Cabinet ministers, which would then be 
the justification for their Petition to His Majesty on the day after, 
to appoint a new Prime Minister and Cabinet. (I accidentally 
witnessed part of the preparation of this Petition on Wednesday, 
15 November by ‘Akilisi Pohiva, ‘Uliti Uata and Lepolo Taunisila 
at the Offices of the Legislative Assembly.) (Senituli, 2006: 20)
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This was disputed by Akilisi Pohiva, who argued that:
It was rather a people’s upheaval caused and consistently activated 
by suppressive and dictatorial measures and continuous refusal 
of government to listen and respond to people’s grievances over 
a  long period of time. The exercise of suppressive methods and 
delay tactics to avoid the vote on the people representatives’ 
proposals in the last session of Parliament for the year sparked 
people’s anger and discontent. (Pohiva, 2007: 1)
For Pohiva, the collective angry mood was beyond his control. Whether 
or not the PCPR leaders gave direct ‘orders’ to demonstrators to ‘attack’ 
is not clear, although Pohiva himself admitted that he was ‘in front of 
an angry mob that surrounded the Prime Minister’s office to stop them 
from attacking him and from invading the Cabinet room where the Prime 
Minister, and a few others, including the speaker of the House, remained’ 
(Pohiva, 2007: 1). An eyewitness and editor of Kele’a, the pro-democracy 
movement newspaper, Mateni Tapueluelu (Pohiva’s son-in-law, now 
a government minister), affirmed that rioters ‘were pro-democracy 
supporters, and some had been at a rally at which thousands of people 
demanded that a vote approving democratic reforms take place in the 
Legislative Assembly before the House rose for the year’. He added that 
‘they demanded that if the Government did not agree to political reform 
by 2008, they would do something—nobody knew what they meant’ 
(New Zealand Herald, 2006).
In a further response to Senituli’s suggestion that what happened was 
tantamount to a ‘coup’, as we saw earlier, Pohiva countered that ‘the crisis 
of November 16 was not a coup d’état’ because, if it was, ‘we would all 
have witnessed a totally different picture of the situation’ (Pohiva, 2007: 
1). If there was ‘a plan to harm the Prime Minister and other Ministers 
and/or even kill them … it could have come from a different group of 
people unknown to our committee’ (Pohiva, 2007: 2).
The NCPR was also blamed for undermining the power of the monarch 
and inciting the riot, but a member of the NCPR, Dr Ana Taufe’ulungaki, 
defended the committee by arguing that the recommendations of the 
committee were merely constitutional and not structural:
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In essence, there were no changes recommended to the existing 
political and social structures but there were recommendations for 
some shifts in the powers of the King and greater participation 
of the people in political decisions. The reforms would occur 
at the Constitutional level, not in the political system as such. 
(Taufe’ulungaki, 2006: 3)
This was disputed by Senituli, who argued:
The changes that the NCPR recommended amounted to the total 
overhaul of the constitution and of the country’s political system 
and turning a uniquely Tongan, and a  uniquely tripartite but 
unicameral Legislative Assembly into a bipartisan Westminster-
type Parliament and in the process disenfranchising His Majesty 
the King. (Senituli, 2006: 9)
For instance, one of the key recommendations was the increase in the 
people’s representation in the Legislative Assembly from nine to 17, while 
the number of noble representatives remained at nine, and the King lost 
his prerogative to select his nine representatives as well as the appointment 
of the Cabinet (NCPR, 2006).
Dr Taufe’ulungaki also blamed the pro-democracy movement for inciting 
the protesters during the build-up to 16 November:
The abusive language, charges of corruption, and threats, targeting 
Government leaders and the Royal Family, continued unabated in 
these public meetings. Their members also continued to protest 
and occupy Pangai Si’i, and held panel discussions almost every 
night on OBNTV, which was more of the same kind of content 
as their public meetings around Tongatapu. (Taufe’ulungaki, 
2006: 6–7)
The then director of the Friendly Islands Human Rights and Democracy 
Movement, ‘Akenete Lauti, a close associate of Pohiva, retorted that they 
advocated ‘non-violence’ but blamed the government for the riot (AIMC, 
2006). Both sides blamed each other for the violence and, understandably, 
no one was prepared to take responsibility. From the pro-democracy 
side, the blame lay squarely with the government for being too slow in 
responding to the people’s wishes, whereas, from the government side, the 
blame lay with the pro-democracy forces for deliberately instigating 
the violence to force regime change.
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Dr Sitiveni Halapua, the deputy chair and later chair of the NCPR, 
concurred with Pohiva that the prime minister should shoulder the blame 
for the crisis. Dr Halapua accused the government of not responding 
positively to the NCPR’s and the people’s proposals and instead tried to 
put forward its own counter proposals (New Zealand Herald, 2006).
In response to the spontaneous violence, the prime minister, under 
immense duress, convened a meeting with the nobles and people’s 
representatives in the hope of making some concessions to help quell 
public anger. He wrote in a letter:
A meeting was held between the Prime Minister, Nobles and the 
People’s Representatives today the 16th November 2006. They 
agreed to have the people elect 21 representatives and Nobles to 
elect 9 representatives commencing in 2008, and the total seats in 
Parliament will be 30. (Court of Appeal, 2009a: 16)
This agreement had little influence on stopping the wave of political anger, 
which had spilled onto the streets of Nuku’alofa. Perhaps the disturbances 
could have been avoided had the agreement been reached earlier.
Given their minority position in Parliament, PCPR deployed the strategy 
of using people power as political leverage. In his letter to the secretary 
general of the Pacific Islands Forum in Suva in July 2006 (four months 
before the riot), Pohiva wrote that the PCPR had devised a strategy of 
demonstrations and civil disobedience, which they planned to use until 
the Forum meeting, and added that:
Because the Tonga Government has been ignoring the will of its 
people for a considerable number of years, it now feels it can no 
longer ignore nor tolerate the continuation of the present despotic 
regime therefore would like to warn the Forum Secretariat 
that the demonstration cannot be guaranteed to be peaceful. 
(Pohiva, 2006: 1)
The warning to the Forum that ‘the demonstration cannot be guaranteed 
to be peaceful’ was a veiled threat to attract the attention of the regional 
organisation and the region generally to the lack of democracy in Tonga.
In a way, Pohiva claimed victory by the people. Although he did not 
have the numbers in the Legislative Assembly, his use of people power to 
pressure the government might have worked:
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The only chance lay with people outside Parliament. It was proved 
true when the Prime Minister was forced by pressure from the 
angry mob outside the Prime Minister’s building to agree to our 
proposals. Despite that, why did they want the people, our power 
base, to leave Pangai si’i and allow them, as the majority to win 
the game inside Parliament by default? We appealed to the people 
to come to Pangai si’i to show their support to our proposals and 
to demonstrate that we are the majority outside. And we had the 
right to do that. And ministers had nothing to worry about if they 
were willing to listen to the majority. (Pohiva, 2007: 1)
The PCPR’s strategy was quite clear. Tongan democracy was unfair and 
unjust, and provided little potential for the majority of the population 
to realise political transformation through Parliament. The only viable 
option they had was the use of extraparliamentary means; that is, as 
Pohiva argues, the use of ‘pressure from the angry mob’ to force Parliament 
‘to agree to our proposals’ (Pohiva, 2007: 2).
The contending security narratives shows the wide political divide in 
a culturally homogenous society. The riot had unleashed the genie 
of political grievances and social gripes that had been bottled up for 
decades. One of the positive consequences of the riots, as we have seen 
in this section, is that it forced the debates to become more rigorous and 
arrive at a conclusion quite fast. The government’s decision to engage in 
a lengthy process of deliberation to arrive at a consensus was not a very 
smart strategy in the circumstances. The post-riot debate was a time to 
reflect on where things went wrong and how the destruction could have 
been avoided. Whether the crisis constituted a coup or whether it was 
a ‘people’s upheaval’ or both, the government and pro-democracy forces 
both played a part in heightening the political tension, which eventually 
exploded into Tonga’s worst case of political violence in the modern era.
Fanning the fire of insecurity: The security 
symbolism of Si’i Park
Any discussion of the 16 November 2006 event must necessarily include 
an analysis of the significance of Pangai Si’i Park, which over the years 
had been used as ‘ground zero’, as it were, of agitation, mobilisation and 
activism. For the protesters, the park was strategically located because 
it was adjacent to the offices of the prime minister and the Ministry of 
Finance—two important symbols of state power.
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In the years leading to the 2006 riot, the park had become a symbol of 
protest, democracy and free expression in the political life of the kingdom. 
It was where the 2005 civil service strike was organised and for days became 
‘home’ to strikers and their supporters. Again, in 2006 it was the gathering 
centre of the pro-democracy supporters throughout the year. It was a hive 
of festivities, cultural performance and political mobilisation. For days 
before 16 November, it was where people converged, political banners were 
hung, political speeches made, prayers dedicated and a feeling of common 
bonds forged. It was a safe space where people could feel protected by the 
presence of other fellow pro-democracy supporters. It was also a source of 
information on what was happening and instructions on what needed to 
be done. It was where the pro-democracy identity was defined and vision 
articulated. There was a public appeal by the pro-democracy leaders for 
people to come to Pangai Si’i Park, which had acted as a kind of people’s 
alternative assembly, outside the parliamentary process. Pohiva stated:
To me it was part of the process of continuous events of the 
last 15–20 years. My role is to speak on behalf of the people. 
Government kept telling us that we didn’t have the support of the 
people. So we had to show the government we have the support of 
the people. We called them. Just to show that we have the support 
of the people. That’s why they said we didn’t have the support. 
So we appeared on TV and appealed to people to come to Pangai 
Si’i to show support. We had come to a point in Parliament where 
we were asking people to support us … during the Parliament’s 
discussions, just to show support. (Fonua, 2006: 1)
Loudspeakers were directed at Parliament to drown out proceedings. 
On 7 November, for instance, Parliament had to stop its session for the 
day as a result of abusive language and threats emanating from Pangai Si’i. 
A parliamentary subcommittee was set up to look into the matter, and it 
was decided to shift the speakers to the far end of the park.
The fiery speeches leading up to the riot would have nurtured an 
atmosphere of collective anger and anticipation of collective action, 
as reported in Tonga Now:
During the daily Pangai Sii protest, people were led to believe 
that everything was going to be held peacefully and in accordance 
with the law. However, if you analyse the events of the last two 
weeks—you will find that the rhetoric and abusive words used 
at Pangai Si’i was increasing on a daily basis and up to a point 
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where supporters were swearing in the open though this was very 
disrespectful. Many prominent individuals as well as People’s 
Representatives were on-hand to cheer and urge the speakers on.
Pangia Si’i was where the people’s parliamentary representatives generated 
legitimacy and support and the base from which they consulted the people 
as they engaged in talks with Parliament and the government. In a speech 
captured on film on 16 November, before the riot, Mr Pohiva said:
Before we return to Parliament and pass onto the chair and the 
nobles the things that we want and the things we are waiting for, 
I want the news media of Tonga today to tell the world the truth. 
The will of the people is here in Pangai Si’i today. My ministers, 
we have visited all the villages and have had meetings. How many 
Misi? Thirty-four meetings. And we have spread this issue to the 
people of this country … We are not going to change our minds. 
We represent 98 per cent of the population.
The collective synergy, group dynamics and political solidarity that the 
Pangai Si’i environment created was to have a very powerful impact 
on crowd behaviour during the day. The ‘route’ of the riot began and 
ended at Pangai Si’i. A film of the riot showed many who were at Pangai 
Si’i being involved in the riot and then returning to Pangai Si’i later. 
The park symbolised resistance, democratisation, transformation and 
indeed security. It is now part of Tonga’s security narrative. Some of the 
sentiments fermented at Pangai Si’i could be seen around Nuku’aloka in 
the form of graffiti such as: ‘The nu face of youth rebellion’, ‘Revolutionary 
not  evolutionary’, ‘Freedomfighter’, ‘Fight the Power’, ‘Democracy not 
Hypocrisy’, ‘You had it coming’ and ‘F … Prime Minister’.
Tongan masculinity and security
Like any other political organisation with an overtly transformative 
agenda, the pro-democracy movement consisted of diverse individuals 
and subgroups with different political positions relating to strategies for 
change. By and large the movement, under the leadership and ideological 
direction of Pohiva, advocated peaceful reform. However, there was 
a very small minority who advocated extremist methods in the form of 
violence. While researching the pro-democracy movement in Tonga, 
I encountered rumblings about the potential for deliberate use of violence 
to bring about change. For instance, in 1994, a Tongan scholar (name 
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withheld), now residing in Australia, talked of the possibility of Tongans 
who were Vietnam War veterans being mobilised to carry out a Fiji-style 
coup.14 During a public lecture on Tongan pro-democracy in 2002, 
which I chaired at The Australian National University in Canberra, where 
I worked, the same pro-democracy supporter expressed his desire to see 
the monarchy totally eradicated. Discussions in some of the international 
Tongan blogs also raised similar sentiments. The use of military-style 
violence might have been based on speculation; however, given the 
experiences of some countries where foreign mercenaries have been used 
to topple governments, there was reason to take note of its seriousness 
at the time.
The second violent option was spontaneous public expression of anger. 
This was always seen as an alternative in the minds of some pro-democracy 
campaigners, and this was often used as a warning to those resisting 
change. Speeches by pro-democracy leaders have often included threats 
of possible violence if demands were not met.
Culturally, Tongans have profound respect for authority and community 
values, a factor that provides political restraint and mitigates against the 
potential for violence. However, the threshold for violent action had been 
lowered considerably by the increasing grievances and anger of the people, 
the national campaign for democracy through the media, village meetings 
and international and public campaigns over a period of more than two 
decades by the pro-democracy movement.
While the pro-democracy leaders did not explicitly preach about violence, 
the tense environment and the interpretation of speeches in this politically 
charged atmosphere made violence almost imperative. At the same time, 
there were also elements of masculinity, which found expression in the 
politically volatile situation. Within the Tongan framing of masculinity, 
the image of the warrior (to’a) personality features strongly. This is often 
represented in traditional mythology, songs and male dances (kailao). 
A version of warrior dancing (sipi tau) is now being used as a ‘pre-war’ 
psyching challenge before an international rugby match. Tongans pride 
themselves on being natural warriors whose ancestors defeated their Fijian 
14  The Fiji coup in 1987 redefined new parameters for extralegal options for political change in 
the Pacific. It provided inspiration for some Maori activists, and in the 1990s some Tongans I spoke 
to showed enthusiasm about a similar coup in Tonga. These were based more on speculative thinking 
rather than serious political strategising.
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and Samoan neighbours in fierce battles of the past.15 This masculine 
identity is often masked by the Tongans’ calm and humorous disposition. 
However, when threatened, the Tongan spirit of to’a can be manifested in 
the form of threats or sometimes violent behaviour.
This expression of masculinity was very much identifiable in the fiery 
speeches and challenges to the government by the pro-democracy leaders 
during village gatherings and at Pangai Si’i. Moreover, the occasional 
festive environment at Pangai Si’i kept the peace for a certain period 
before the riot began. This is not to say that the to’a sprit caused the riot. 
Rather, the to’a spirit might have provided some psychological boost to 
the male participants in the riot. Having said this, it is important to note 
that Tongan culture has a powerful peace-building mechanism where 
anger and conflict can be easily mitigated through traditional forms of 
reconciliation. This became obvious after the riot as the reconciliation 
process started.
Hence, despite the appeal for peaceful orderly demonstrations, pro-
democracy leaders were fully aware that beneath the veneer of a Christian 
and law-abiding friendly citizen was a proud Tongan warrior ready to 
defend his honour when his human and political rights were trampled 
on. All that was needed was the right political environment, appropriate 
political psyching and a trigger, before an explosion took place. Most of 
those involved in the riots were males, although some females were also 
seen participating.
Individual criminality or collective political 
action: Implications for security
It has been argued that the riots of 16 November 2006 in Tonga need 
to be understood in relation to the criminal behaviour of the individual 
rioters rather than the political context. Campbell (2012: 20) contends 
that the ‘arson was the work of criminal elements separate from the larger 
political events going on around them’. This argument was used in a court 
case involving insurance payout to a number of businesses that were burnt 
during the riots. How valid is Campbell’s position?




Over the years, sociologists studying crowd psychology have shifted the 
focus of their work from the classical psychological reductionist approach 
(CPR) to the sociocontextual approach. CPR, first advocated by French 
sociologist Gastave Le Bon (1895), argued that in a situation of crowd 
conflict, people must be seen as individualised, irrational and regressive 
beings acting robotically without any coherent thinking. This approach has 
been criticised for being too mechanical and simplistic because it reduces 
rioters to thoughtless packs of potentially destructive beings inspired by 
primordial (or inborn) and irrational criminal urges. It portrays rioters as 
unrelated and autonomous individuals driven by self-gratifying instincts 
(Waddington & King, 2005). These explanations do not stand up to the 
results of sociological research on human behaviour and crowd psychology 
over the years.
Sociologists now accept the sociocontextual approach as the most 
appropriate way to understand the complex nature and dynamics of 
crowd behaviour and individual responses in a situation of conflict and 
riot. The  importance of the political context, collective social identity 
and  the role of beliefs and ideologies are crucial in shaping  crowd 
behaviour.  A  leading British and world expert on street riots and 
crowd behaviour, Professor Steven Reicher, wrote:
Indeed, understanding social identity is the key to understanding 
crowds and how to deal with them. It is not simply that social 
identity shapes the values and standards on which we act, it also 
determines, amongst other things, who can influence us and how, 
the nature of our goals and priorities, how we view others and 
interpret their behavior, and, more specifically, the conditions 
under which we enter into conflict with others. (Reicher et al., 
2004: 556)
Reicher developed the now widely used Elaborated Social Identity Model 
of crowd psychology and conflict as a result of years of careful research into 
riots in British cities and other parts of the world. This approach is now 
widely used by police forces around the world as a guide to riot control. 
The approach concluded that, in the context of British riots, participants 
shared common social attributes and definitions of themselves and others: 
(a) they unanimously considered themselves exploited and impoverished 
by the government and financial institutions, and perceived themselves 
as victims of regular police discrimination; (b) they suffered constant 
humiliation due to their dependency on the welfare system; (c) they were 
resentful of local retailers who were taking advantage of low local rental 
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costs but whose goods were not affordable to the community; and (d) they 
felt that they had lost the capacity to exert any control over community 
matters (Waddington & King, 2005: 496).
The above assessment sounds uncannily similar to the Nuku’alofa 
situation  on 16 November 2006. The Nuku’alofa rioters shared 
some common immediate goals: (a) a collective desire for reform, 
(b)  a  guarantee  that reform be visible and real, and (c) that reform be 
prompt. There were broader shared attributes as well: (a) they collectively 
saw themselves as exploited, poor, commoner Tongans; (b) they were 
resentful of nepotism, corruption and business monopolies by royals; 
(c) they were resentful of government allowing foreign entrepreneurs to 
operate locally at the cost of Tongan business; (d) given their politically 
disadvantaged position  in a highly rigid feudal-type sociopolitical 
hierarchy dominated by the privileged few, they felt a sense of alienation, 
powerlessness and lack of control over their future and the future of their 
children; and (e) given the lack of meaningful reform after more than 
20 years of demands for change, many were beginning to lose patience. 
These shared attributes provided the potentially explosive cocktail for 
spontaneous collective action.
Sociologically, the broader and specific contexts of riots have to be 
understood because human beings do not behave responsively in a vacuum 
but in a cultural, social or political context.
While the political and cultural contexts of riots differ from society to 
society, the group dynamics and the way they shape people’s behaviour 
and the outcome of the violence have similar characteristics. The analyses 
of the situation by eyewitnesses from both sides of the political divide 
(Senituli and Pohiva for instance), despite disagreement as to who was 
responsible, agree that collective identification with the political cause of 
reform spawned the wave of grievances that reached a flashpoint leading 
to the riot.
Sociologists and social psychologists doing research on crowd psychology 
will reject in no uncertain terms the assumption that individual criminal 
intent led to or inspired the Nuku’alofa riot. In fact there is no prima facie 
evidence from research carried out on crowd riots around the world in 
recent times to suggest this conclusion. While there would be individuals 
joining in to be part of the crowd, the common goal is the overriding 
factor. As Reicher (2008) argues, the driving force, the momentum of the 
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crowd and even the targets of the riots often become part of the collective 
synergy and identity. While it might appear that certain individuals are 
acting on their own, they are still part of the group, and their behaviour 
is shaped by what sociologists refer to as ‘group dynamics’, defined as 
the roles, relationships, collective goals, collective identity, collective 
expectations and behaviour of people in a  group (Pettigrew & Tropp, 
2006). If you remove the situation of group dynamics, then individuals 
would not be rioting publicly on their own as they did in Nuku’alofa.
Although the riot itself appeared to be spontaneous, the build-up took 
years of political resentment and anger. The expressions of political 
grievances spanning almost two decades of demand for political reform 
had reached a flashpoint, which inevitably manifested itself in the form of 
the riot. This was a case of political expression overriding communal and 
cultural ethos, which revolved around the community and kainga (family). 
The autocratic rule of the monarch, the widely publicised corruption, the 
violation of human rights and free speech and the increase in poverty 
and inequality nurtured widespread dissatisfaction over time and changed 
people’s perception of and attitude to authority.
The riot needs to be understood in the context of a number of factors, 
including the broader political climate of demand for reform over a period 
of almost two decades; the extensive campaign by the pro-democracy 
movement in mobilising people’s opinions, sentiments and anger through 
the media and village meetings weeks before 16 November; the way the 
campaign became intensified as people converged on Panagai Si’i Park 
days before the riot and on the day of the riot; and the perceived ‘delay’ in 
adopting the pro-democracy proposal for constitutional change.
The constitutional reform process had heightened expectations as people 
realised that it was the only option for political reform available to them. 
This high expectation, built up by months of country-wide mobilisation 
of opinion through village meetings, media hype and fiery speeches at 
Pangai Si’i, provided a politically combustible condition for crowd 
psychology. Although the law was broken and there were sporadic acts 
of criminality, the wider mobilising and motivating force was political.
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Socioeconomic deprivation: A future 
security threat?
One of the major threats to the future security of Tonga is growing 
poverty, inequality and lack of opportunity. Although political reform has 
always been highlighted as being of the utmost importance, economic 
reform is equally significant. The monarchy might have relinquished some 
political power, but its control over wealth and resources such as land will 
continue to be problematic and might cause even more friction in the 
future as people’s expectations grow rapidly as a result of globalisation in 
the context of retarded socioeconomic development.
The deprived economic situation of ordinary Tongans fed into the swelling 
vortex of grievances that fuelled the riot. The inequality between the 
monarch and the nobles on the one hand and the ordinary people on the 
other was made worse by the monarchy’s monopoly of some major national 
business operations such as power, airlines and geostationary satellite slots.16 
Many Tongans relied on remittances from their relatives working overseas, 
but this source of income was badly affected by the global economic crisis 
in 2008.17
The GDP per capita for Tonga in 2004–05, the period leading up to 
the riot, was US$2,350. Comparatively, around the same period, close 
neighbour Samoa had a GDP per capita of US$5,125. The growth rate 
for Tonga in the 20 years between 1990 and 2010 was 1.6 per  cent, 
compared to Samoa’s 3 per cent. The 2009 Tonga Household Income 
and Expenditure  Survey showed that absolute poverty in Tonga 
increased from 2.8 per cent in 2001 to 3.1 per cent in 2009 and that the 
proportion of people living below the basic needs poverty line jumped 
from 16.2 per cent in 2001 to 22.5 per cent of the population in 2009 
(Government of Tonga, 2010b). The United Nations Millennium 
16  The distinction between property and wealth belonging to the state and those belonging to the 
royal family personally has not been very clear. This was brought out into the open when the late King 
tried to sell a property in Auckland. The controversial sale led to a debate between royal ownership 
and people/state ownership. The lack of clear distinction between the state and the monarch’s assets 
and the behaviour of members of the royal family using state resources and privileges for family 
business has been a major concern of the pro-democracy advocates.
17  The global crisis led to a reduction in remittances, and Tonga’s membership of the WTO 
undermined local business as well as depriving the government of income worth millions of dollars. 
These factors have contributed to increased poverty.
COnTESTEd TERRAIn 
200
Development Goal Report states that more than 3,000 Tongans live in 
‘absolute poverty’ or ‘food poverty’—having less than T$24.12 per person 
per week (UN, 2010).
There was an increase in the Poverty Gap Index (the average gap between 
poor people’s standard of living and the basic needs poverty line) from 
4.4 in 2001 to 6.3 in 2009. Poverty in the outer islands almost doubled 
from 11.8 per cent of the population in 2001 to 22.9 per cent in 2009. 
The very low growth in Tonga’s economy (0.9 per cent in 2009 and 
1.2 per cent in 2010) compares unfavourably with 3.9 per cent in growth 
for the rest of the Pacific.
The lack of socioeconomic opportunities is a major factor for migration 
of Tongans to New Zealand, Australia and the United States. Although 
Tonga had for a number of years achieved a high Human Development 
Index, it was more an indication of the level of universal access to education 
and life expectancy supported by subsistence farming and kinship support 
systems than a measure of disposable income and wealth in the country. 
Economic production and investment in Tonga has been low, and many 
people have had to rely on the subsistence economy for sustenance. 
What kept the economy going was remittances from overseas, but even 
this source declined over the years as a result of the 2008 global financial 
crisis. The growing business of a few elites, including members of the 
royal family and foreigners, made the disparity more obvious, and this was 
a cause of resentment. The targeted burning of some shops reflected that 
anger. Political discourse and action became a means by which economic 
grievances were articulated.
Frustrations emanating from socioeconomic conditions were exacerbated 
by the visible inequality manifested by the opulent lifestyle of royalty 
and nobles. Over the years, the increase in the number of European, 
Chinese and Indian business immigrants has added to the socioeconomic 
grievances of locals, and this was expressed in a violent way during the 
riot, when Chinese shops were burnt and looted.18
18  Anti-foreigner feelings were also aimed at the government for allowing Tonga to be flooded with 
foreign entrepreneurs with whom local Tongan shopkeepers and businessmen could not compete.
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Unfinished revolution? Implications of the 
riot for Tonga’s security
Have reforms in Tonga been sufficient to ensure the sustainability of 
Tonga’s  security in the future? Was November 2006 an unfinished 
revolution that has not completed the process of democratisation? 
A starting point is to examine more carefully the statement by Tupou V, the 
reformist monarch, who, as we saw earlier, categorically stated: ‘Officially, 
the sovereign’s powers remain unchanged. Because we are a monarchy, we 
have a unity of power as opposed to a separation of power.’ The notion of 
‘unity of power’ is another way of articulating the subservience of all state 
institutions under the supreme authority of the monarch.
One of the changes is that, instead of exercising his power ‘at will’, the 
monarch would rely on the advice of the prime minister or the law lords. 
Despite this public declaration, the monarch still retains veto powers 
over bills adopted by the Legislative Assembly. The first test of the new 
doctrine was in relation to the adoption, by a vote of 10 to eight, of 
the Arms and Ammunition (Amendment) Bill in October 2012, which 
aimed to reduce criminal sentences for illicit possession of firearms. 
Members of the government, including the prime minister, voted for 
the Bill in support of two government members who had been charged 
under the law. The Opposition was incensed with what they saw as 
political nepotism and conflict of interest, and asked the King to veto 
the decision of the Legislative Assembly. The King agreed and vetoed 
the Bill. Although ethically it could be argued that the King might have 
made the right decision in vetoing a highly questionable bill, the broader 
principle relating to the exercise of veto power by the monarch could be 
problematic in future.
Although commoners now have 17 representatives in Parliament, this 
expression of democratic representation is still overshadowed by the 
uncontested supreme power of the monarch. As demonstrated during 
the 2010 election, the reform did not guarantee a functional democratic 
process whereby all members of the Legislative Assembly are elected 
through popular votes. The 33 nobles are still represented by nine 
members and 40,736 voters are represented by a mere 17 members. This 
is a startling contrast of seat-to-voter ratio of 1:2,396 as opposed to 1:4 
for the nobles. The reform has simply brought down the people’s seat-to-
voter ratio from 1:4,526, a reduction of almost 50 per cent.
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However, despite the changes in favour of the people’s representatives, 
the nobles still hold the balance of power and, as we saw during the 2010 
election, they can leverage their position to return to power and maintain 
the status quo. The role of the independents is also critical in shifting the 
balance of power, as we saw in the last two elections. The shift in the centre 
of political gravity from the nobles after the 2010 election to Pohiva’s 
pro-democracy group after the 2014 election signifies a see-saw tendency, 
which could become a permanent feature of Tongan politics. If at some 
point the nobles are able to claw their way back into power and maintain 
their rule, there might be counter-reaction by the new generation, who 
would feel that their high expectations and hopes for democratisation 
had been dashed by the self-serving nobles. This is a long-term security 
dilemma for Tonga.
At the same time, what holds the pro-democracy group together is the 
charisma and leadership skills of Pohiva, who is now sickly and frail. 
When he steps down, the political dynamics will change quickly. Because 
his son, who has been groomed as his successor, might not have the same 
charisma, there is bound to be a leadership struggle, and there will no 
doubt be casualties. This will probably divide the pro-democracy group 
further and thus make Tongan politics more unstable. Pohiva’s rule as 
prime minister has been a challenge because of lack of policy experience, 
inability to maintain a coherent stance and pressures from the nobles to 
undermine his rule. The suspension of Parliament in August 2017 shows 
that the democratic transformation is far from over.
Another major security issue is the role of the military. The military is 
directly under the control of the monarch and, as in Thailand, it can be 
used against an ‘unwanted’ government. This might sound far-fetched, 
but any attempt to weaken the real power of the monarch into mere titular 
authority, such as in Britain, through large-scale reform, could provoke 
stiff resistance from the nobles and monarch; and the military could 
be used either to directly suppress any disturbance or even to remove 
a government bent on neutralising the power of the monarch.
The dilemma for Tonga is that on the one hand the unfinished revolution 
provides a breathing space and hope, but it also raises expectations that 
could unfold into a 16 November-type scenario if expectations are not 
fulfilled. On the other hand, attempts to execute a ‘complete’ change have 
the potential to invoke the wrath of the ruling classes, as we have seen 
in the King’s intervention to suspend Parliament on the pretext that the 
government under Pohiva was trying to undermine the King’s power.
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Conclusion
Although Tonga was never formally colonised, the British influence 
was similar to other colonies. The political structure, economic system 
and class structure are very much reflective of postcolonial realities. The 
history and sociology of conflict in Tonga might not be as complex as that 
of Fiji, but it is unique in the sense that is shows a classical intracommunal 
class tension in a way that has not been seen in the Pacific. Tonga’s rigid 
class structure, consisting of the monarch, nobles and commoners, had 
been sustained and reproduced through Christianity, the constitution, 
education, political hegemony, cultural loyalty and social mythology. 
The contradictions began to unravel as subaltern social class forces 
began to exert their demands. As commoners attempted to express their 
grievances as a subaltern group, the establishment was not in a position 
to accommodate their demands by instituting necessary changes. It was 
really after George Tupou V came to the throne that reforms began in 
earnest. The reforms gave the pro-democracy movement an added political 
thrust and heightened people’s expectations of greater things to come. 
The high expectations and rising tension, coupled with the slow pace of 
reform, triggered the riot. The violence, although politically driven, also 
became an opportunity for unemployed, disgruntled young people and 
poor sections of the community to vent their anger and appropriate goods 
from burning shops.
The violence, the worst in Tonga’s contemporary history, redefined 
Tonga’s historical trajectory in an unprecedented way. It showed how 
formal state authority and hegemony, which had been the cornerstone 
of Tongan ‘stability’, could easily be usurped by collective expressions of 
power by the people. Resorting to violence is often an unstated option in 
situations of political contestation and, as in the case of Tonga, it became 
a latent result of the ongoing power struggle between the people and the 
establishment. Often, as in the case of Fiji’s first coup in 1987, the first 
case of extralegal violence sometimes opens the floodgate, as extra-violence 
becomes a recognised option in regime change when legal mechanisms are 
seen as ineffective. The possibility of further political violence resurfacing 
in Tonga will depend on the right circumstances and triggers occurring. 
As poverty and inequality increases and as economic and political reforms 
stall amid high expectations and repressed grievances, a repetition of 
16 November is not impossible.
COnTESTEd TERRAIn 
204
The role of the Tongan military will increasingly become important in 
future as the vanguard of Tonga’s security. Although it was largely ineffective 
during the 2006 riot, its symbolic presence and the rearticulation of its 
role might help to consolidate the state’s capacity to respond to national 
emergencies. The expansion of the military coincided with the rise and 
expansion of the pro-democracy movement. The fact that the military 
is directly under the control of the monarch creates an ironic situation 
akin to Thailand, where the government can be constantly threatened by 
a military it does not control.
Nevertheless, perhaps the most powerful forces that have kept the peace 
in Tonga are religion and culture, which in everyday life are inseparably 
tied together. Tongan communal life is resilient and adaptive and, despite 
the violence, relationships have normalised as people have moved on as 
they embrace the future. However, the ghosts of 16 November 2006 have 
not completely disappeared, and there is constant fear that history might 
return for another eerie visit. In a country where human security factors 
like socioeconomic difficulties are prevalent, and where the hegemonic 
role of the monarch and lords still dominate political power and wealth, 
this is not a remote possibility.
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Longing for peace: 
Transformation of 
the Solomon Islands 
security environment
An eye for an eye only ends up making the whole world blind.
Mahatma Gandhi
The formal termination of the mandate of the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) on 30 June 2017 marked the 
end of a significant phase in the Solomon Islands peace-building and 
rehabilitation process, although it did not necessarily mean the ‘end’ of 
conflict itself and the ‘beginning’ of long-term peace. This is because some 
of the fundamental issues emanating from an interplay between identity, 
land dispute, poverty and inequality, intercommunal perception, political 
governance, corruption and behaviour of political elites, which contributed 
to nurturing the tension in the first place, are still shimmering. This was 
perhaps one of the factors that inspired the security treaty of 14 August 
2017 between Australia and Solomon Islands, which would enable the 
rapid deployment of Australian security forces in case of civil unrest 
(Batley, 2017). This in itself is symbolic of a shared feeling of caution (just 
in case) and trepidation by the two sides on the potential sustainability of 
the post-RAMSI security environment. This chapter explores some of the 
factors that shaped the evolving security climate in Solomon Islands and 
the effectiveness of RAMSI as a security response mechanism.
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The security environment—and indeed the conflict in Solomon Islands—
was different from the case studies of Fiji and Tonga (in Chapters 4 and 5, 
respectively) because of a number of historical and sociopolitical factors. 
The tension in Fiji revolved around a diaspora group and the indigenous 
community and the way these groups interplayed with economic, 
cultural and political factors, whereas in Tonga, the tension was largely 
been two social classes. In Solomon Islands, the tension was between two 
indigenous groups whose respective histories were connected to political, 
socioeconomic and cultural developments that over time led to conflict. 
These differences make these case studies historically unique in their own 
ways, a salient aspect that one needs to take into consideration while 
doing comparative analysis.
The conflict in Solomon Islands from 1999 to 2001 was complex, with 
multiple dimensions—local, national, regional and international—and 
had a profound impact on the country, whose population numbers 
about half a million people. It transformed a largely subsistence society 
in a significant way and left scars, which have been the subject of peace-
building efforts. Attempts to address the conflict in Solomon Islands 
took various forms, ranging from community-based reconciliation 
predicated on indigenous notions of balance and harmony to external 
intervention in the form of RAMSI. There were other formal initiatives, 
such as the Townsville Peace Agreement and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, as well as peace projects, which consisted of shades of 
customary and introduced peace-building mechanisms, which some 
have referred to as ‘hybrid’ (Clements et al., 2007). Although their 
strategic focus, ideological assumptions and methodological tools were 
different, they were, by and large, preoccupied with creating a stable and 
peaceful society.
One of the interesting challenges in the debates around the Solomon 
Islands conflict is the contending theoretical positions held by different 
authors, based largely on different interpretations of historical events, 
trends and changes. This is nothing new in the study of conflicts in 
which the complex interplay between ethnicity, class, power, resources 
and culture can be overwhelming for observers and researchers. In the 
face of such complexity, some are compelled to emphasise certain aspects 
that they feel intellectually competent and comfortable to deal with. One 
of the approaches that has been dominant in debates on the conflict in 
Solomon Islands was the ‘failed state’ and ‘arc of instability’ discourse, 
discussed in Chapter 2.
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Solomon Islands is often depicted as possessing unsophisticated cultures, 
norms and structures. Frequently accompanied by doses of social 
Darwinism and racism, such a view does more to obfuscate than enlighten 
us as to the trends of history, realities of society and dynamics of conflict. 
On the other hand, the increasingly popular hybrid discourse, which is 
meant to be a counter to the deficit approach, provides an overly simplistic 
assumption about the complexity of cultural engagements (Richmond, 
2011; Wallis, Jeffery & Kent, 2015). It is assumed by advocates of the 
hybrid approach that cultures create an instant ‘mix’ when they come 
together. Contrary to this simplistic framework, the sociological reality 
is far more complex; the encounter between two different cultural forces 
involves a spontaneous process of accommodation, resistance/opposition, 
synthesis and coexistence, rather than just creating a new hybrid.
This chapter moves away from the deficit and hybrid approaches and 
instead focuses on the broader dialectics between the colonial economic 
and political systems and the local cultures and people, and examines 
some of the resulting contradictions that articulated themselves during 
the colonial and postcolonial periods in the context of postcolonial 
theory. The argument made here is that, to understand the Solomon 
Islands conflict of 1999 to 2001 better, one needs to use postcolonial 
lenses to capture some of the dynamics of the colonial state: human 
relationships, including the development policies that led to internal 
labour migration; the shabby and ineffective governance structure; 
the paternalistic attitude of the British; the issues of land and lack of 
autonomy; and participation of local cultural groups. These issues were 
firmly entrenched in the structural and normative life of the country and 
spilled over into the postcolonial period and fermented conditions for 
the conflicts. The grievances and conditions for conflict built up over 
time, and, although there were accommodating factors such as kinship, 
religion, intermarriage and the wantok ideology,1 which moderated the 
rising tension, other external factors, such as the demands of the market 
economy for the commodification of land and employment, and rising 
poverty, inequality and economic marginalisation, intensified the tension 
and eventually sparked the conflict. Solomon Islands is a classic example 
of the way in which the denial and lack of human security among certain 
1  Wantok, a pidgin term that literally means ‘one language’, refers to common identity, common 
origin and shared culture.
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parts of the population has led to conflict. The approach here will weave 
together postcolonial, securitisation and human security approaches to 
understand some of the complex issues relating to conflict.
Genesis and transformation
Settled about 30,000 years ago, Solomon Islands was, apart from the 
island of New Guinea and other surrounding archipelagos, the earliest 
inhabited place in the South Pacific. A culturally diverse society with 
around 86 languages, the population of the Solomon Islands consisted 
of independent kinship-based communities operating within defined 
localities (Bennett, 2002). Beyond the local social boundaries, interisland 
and intertribal trade enabled the exchange and circulation of goods while 
maintaining social networks and peaceful relationships. Although there 
were inter- and intra-tribal skirmishes, these were mostly localised and 
were due to disputes over territory, resources, women, relationships and 
other factors. Culture-based conflict mitigation and resolution systems 
were in place to maintain a sense of balance, continuity and perpetuity of 
peaceful and stable relations. Community life revolved around kinship and 
division of labour, based on gender and age, with females involved largely 
with looking after the domestic duties and gardening while males were 
engaged in more ‘prestigious’ political matters such as decision-making, 
as well as ‘masculine’ activities such as hunting and acting as protectors 
of the family and community. Although, in many communities, land was 
allocated through matrilineal lines, political power still rested largely with 
older men (Bennett, 1987).
Trading in the form of barter and the use of traditional currency such as 
shell money took place between islands, and intermarriage consolidated 
relationships and created alliances between island tribes (Naitoro, 2000). 
Loyalty and identity revolved around localised kinship groups, and there 
was a clear distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, although the line 
of demarcation shifted as a result of intermarriage and greater integration 
with neighbouring and faraway communities. The identity boundary 
was maintained and guarded through constant intra- and inter-tribal 
negotiation, war or sorcery, and the practice of compensation was a way 
of restoring balance and goodwill between groups and individuals. Social 
relations and identities were defined at both the social and cosmological 
levels, in which people and spiritual existence were intricately linked. 
In his study of the Kwara’ae people, Ben Burt observed that:
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This dialectic is quite transparent in the way the Kwara’ae created 
relationships of authority and power, extended beyond the living 
to include the dead. Through these relationships, their society 
participated in a cosmic order of religious power which provided 
a religious legitimation of the social order by transcending and 
denying its human construction. (Burt, 2001: 2)
Land, which later became a central issue in the tension in Solomon 
Islands, was part of the broader kinship and cosmological relationship that 
connected individuals and defined collective identity and relationships. 
This played out in different ways in different localities. For instance, in 
Morovo, rights to fishing, planting and access to land for various purposes 
depended on their claim to access through recognised consanguineal 
and affinal ties with tribal groups that controlled the land (Hviding & 
Baines, 1994).
Christianity later transformed this relationship through imposition of 
a highly structured and globalised organisation, characterised by a new 
set of morals and a new eschatological paradigm, which, just as before, 
put humans at a lower level of the cosmic order below the revered deity. 
Christianity attempted to undermine the traditional cosmic world and 
in the process also created conditions for the emergence of new forms of 
resistance as locals attempted to articulate their identities in a changing 
environment. However, at the same time, aspects of Christianity were 
indigenised and incorporated into the local culture and vice versa. As in 
other parts of the Pacific such as Fiji and Tonga, the distinction between 
customary ways and the Christian ethos became blurred as the two systems 
morphed into each other. As we shall see later, the Christian notion of 
peace was later incorporated into the local peace-building approaches to 
address future conflicts (Brown, 2004).
Even before the missionaries arrived, some of the early contact with 
Europeans in the form of whalers, shell and bêche-de-mer collectors and 
beachcombers had made their mark on hitherto autonomous communities. 
There was a series of contacts with Europeans, some substantive and some 
minimal. There was a period of 325 years between the first contact with 
Europeans in the form of the Spanish explorer Alvaro de Mendana de 
Neira in 1568, and the start of British annexation. The British annexed 
the South Solomons (Guadalcanal, Savo, Malaita, San Cristobal, the New 
Georgia group) in 1893, the Santa Cruz group in 1898 and 1899, and 
the Shortlands group (Santa Isabel, Choiseul and Ontong Java) in 1900. 
COnTESTEd TERRAIn 
210
They decided to take over Solomon Islands not for economic gain but for 
strategic reasons: to keep German influence, now entrenched in nearby 
New Guinea, at bay.
The forced recruitment of labour, through what came to be known as 
‘blackbirding’, had started in 1870, about two decades before British 
annexation, and many Solomon Islanders, together with some workers 
from Vanuatu and New Caledonia, were sent to Fiji, Queensland and 
Samoa as plantation labourers (Corris, 1970). This was probably the first 
large-scale and permanent encounter between many local communities 
and global capitalism and was probably the single most transformative 
external force for Solomon Islands, aside from Christianity and 
colonialism.
The Malaitans were the most widely recruited group during the labour 
trade, with a total of 14,335 involved in contracts to Queensland and 
Fiji between the 1870s and 1911 and 35,596 contracts internally in 
Solomon Islands between 1913 and 1940. While this labour system was 
exacting and exploitative, it also allowed for voluntary labour and some 
workers willingly embraced it, as they valued the European goods they 
were given as part of their payment. Guns, especially, were highly valued, 
since they were effective in subduing competing tribes and chiefs in local 
disputes and helped to expand the power and influence of some chiefs. 
Internal labour migration, especially involving Malaitans in Guadalcanal, 
was encouraged and supervised by the colonial administration, and 
contributed to tension over land in later years. Malaitans mostly worked 
as contract labourers on copra plantations, the most important source 
of revenue for the protectorate.
Breeding insecurity: Half-hearted British 
colonial hegemony
Solomon Islands was not a full-fledged British colony but a protectorate 
under supervision from Fiji, the only British Crown colony in the Pacific 
Islands. The governor of Fiji also acted as high commissioner for the 
western Pacific and oversaw other Pacific protectorates such as Solomon 
Islands, Vanuatu (a condominium with France), Tonga (a British 
protected state since 1900), Tuvalu and Kiribati (Scarr, 1968). The local 
Solomon Islands representative, called the resident commissioner, looked 
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after the day-to-day operation of the protectorate and was in charge of all 
British personnel. This arrangement lasted for 60 years, ending when the 
high commissioner’s headquarters was moved to Solomon Islands in 1953 
after the other British protectorates in the Pacific were removed from its 
supervision. The title was changed to governor in 1974 as the country 
moved closer to independence.
The British had a half-hearted presence and a reserved policy stance 
in Solomon Islands. With their headquarters 2,129 kilometres away in 
Fiji, the colonial state implanted a shabbily constructed administrative 
structure by ‘remote control’, consisting of a hierarchy of positions 
and government stations that were far removed both from the centre 
and from the local social structures and people. This was in significant 
contrast with British policies in Fiji, where the central colonial state 
assumed a  hegemonic presence at different levels of the local social 
structures through a patronage system that included chieftocrats acting as 
comprador agents for the British colonial state, as we saw in Chapter 4. 
In the case of Solomon Islands, the ‘state’ assumed the form of a resident 
commissioner who held supreme authority, below whom was a resident 
magistrate (sometimes referred to as district magistrate), whose title 
changed to district officer in 1914.
To extend their nationwide reach, the British progressively created 
a  network of government stations over the years, starting with Gizo 
Island in 1899, Shortland Islands in 1907, Malaita at Rarasu (now called 
Auki) in 1909, a temporary base at Masi (New Georgia) in 1910, Aola 
(Guadalcanal) in 1914, Makira (San Cristoval) and Isabel in 1918, and 
Peu (Vanikolo) in 1923 to administer the new Santa Cruz District on 
Savo and in the Nggela Islands (separate from Tulagi). A total of eight 
administrative areas, each with at least one district officer and sometimes 
additional officers, were set up by 1934 in Mala (Malaita), Guadalcanal, 
Gizo, Shortlands, Isabel and Russell, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz and 
Tulagi (British High Commission Protectorate, 1911; 1926; 1934).
This state governance ‘structure’ was in practice a network of positions 
superimposed on communities without there necessarily being any 
coherent system of communication, administration and operation to link 
to each other effectively or to connect with the people. At one level this 
system had a symbolic role in affirming a sense of British ‘presence’ and 
colonial ‘legitimacy’. At a more mundane level, it also acted as a system 
of social control to consolidate colonial hegemony and respond to 
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situations that were deemed threatening to the colonial establishment. 
The governance structure was disconnected from ordinary citizens, who 
in turn saw it as something of minimal or even no relevance to their 
everyday existence.
The colonial presence was a distant and strange phenomenon and, despite 
some development projects and social changes, local life hardly changed 
for years during the colonial and postcolonial periods. In addition to 
this disconnect was the paternalistic and racist attitudes in the minds 
of British officials. Young field officials in Solomon Islands and senior 
administrators in faraway Fiji and London were ignorant of local cultures 
and perceptions and imposed their will in insensitive and often racially 
prejudiced ways.
Let us not forget that the first governor of Fiji, Sir Arthur Gordon, as we 
saw in Chapter 4, was an adherent of social Darwinism. This influenced 
his policies towards indigenous Fijians, whom he thought could be saved 
by cocooning them in their traditional social system to ensure their slow 
evolution and survival in the face of cultural onslaught by the ‘superior’ 
European race (Ratuva, 2005). This patronising world view would have 
also influenced the way in which Solomon Islands was administered. The 
difference, however, was that, in the case of Fiji, the native administration, 
run on the basis of separate development (which they referred to as 
‘indirect rule’), was based on a complex state bureaucracy from the village 
level to the governor, supported by rigid rules and regulations, unlike 
Solomon Islands, where the reach of the state was minimal or even non-
existent in most localities.
The period from annexation to the 1920s was characterised largely by 
consolidation of British hegemony through pacification and by ensuring 
a steady supply of labourers for plantations, which were central to the 
colonial economy. In response to emerging circumstances, some changes 
were made in the 1920s, starting with the setting up of an advisory council 
in 1921 to provide the resident commissioner with advice on issues 
relating to the administration of the protectorate. The advisory council 
included Solomon Islanders, and for the first time locals were involved in 
the decision-making process in the country. In addition to this, in 1925 
a structure like that of the Fijian Native Administration was established 
with the appointment of the first native clerks, subdistrict headmen, 
village headmen and village constables. There was also some emphasis on 
medical services as well as, as in Fiji, the introduction of taxation of the 
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indigenous population in 1921. The introduction of taxation was very 
unpopular and, as we shall see later, helped to fuel anti-colonial resistance. 
Education and training were also emphasised in the 1920s in response to 
the need for more locals to run lower positions in the civil service, as well 
as professional positions such as teachers and medical officers.
It was not until 1937 that attempts were made to create a more coherent 
‘native administration’, in response both to demands for more local 
participation and to growing grievances relating to taxation and other 
issues. The changes included the setting up of native courts in several 
districts in 1940 to enforce law and order in communities, most of which 
were in rural areas. World War II put a stop to reforms and, after the war, 
in 1945, the two main issues faced by the protectorate were reconstruction 
and development. The capital was shifted from Tulagi to Honiara, and it was 
also suggested that local government councils be set up, to be responsible 
for local administration, development, justice, health, education and 
agriculture. An attempt was made to divide the protectorate into two 
divisions, but this was deemed too cumbersome and impractical. In late 
1948 four districts were created instead, each under the responsibility of 
a district commissioner. These were the Western district, Central district, 
Malaita district and the Eastern district. Further changes were made to 
the membership of these districts in the 1950s. The districts were further 
divided into subdistricts, run by district commissioners and their district 
officers, who were assisted by headmen and assistant headmen. This system 
was purely administrative rather than developmental and participatory, 
and lacked any direct link with the communities. These administrative 
measures were, at best, symbols of state authority rather than effective 
tools of state service. This was an unwieldy undertaking because the idea 
was to construct a series of administrative entities from a collection of 
heterogenous communities with different languages, cultures and world 
views. This was just one of a series of superficial institutional structures set 
up by the protectorate that were incompatible with local social realities.
The relocation of the western Pacific high commissioner to Solomon 
Islands in 1953 was the first time the country had its own central 
government with more new substantive positions, although advisory 
links with the Fiji administration were maintained in health, education 
and agriculture. Following the proclamation of the British Solomon 
Islands constitution on 10 October 1960, the Legislative Council, with 
21 members, was created. Thus, a national representative body was set 
up for the first time. Eleven members were to be government officials, 
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and 10 were nominees. Six of the 10 were to be Solomon Islanders. 
A  new constitution was introduced in 1964, with the council having 
25 members. Representation by Solomon Islanders was through electoral 
colleges, formed by local district councils. This nurtured the culture of 
patronage that was to characterise the Solomon Islands political culture 
in future years.
As independence drew closer, the policy of localisation in the civil 
service increased in tempo. This included the district officer and district 
commissioner positions, which were filled after independence in 1978 
by people who later became national leaders, such as Peter Kenilorea, 
Francis Talasasa, Francis Billy Hilly and Nathaniel Waena. A new pre-
independence constitution was approved in 1974, which, among other 
new initiatives, provided for a governor and an elected Legislative 
Assembly. As a prelude to independence, the country acquired internal 
self-governing status on 2 January 1976. It became independent on 
7  July 1978 under the leadership of Peter Kenilorea, who served three 
terms in office. Kenilorea was succeeded by his deputy, Ezekiel Alebua, in 
1986. Other prime ministers since independence and before the conflict 
were Solomon Mamaloni, who had three terms, Francis Billy Hilly and 
Bartholomew Ulufa’alu.
Although the above description of the colonial system might sound 
mechanical, there are a number of salient points that I need to raise as part 
of the security analysis here. The state architecture had a fundamentally 
hegemonic role in advancing the pacification role of the colonial state. 
The state’s presence in the rural communities was meant to make the 
statement that colonial authority was supreme and dissent would not be 
tolerated. This was consistent with British colonial subjugation in other 
parts of the world. Furthermore, the colonial structures were intended 
to facilitate the ready appropriation of cheap local labour to produce 
a surplus for the colonial economy. Money was needed to run the colonial 
system, and labour recruitment was seen as an economic imperative. Most 
of the labourers were recruited from Malaita, and many of these were 
relocated to various parts of Solomon Islands, where they were involved in 
commercial labour and other market-based activities. This provoked the 
wrath of the largely subsistence-based local population and planted 
the seeds of future tension.
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To help fund the colonial structure, taxation was introduced as 
a  compulsory imposition. Apart from this economic role, it also had a 
hegemonic role in controlling people’s political choices, or rather lack 
of choices, because failure to pay tax could lead to imprisonment. What 
might have looked like an innocent administrative structure, justified 
as a system to provide law and order and to maintain stability, created 
contradictions that alerted people to the injustices of colonialism, as we 
shall see later.
Increasing insecurity: Resistance against 
colonial hegemony
Even before colonial rule, resistance to external intervention took many 
forms, including skirmishes with explorers, missionaries, traders and 
later with colonial officials as Solomon Islanders found their way of life, 
identity, well-being and even their territories threatened by foreigners. 
Some of this resistance ended in deaths on both sides. In 1872 six crew 
members of the schooner Lavinia were killed on Nggela Island while 
collecting bêche-de-mer. Eight years later, Lieutenant Bower, commander 
of HMS Sandfly, and three crewmen were killed on the same island. On 
20 May 1886, six crewmen and six Malaitans on the schooner Young Dick 
were killed while involved in a blackbirding mission.
The accumulation of grievances over the years came to the fore in late 
1927 when William Bell, district officer in Malaita, together with some 
assistants, killed while on a tax-collection trip on Malaita (Keesing 
& Corris, 1980). The labour recruitment policies of the British, the 
imposition of tax, and the uneven development and marginalisation of 
locals had spawned widespread grievances and anti-colonial resentment. 
The head tax was one of the most notorious and unpopular policies 
because locals could not understand why they should be paying for 
something from their meagre resources that did not benefit them at all. 
Besides, taxation, which was extractive and non-reciprocal, unlike local 
economic exchanges, was seen as an affront to their culture. Government 
public services were practically non-existent, and the patronising attitude 
of colonial officials fuelled the tension further. In response to Bell’s death, 
the British sent a punitive expedition that carried out a brutal retribution, 
resulting in the death of about 60 Malaitans and the incarceration 
of almost 200 people (Swinden,  1998). This was part of the broader 
COnTESTEd TERRAIn 
216
‘pacification’ process whereby sacred sites were desecrated and cultural 
relics were burned and destroyed as a  way of forcing people to accept 
Christianity and to submit to colonial rule.
The incident was historically significant in a number of ways. The attack 
on Bell and his group, which was well planned and widely supported by 
locals, manifested the deep-seated revulsion to the British style of rule, 
which was aloof, condescending and exploitative, with virtually no return 
to the people in the form of health services, education or development. 
The legal system could not be relied on for recourse, nor were there local 
representatives to take up their cause with the authorities, based far away 
in Suva. The locals realised that taking the law in to their own hands, 
although seen as a last resort, was a form of self-empowerment to express 
their will in the most direct and explicit way. The harsh response by the 
British was characteristic of a power that no longer had any sense of control 
of the situation and therefore resorted to extreme violence as a form of 
deterrence to other potential dissent. It was symbolic of the colonial state’s 
failure to address the fundamental issues of development, governance, 
security and justice in a humane way. The ability of the British to exert 
control was due in part to their tactical use of locals to kill and arrest their 
own people, a technique they used effectively, as part of their pacification 
program in other colonies, as we saw in the case of Fiji.
The incident made both sides realise that better and more effective means 
of rule were important to create and maintain trust between the people 
and the colonial administration. For the British, it revealed how little they 
knew about the local cultures or the aspirations and feelings of the local 
people, and showed the need to change their attitudes and approaches. The 
colonial administration had a strong alliance with the European planters 
who volunteered to be part of the punitive expedition. The planters’ 
participation in the incident served their interest in appropriating land 
and local resources for business. For the locals, there was clamour for 
a more efficient and humane system to protect their interests, identity, 
culture and future against what they saw as impending usurpation of their 
customary way of life.
The trial was used to show the unquestionable dominance of British 
justice. Of those arrested, 11 were charged with murder and, of these, six 
were convicted; of the 71 charged with lesser offences, 21 were convicted. 
The leader of the resistance, Basiana, who also killed Bell, was executed 
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by hanging on 29 June 1928, while his two sons watched. Repressive 
regulations were also put in place to legalise arrests as well as detention to 
maintain order.
The pacification program had its limitations. Instead of nipping rebellion 
in the bud, it merely inflamed greater passion for autonomy. The issues 
that led to the killing of Bell and the clamour for protection of local 
customs and greater political and economic empowerment led to the 
emergence of the Maasina movement, which started in Malaita and 
spread to other nearby islands. Its central demand was the creation of an 
alternative, indigenous-led economic development policy and a politically 
autonomous system separate from the colonial state. It called for an 
increase in pay for plantation labourers and demanded the reform of the 
exploitative labour contract system. In addition, it also called for a more 
democratic system with indigenous representation in the decision-making 
process (Keesing, 1978).
There were external factors, too, which helped to catalyse the process. 
These included the 1930s Depression, which saw the collapse of copra 
prices. This meant that many Malaitans (who, since the inception of the 
Queensland and Fiji labour trade, had come to depend on plantation 
labour) lost their jobs, and those who continued working had their pay 
reduced. There was widespread disenchantment, expressed in sporadic 
cases of plantation rebellion and withdrawal of labour. Another important 
factor was the influence of World War II in raising the consciousness 
of people about the need for liberation from the British. There was 
hope that the Americans, who treated the locals better, would help the 
Solomon Islanders displace the British, but when this did not eventuate 
the Solomon Islanders proceeded to organise their new liberation strategy 
(Laracy, 1983).
The Maasina publicly manifested itself during the war in 1943 and 1944 
and was symbolic of both political resistance and economic liberation, 
ideals that the Malaitans have engaged with and nurtured as a result of 
their grim experiences in labour migration and plantation work over 
decades. They had learnt how vulnerable they were to global capitalism 
and colonial rule, the two most powerful foreign forces they had to deal 
with every day. Their only option was to create their own independent 
system, which they could control to serve their interests and maximise 
benefits for themselves (Akin, 2013). They set up their own system of 
government, which won widespread support and which extended to 
various other parts of the country.
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Needless to say, the Maasina movement was seen as a direct threat to the 
colonial administration, and in response the British launched Operation 
De-Louse to arrest the leaders of the movement for violation of the British 
Unlawful Societies Act of 1799 and the Seditious Meetings Act of 1817. 
Both these acts were invoked, and the leading chiefs were arrested and 
sentenced to six years hard labour for secretly conspiring to overthrow the 
government and holding illegal courts. The people responded by refusing 
to pay tax, submit to the census or cooperate in any way. This led to the 
arrest and imprisonment of thousands of people in 1948 and 1949. This 
softened the islanders’ urge for further resistance and, when the first island 
council was set up in Malaita in 1952, the last bastion of resistance ceased 
(Frazer, 1990).
In his book Colonialism, Maasina Rule and the Origins of Malaitan Kastom, 
Akin (2013) provides a historical as well as ethnographic analysis of the 
Maasina rule using the postcolonial lenses to focus on how economic 
exploitation, political subjugation and ethnic marginalisation created 
conditions for resistance. The British colonial policy of pacification 
and coerced imposition under unilateral centralised rule was ‘an alien 
imposition’ (Akin, 2013: 87), which came into contradiction with the 
cultural world of a group of people who lived in relatively egalitarian, 
subsistence-based and autonomous kinship systems. The early reactions 
were ‘against taxation, unpaid labour, loss of dignity’ (Akin, 2013: 87).
Inequality in a structural, ethnic and economic form was an inevitable 
result of British colonial rule. It permeated the entire society from the level 
of institutionalised political power to the level of everyday interaction. 
As an example, reflecting on the issue of unequal justice, Akin says:
There was also anger that when Europeans committed crimes 
such as murder, severe assault, or rape they were most always 
deported rather than punished in the Solomons (if at all) in order 
to avoid embarrassing the white community by a local trial and 
imprisonment. And when an Islander fought a European, it was 
always the Islander who went to jail. (Akin, 2013: 86)
The locals found solace in kastom, the locally constructed cultural norms 
to help define their community identity and help them adapt to the 
changing circumstances. These became the prisms for self-identification, 
intragroup relationships and engagement with the outside world. Kastom 
became a multipurpose system to provide moral and ethical guidance 
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and collective protection against outside usurpation, a tool of cultural 
socialisation as well as a framework for social transformation, adaptation 
and engagement with the outside world.
The anti-colonial resistance shown by Bell’s killing and the Maasina 
movement set the tone for future conflicts, because some of the same forces 
that contributed to these events manifested themselves in those conflicts. 
Among these was the creation of a new proletarian class of Malaitans, who 
participated in labour migration. In later years, this created tension with 
the people of Guadalcanal, who felt threatened by their more mobile and 
commercially experienced island neighbours. Another significant factor 
was the uneven and socially disruptive development strategies of the 
British, which created conditions for both the anti-British rebellion and 
the Malaita/Guadalcanal conflict. The lack of an effective state system to 
ameliorate tension was also a common feature of colonial and postcolonial 
conflicts. Both participatory governance and people-centred development 
were minimal or non-existent in many cases, and this bred animosity.
The colonial hegemony and transformation of the Solomon Islands under 
the British bred its own contradictions, created in part by an incompetent 
colonial administration. An ineffective administrative system that 
boasted neither a central state as a locus of authority nor entrenched local 
community support was constructed and implanted. The British were 
more concerned with simply making a physical ‘presence’ in Solomon 
Islands as a buffer against German interest in nearby New Guinea than in 
taking any genuine interest in developing the protectorate.
The colonial administrative structure had neither the capacity nor the intent 
to unite the culturally diverse country. If anything, it merely exacerbated 
differences and tensions. For instance, carving up the country into four 
districts meant that different tribes were forced into administrative units 
with others and, in the process, separated from cognate tribes in other 
districts. The role of the districts in acting as electoral colleges for the 
Legislative Council encouraged patronage at the local level. This allowed 
district officers and powerful individuals to leverage power to achieve 
their own political and economic interests. The structure of the state was 
thin and superficial, and its role was purely administrative rather than 
policy-making, developmental and legislative.
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Although reforms to create a more representative legislative system took 
place in the 1960s and 1970s, these did very little to enhance people’s 
participation and promote democratic values and culture. The system 
failed to incorporate Solomon Islands’ communities effectively into the 
administrative structure and vice versa. The reach of the state was limited; 
there was a huge gap between local identities and loyalties, and national 
identity and local identities often supplanted national identity. In fact, the 
idea of a national identity was contested and continues to be so.
Thus it would be nonsensical to talk of Solomon Islands as a ‘failed state’, 
fundamentally because the state itself was not sufficiently developed 
into a fully fledged democracy. Rather than being a failed state, the best 
description would be a ‘syncretic state’, where there was a complex ensemble 
of forces interacting with each other in a situation of contradiction, 
accommodation or synthesis (Ratuva, 2004). In the case of  Solomon 
Islands, as with many postcolonial societies, there was a constant 
interaction (action and reaction) between tradition and modernity, 
subsistence and market economy, communalism and individualism, and 
Western bureaucracy and indigenous power structures. Sometimes one 
overrode the other or contradicted one another, and at other times they 
accommodated each other or integrated to form a new mode of behaviour 
and a new structure. Hence this complex process of interaction cannot be 
simplistically explained as being ‘failed’ or artificially framed as ‘hybrid’.
The Malaita/Guadalcanal conflict
In the earlier part of the chapter, we discussed some of the broader forces 
that nurtured the conditions for future conflict between the Guadalcanal 
and Malaitan communities. Strained relations led to the eruption of 
violence around the latter part of 1998, although some Guadalcanal 
youths had been collecting arms since 1996 as anti-Malaitan grievances 
gradually built up over the years. The attack on Malaita settlements by 
a group of Guadalcanal youths in November 1998 was the catalyst that 
set in train an almost inevitable process of intercommunal violence. 
Sentiments were further heightened by the nationalistic utterance by 
Ezekiel Alebua, premier of Guadalcanal province, who proclaimed that 
non-Guadalcanal people should respect their hosts, pay rent to Honiara 
landowners and pay compensation for the Guadalcanal people murdered 
in Honiara (Kabutaulaka, 2001).
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The attack sent shockwaves around the country and sparked further 
escalation, which saw the shooting of a Guadalcanal youth by the 
police in December 1998. Guadalcanal youths formed themselves into 
an organised paramilitary group with different labels, including the 
Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA), the Isatabu Freedom Fighters 
(IFF) and later the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM). Attacks on settlers 
continued and, by June 1999, about 50 people had been killed and about 
20,000 people from Malaita and other provinces were displaced from 
areas around Honiara. The police responded violently and, as a result, 
13 members of the IFM were killed. This tit-for-tat killing spawned more 
violence that consumed the communities around the Honiara area.
In response to the IFM’s violent tactics, the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) 
was formed by Malaitan youth to protect the displaced Malaitans, seek 
vengeance for their treatment at the hands of the IFM, and compensation 
for the damages to properties and for Malaitan deaths. Their raids on 
Guadalcanal villages led to a number of deaths, including of women and 
children. The initial skirmishes turned into full-blown confrontations, 
with both sides inflicting and suffering casualties.
Without an effective security apparatus for law enforcement, the state 
lacked the authority and power to maintain stability. The security 
situation deteriorated further after the MEF and other Malaitans in 
the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) took over the police 
armoury in Roveand. Prime Minister Ulufa’alu was forced to resign after 
a coup led by Malaitan lawyer Andrew Nori, and, in the midst of the 
ensuing confusion, Manasseh Sogavare was elected prime minister under 
duress (Kabutaulaka, 2001). The violent confrontation between the MEF 
and IFM worsened and took centre stage, with more than 200 people 
estimated to have died. The consequences of the conflict were disastrous 
for a country that had not been able to frame a coherent national identity 
to unify the different ethnocultural groups since independence.
The situation in Solomon Islands at the time of the conflict was much 
more complex than the ethnic and tribal factors that have been popularly 
articulated by the media and other commentators (Kabutaulaka, 2001). 
The salient factors were multifaceted and in different ways contributed to 
the grievances, tension and eventual violence. First, as mentioned earlier, 
the half-hearted colonial policies on governance had consequences that 
carried over into the postcolonial period. Upon independence, while 
positions in leadership were localised, the principles of governance and 
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development remained unchanged, and there was little attempt to redirect 
development towards what was relevant to the local population. The state 
became a conduit for cronyism and patronage. Rather than encouraging 
unity and common identity, the political elites were more focused on 
their local constituencies and their own political careers. There was, since 
independence, optimism about creating a new national consciousness and 
identity, particularly among the urban-based elites and the young educated 
individuals who had acquired a taste of regionalised and globalised life 
through contact with the outside world. These progressive and globalised 
views were at odds with the localised loyalties and identities of rural village 
folk (Jourdan, 1995).
As with other newly independent postcolonial states, the tension between 
common national consciousness (through education, common pidgin 
language, common popular cultural expressions such as music and 
common national symbolism such as the flag and emblem) on the one 
hand and communal consciousness on the other, became a dominant 
challenge for the new state. This was a classic situation of a binary 
relationship between civic nationalism (national consciousness in relation 
to the state) and communal nationalism (exertion of communal interests), 
which Stavenhagen (1996) talked about as a potential cause of friction 
and instability. Creating the balance between the desire to construct 
a unified national identity and expressions of distinctive communal 
identity provides a major cultural and political backdrop to the Malaita/
Guadalcanal tension and remains a major issue for Solomon Islands today.
This identity crisis was made more volatile by uneven development and 
worsening poverty and inequality. The prevalence of inequality and 
perception of socioeconomic differences between social and cultural groups 
was a recipe for conflict. The Malaitans were seen to be the ‘industrious’ 
ones, acquiring the most lucrative jobs and businesses, thus invoking envy 
and ethnic stereotypes as ‘aggressive’ and ‘selfish’. The situation was further 
exacerbated by widespread corruption among politicians, who took bribes 
from mostly Chinese businessmen and foreign logging companies in return 
for favours. This also brewed anti-Chinese sentiments, which led to a major 
riot. The fact that people’s expectations in relation to improved livelihood 
did not match their living standard was a recipe for violence. On top of 
this was the sensitive issue of land rights, sale and usage. The migration of 
people into Honiara, especially from Malaita, put considerable pressure 
on the land and created tension. Many Malaitans married Guadalcanal 
women and, through matrilineal determination of land rights, were able 
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to acquire land on which they invited other relatives to settle. Settlements 
mushroomed around Honiara, and the local landowners might have felt 
crowded out by the new migrants. Many felt that their identity was being 
trampled on.
Rising unemployment, poverty and alienation among Guadalcanal youths 
helped to brew grievances. Knowledge of the outside world through 
education and the media raised the young people’s expectations and, 
when the goods were not forthcoming and dreams remained unfulfilled, 
grievances turned to anger and eventually mobilisation for violent 
action. This was further heightened by the intimidation and killing of 
some Guadalcanal people by Malaitans. The speech by Alebua regarding 
indiscretions by Malaitans and the need for compensation was seen by 
some as the ‘order’ to open the floodgates of violence.
The inability of the government, run by self-serving politicians, to address 
the above issues was a major problem. The conflict revealed the inability 
of the state machinery to deal with law and order and, when the crunch 
came, those in government had to choose between loyalty to national 
interest or loyalty to their communities. Many chose the latter.
The analysis by Allen (2012) focuses on a critical assessment of competing 
identity narratives between ‘a Malaitan settler narrative and a Guadalcanal 
landowner narrative’ and how this helped transform the conditions for 
conflict. Malaitans were initially able to acquire rights to use tribal land 
on northern Guadalcanal ‘but subsequently fell victim to a Guale project 
of exclusion’ (Allen, 2012: 163). The Guadalcanal landowners denied 
Malaitans the use of land as an expression of discontent against what they 
saw as cultural and economic intrusion into their traditional domain. 
This reinforced the Guale claim to ownership and denied Malaitans 
their source of livelihood. This social disequilibrium—based on the dual 
processes of exclusion and assertion of rights—contributed significantly 
to the tension. The denial of access to land and associated socioeconomic 
and political benefits shaped the power relations and provoked violent 
reaction. Local grievances based on the desire to share the benefits 
from resource development on their land escalated to become part of 
the broader autonomy project for Guadalcanal. Filer, McDonnell and 
Allen (2017) refer to this process as the ‘power of exclusion’, referring to 
a dynamic power relationship where a group denies another access to land 
and resources and associated socioeconomic and political benefits.
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Fraenkel (2004) makes the argument that the conflict was made even more 
complex by what he referred to as the ‘manipulation of culture’. According 
to Fraenkel, one of the significant features of the conflict was the way in 
which both sides used the traditional practice of compensation as a means 
of acquiring cash either from each other or from the government. The state 
was criminally leached and looted to the point of bankruptcy. He argues 
that ‘custom was inevitably remoulded, redefined and selectively styled to 
meet these new and unfamiliar circumstances. And since there was scope 
for designing custom, there was also space for manipulation’ (Fraenkel, 
2004: 11). Ethnographers might disagree with this instrumentalist view 
of culture since it ignores the sociocultural role of compensation as a 
means of maintaining social equilibrium in a changing situation.
A significant aspect of the conflict that is not well understood is the way 
in which the local issues were part of the globalised discussions among 
the Solomon Islands diaspora through the Iu-Mi-Nao (‘It’s up to us to do 
it now’) chat group. Discussions ranged from updates of daily events to 
critical assessment of the political situation back home and how to address 
these (Moore, 2004). Cyberspace became the connecting mechanism 
that linked individuals and groups located overseas but who had a strong 
primordial attachment to and sense of place with Solomon Islands. 
The indigenous Solomon Islands narratives were globalised and found 
expressions in an internationalised discursive space through the more 
mobile and educated citizens based overseas.
Assault on human security: ‘Shadow’ 
political economy, corruption and patronage
The potential for instability, exploitation and retarded development was 
exacerbated by prevalent patronage and corruption, which ranged from 
‘petty and bureaucratic corruption to grand forms of corruption involving 
high-level officials’ (Chene, 2017). The economy itself has been infested 
with the scourge of money politics and patronage at different levels from 
the village to the highest level of politics. Solomon Islands has been 
described as having a number of ‘shadow’ states, including a complex 
system of patronage based on money and power, which linked politicians, 
their constituencies and businessmen outside the ambit of state control 
(Braithwaite et al., 2010).
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Among the notorious shadowy figures are the Asian logging companies 
who are able to access logging areas directly by bribing landowners and 
government officials. For landowners, who live a largely subsistence life 
and have no direct means of generating income, this is an attractive source 
of cash. Dawea and Canon (2017) document how Malaysian companies 
were able to use tens of thousands of dollars to pay off landowners and 
government officials, including the local police, in order to access the 
local forests on the Santa Cruz Islands. The corrupted local officials 
acted as ‘consultants’ and guides and provided legitimacy for the illegal 
logging operations. The companies had no legal licences to operate and 
took advantage of the administrative disconnect between the capital 
Honiara and the rural areas as well as inefficiency in the enforcement 
system. To justify receiving the money, the locals argued that they ‘have 
effectively been cut loose by the national government, with little choice 
but to monetise the islands’ natural resources to fill the province’s coffers 
and fund development programs’ (Dawea & Canon, 2017). Given the 
government’s inability to fund the provinces, logging money plays a vital 
role in providing resources for local development. Logging has caused 
irreversible environmental damage and not only on land but also the reefs 
and coastal areas as a result of silt being washed down rivers. In addition, 
logging companies have been involved in illegal logging, tax evasion, 
money-laundering, under-reporting of export value, price transfer and 
altering the names of tree species. Government officials are often bribed 
to look the other way. These issues have caused dismay and grievances 
among many Solomon Islanders and a threat to human security as well as 
a potential flashpoint for future tensions.
There is a danger that this culture of patronage and corruption will 
also undermine the environmental, social and economic viability of 
the mining industry, now envisaged as a substitute for logging, after the 
forestry resources have been exhausted. Some of these anomalies have 
manifested themselves in the Gold Ridge mining operations, where there 
have been issues of licensing, disputes over the disbursement of royalties 
and benefit-sharing between Guadalcanal province and the national 
government, and a corrupt payment made to a member of Parliament. 
The lack of proper regulation and transparency in the administration of 
the primary industry, coupled with the predatory nature of unscrupulous 
foreign businesses in collaboration with local entrepreneurial politicians, 
has a profound impact on social cohesion, communal trust and human 
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security. The  shadowy networks involve state officials and community 
leaders entrusted with the responsibility of looking after the social and 
economic security of ordinary citizens, many of whom are not well 
educated and lack the means for social mobility in a capitalist system.
Another issue that has compromised the integrity of political leaders in 
a significant way is the discretionary funds allocated to parliamentarians 
annually. While the official purpose of the fund are for constituency 
development not covered by the budget, parliamentarians have total 
discretion as to how the money is used. A significant portion of the money 
is used for family business, and to build up local patronage and buy off 
voters. Although a guiding policy for the disbursement and accountability 
of the discretionary funds exists, this blatant abuse of public money, which 
is well known, is due to the lack of accountability and regulation because 
the beneficiaries of the system are the very same people who are supposed 
to be responsible for enforcement and policing.
In response to concerns about the potential damage that widespread 
corruption could cause the economy, pressure from the public and 
international agencies, the National Development Strategy 2016–35 
prioritises the battle against corruption in logging and mining. This includes 
strengthening of anti-bribery laws, creating a special anti-corruption 
agency and enacting accountability laws (Chene, 2017). The challenges 
to achieving the aim of reduced corruption are hampered by a number 
of factors, including weak government capacity, lack of state presence in 
the outer communities, limited opportunities for public participation as 
well as the fluidity and instability in state policy due to constant changes 
in government.
Corruption and patronage pose a direct threat to people’s human security 
due to the arbitrary appropriation of wealth by certain individuals linked 
to state power, diversion of bribery money from public use, misdistribution 
of resources, deprivation of a large section of the population and 
undermining of the developmental potential of the country. Grievances 
could lead to distrust and tension. The attempts by the government to 
address corruption can be viable only if the politicians themselves take the 
lead in adhering to the rules and there is greater cooperation between 
the state and the people to ensure equal and just distribution of power 
over resources and decision-making.
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Desecuritisation through peace-building 
initiatives
The conflict went through several phases: the expression of communal 
grievances, which built up to sporadic violence; the formation of rival 
militia groups (1998–2000); internecine conflict (2000–01); and more 
criminalised disturbances (2000–03). At different stages, there were futile 
attempts to intervene as the dividing line between warring groups became 
sharper and the tension more intense.
As the conflict subsided and life slowly returned to ‘normal’, perhaps the 
biggest challenges for Solomon Islands were how to rebuild destroyed 
infrastructure, reshape collapsed state institutions, reconstruct shattered 
social relations and, more importantly, avoid future conflicts of a similar 
nature. When the state security apparatus failed to stop—or at least 
manage—the conflict, the responsibility fell on the local and international 
communities. Wars have the paradoxical effect of expressing both the most 
inhuman and the most humane form of behavioural dispositions. While 
there is a desire to destroy, there is also a desire for peace and rebuilding.
In Solomon Islands, there were various levels of peace-building efforts at 
the regional, national and local levels. Some of these were formally linked, 
some were informally associated and some operated independently of 
each other. We cannot dismiss them as being ineffective because, in their 
own ways, in particular contexts and at particular times, they had their 
own impact in engaging people and created their own synergy, even if 
carried out in a limited space and with limited reach and effectiveness. 
Some were focused on addressing the manifestations of conflict, some 
were related to addressing relationships and intergroup trust, some were 
based on managing conflict to ensure that it did not escalate, some were 
attempts to heal psychological wounds and some were geared towards 
addressing the root causes of the tension. The last approach is always the 
most difficult because it means rewinding history and identifying some 
of the historical issues, as well as casting analytical eyes far and wide to 
identify deeper economic, political and sociocultural issues at the heart 
of the tension.
One of the first major attempts (apart from several earlier initiatives) 
to bring the conflicting parties together was the Townsville Peace 
Agreement (TPA), facilitated by Australia. It was, as the TPA document 
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itself proclaims, an agreement for the ‘cessation of hostilities between 
Malaita Eagle Force and the Isatabu Freedom Movement and for the 
restoration of peace and ethnic harmony in Solomon Islands’ (Solomon 
Islands Government, 2000). This involved a six-day discussion between 
the rival militia groups and the Solomon Islands Government in October 
2000 in Townsville, in order to arrive at some common understanding 
regarding the way forward. Both sides attempted to articulate conditions 
and demands based on their own political and historical narratives of the 
conflict. This posed some difficulties in the beginning, but compromises 
were made in certain areas and attempts were made to balance sectarian 
and national interests in a win-win formula. The final agreement was 
hailed as a significant way forward, but not everyone was happy.
The agreement contained a number of ambitious and almost impractical 
provisions to reduce the tension, initiate peace-building and facilitate 
rehabilitation. These included the continued employment of police 
officers who took sides during the confrontation; restructuring of the 
police force; provision of weapons and general amnesty for combatants; 
rehabilitation for combatants, which included repatriation to their 
villages; demilitarisation; more government autonomy for Malaita and 
Guadalcanal; appointment of a constitutional council; a land enquiry 
in Guadalcanal; and increased development projects to provide jobs and 
support for rehabilitation. On the peace-building side, the agreement 
encouraged reconciliation and proposed the formation of a peace and 
reconciliation committee as well as international peace monitors. Above 
all it proclaimed that: ‘The parties hereby agree that they renounce violence 
and intimidation and will henceforth address their differences through 
negotiations and develop co-operative processes to fulfil the needs of their 
communities’ (Solomon Island Government, 2000: 29).
The TPA took place in the wake of the deaths of perhaps 2,000 
people and  the failure of six previous peace initiatives brokered by the 
Commonwealth Secretariat and Solomon Islands Government between 
June 1999 and 12 May 2000. Despite being hailed by some as a success 
story,  there were shortcomings in the agreement. These included its 
inability  to address some of the fundamental causes of the conflict, 
which had been built up over generations. For instance, while the idea 
of rehabilitation of the former militia members through socioeconomic 
development was a theoretically sound proposal, it was quite ambitious 
in as far as availability of resources was concerned. The government was 
literally bankrupt, and there was a lack of funds for any meaningful 
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development. Furthermore, while the agreement provided proposals for 
quick solutions to stop the tension, there was no realistic framework for 
long-term conflict resolution. It has also been argued that the agreement 
merely ‘institutionalises ethnic division’ because militia from the 
two sides were encouraged to go back to their home islands, and this 
minimised interaction and increased the possible recurrence of violence 
(Byrne, 2000). Indeed violence continued despite the TPA.
The TPA of 15 October 2000 was followed by the mobilisation of an 
Australian-led International Peace Monitoring Team to supervise the 
surrender of weapons. Ironically, instead of ending the conflict as 
anticipated, the TPA caused further differences and tension. Tension 
was  particularly prevalent around Guadalcanal’s Weather Coast, where 
pro-TPA and anti-TPA factions were engaged in a violent campaign 
against each other. The pro-TPA faction, led by Harold Keke, was involved 
in police patrol-boat raids against those opposed to the agreement. There 
were cases of threats, intimidation and violence, including torture. Keke’s 
rebellious stance and intimidating activities were used by the Malaitan 
militants as an excuse for refusing to surrender their weapons. Even today, 
these incidents still provoke grievances among some local communities.
Desecuritising the land: The Regional 
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
took place under the auspices of the Biketawa Declaration, a regional 
security agreement by the Pacific Island Forum leaders, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. The declaration provided for possible intervention by members 
of the Pacific Island Forum in a member country if invited to do so. 
Article 2 states:
Forum Leaders recognised the need in time of crisis or in response 
to members’ request for assistance, for action to be taken on the 
basis of all members of the Forum being part of the Pacific Islands 
extended family. (PIF, 2000: 1)
The Solomon Islands Government’s request to Australia for help in 1999 
was ignored until after 9/11, when Australia reformulated its security 
approach, which framed neighbouring Pacific Island states as ‘failed’ 
and possible bases for terrorists to attack Australia. Thus RAMSI was 
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originally conceived not as a humanitarian gesture but as part of a bigger 
strategic policy thrust by Australia to create a security buffer around itself 
against mythical terrorists lurking around Oceania ready to pounce on 
Australia. Nevertheless, many Solomon Islanders saw RAMSI as a saviour 
to rid the country of some security threats in the form of armed militants 
and lawlessness.
The intervention, which started on 24 July 2003, was led by Australia. 
One of the first tasks was to establish law and order and provide security 
for citizens. Among other things, one of the approaches was to give an 
ultimatum to militant groups to surrender their weapons and to back 
this threat with legal force. The mission’s personnel included military and 
police officers from the member countries of the Pacific Island Forum, 
together with civilians who worked in advisory and even operational 
capacities in government departments.
Apart from security, RAMSI’s other focus was on state-building by way 
of institutional reconstruction along the lines of the Australian neoliberal 
agenda. Almost every ministry had a RAMSI adviser, whose job involved 
both day-to-day operational matters and broader strategic issues. One of 
the underlying assumptions was that locals lacked the capacity to operate 
a modern state system and that external expertise was needed to build 
professional capacity and work ethic. In some cases, local personnel 
were displaced from line ministries and remained as symbolic figures 
while policies and decisions were formulated and carried out by RAMSI 
officials. This imposing approach created some tension, especially among 
locals who felt that their capabilities were not being appreciated—in fact 
were shunned—by another neocolonial establishment.
With RAMSI taking over security, legal and operational matters, 
a number of security issues emerged. At the political level, the question 
of Solomon Islands sovereignty was at stake as a new hegemonic force 
took over operations of important state apparatus. Differences between 
the Solomon Islands and Australian governments, predicated on opposing 
perceptions of each other, intensified over the years. Many Australian 
officials still perceived Solomon Islands through the condescending ‘arc of 
instability’ prism, and Solomon Islanders were conscious of this and viewed 
the Australians with suspicion and distrust. In this situation of mutual 
psychological distance and suspicion, it was inevitable that particular 
types of behaviour were interpreted and stereotyped in disparaging ways. 
The Australian Government’s interference in some sensitive local issues 
heightened the political temperature significantly.
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A case in point was the Australian Government’s attempt to thwart the 
appointment of the Fiji-born Attorney General, Julian Moti, whom 
Australia saw as a threat to their interests. A charge of sexual assault 
was used to try to prosecute Moti, but eventually the Australian courts 
dismissed the case. This was an embarrassing case for Australia, whose 
credibility in Solomon Islands was badly dented. Another case related to 
the behind-the-scenes involvement of Patrick Cole, the Australian high 
commissioner, in local politics. The revelations came in an email leaked by 
a RAMSI officer, and as a consequence Cole was expelled.
RAMSI’s patronising approach attracted negative reaction from the 
Solomon Islands Government. This included a report by six ministers of 
the government, which recommended that RAMSI be scaled back and its 
excesses limited. One of the reasons given was that under the accountant 
general, the Ministry of Finance was slow in delivering services and goods 
to the people. It recommended that the role of RAMSI officials should be 
purely advisory and not substantive. RAMSI was accused of being a stooge 
of Canberra and was alienated from the Solomon Islands Government 
(Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi & Okole, 2014). The feeling was widespread 
among local politicians, civil servants and many Solomon Islands citizens 
themselves, who saw RAMSI as a semi-imperialist force of sorts, imposing 
its will on the local population.
People’s anger was also violently expressed after Snyder Rini was chosen as 
prime minister during the April 2006 general elections. A demonstration 
against Rini’s appointment turned violent when Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) personnel fired tear gas at demonstrators. This led to riots 
and burnings, including the smashing and torching of RAMSI vehicles 
around the China Town business district. RAMSI personnel were also 
targeted. A possible vote of no confidence forced Rini to resign, thus 
opening the door for the selection of Manasseh Sogavare, who was an 
uncompromising anti-Australian politician. Australian officials loathed 
him and tried to undermine him when the chance arose (Fraenkel, 
Madraiwiwi & Okole, 2014).
The relationship between the Solomon Islands Government and RAMSI 
oscillated between tension and cordiality, depending very much on 
the circumstances and who was at the helm. Different prime ministers 
had different attitudes towards RAMSI but, by and large, there was 
some agreement that it provided the desired security and institutional 
rehabilitation for a country struggling to find its footing in constantly 
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shifting internal and regional political dynamics. There was also a general 
feeling that RAMSI’s role was finite. The ultimate question related to 
the exit strategy and the timing of it. New Zealand made it clear that it 
preferred a bilateral program and the rolling back of RAMSI operations. 
A transitional strategy was put in place after the 2010 Solomon Islands 
election, resulting in the withdrawal of military personnel in favour of 
police-assisted programs by 2013. By then, RAMSI had been sufficiently 
established for Australia to use it as a supporting reference for its bid for 
a United Nation’s Security Council seat (Fullilove, 2009).
Perspectives on RAMSI vary considerably, depending on the respondents 
and the context of their responses. Advocates of RAMSI often refer to its 
significance in removing the security threat from the combatants and for 
creating a more stable and more peaceful environment for the people, 
many of whom were displaced or suffered in various ways as a result of the 
conflict. Opponents of RAMSI see it as a Trojan horse for an Australian 
neo-imperialist agenda, which was manifested in Australian personnel 
having control of significant line ministries such as finance and justice 
and in reforming the state bureaucracy to mirror Australian civil service 
norms and culture. Australians were often accused of being Aussie-centric 
due to their alleged cultural arrogance and disdain (latent and sometimes 
manifest) for the local people and culture.
Discussions between the author and civil servants, Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs), academics and other citizens revealed some deep-
seated concern and at times anger about what was perceived as the ‘racist’ 
attitude of Australian personnel. The locals had developed a means of 
‘security mapping’ representing the various levels of ‘reliability’ and 
‘trustworthiness’, to use Enloe’s (1980) terminology, to categorise the 
RAMSI personnel and their attitude towards locals. A local guide took 
the author around Honiara, observing the way soldiers from the different 
countries carried out their daily patrols, and to confirm his story about 
the level of security consciousness of, and trust of the local population 
by, RAMSI military personnel. We observed the Australian soldiers, fully 
armed with weapons at the ready position, as if prepared at any moment 
to pounce on unsuspecting terrorists or to respond to any sudden ambush 
by hidden ‘enemies’. One is reminded of nervous and trigger-happy US 
marines, in full battle gear, cautiously patrolling the streets of Baghdad 
and at the same time putting up an aggressively menacing look, as if 
motivated by the belief that every local was a potential terrorist who must 
not be trusted. The guide explained that the ‘Aussies’ (as he referred to 
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them) not only had little trust in the local population but also treated 
them as inferiors. This, he felt, helped to fuel the groundswell of anti-
Aussie sentiments.
Next we observed the New Zealand soldiers on patrol. They were far 
more relaxed and, although fully armed with light weapons, casually held 
their guns, which were pointed, not horizontally as the Australians, but 
towards the ground. Many New Zealanders were of Pacific Islands and 
Maori heritage; they fitted in well with the local culture and community 
and were generally trusted by locals. Many locals the author talked to 
were highly appreciative of New Zealanders, who they thought were 
more understanding and down to earth in contrast to their Australian 
counterparts.
The guide then told me to watch how the Fijian soldiers carried out their 
patrol. They were quite unique in their patrolling style, and we observed 
them walking around unarmed, shaking people’s hands, smiling and 
saying ‘bula’ (hello) in response to a chorus of ‘bula’ from locals. The 
Fijians’ level of understanding of the local culture and their degree of 
integration into local life was relatively deep, and locals saw them as the 
most trustworthy of the RAMSI military forces. Apart from some areas of 
similarity in their cultural background with the locals, the Fijian soldiers 
deployed to Solomon Islands had significant experience in peace-keeping 
operations in the Middle East and other parts of the world. The different 
approaches of the other military forces testified to the diversity of RAMSI 
as well as the differing world views that participating nations brought to 
the mission.
RAMSI was more than just an operation; it turned out to be a system, 
a complex of multilayered structures and relationships. It was, to put it 
rather simplistically, a kind of state within a state. Its role spanned a variety 
of activities including security, finance, development, rehabilitation, 
justice, policing, public service reform, electoral support and peace-
building. Some of these were formally part of the prescribed functions, 
and some were auxiliary responsibilities. There were differences in opinion 
as to what RAMSI should be doing. While RAMSI’s main responsibilities 
were to re-establish and ensure security and state rebuilding, some were 
concerned about its lack of focus on economic development and peace-
building. To be fair to RAMSI, it had neither the mandate nor the 
expertise to carry out either of these two activities. RAMSI’s work was 
more focused on rebuilding institutions rather than mending people’s 
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strained post-conflict relationships. The deep-seated grievances and 
tensions that helped to spawn the conflict remained relatively untouched. 
Now that much of RAMSI’s security apparatus has been withdrawn, the 
biggest challenge is how the current ‘peace’ can hold and for how long. 
Whether the people of Solomon Islands have reached a stage of conflict 
fatigue is a critical question. Even if this is the case, there will always be 
opportunistic individuals and groups who exploit particular situations for 
their political and economic ends.
What about the role of the Solomon Islands police in future security 
operations? On the positive side, RAMSI itself has argued that there has 
been a ‘noticeable improvement in the responsiveness and capability of 
Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF)’ (RAMSI Media Unit, 2016). 
How  permanent the ‘noticeable improvement’ is might be debatable. 
Pessimists could argue that the ‘improvement’ could just be a temporary 
expression of enthusiasm by the RSIPF while optimists see it as 
a promising sign for the future response capability of the force. It will take 
time before the restructuring and training carried out by RAMSI gels into 
the institutional norms and behavioural ethics of the force’s personnel. 
Perhaps the biggest question is whether the training was appropriate for 
the local cultural context and the unique political terrain of the Solomon 
Islands, especially when the training template was based on the AFP model 
of policing. The incongruity between the sociocultural appropriateness of 
the remodelled police force and the changing local sociopolitical realities 
could be a security challenge in itself. While the police have been trained 
to address the visible manifestations of conflict, their inability to address 
the deep-rooted aspects of conflict, something they might not be trained 
for, could be overwhelming. The fact that the police personnel might still 
harbour tribal loyalties that mirror the original political fault lines also 
poses grave threats to future security.
The current move to arm the police force needs careful consideration, 
given the situation in 2000 when arms were taken from the armoury by 
the Malaita-aligned faction of the police force. The need for regulatory 
and control mechanisms to ensure that this is not repeated is critical for 
the force and national security at large. Because arms may still be illegally 
kept by some members of the former combatants, there is some validity 
in the idea of arming the police. The disadvantages, however, are that an 
armed police can encourage use of arms by those with guns and, second, 
there is no guarantee that arms cannot be used by factions within the 
police against other factions in times of crisis, as we saw in 2000. A more 
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sensible approach is to develop a highly disciplined and well-trained 
special response team who are allowed to use arms only when confronted 
with a gun-related life-and-death situation.
Lessons of RAMSI
There are a number of critical lessons we can learn from RAMSI. First, 
in terms of regional security, RAMSI has demonstrated the capacity 
of regional states to collaborate in an interventionist way, to provide 
security and help in the post-conflict rebuilding of another neighbouring 
Pacific state. This was a major regional security project emanating from 
the Biketawa Declaration, which provided for possible intervention by 
members of the Pacific Islands Forum if invited by the host country. 
RAMSI demonstrated that regional security cooperation was possible, 
given the right circumstances, and if there was a common interest among 
Forum member countries. However, regional intervention dos not always 
work, as we saw in the case of Fiji after the 2006 coup. The Forum’s 
Eminent Persons Group mission to Fiji turned out to be disastrously 
comical and purely tokenistic because Fiji did not take it seriously, and it 
had no impact on post-2006 coup developments in Fiji.
The flip side of the coin is that any similar intervention has implications 
concerning resources. Intervention has to be funded, and this is where the 
major challenge begins. Australia, by virtue of being the richest country 
in the region, was able to bankroll the operation with ease and efficiency. 
However, the deeper issue relates to the way this money could be used 
as a  powerful political lever and soft power instrument to reinforce 
Australia’s hegemony, not only in Solomon Islands but also in the region 
generally. RAMSI was an opportunity for Australia, through the estimated 
A$2.4 billion poured into the operation, to drive its reform agenda in 
Solomon Islands and the region, as well as providing opportunities for 
employment for hundreds of Australian citizens, who worked in various 
capacities. It was probably Australia’s largest single aid project as well as 
the most high profile and most prestigious in the region.
In a way, in terms of geopolitical psychology, RAMSI would have boosted 
Australia’s ego as a big regional power. To claim a position in the upper 
echelons of global security stratification, a country needs to ‘prove’ its 
capacity to influence and dominate others politically. This has been the 
basis of big power hegemony such as that of the United States. Australia’s 
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ability to exert its power, to buy off or influence Pacific Island states 
by virtue of its wealth and political leverage, has often worked well in 
its favour. Interestingly, Australia is not able to demonstrate a similar 
hegemonic tendency in Asia, which contains equally powerful or more 
powerful states that can outmanoeuvre Australia.
Another effect of RAMSI was the creation of an artificial and unequal 
economy, which exacerbated the class divide between locals, who relied 
largely on a semi-subsistence livelihood, and highly paid expatriate 
advisers, consultants and other RAMSI personnel. The large amount 
of money poured into the country caused unprecedented inflation and 
hikes in the cost of real estate and funded a lifestyle for foreigners that 
became the envy of locals, some of whom, admittedly, benefited through 
employment, the sale of produce and other economic activities in the 
informal sector. However, the substantial flow of monetary benefits was 
restricted to locals who had established business interests in hotels, shops, 
real estate and the food industry. TThe sharp disparity between the wealth 
of foreigners and the income of locals also fed into shimmering anti-
foreigner grievances and nationalism that erupted during violence against 
the Australian police and Chinese businesses during the 2006 riots.
Despite its role in restoring stability, one of the major shortcomings 
of RAMSI was its inability to establish a long-term conflict resolution 
strategy for Solomon Islands. The focus of the intervention was largely on 
rebuilding state institutions, not on nation-building. As a result, the issues 
of social tension, community fractures, conflict and social dislocation 
remained. RAMSI had neither the intention nor the expertise to carry out 
these activities, although some of their personnel were involved in some 
community-based reconciliation.
Post-conflict transformation requires a process of continuity from conflict 
to stabilisation and restoration of community trust and relationships. 
This should involve a restorative and transformative approach. RAMSI’s 
approach was based on retributive rather than restorative justice. In other 
words, the legal process was paramount in determining who was guilty 
and what type of punishment was needed. The judicial reforms were 
largely targeted at ensuring the effectiveness of the retributive system. 
While the retributive approach provided for short-term stability, it might 
not be sufficient to guarantee long-term sustainable peace.
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In this regard, one of the major tests of cultural inclusivity for RAMSI 
was its recognition of local peace-building initiatives as a legitimate part 
of the post-conflict rehabilitation process. RAMSI failed this test because 
local peace-building initiatives were still seen as culturally distinct and 
in fact of lesser value, and were not accorded a prominent place in the 
RAMSI official discourse. What needs to be recognised, however, is that 
community-based peace initiatives helped to energise the peace process 
and helped to make RAMSI’s work easier to achieve. While RAMSI might 
have provided the macro and national framework for security, its lack 
of reach and influence within the villages meant that local communities 
themselves had to be responsible for local peace-building. The future of 
sustainable peace in Solomon Islands will depend quite significantly on 
the social cohesion and harmonious relations emanating from local peace-
building initiatives. This reflects the bigger problem of disjuncture between 
RAMSI and the local communities. RAMSI operated at three different 
levels: state politics, government bureaucracy and local community. Each 
had its own identity and operational boundary. Although RAMSI was 
officially linked to the state elites and bureaucracy, it maintained a certain 
degree of paternalistic distance. Local state officials were hostile to what 
they saw as the condescending and haughty attitudes of RAMSI personnel.
This ‘cultural gap’ might have had a hand in shaping the relationship 
between local cultural perceptions and the Australian-driven world view 
of RAMSI. The Australian-centric approach to the intervention was 
dominant and provided the ideological engine for the entire operation 
from the policy level to the individual behavioural disposition of 
Australian RAMSI personnel. Rather than taking a politically ‘objective’ 
approach, as often assumed, RAMSI’s intervention was highly ideological 
and culturally driven. It was an extension of Australia’s foreign policy 
discourse and a manifestation of Australia’s self-mandated missionising 
influence in the Pacific. RAMSI was a new missionary enterprise that 
acted as a conduit for Australian values and Australia’s political system and 
social ethos in a Pacific ‘failed state’. RAMSI existed in a different cultural 
and ideological space from that in which the local people lived, and its 
aspirations were not really implanted meaningfully into the community.
In their analysis of peace-building in Solomon Islands, Braithwaite et 
al. (2010: 1) argue that there were issues relating to the framing of the 
problem and the approaches used. Contrary to the dominant perception 
that Solomon Islands was a ‘failed state’, a framework used by RAMSI, the 
COnTESTEd TERRAIn 
238
country was not a ‘failed’ state because it was ‘not a “formed state” but a 
“state in a process of formation”’. They also refer to RAMSI as a ‘shadow 
state’ because it operated autonomously, separate from the central state.
Braithwaite et al. (2010: 2) argue that, although RAMSI had some 
notable successes, it did not really address some of the basic issues that 
led to conflict. It was in fact a ‘crude state-building agenda; it was not 
about unpicking the specificities of a knot of fragilities’. RAMSI was 
more interested in state-building than peace-building, and most of its 
rebuilding  activities revolved around urban Honiara, yet more than 
80  per  cent of the population were hardly affected. Braithwaite et al. 
(2010) maintain that, although many mistakes were made during the 
peace-building process, a lot of lessons were also learned, and this is one 
of the reasons peace-building has not yet failed in Solomon Islands.
Constitutional engineering and security
The proposal for a new federal constitution has been a central 
political agenda item in the post-conflict era because of the need for 
a political structure and constitutional system that addresses some of the 
issues of governance, resource distribution, civic organisation and people’s 
loyalties, which were salient to the conflict. Remember that the TPA had 
proposed a new political system to facilitate different regional interests; 
the challenge was how to put in place a constitution that was acceptable 
to all the provinces and people of the country. The broad idea was that 
constitutional reform would help in addressing some of the country’s 
issues of security and stability.
In fact, even before independence in 1978, debate as to the best 
constitutional arrangement to unify a diverse country with about 
65 different languages had started. The centralised Westminster system 
was chosen ahead of the federal one because it was considered to be cheaper 
and easier to operate and because it was a continuation of the precolonial 
structure and process. However, postcolonial system did not serve the 
general interests of the population in terms of political empowerment and 
participation, as Mae proclaimed:
The level of participation in Solomon Islands under the 
Westminster system is far from what was envisaged in the 1978 
Independence Constitution. There is a huge gap between the 
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promise of popular participation and the reality of participation 
… Furthermore, the current Westminster system of government 
still resembles the colonial system of government—it’s just the 
personnel serving the system that changed. (Mae, 2010: 5)
The clamour for a federal system was strong even before independence, as 
was reflected in the boycott of independence celebrations by the Western 
district. Also, in 1988, the Guadalcanal people staged a demonstration 
and demanded the formation of state governments in order to protect 
their traditional rights, which they believed were being undermined by 
migrants from other islands. The seeds of rebellion against the status 
quo were already in place. For the people of Guadalcanal, a system that 
gave them more autonomy to engage with their own development and 
with land rights, and to deal with economic and political domination by 
migrants, especially Malaitans, was uppermost in their mind.
The two-tier, post-independence politico-administrative system, 
consisting of the central government and the provincial governments, did 
not fully address the issue of autonomy. While the Provincial Government 
Act of 1981 delegated some power to provincial governments, the central 
government retained most of the power to make laws and decisions for the 
country. This structure was problematic because, rather than empowering 
and encouraging the participation of people in their own governance and 
development, it merely created a political and bureaucratic ‘gap’, which 
disconnected the state from the people. The absence of any effective and 
trusted mechanism through which people could channel their grievances 
merely exacerbated discontent. The structure not only replicated the 
colonial administrative architecture but also simulated its intent, which 
was based on paternalistic centralised political control rather than 
democratic participation.
The issue of federalism dominated Solomon Islands political discourse 
in its postcolonial life. It was the subject of a number of reviews and 
consultations, including the Provincial Government Review Committee 
(Kausimae Report, 1979), the Committee to Review the Provincial 
Government System (Lulei Report, 1986), the Constitutional 
Review Committee (Mamaloni Report, 1987), the Committee to Review 
the Provincial Government System (Tozaka Report, 1999), the Buala 
and Auki Communiqués (2000), the State Government Task Force 
Report (SGTF, 2000), UNDP Provincial Consultations (2003), MPs 
Consultations (2005) and the Constitutional Congress Consultations 
COnTESTEd TERRAIn 
240
(2007–10). A draft of a federal constitution was produced in 2011 and, 
after wide consultations and review, the final draft was produced in 2014. 
From 2014 to 2016, the government was involved in wide consultation 
within the country as well as outside the country in places where Solomon 
Islands citizens lived, such as in Fiji.
There is a general perception that the new constitution will provide a strong 
platform for addressing some of the issues of empowerment, autonomy, 
land rights and development, which had helped fuel discontent in the 
past. Three pertinent provisions in the Preamble of the 2014 constitutional 
draft attempt to do this:
Affirm the indigenous political units of our original society, whose 
cultures, traditions, customs, practices and social relationships 
have always existed, based on tribes, clans, lineages; Respect 
our diversity, even as we are proud of our common identity and 
conscious of our shared destiny; Desire that those changes will 
be directed through constitutional and legal channels and not by 
violent or unlawful means. (Solomon Islands Joint Constitutional 
Congress, 2014)
These three key principles—affirmation of indigenous culture and linages, 
respect for diversity and avoidance of the deployment of violence—are 
central to the ideological foundation of the nation-building process for 
a country scarred by violence, ethnic displacement and cultural dislocation. 
The proposed draft constitution attempts to address some of these 
outstanding grievances by proposing a three-tier governance structure 
consisting of the federal government, state government and community 
governments, under the rubric of what is fancifully termed ‘cooperative 
federalism’. A number of critical areas to help bolster nation-building are 
also proposed. These include equal citizenship, a bill of rights, protection 
of the natural heritage and environment, provisions concerning civil 
society, political parties, national security and the election of a unifying 
president as head of state.
As we have seen in the case of Fiji, the effectiveness of the constitution 
lies not so much in the enlightening appeal of its principles nor its grand 
vision for the future, but in how it responds to constantly changing 
sociopolitical realities and how much legitimacy and respect it is accorded 
by the people. On the bright side, the federal system has the potential 
to engage the communities much more closely and meaningfully in 
relation to issues of socioeconomic development and well-being and to 
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facilitate and enhance direct democratic participation and community 
empowerment. These benefits might help to moderate some of the 
conditions and lessen some of the tensions that spawned the Guadalcanal/
Malaita conflict. However, one of the dangers of the federal system is 
that, while it provides for ‘autonomy’, dispersal of power and localised 
decision-making, it has the potential to exacerbate the existing divisions. 
Administrative and political divisions based on ethnocultural factors 
might generate intranational enclaves. This will further weaken the 
central state, which, since independence, has had minimal penetration 
into and influence in the local communities. Because the population is 
now nationally dispersed, an important issue is how local governments 
are going to accommodate people from outside the federal ‘states’. For 
instance, what will happen to the numerous Malaitans who hold high 
positions in other states, such as Guadalcanal? The issue of distribution of 
resources and wealth is also a critical one, given the obvious differences in 
the resource base of the various ‘states’.
The situation seems to be more complicated than originally realised 
because of the different positions taken by different regions. Nevertheless, 
the optimism about the newly proposed constitution is in itself a unifying 
factor. It is asking a great deal for it to deliver the benefits hoped for in 
terms of national unity and stability, but that outcome is also a bright 
possibility.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Based on the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) model, the Solomon Islands’ localised version was meant to 
explore and make more explicit some deep-seated issues of communal 
conflict, individual and collective traumas and grievances as a basis for 
collective forgiveness and reconciliation. The principle behind TRCs 
in other countries often revolve around providing a climate conducive 
to peace-building and national reconciliation, healing some of the 
wounds inflicted on victims by both sides of the conflict through direct 
engagement between victims and perpetrators, and re-establishing a long-
term environment of nation-building in a politically scarred landscape.
The Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission (STRC), 
consisting of five members, was set up in 2009 under the 2008 Truth and 
Reconciliation Act, and completed its assignment in 2011, with the aim 
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to ‘discover the causes, details and effects of the country’s “ethnic tension” 
crisis of 1998–2003’ (STRC, 2012). The Act itself mandated that there 
should be wide participation of people nationwide in the reconciliation 
process. The STRC, the Act suggested, should be engaged in the promotion 
of national unity and reconciliation through identification of the truth 
about what happened in the conflicts and why (STRC Act, Section 5c). 
To this end, the STRC conducted public and closed hearings and collected 
statements from victims and perpetrators alike. It also facilitated focus 
group interviews with a diverse range of people directly involved in the 
conflict and carried out research on issues related to the conflict.
To make the process workable, a number of mechanisms were put in place 
to protect both victims and perpetrators who were able to share their 
stories. Among these was the rights of witnesses in relation to the provision 
of personal security and freedom from incrimination for what was said. 
Confidentiality was strictly adhered to if requested, and no personal 
information was to be publicised. Furthermore, a number of principles 
guided the process to ensure its credibility: informed consent of victims 
and witnesses before interviews, respect for diversity, non-hierarchical 
ordering of cases, provision of emotional and social support for victims 
and witnesses, availability of trauma counselling, special attention to the 
situation of children, transparency, freedom to use any language, and 
procedural fairness for all those involved. These were restorative justice 
principles that ensured that the subjective being of the person, not the 
process, was the central focus of attention. This was necessary in a situation 
of deeply fractured relationships, communal hostility and mutual distrust, 
to ensure that the engagement space was welcoming, non-inhibiting and 
non-partisan.
STRC’s comprehensive nationwide engagement with the communities 
unearthed diverse experiences, views and sentiments of individuals, 
organisations and communities relating to the conflict. The STRC 
divided the consultation process into regions, which in themselves were 
unique in terms of their circumstances, problems and the way they were 
linked to the conflict. For instance, in the Weather Coast area (one of 
the strongholds of Guadalcanal nationalism and where 35 per cent of all 
deaths took place) a significant amount of focus was on Harold Keke, 
one of the rebel leaders, and the havoc he created. Most of the 70 people 
who died did so as a result of incursions by the so-called Joint Operation 
to subdue Keke and his supporters. Guadalcanal was also the birthplace 
of the Moro group, an anti-colonial movement for self-determination. 
243
6 . LOngIng FOR PEACE
It was apparent that some of these earlier nationalistic sentiments 
rearticulated themselves during the conflict. In the Western province of 
Solomon Islands, an interesting development was the involvement of the 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army in providing security for the locals.
The STRC captured personal stories about compensation, vengeance, 
displacement, violence, personal and collective trauma, despair, fear, 
silence and intimidation. The 330-page report was itself an interesting 
study in power by the gun and the powerlessness of citizens in a world of 
uncertainty and deep anxiety. All these factors had a devastating impact on 
basic services like health, education and the rule of law. The dismantling 
of state institutions and usurpation of state power meant that the police 
force, the most visible manifestation of state authority in the country, and 
which was also divided by tribal loyalties, was rendered ineffective. Militia 
members and local warlords like Keke ruled the streets, the villages and 
the country in partisan and often violent ways.
Caught between the warring militias, and in the absence of any state 
protection, the general population had to seek refuge in certain ‘safe’ 
places, some under the protection of their respective militia groups 
and some with their kinsfolks on the ‘other’ side of the divide. Links 
through intermarriage became a useful means of security; for instance, 
some Malaitans who married into Guadalcanal families were protected 
by their kin. Many Malaitans who had bought land, built houses and 
ran businesses  in Guadalcanal lost everything and left Honiara as 
internal refugees.
Despite the stories of doom and despair, the STRC also heard stories of 
hope. There were narratives of people helping and caring for each other 
in times of crisis and tribulation. This was a great sign of promise for 
the future. Amid death and destruction, there were pockets of peaceful 
engagement and coexistence among the members of the community, 
which sustained stability at the local level.
The responses to the conflict, as we have seen with RAMSI and the 
numerous court cases, were very legalistic. This was also reflected in the 
rather bureaucratic recommendations of the STRC, which suggested the 
introduction of community policing to re-establish trust and confidence 
between the community and police; developing the capacity of local 
professionals in the Office of the Director of Public Prosecution and the 
Office of the Public Solicitor; improvement of juvenile rehabilitation 
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programs; provision of mental health facilities for accused persons and 
prisoners; a provincial quota system for the police force and prisons 
service; a review of tension trials; and consideration of correctional services 
redundancies, especially for officers who compromised themselves during 
the conflict (STRC, 2012: 330–2). These recommendations were quite 
disappointing because they were not based on restorative justice principles 
but on legally conceptualised and framed retributive approaches. They 
hardly addressed the deeper issues of healing community wounds and 
societal fractures, which truth and reconciliation commissions are 
supposed to address.
Although the recommendations of the STRC do little to address the bigger 
issue of nation-building and long-term security, from the point of view 
of the individuals and communities who shared their stories, narrating 
their experiences was in itself therapeutic and helped to establish a social 
space for open dialogue. The future of peace-building in Solomon Islands 
lies not simply in strengthening the legal process, as the STRC suggested, 
but in empowering people to establish a culture of peace that flows both 
vertically to the top and horizontally across communities.
Community-based peace-building
The predominant focus on the role of RAMSI, STRC and high-
profile legal cases often overshadowed peace-building initiatives on the 
ground. Yet, in a society based on kinship and sociocultural bonding, 
communally based peace initiatives have been part of people’s lives for 
generations. The fact that they usually exist below the radar of state and 
legal institutions does not render them inferior in any way. Religious, 
women’s and other community organisations were eager to engage with 
the people and repair the deep-seated impact of the conflict on their 
community structures, relationships and norms. While some community 
groups operated independently at the local level, at the national levels, the 
Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace (MNURP) provided 
an institutional state umbrella within which some of the national peace 
initiatives were carried out.
One of the lessons learnt from the conflict was the need for 
multistakeholder cooperation. That was one of the reasons why MNURP 
has been working closely with churches, such as the Anglican Church 
of Melanesia, on projects such as training in peace-building (Solomon 
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Star, 2015). As the most influential and powerful institutions outside 
the state, churches have used their social and spiritual status to involve 
themselves directly in the social transformation process by promoting 
communal harmony. Since the conflict, different churches have pursued 
their own programs using their respective national networks. For instance, 
from 28 April to 1 May 2008, 90 members of the Church of Melanesia 
convened for a provincial consultation process in Honiara on the theme 
‘Healing past hurts: A way forward for the Church of Melanesia’. The 
participants were from areas badly affected by the conflict, including rural 
Guadalcanal, Malaita Province and Honiara. The participants included 
bishops, clergy, the Church’s four religious communities, women, youth, 
chiefs, laymen, ex-militants and ex-police, as well as Provincial Office staff, 
bishops of other dioceses in Solomon Islands and representatives of the 
Solomon Islands Government (Solomon Islands Anglican Communion 
New Service, 2008). The focus of the consultation was to find a common 
reconciliatory path for those affected by the conflict using the Christian 
principles of love and forgiveness in a communal setting and to respond 
to the need to fully understand the deeper impact of the conflict on 
families. The meeting also endorsed the STRC, which was to be convened 
later. This was just one of the many conferences, meetings and workshops 
conducted by civil society organisations on the matter.
International organisations participated in the community rehabilitation 
and peace process in various ways. For instance, UNICEF was involved 
in addressing children’s needs and UNESCO was directly involved in 
programs to integrate children’s welfare with peace-building and education. 
This was crucial because of the involvement in the conflict of many young 
people without formal education and unemployed young people, both as 
victims and perpetrators (UNESCO, 2014). This went hand in hand with 
the Ministry of Education’s initiative to introduce peace-based modules 
into its curriculum (Maebuta, 2012). In 2016 the UNDP launched a UN 
peace-building program designed to support national efforts towards 
sustainable peace and stability, with emphasis on women’s participation, 
in Solomon Islands (UNDP, 2016). Other international organisations 
such as the Asian Development Bank, World Bank and European Union 
were involved in direct or indirect ways through their contribution to 
development projects as well as social protection.
The role of the international agencies was problematic because of the 
lack of  connection with the local communities. Their links were on 
a  multilateral basis, which, in many instances, were far removed from 
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reality on the ground. From the vantage point of the international agencies, 
the value of their contribution to peace-building was the publicity they 
were able to generate to reinforce their status and legitimacy. The photo 
sessions and news publicity became ends in themselves. Being seen to 
be concerned and being pictured on the ground was a great publicity 
opportunity, although the financial contribution and the actual impact 
was nominal or, at worst, insignificant. In the bigger scheme of things, 
peace-building has become an industry that has spawned competition 
and territoriality among international agencies, academics and consulting 
firms. For some international agencies, their global status and reputation 
have been used to help cement their claim to relevance and legitimacy in 
the peace-building world.
The real workhorses in community peace-building in Solomon Islands 
were women’s organisations, whose role as advocates of non-violence, 
dialogue, disarmament and peace-building spanned the entire period of 
the conflict. They provided the support system for children and the old, 
and kept families together amid the crisis. Unfortunately, women were 
largely excluded from the formal peace dialogue processes, but this did 
not deter them from being actively involved in grassroots mobilisation 
and in creating the necessary conditions for peace-building and dialogue 
processes such as the TPA and other peace-building initiatives during and 
after the conflict.
Conclusion
The colonial experience of Solomon Islands created an economically 
uneven, institutionally weak, socially fractious and politically demarcated 
society in which state structures were wobbly, ineffective and largely 
tokenistic. The British were not really interested in developing infrastructure 
because it was a secondary colony, ruled from Fiji, the Crown colony. 
The only visible manifestation of British colonial rule was the flag and 
a handful of British officials. This neglect created a distorted sociopolitical 
structure, and the resulting configuration was not fully modelled on the 
Westminster or customary system, nor was it a utilitarian combination 
of both, as was the case in other British colonies like Fiji.
Upon independence, Solomon Islands, with minimal or a complete 
absence of trained expertise, infrastructure and basic state structure, had 
to start from scratch, and it was not long before seismic shifts began to 
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be felt. The struggle to keep up with modernity led to overexploitation 
of resources, corruption, land disputes and maldistribution of wealth, 
and these put increasing stress on the new country, struggling to create 
a unified nation amid ethnic and cultural diversity. The syncretic 
relationship between civic nationalism (the desire to create a unified 
national identity) and communal nationalism (the desire to maintain 
communal distinctiveness) formed a fault line, which was exacerbated 
by socioeconomic disparity and grievances. This intersection between 
communal mobilisation and socioeconomic disparity became the 
epicentre of the rippling political quakes.
It was only a matter of time before the inevitable happened. When it 
happened, the Solomon Island communities were not ready in terms of 
their conflict resolution responses. They had to adapt to the fast-changing 
conflict culture and its consequences. The conflict was the single most 
transformative event in the modern history of Solomon Islands, at least 
since colonisation, and its long-term effects will be felt for some time yet. 
Communities were transformed in a fundamental way, and so were the 
cultural response mechanisms and sense of resilience. Historians will look 
back and define the conflict as the watershed moment when the country 
had to come to terms with the complexities of social transformation, 
a  time when indigenous values and colonial cultures intersected and 
defined each other in a syncretic way.
The conflict in Solomon Islands had a number of significant characteristics 
that were typical of many postcolonial societies. One major issue was the 
way in which modernity disrupted and transformed a communal and 
subsistence culture and created social and political fissures that led to 
conflict. While local conflicts were taking place as part of normal everyday 
tension, as in any society, the national conflict in Solomon Islands moved 
to another level of intensity. The consequences were unprecedented. The 
growth of the capitalist economy and the subsequent demand for labour 
and the pressure this put on land and social relations on Guadalcanal 
provided a recipe for tension. Economic disparity and the corrupt activities 
of political elites, many of whom were from economically depressed 
communities and, therefore, wanted quick money for themselves, together 
with the pressure from their wantok for resources, were all juxtaposed in 
a melting pot of grievances, waiting for a spark to cause an explosion. 
When it did, it was not easy to stop the genie of aggression, which had 
been bottled up for some time.
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The customary means of reconciliation that had provided for social 
balance and cultural harmony within kinship groups could not stem the 
tide of violence and destruction. The extent of violence was national in 
latitude and impact and was beyond the capacity of local communities 
to contain using customary means. The setting up of armed groups by 
warring sides and the mode of engagement and weaponry were modelled 
on modern militaries or guerrilla armies elsewhere around the world. 
Clearly these were beyond the cultural knowledge and notion of place 
of local communities, who found themselves sandwiched between 
contending forces in a confrontation whose magnitude and intensity were 
outside the conflict norms of their familiar world. The older generation 
might have remembered the World War II campaign by the Allies against 
the Japanese invasion, but these were seen to be instigated from outside 
and the defeat of the Japanese meant the end of the conflict. This was 
not the case with the internally generated civil disorder that transformed 
Honiara and parts of Guadalcanal into ‘war zones’ of sorts.
The sense of unfamiliarity with the use of firearms and the semi-military 
organised fighting groups were traumatic for the community collectively 
as well as for individuals. Relationships were fractured, but this did not 
dampen the sense of resilience of communities. Often, in times of crisis, 
collective resilience goes through a phase of resurgence as a protective 
mechanism to ensure self-preservation. To some extent, mitigating 
responses might have some links to the subconscious evolutionary 
intuition for survival. At another level, however, there is an important 
social rationale for the perpetuation of the human species. For kinship-
based societies like that of Solomon Islands, the life of individuals is just 
as important as the life of the community in general. Life is defined not 
by the chronological sequence of events from birth to death but by one’s 
consciousness about identity and one’s contribution to collective survival. 
The conflict, and the desire for perpetuity, inspired survival initiatives in 
the form of community peace-building by community groups such as 
church and women’s organisations. At the more ontological level, in the 
absence of the capacity for nationwide reach, community peace groups 
searched more deeply for indigenous modes of reconciliation to address 
conflicts in neighbourhoods. These pockets of peace-building, scattered 
around the country, worked well together in diffusing tension at the 
local level and collectively contributed to national peace, at least for 
the time being.
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For the rest of the Pacific, the Solomon Island conflict was an important 
lesson in regional intervention, where sovereignty had to be traded for 
security. For a country desperate to unload the burden of violence, 
security was the major priority, around which other considerations 
revolved. RAMSI not only provided the much-needed security but 
also transformed the security discourse into an Australian-based one. 
The challenge now is to find ways to build capacity for the local security 
institutions, principally the police, judiciary, corrections and intelligence, 
to ensure the sustainability of security and stability. An equally daunting 
task is to carry out a process of inclusive and consensual nation-building 
to mend the social fractures and communal rifts that have remained in 
a state of hibernation since the height of the violence.
Solomon Islands represents a classic postcolonial state where national 
conflict emanated from the contradiction of its colonial history. The use of 
postcolonial, securitisation and human security discourses are important 
in capturing the multilayered factors that have shaped conflict and security 
during the colonial and postcolonial periods. Although this might be the 
theoretical approach to explain the past, the narrative for the future is in 
the hands not of scholars pontificating about what ought to be done but 
of Solomon Islanders themselves, whose destiny they must take charge of 
without the paternalistic urgings of neo-imperialist neighbours such as 
Australia or the patronising whims of international agencies. A future in 




Contested future: Where 
to for Pacific security?
I refuse to accept the view that mankind is so tragically bound to 
the starless midnight of racism and war that the bright daybreak of 
peace and brotherhood can never become a reality … I believe that 
unarmed truth and unconditional love will have the final word.
Martin Luther King, Jr
The three case studies (in Chapters 4, 5 and 6) are meant to demonstrate 
the wide diversity of historical, sociopolitical and cultural experiences of 
Pacific countries in the area of security. The ‘Pacific’ is not a generic or 
homogenous entity, as is often assumed and reflected in such generalised 
terms as ‘arc of instability’. Rather, the region consists of diverse cultures, 
political systems and life experiences. Instead of constructing universalised 
narratives, it is important to delve deeper into the unique experiences of 
different countries. This book attempts to capture the specific experiences 
of three different countries, without being limited by the usually 
mechanical conventional comparative analysis template of identifying 
similarities and differences, often used by some political scientists. This 
allows one to study the countries in depth without being confined to 
superficial comparative variables.
Within the broader analytical eclecticism paradigm, the book employs 
various conceptual tools, most notably the postcolonial, securitisation and 
human security lenses, to examine power relationships from precolonial 
times to the postcolonial period. The three approaches are closely related, 
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and collectively they can shed light on the complex interactions between 
people’s human security and well-being and the perception of security in 
the postcolonial context.
Critical lessons from the case studies
This study highlights a number of conceptual, methodological and 
empirical aspects that redefine the notion of security in the Pacific and 
more broadly. Not only is the notion of security contested in relation 
to varying schools of thought, it is also contested in terms of contextual 
application, as we have seen in the very different cases of Fiji, Tonga and 
Solomon Islands. With this in mind, it is prudent to think of regional Pacific 
security not in terms of a unifying metanarrative but in terms of multiple 
narratives. The study has also revealed a number of significant aspects of 
Pacific security that could be the basis of how we define, conceptualise 
and operationalise security discourses in the future. Although the case 
studies are meant to stand on their own to represent the unique situations 
of different countries, there are some common strands of conceptual and 
empirical themes that connect them and which are worth considering in 
the context of the broader analytical eclecticism framework of the book. 
We look at some of these below.
Importance of the analytical 
eclecticism approach
At a broad theoretical level, the use of multiconceptual approaches 
provides a holistic narrative of the situation within countries, especially 
in relation to social conditions, group relations, power dynamics, resource 
distribution and conflict as well as phases of their historical development. 
The postcolonial approach provides a more nuanced view, which, instead 
of simply documenting the official state-centred perspectives, examines 
situations from the viewpoint of the subaltern colonised groups in the 
broader contest of history and the unfolding political economy. This 
approach is appropriate for postcolonial societies whose state structures, 
economic development models, cultural institutions and collective 
national consciousness and identities have been shaped to some degree by 
the imposed colonial pacification processes. The imposition of taxation, 
for instance, as we saw in Fiji, Tonga and Solomon Islands, had profound 
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effects on the economic conditions of the locals, thus breeding dissent 
and opposition to state rule. Even after independence, the colonially 
constructed and imposed systems remained and evolved in ways that were 
driven by and served the interests of local elites. Although Tonga was a 
protectorate and not formally a colony of Britain, British influence was 
significant, nonetheless, and the monarch assimilated or imitated a lot of 
the symbolism and state institutions of the British monarch.
The postcolonial narrative has resonance throughout the Pacific. Although 
formal colonialism has passed (except for the French colonies, Tokelau 
and Pitcairn Island), new forms of cultural hegemony, the impact of 
climate change, the global neoliberal agenda, and the influence of big 
power militarism and corporate interests have further diminished the 
leveraging power and increased the insecurity of Pacific Island Countries 
(PICs). In other words, new forms of domination and subalternation have 
emerged and created a structure that continues to keep PICs at the bottom 
of the global power strata. One’s position in this power hierarchy continues 
to pose security challenges for the region, as we have seen. For instance, 
the trade deficit with the Pacific powers of Australia and New Zealand, 
the imposition of the PACER Plus free trade deal, the latent conditions 
linked to aid by donors and the challenges of climate change are just some 
of the ways in which PICs continue to remain ‘subservient’ in a hostile 
geopolitical environment. Domination is justified by stereotyping of 
subaltern communities and countries using negative imagery, a process 
referred to by Said as orientalism. Subconscious prejudices latently 
embedded in terms such as ‘arc of instability’, for instance, have 
reinforced perceptions of inferiority while justifying interventions as 
modern forms of civilising missions. The postcolonial discourse provides 
the methodological tools to illuminate these often hidden dimensions of 
power, exploitation and inequality, which are often overlooked by security 
theories such as realism, liberalism and even securitisation.
While the postcolonial discourse analyses and critiques existing modes of 
dominance and associated problems of marginalisation, it also opens up 
new windows for alternative narratives and new trajectories for the future. 
This is critical for understanding regional security where power differentials 
exist at various levels whereby two dominant countries like New Zealand 
and Australia occupy the top tier and Fiji and Papua New Guinea are at 
the second tier and others at the lower tiers. A related question is how to 
address this unequal power structure, economic disparity and associated 
stereotyping, as detailed in Chapter 3, to ensure that we have a more 
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egalitarian and just economic and political configuration for the region. 
This should be a critical question of our time since lack of equality, access 
and opportunities can pose a serious security challenge for the region.
While the postcolonial discourse provides a useful overarching approach 
that frames and analyses the historical and political economy of the 
region and individual states, there is still a gap in analysis in relation to 
individual perception and psychology. The securitisation theory fills this 
gap by focusing on the dynamic relationship between language, words 
and actions and the way they shape the security environment. Rather than 
just framing security in terms of direct threat, naming and thinking about 
a potential threat can be profoundly transformative. As we have seen in 
the case of Fiji, the use of the term ‘coup’ invokes collective anxiety and 
fear, and discussions of the riots in Tonga or the ‘tension’ in Solomon 
Islands ignite memories of the past and become sources of collective 
psychological threat.
In Fiji, the perception of inequality, economic deprivation of indigenous 
Fijians, threat of loss of land and power, and fear of being politically 
overwhelmed by Indo-Fijians gave rise to ethnonationalist sentiments, 
open conflict and regime change. Perception and framing of each other 
(indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians) as sources of threat as well as the 
use of racialised stereotypes such as jungali pagla (stupid Fijian bushman) 
or Kaidia lawakica (cunning and untrustworthy Indian) have securitised 
ethnic relations in a potentially explosive way. In the case of Tonga, behind 
the veneer of respect for the monarch, the use of the term temokalati 
(democracy) securitised the King and nobles as enemies of the people 
and dichotomised Tonga into two major competing political camps. 
In Solomon Islands, words such as ‘corruption’, ‘politicians’, ‘militants’ 
and ‘tension’ have become part of the vocabulary of security and, even in 
the ‘post-conflict’ era, continue to invoke consciousness of threat because 
of their association with the 1999–2003 civil conflict.
Generally, in the Pacific, although the threat of climate change may 
be real, the mental image of the threat and potential for even more 
destruction in the future has galvanised Pacific countries to engage in 
international lobbying and leadership, such as Fiji’s presidency of climate 
change process under COP23. For small island states in the Pacific, the 
perception of threat from stronger and more destructive cyclones, sinking 
of islands, droughts, sea erosion, loss of land, relocation and loss of culture 
and identity are all mental constructs articulated and realised through 
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language as a means of reification. These images are shared and collectively 
crystalised through social media, electronic networks and other forms 
of modern communication and, in the process, they contribute to the 
securitisation of the environment and everyday life.
While postcolonial theory is based on the study of inequality of power 
and exploitation, and securitisation focuses on the conceptualisation of 
threat through words, the human security approach adds the missing 
dimension of connectivity between different aspects of life and well-
being by defining social, political, economic and environmental issues 
as security-related by virtue of their impact on human well-being. The 
case studies demonstrate how various combinations of human security 
issues such as socioeconomic inequality, justice, competition for power, 
questionable governance, resources allocation and identity could lead to 
various stages of individual and group grievances, shimmering conflict 
and eventually open conflict. The volatile human security issues, which 
were common in all countries, have continued to worsen over the years.
The point I want to emphasise here is that the use of multiple prisms has 
the distinctive advantage of providing multiple dimensions to security 
that single narratives cannot provide. In a region and a world that are 
changing rapidly and where multiple transformational forces are at play, 
using multiple narratives is the appropriate way to go.
Colonial experience and security
A major theme that emerged from all three case studies was that most of 
the security issues were not only internally generated but also built on the 
issues of the past and replicated themselves over time until they exploded 
into open hostility. The political conflicts the countries experienced 
resulted from complex interactions between power relations, inequality 
in resource ownership and distribution, contestation and protection of 
identity and unfulfilled collective expectations. The competing players 
belonged to different ethnicities or classes who constructed cleavages and 
boundaries based on identities. The boundaries became not only social 
lines of identity demarcation but also security and battle lines. Most 
of these security issues had roots in the earlier colonial epoch and, in 
some cases, even the precolonial era. In Fiji and Solomon Islands, the 
process of colonial transformation encompassed a complex process of 
constructing a new imperial state system, resistance to the colonial policies 
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of pacification, introduction of the capitalist mode of production and the 
imposition of a coercive system of rule. These were to have long-lasting 
impacts on security in these societies.
Symbolic and functional role of ‘ethnicity’ 
in the conflicts
A significant feature of the three case studies is that, while the conflicts 
were different in relation to their causes, manifestations and impact, 
ethnicity had a role either as a marker of socioeconomic inequality or as 
a mobilising force. In Fiji one of the main axes of conflict was between an 
indigenous group (Taukei) and a dispora group (Indo-Fijians), whereas 
in Solomon Islands it was between two indigenous groups, although they 
were from separate islands and tribal affiliations. The conflict in Tonga 
was quite different in the sense that it was fundamentally between two 
antagonistic social classes. Moreover, the ethnic factor arose after the riots 
started when Chinese businesses were attacked, but these were ‘collatoral’ 
victims of the main conflict.
The ethnic components of the three case studies were connected to broader 
issues of socioeconomic disparity, identity, land and political power. 
Ethnic differences on their own do not automatically invoke conflict, 
but rather conflict is inspired by the way these differences are linked to 
socioeocomic inequality and competition for power. In the case of Fiji, the 
situation was characterised by the division of the economy along ethnic 
lines with Indo-Fijians controlling commerce and Taukei controlling the 
land and political power. Socioeconomic grievances by the Taukei after 
independence culminated in the 1987 conflict and coups, and since then 
the threat of military takeover has remained part of the country’s security 
narrative. Grievances over land and resources, socioeconomic inequality 
and lack of opportunities contributed to the intercommunal tension 
in Solomon Islands. In Tonga, the tension built up over years of pro-
democracy protests spilled over into street riots, and some rioters took 
advantage of the chaos to attack Chinese businesses that they had loathed 
for some time for taking away business from them. In all these cases of 
conflicts related to ethnicity, ethnic and political entrepreneurs played 
a critical role in mobilising people’s grivances for political ends.
257
7 . COnTESTEd FuTuRE
Responses to conflict
Because the conflicts in the three countries were unique in their own 
right, the responses to them were somewhat different, although there were 
some common features, such as the use of traditional means of conflict 
resolution at the community level. In Fiji, the role of the military was 
paramount in determining the trajectory of the political process towards 
democratic elections. This was not the case in Solomon Islands, where 
the security apparatus of the state was no longer operable and militants 
took over the security role of the state until the arrival of RAMSI. RAMSI 
provided some real security muscle to keep the warring militias at bay. 
In Tonga, they had to call for intervention by the Australian and New 
Zealand military to quell the situation. In all cases, restoration of stability 
became the precondition for democratic elections.
At the community level, a range of programs were organised by civil society 
organisations, churches and other community groups. One of the key 
factors that distinguished conflict in Fiji and Tonga from Solomon Islands 
was the fact that, in Solomon Islands, a ‘civil war’ situation between two 
militia groups representing two communities took place. Nevertheless, 
one of the common features of the three case studies is the use of multiple 
means of peace-building involving a range of stakeholders at the state and 
community levels.
The international community was more sympathetic to the Tonga and 
Solomon Islands situations than to Fiji. Australia, the United States 
and New Zealand imposed sanctions on Fiji and, furthermore, Fiji was 
suspended from the Pacific Island Forum and the Commonwealth. Instead 
of weakening Fiji, the sanctions forced Fiji to align itself more strongly 
with China as well as to build up a more independent and assertive foreign 
policy aimed at outflanking Australia and New Zealand and making it 
a minor regional power in its own right. The establishment of the Pacific 
Islands Development Forum to counter the Pacific Islands Forum, funded 
by Australia and New Zealand, was part of these geopolitical manoeuvres.
In all three cases of conflict, the ripples spread throughout the region and 
had different effects. In the case of Fiji, the PICs were initially sympathetic 
to Fiji after the 1987 and 2000 coups, but this was not so after the coup 
in 2006. The Pacific Islands Forum tried to send a team to engage with 
the military government, but Fiji did not take it seriously. The Forum 
resorted to suspension. In the case of Tonga, Australia and New Zealand, 
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the strongest powers in the region, intervened in the form of military 
assistance, whereas in the case of Solomon Islands, regional intervention 
was possible through RAMSI. These interventions show the increasingly 
regional nature of national conflicts and at the same time the impact of 
regional security narratives on national conflict resolution.
Security and regime change
In the case of Fiji and Solomon Islands, extralegal regime changes resulted 
from the conflicts while in Tonga there was potential for a similar situation 
to occur. Regime change through coups has been an unsavoury part of Fiji’s 
political evolution since 1987, where every coup was followed by a period 
of calm and then tension as prelude to another coup. In Solomon Islands, 
the coup in 2000 was part of the larger environment of instability at the 
time rather than an imitation of the Fiji coup earlier in the same year, as 
some journalists suggested. In Tonga, it was alleged by the government 
representative, Lopeti Senituli, that the November 2006 riots were aimed 
at staging a ‘coup’, but this did not eventuate.
In the context of the securitisation theory, regime change provides an 
extreme image of a scenario that must be avoided at all cost. It is associated 
with images of a collapsed society, anarchy, lawlessness and possible deaths. 
Although regime change may be ‘relatively’ peaceful as in the case of Fiji, 
the thought of a disintegrated, chaotic and lawless society is a  powerful 
psychological deterrent against the use of force as well as a strong incentive 
for peace-building and conflict resolution. Regime change is an extreme 
expression of what is possible when human security issues remain unchecked 
and neglected. Viewed through a postcolonial lens, regime change is seen 
as a consequence of tension that has its roots in the colonial order. Regime 
change, and the potential for it, have created new narratives of peace-
building in the three communities. As a securitised concept, it provides 
a psychological marker as a lesson for the future.
Level of violence
The level of violence experienced during the Fiji coups, Tongan riots and 
Solomon Islands conflict differed considerably. Except for the 2000 coup, 
when a failed mutiny led to several deaths, the coups in Fiji were relatively 
bloodless. While there were documented cases of torture and human 
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rights abuse, there was no civil unrest in terms of intercommunal violence 
of the type witnessed in Rwanda, Kosovo or even Solomon Islands. One 
of the reasons was that the coups focused largely on competition for state 
power by elites and the military, and tension was concentrated in the 
realm of state power. By and large, everyday ethnic relations remained 
stable, despite some cases of sporadic ethnic violence and intimidation.
This was also the case in Tonga, a very homogenous society. Conflict 
manifested itself much more vigorously at the realm of state institutions 
and power. Community relations remained strong amid the riots and 
burnings. Those who died in the riots were victims of the fire and not 
of violence. This was not the case in Solomon Islands, where violence 
revolved around the civil realm. The Malaitans and Guadalcanal 
communities were in direct confrontation through their respective militia 
forces and, as a result, hundreds of people were killed. The inability of the 
state to intervene provided the militia with the self-issued licence to kill, 
thus worsening the situation considerably.
The contested terrain
This multilayered approach to analysis of the three Pacific case studies 
testifies to the contested nature of security in the broader theoretical 
debate. Indeed the competing discourses on security that we examined 
in Chapter  2 show the diverse ways in which security is framed and 
articulated. These differences are not to be taken as a basis for creating 
a hierarchy of reliability of the different modes of framing offered, but 
as signalling the fact that different approaches have their own legitimate 
claims, based on their choice of explanatory variables and conceptual 
justifications. It is probably fair to say that there is no strictly ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’ way to frame security but rather that there are a range of alternative 
narratives one can choose from, given particular circumstances.
The debates on security are manifestations of the way in which we 
interpret the causes, dynamics and consequences of particular types of 
human behaviour deemed threatening to a particular group or to society 
as a whole. What is ‘threatening’ is often constructed in relation to the 
‘victim/perpetrator’ dichotomy, and interpretation of ‘threat’ depends 
very much on where one is located in the relationship as well as in the 
intellectual and ideological lenses of the beholder. For instance, while 
the  notion of ‘security as speech act’ espoused by the securitisation 
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discourse of the Copenhagen School has been seen as a breakthrough 
in terms of its ability to redefine the psychological aspect of threat, it 
has nonetheless been criticised by realists for being too incoherent and 
idealistic, and by postcolonial theorists for being Eurocentric. These 
criticisms have not stopped the expanding influence of securitisation and 
modern security thinking.
The ambiguity and confusion relating to defining security also emanates 
from this diversity. For instance, while some theories of security, such as 
human security, have a universalised thrust, others, like the concept of 
orientalism, are more contextual and are seen as appropriate in particular 
historical circumstances and in particular places. In addition, some 
theories (such as securitisation) are classified as formal theories of security 
whereas some concepts (such as orientalism), which clearly have deep 
security implications, are not seen as relevant to conventional security 
framing. This is where a more nuanced, critical and contextualised 
security approach is important in order to illuminate for us what is 
relevant without making superficial generalisations that are not applicable 
in many situations.
The limitations posed by some of the dominant security discourses such 
as realism, neo-realism and liberalism, among others, are due to their links 
to particular ideological and geocultural and technical lenses, which often 
have underpinning interests that exponents hope will serve them. Realism, 
for instance, was an influential narrative to justify the military build-up 
and arms race during the Cold War, while securitisation became a more 
nuanced way of not only redefining the diverse manifestation of security 
but also identifying the sociopsychological basis of the construction 
of security. Moreover, security theories should not be seen as strictly 
independent because, in some cases, there are common strands running 
through some theories, and there are also areas of overlap. For instance, 
one of the common threads linking securitisation theory and human 
security is a shift from identification of generic threats to a more nuanced 
construction of what constitutes threat, using more dispersed variables.
The increasing dominance of the human security agenda has not 
necessarily displaced realist and traditional ‘hard’ or state-centred security 
thinking. In many ways, rather than ‘shifting’ the paradigm, as claimed 
by the UNDP, it has simply absorbed state-centred security into its broad 
coverage and redefined it as just another random element in the universal 
basket of human security variables. The numerous criticisms of human 
security as lacking in coherence and focus have ignited further debates 
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about prioritising threats. US President Donald Trump’s disdain for ‘liberal’ 
issues and values, including his denial of aspects of human security such 
as climate change, environmental considerations, accountable democratic 
governance and ethical politics, poses a major threat to the global human 
security agenda. His attitude has effectively changed the global power 
configuration and security dynamics in a major way. To the securitisation 
school’s speech act approach, Trump is himself a security threat because 
almost everyone—the media, political analysts, world leaders, the general 
public—talks about him and defines him as such. This has redefined 
global security dynamics in unprecedented ways, especially when the US 
president, who is constitutionally the embodiment of US state identity 
and is to be protected and preserved, is now seen as a security threat to 
his own country through his alleged political and business dealings with 
Russia and his perceived lack of integrity.
The securitisation and human security approaches have their shortcomings 
in terms of providing a reliable framework for understanding the complex 
realities of ‘developing’ societies. With its focus on power, ideology, 
exploitation and the relationship between dominant and subaltern groups, 
the postcolonial theory tries to rectify these theoretical and analytical 
deficiencies. Although mainstream political science and international 
relations does not usually see the postcolonial discourse as a formal security 
discourse, it does provide a critical approach, which unearths some of the 
deeper issues of socioeconomic, cultural and political domination that 
threaten the well-being, identity and survival of subaltern societies.
Capturing diversity of narratives
The use of multiple approaches in this book, especially the postcolonial 
and human security lenses, to understand some of the dynamics in Pacific 
societies is an attempt to broaden the analytical paradigm to incorporate 
diverse perspectives in a highly diverse region. Contrary to dominant 
stereotypes about a homogeneous entity represented in such romantic 
notions as ‘Pacific identity’, ‘Pacific way’, ‘Pacific culture’ and ‘sea of 
islands’, or articulated in deficit terms such as ‘arc of instability’ or ‘failed 
states’, the case studies show that the three countries have very little in 
common in terms of sociopolitical security situations. Although they 
all shared a common ‘player’ in the form of the British colonial state, 
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the specific historical conditions that shaped the sociopolitical security 
contours in those countries over the years and that led to political upheaval 
were very different.
Fiji faced probably the most complex situation because of its multi-ethnic, 
multireligious and multicultural make-up. Tension was spawned over 
time by the dynamic and invariable interplay between multiple factors 
such as resource distribution, intra- and inter-ethnic competition over 
political power, an ethnically based parliamentary system under the first 
three constitutions, feelings of insecurity (real and perceived), the role of 
ethnic entrepreneurs in mobilising ethnonationalism, the politicisation 
of stereotypes and the military, the political role of the churches and the 
failure of the state and political leaders to respond effectively to grievances. 
Ethnicity was often considered the ‘primary’ factor, but behind the facade 
of genetics and culture were deeper political and economic interests that 
constantly constructed and manipulated ethnicity as mobilisation and 
justificatory leverage.
Tonga’s conflict does not involve ethnic diversity but intracommunal 
class inequality and associated contestation over power. Tonga’s hierarchy 
has three superimposed pyramidal structures, all headed by the King: the 
traditional chiefly structure of the Tu’i Kanokupolu and Tu’i Tonga lineage; 
the feudal structure modelled on the British system based on the three tiers 
of monarch, nobles and commoners; and the constitutional state system, 
centred on legal political authority and governance. The commoner-based 
pro-democracy movement has been fighting for democratisation and 
greater distribution of political rights. Other intersecting variables, such 
as economic inequality and corruption, fuelled and sparked the riot and 
arson in November 2006.
In the case of Solomon Islands, paternalistic, unequal and oppressive 
British development policies and labour policies that encouraged internal 
migration, land alienation and maldistribution of wealth and resources, 
nurtured grievances and exploded into open civil war. The conflict was 
contained by external regional intervention in the form of RAMSI and, 
with the recent termination of the mandate of the intervention forces and 
officials, the Solomon Islands Government has now resumed full control 
of the security of the country.
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Despite fundamental differences, a couple of strands seem to connect 
the three cases. First, they were at some point in their history associated 
with British colonial rule. Fiji was a Crown colony, Solomon Islands was 
a protectorate through the British colonial establishment in Fiji, while 
Tonga was an ‘independent’ protectorate or ‘protected state’. British 
influence had a significant bearing on the situations in both Fiji and 
Solomon Islands, especially in relation to socioeconomic development and 
the political power structure and dynamics, and the effects of these on the 
security of these countries were profound and long-lasting. While Tonga’s 
political elites had the tendency to mimic British royal symbolism, titles 
and idiosyncrasies, the actual impact of the British in terms of applied 
policies was minimal.
The second common thread was ethnicity, although its place in social 
life and political discourse was very different indeed in each case. In Fiji 
the two major ethnic groups competing for political power and resources 
were the indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians, a major diaspora group. In 
contrast, the Chinese, who were ‘collateral’ victims of both the Tongan 
and Solomon Islands conflicts, were not major political competitors 
against the local political elites. Their only ‘crime’ was their control of 
local retail businesses, which caused socioeconomic grievances that, over 
time, metamorphosed into political mobilisation. This was also true in the 
case of Fiji in respect of Indo-Fijians, where Indo-Fijian retail shops and 
businesses, which symbolised horizontal inequality, were targeted during 
the 2000 riots. However, in Fiji, Indo-Fijians were seen by the Taukei as 
both political and economic threats. The symbiotic relationship between 
socioeconomic class, ethnicity and politics manifested itself differently in 
the three different countries. These unique experiences are what this book 
attempts to capture.
However, it must be noted that these three factors were not part of an 
interrelated general trend in the Pacific but were, rather, unrelated 
developments that emanated from specific historical conditions. 
Nevertheless, it is also relevant to point out here that, as a result of 
globalisation, regional interactions and the adoption of a common 
development agenda, including such issues as free trade, there will 
increasingly be more shared security issues and challenges in the future. 
The capacity of the different PICs to deal with these challenges differs, 
and there will be an increasing tendency for both regional approaches and 
bilateral approaches to be taken, whereby bigger and more resourceful 
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PICs will need to provide assistance to small ones. The role of New 
Zealand and Australia, who themselves have entrenched interests, will 
become more critical in the future.
Rethinking security and empowerment
In a fast-changing and perilous world, perhaps the most critical question 
that we need to ask is: what are the most empowering and effective responses 
to security for Pacific peoples? The answer to this is not straightforward 
for several pertinent and often interrelated reasons.
First, it is not possible to generalise about the universality of various 
security issues around the Pacific because of the diverse sociocultural, 
historical and sociopolitical experiences and dynamics of the different 
communities. The much larger communities in the west are far more 
heterogeneous than the smaller and more homogeneous communities 
of the eastern Pacific. Conflict over resources, status and power pervades 
all communities, but they are manifested in quite different ways. Many 
of the larger and more resourceful Pacific communities, such as PNG, 
Fiji and Solomon Islands, face problems associated with commercial 
appropriation of land resources, while many of the small states do not face 
the same problems. The level of literacy, health, social support systems 
and other forms of social protection and associated challenges differ from 
country to country.
Second, the way security is defined and conceptualised internally by the 
communities can be at odds with the external definition formulated by 
others. For instance, land disputes between or within tribal groups in 
Fiji may be seen from the outside as security threats, but at the same 
time they are seen by the people involved as ironing out anomalies and 
correcting imbalances. While lack of luxurious living is usually associated 
with ‘poverty’, it is often seen by many villagers as humble, cultural 
living and being close to nature. In Kiribati and Tuvalu, one of the most 
challenging social and ideological hurdles for addressing climate change 
is the perception by ordinary villagers that climate change is part of the 
divine plan and that humans have no right to alter its course. The appeal 
to supernatural explanations, either in terms of the intent of the ancestors 
or the will of the Christian God, is often lauded as an explanation for 
natural disasters or human misdeeds. These beliefs may run counter 
to the externally introduced technical and political discourses by the 
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state, civil society organisations, regional institutions and international 
agencies. Changing perception is not easy, especially when it is rooted in 
religious beliefs that explain things in terms of divinity, immemoriality 
and primordiality.
In addition to these forces, the ways in which these threats manifest 
themselves and affect the communities differ, and the technical capacity 
of the local communities and the state to respond appropriately differs as 
well. Some countries, such as Fiji, are more economically advanced than 
others and are in a position to address some of the security issues more 
effectively than others.
Given these diverse challenges, addressing and mitigating the security 
issues in the Pacific needs careful thought and systematic approaches. 
As we have seen in the cases of Fiji, Tonga and Solomon Islands, political 
security is linked in complex ways to other human security issues relating 
to inequality, resource distribution, intergroup perception, feelings of 
powerlessness and state policies. This means that long-term approaches 
should encapsulate multiple strategies to address different aspects of 
security. The different stakeholders, including the state, civil society, 
faith-based organisations, the private sector and communities, should 
be involved in a broad collaborative engagement to identify individual 
security issues and propose ways of collectively addressing these. Because 
it affects everyone, security should involve a partnership in relation to 
conceptualisation, response and monitoring. Security partnerships should 
be inclusive, participatory and consensual:
The notion of security partnership in this context involves the 
participatory and mutually agreed process of sustained collective 
engagement between the state, civil society, private sector and 
citizens at large in identifying and critically examining security 
issues, framing responses to security dilemmas and establishing 
a collective and appropriate process which is sustainable in 
addressing old and new security challenges. (Ratuva, 2015a: 2)
As we have seen, one of the salient issues pertains to the contending 
conceptions of security and their various claims over the legitimate 
approach. Conversations between rival views and approaches are 
important  in creating a consensus. Competing approaches often create 
conditions for insecurity itself. The seemingly irreconcilable different 
schools of thought actually have certain things in common, such as the 
focus on humans and their well-being, yet these are often ignored in favour 
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of differences as a way of imposing intellectual and ideological superiority 
over one another. Identifying and popularising common strands can be 
a way forward in a security partnership approach.
In the Pacific, there should be broad partnership at the local, national 
and  regional levels. Different countries have different historical 
experiences, yet common threads bind them and, increasingly, they 
share similar security challenges. At the global level, the PICs have 
exerted themselves quite visibly in drawing the world’s attention to their 
plight. The presidents of Kiribati and Marshall Islands have been vocal 
internationally about climate change and associated human security issues, 
and Fiji’s convening of the UN Oceans Conference in New York in June 
2017 and chairing of COP25 in November 2017 have raised the level of 
articulation and campaigning for Pacific security for the future. There are 
indeed obstacles posed by powerful economic and political interests that 
need to be understood and addressed.
In a world marked by dramatic transformation and conflict, peace-
building increasingly becomes an important aspect of life. How secure 
we are depends very much on how we define security, respond to it and 
monitor its impact. Security should not be seen as the responsibility of 
a single group, a single country or a single region. It should be a global 
responsibility. After all, we are now connected globally, and the painful 
experience of one becomes a source of collective grief of others.
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